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On different wavelengths
By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 16 Oct, 2009 | 08:41 AM PST |
The recent attack on GHQ and yesterdays attacks in Lahore and Kohat and the governments response to these incidents reminded one of the days after the terrorist attack on Islamabads Marriott Hotel.
There were some in the government who referred to the incident as Pakistans 9/11. While that particular date in American history can be interpreted in several ways, its greatest significance lies in the fact that it brought the state and society in the US on the same page as far as fighting the war against terror was concerned. Did we manage to achieve this consensus on Sept 20 last year? Perhaps not.
But this is where the catch lies. The enemy is far more intelligent than what some of our television commentators would like us to believe. In the GHQ case, the terrorists not only understood the strategic value of attacking at the heart of the armys power base, they also appeared to understand the chasm between the state and society and within the state at several levels. The attackers understand the civilian-military divide better than a lot of people who talk about a new era of civilian-military relations in the country and boast about the two sides being on the same page.
They probably understand that the civilian government might pretend to be powerful but that it depends on externally borrowed power and that in the case of friction between the two centres of power, it is the civilians who would back off. This was most obvious from the fact that instead of raising some critical questions after the attack on GHQ, all that the president and prime minister could do was congratulate Gen Ashfaq Kayani on the excellent handling of the crisis.
There is no doubt that the nation is saddened by the death of unarmed officers and soldiers, and supports any action to punish those who carried out the attack. But the entire event ought to be discussed threadbare without any mudslinging. Why was it that 10 men penetrated a highly guarded area and remained ensconced in GHQ for about 19 hours, especially when the armys high command was in the premises?
There are two important issues here. First, the Pakistan Army, which is trained mainly in conventional warfare and fighting state forces, is not well trained in counter-insurgency operations. This explains why despite being armed with G3s and other types of infantry equipment the force guarding GHQ could not respond properly. Hence, this capacity must be beefed up at the earliest.
Second, the connection of the key planner Aqeel, alias Dr Usman, with the army medical stores is a reminder of the problem that could perhaps prevail in pockets inside the rest of the military. This pertains to the religio-political inclinations of individual civil and military officials and officers that directly or indirectly support the jihadis.
Aqeels is not a unique case. Earlier there was Major Haroon Ashiq alleged to be involved in the murder of Gen Faisal Alavi. He was linked with one of the Punjab-based militant outfits. His capture led the police and agencies to other retired officers who had split from the Lashkar-i-Taiba and were waging jihad on their own. We must also not forget the air force officials and officers involved in the first attack on the former president Gen Pervez Musharraf. Reportedly, the agencies were forced to go deep within the PAF in search of people connected to different militant outfits or the tableeghi jamaat.
At this point, how sure are we that all older links between the jihadis and individuals in the police or military have been snapped? Instead of eulogising the army, parliament should be carefully looking at and questioning the old linkages from the perspective of having a handle on the problem of jihadism and what it means for the state.
ISPR director general Maj-Gen Athar Abbas stated that the attackers had planned to use the hostages to negotiate the release of about 100 terrorists. Reportedly, there are about 400 terrorists in different jails. Some of the more high-profile detainees are believed to include Malik Ishaq, head of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and Qari Saifullah Akhtar, head of the Hizb-ul-Jihad Islami. The government must now look at its preparedness and the capacity to protect its high-value detainees.
Although the military and government now seem inclined to consider other reasons for the attack, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan trying to avenge Baitullah Mehsuds death, the rescue of high-value terrorists seems to be the primary reason, which must not be ignored at any cost. It must not be forgotten that the attack on the Sri Lankan team in Lahore was also meant to take hostages who could then be exchanged for top jihadis. Sources even claim that the LJs Malik Ishaq was involved in the earlier case and had decided to use the attack to get himself freed after the elected Punjab government failed to deliver on a mutual agreement between LJ and the PML-N leadership.
Whats equally interesting is the fact that there is an effort by those in power to ignore or divert attention from areas which are as infested with extremist militants as Fata and the tribal areas. The sudden effort to get policemen from most districts of south Punjab to deny the existence of the jihadi problem in their areas is a reaction similar to when the government denied the Pakistani connections of the Mumbai attackers even before investigating the matter. The denial is strange since most of the attacks in Punjab or the federal capital are believed to be provoked or carried out by Punjabis or Punjab-based militant outfits.
Perhaps the fear is that this might divert international attention towards Punjab or make ordinary Pakistanis think about the reasons why jihadis have spread terror across Pakistan and not confined themselves to the tribal areas as the authorities would like us to believe. Interestingly, even the ISPRs emphasis is that the attack might have involved Punjabis but that it was carried out at the behest of the Pakhtun Taliban.
It is indeed important to fight militants in Waziristan who are influenced by Al Qaeda, but why does it have to be at the cost of ignoring the Punjab-based outfits who are proving to be good hosts for the terrorist network? Sources believe that Al Qaeda has trickled into areas bordering Punjab. These outfits operate beyond the Pakhtun-inhabited tribal areas and their threat is evident from the sectarian killings in Dera Ismail Khan and other places.
There is a possibility that the civilian government might lose the initiative in an urge to appease the military and the latter might just lose the initiative to act against those that were part of the GHQ attack for unexplained strategic reasons. This raises the question of how much bloodshed would there be before strategic re-evaluation.
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd***********
DAWN.COM | Columnists | On different wavelengths
Copyright © 2009 - Dawn Media Group
By Ayesha Siddiqa
Friday, 16 Oct, 2009 | 08:41 AM PST |
The recent attack on GHQ and yesterdays attacks in Lahore and Kohat and the governments response to these incidents reminded one of the days after the terrorist attack on Islamabads Marriott Hotel.
There were some in the government who referred to the incident as Pakistans 9/11. While that particular date in American history can be interpreted in several ways, its greatest significance lies in the fact that it brought the state and society in the US on the same page as far as fighting the war against terror was concerned. Did we manage to achieve this consensus on Sept 20 last year? Perhaps not.
But this is where the catch lies. The enemy is far more intelligent than what some of our television commentators would like us to believe. In the GHQ case, the terrorists not only understood the strategic value of attacking at the heart of the armys power base, they also appeared to understand the chasm between the state and society and within the state at several levels. The attackers understand the civilian-military divide better than a lot of people who talk about a new era of civilian-military relations in the country and boast about the two sides being on the same page.
They probably understand that the civilian government might pretend to be powerful but that it depends on externally borrowed power and that in the case of friction between the two centres of power, it is the civilians who would back off. This was most obvious from the fact that instead of raising some critical questions after the attack on GHQ, all that the president and prime minister could do was congratulate Gen Ashfaq Kayani on the excellent handling of the crisis.
There is no doubt that the nation is saddened by the death of unarmed officers and soldiers, and supports any action to punish those who carried out the attack. But the entire event ought to be discussed threadbare without any mudslinging. Why was it that 10 men penetrated a highly guarded area and remained ensconced in GHQ for about 19 hours, especially when the armys high command was in the premises?
There are two important issues here. First, the Pakistan Army, which is trained mainly in conventional warfare and fighting state forces, is not well trained in counter-insurgency operations. This explains why despite being armed with G3s and other types of infantry equipment the force guarding GHQ could not respond properly. Hence, this capacity must be beefed up at the earliest.
Second, the connection of the key planner Aqeel, alias Dr Usman, with the army medical stores is a reminder of the problem that could perhaps prevail in pockets inside the rest of the military. This pertains to the religio-political inclinations of individual civil and military officials and officers that directly or indirectly support the jihadis.
Aqeels is not a unique case. Earlier there was Major Haroon Ashiq alleged to be involved in the murder of Gen Faisal Alavi. He was linked with one of the Punjab-based militant outfits. His capture led the police and agencies to other retired officers who had split from the Lashkar-i-Taiba and were waging jihad on their own. We must also not forget the air force officials and officers involved in the first attack on the former president Gen Pervez Musharraf. Reportedly, the agencies were forced to go deep within the PAF in search of people connected to different militant outfits or the tableeghi jamaat.
At this point, how sure are we that all older links between the jihadis and individuals in the police or military have been snapped? Instead of eulogising the army, parliament should be carefully looking at and questioning the old linkages from the perspective of having a handle on the problem of jihadism and what it means for the state.
ISPR director general Maj-Gen Athar Abbas stated that the attackers had planned to use the hostages to negotiate the release of about 100 terrorists. Reportedly, there are about 400 terrorists in different jails. Some of the more high-profile detainees are believed to include Malik Ishaq, head of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and Qari Saifullah Akhtar, head of the Hizb-ul-Jihad Islami. The government must now look at its preparedness and the capacity to protect its high-value detainees.
Although the military and government now seem inclined to consider other reasons for the attack, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan trying to avenge Baitullah Mehsuds death, the rescue of high-value terrorists seems to be the primary reason, which must not be ignored at any cost. It must not be forgotten that the attack on the Sri Lankan team in Lahore was also meant to take hostages who could then be exchanged for top jihadis. Sources even claim that the LJs Malik Ishaq was involved in the earlier case and had decided to use the attack to get himself freed after the elected Punjab government failed to deliver on a mutual agreement between LJ and the PML-N leadership.
Whats equally interesting is the fact that there is an effort by those in power to ignore or divert attention from areas which are as infested with extremist militants as Fata and the tribal areas. The sudden effort to get policemen from most districts of south Punjab to deny the existence of the jihadi problem in their areas is a reaction similar to when the government denied the Pakistani connections of the Mumbai attackers even before investigating the matter. The denial is strange since most of the attacks in Punjab or the federal capital are believed to be provoked or carried out by Punjabis or Punjab-based militant outfits.
Perhaps the fear is that this might divert international attention towards Punjab or make ordinary Pakistanis think about the reasons why jihadis have spread terror across Pakistan and not confined themselves to the tribal areas as the authorities would like us to believe. Interestingly, even the ISPRs emphasis is that the attack might have involved Punjabis but that it was carried out at the behest of the Pakhtun Taliban.
It is indeed important to fight militants in Waziristan who are influenced by Al Qaeda, but why does it have to be at the cost of ignoring the Punjab-based outfits who are proving to be good hosts for the terrorist network? Sources believe that Al Qaeda has trickled into areas bordering Punjab. These outfits operate beyond the Pakhtun-inhabited tribal areas and their threat is evident from the sectarian killings in Dera Ismail Khan and other places.
There is a possibility that the civilian government might lose the initiative in an urge to appease the military and the latter might just lose the initiative to act against those that were part of the GHQ attack for unexplained strategic reasons. This raises the question of how much bloodshed would there be before strategic re-evaluation.
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd***********
DAWN.COM | Columnists | On different wavelengths
Copyright © 2009 - Dawn Media Group
