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Obama’s Pakistan Successes - Newsweek

Nuke deal is not just about Uranium, we have deposits also of it. Nuke deal covers everything, new reactors to new technology for betterment of the infrastructure.
Very rightly said sir.But to add an important point to this I would say deals like this are not only for technology betterment and infrastructure.Such big deals always have a huge side impact which is quite important.In pakistans case it would be a stamped verification to the world that it is now a terrorist free nation.It would become a harbinger of a new positive image for pakistan and would increase is international stature.The mncs and other big companies which are now restricted across southern and south eastern pakistan only would be all over the country,they would have no doubts regarding doing business in pakistan which until now they have hesitated to do.So it is not only nuclear technology transfer,it would be a strong catalyst in growth and development of pakistan which I think is far more important thing for pakistan and pakistanis than the nuclear thing.
 
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"Taimikhan may be right about this unless Pakistan changes its stance on Israel. The Israeli lobby in Congress is always looking out for a way (excuse) to punish Pakistan."

So if I understand these thoughts correctly, America will-nevermind any possible nuclear deal- actually SANCTION Pakistan sometime in the undetermined future because of Pakistan's relations with Israel-or the absence therein?

Provide the link to this caucus with their complete list of members please? That'll permit us our resistance to them while they hold office and our vote against them in any elections before these yet-undeveloped sanctions take effect in the undetermined future. You're our first line of defense against such, truthseeker. Looking forward to that complete list.:agree:

"History repeats itself. It happened in the past, it will happen again."

That's not guaranteed This is a very weak and poorly constructed false analogy. The past does not always foretell the future nor with perfect accuracy when it does so. It might leave clues but only clues and they remain an uncertain predictive guide. If your absolutism is true, it is a certainty that we'll again wear only animal skin and wage war with sticks, clubs, and stones. Perhaps, but only a fool will hold his breath awaiting such.

"And with the current and future level of friendship of US & India happening, it would be very difficult for US to have some level of friendship. It will either be a very low level friendship with Pakistan, or none whatsoever."

And I suppose because America has enjoyed consistently strong relations with France it was therefore impossible to do the same with Germany? Because America enjoys consistently strong relations with S. Korea it is impossible to do the same with Japan? Because America has provided for the support and defense of Israel it's been impossible to possess friendly relations with Jordan, KSA, the G.C.C or Egypt? Because America has provided for the defense of Taiwan we've not seen the evolution of relations with the PRC despite disagreement on that specific issue?

You appear too unaware of history to evaluate the future based upon the past.

Thanks.:usflag:
 
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The past does not always foretell the future nor with perfect accuracy when it does so
i think the forumla throughout recent goes roughly like this;

america wants something

america tries to get it

if its not offered on a plate through bribes and other "incentives" america will trample over people to get it.

then america tells its population how virtuous they are - and they agree

then the doughnuts who fully agree come on places like an internet forum to justify their cognitive dissonance of supporting the continual death/suppression of thousands of people yet claiming to be virtuous at the same time.


repeat ad nauseum...you have modern day imperialism













:usa:
 
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usa is helping pakistan from long of time they provide money wepaons f etc to pakistan and what usa getback hate and terror attack on usa

usa and pakistan and china relation is very complex

usa need pakistan but pakistan need china

is usa policy suceesful or they are getting fail why usa is playing same card again and again

when has the pakistan state terror attacked the USA! - we understand your hatred towards us as it is coming out quite clearly in your innuendo!
 
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The game-changer

And, just possibly, down the road, a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement similar to that concluded with India; at least, that is what Christiane Fair, who in her earlier incarnation was a Pakistan-basher, has proposed.


What's with this Pakistani obsession with a nuclear deal? Seems like a severe case of the "me too" syndrome. No Pakistani, leader or otherwise has ever articulated clearly why they think they need a nuclear deal except to say ' India has been given one, so we should be offered it too". I don't recall any Pakistani ask for this deal before the U.S. concluded it with India. If generating electrical power was the main concern then surely it stands to reason that such a requirement existed even before India signed the deal. Pakistan's argument has been full of petulance like a child wanting something just because someone else has it.

Pakistan seriously needs to be clear if they actually need such a deal and can start firstly by saying goodbye to the Iranian pipeline. Be prepared to put existing plants under international safeguards. Sort out the financial implications of such a deal which are going to be huge. Building nuclear plants is not going to be cheap and the suppliers will only be interested if as they say 'you show them the money'. India is planning to invest $100 billion on new nuclear plants which was one of the primary reasons for getting such a deal.

Pakistan also needs to come up with a plan of how they would manage to get such a deal through the IAEA And the Nuclear Suppliers Group. What can you offer them for their co-operation? You cannot just go there claiming that you somehow feel entitled to such a deal and therefore should be given one. India was able to swing the votes because of the strength of its economy, the promise of future deals and by waving (discreetly) a very big stick of severe economic consequences to countries that were holding out (NZ, Ireland, Canada, Sweden). What's your big stick? Threatening by holding a gun to one's own head has its limitations as a negotiating ploy.

India also had George Bush who went out of his way and did some serious muscle flexing especially with China to get India the deal. Do you actually see Obama staying up all night like Bush did ? On behalf of Pakistan? What is Pakistan going to offer in return?

Finally, no one will risk a nuclear deal on a nation where terrorists have a free run. The idea of protecting some militants solely because they are not fighting the Pakistani state as of now has run its course. Sooner or later Pakistan has to make a decision. Whether it wants to join the international community as a proud responsible country which is willing to play by the book or whether it wants continue what it is doing now i.e. to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds.

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"Seems like a severe case of the "me too" syndrome".

Absolutely...at this board and among the rank and file elsewhere. So?

"If generating electrical power was the main concern then surely it stands to reason that such a requirement existed even before India signed the deal."

If rolling blackouts are any indication and they absolutely existed before the India-U.S. deal was concluded then, yes, the need might well exist. I might well make the case that the need exists in America too but that's irrelevant to this instance.

By C. CHRISTINE FAIR For the Wall Street Journal Feb. 10, 2010

"Pakistan terrifies the United States because it is a unique nexus of nuclear proliferation and Islamist militancy. But with success in Afghanistan elusive, Washington needs Islamabad more than ever, and vice versa. The two countries have never been able to achieve a durable relationship based on mutual trust. That could be fixed, however, if the U.S. were willing to consider a radical new approach: a policy centered on a conditions-based civilian nuclear deal.

Nuclear cooperation could deliver results where billions of dollars of American aid have failed. Pakistan has long benefited from Washington's largess—including more than $15 billion in aid and lucrative reimbursements since 9/11—while only marginally delivering on U.S. expectations. Islamabad has refused to work against the Afghan Taliban and homegrown terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, or provide Washington access to A.Q. Khan to verify that his nuclear black markets have been dismantled.

Pakistan has bristled at U.S. attempts to tie better behavior to security assistance, such as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation. That law provides for $7.5 billion in civilian aid. But it conditions unspecified amounts of security assistance on Pakistan's continued cooperation with Washington to dismantle nuclear supply networks such as Khan's. And it demands a sustained commitment to combat terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba.

More so than conventional weapons or large sums of cash, a conditions-based civilian nuclear deal may be able to diminish Pakistani fears of U.S. intentions while allowing Washington to leverage these gains for greater Pakistani cooperation on nuclear proliferation and terrorism. This deal would confer acceptance to Islamabad's nuclear weapon program and reward it for the improvements in nuclear security that it has made since 2002. In the long shadow of A.Q. Khan and continued uncertainty about the status of his networks, it is easy to forget that Pakistan has established a Strategic Plans Division that has done much to improve safety of the country's nuclear assets.

In exchange for fundamental recognition of its nuclear status and civilian assistance, Pakistan would have to meet two criteria. First, Pakistan would have to provide the kind of access and cooperation on nuclear suppliers' networks identified in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation. Second, Pakistan would have to demonstrate sustained and verifiable commitment in combating all terrorist groups on its soil, including those groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba that Pakistan often calls "freedom fighters" acting on behalf of Kashmir and India's Muslims.

Such a civilian nuclear deal could achieve the goals that Kerry-Lugar-Berman could not because it would offer Pakistan benefits that it actually values and which only the United States can meaningfully confer. Finding means of addressing these joint concerns is critical to U.S. international and regional interests. Pakistan currently operates on the assumption that its possession of nuclear weapons confers a degree of protection against American or Indian attempts to crack down on Pakistan's home-grown terror groups. Ample experience has shown that "jihad under the nuclear umbrella" is a reliable means to secure Islamabad's interests against a larger and more powerful set of adversaries.

In the future Pakistan is likely to become more reliant, not less, on nuclear-protected jihad to secure its interests. Pakistan's fears of India are chronic and are likely to deepen as India continues its ascent on the world stage. Despite India's past restraint, a militant attack in India remains one of the most likely precipitants of an Indo-Pakistan war. The specter of further nuclear proliferation to states or non-state actors remains a serious concern.

That's where a civilian nuclear deal between the U.S. and Pakistan could prove so important. The U.S. is currently limited in its ability to shore up Pakistan's confidence against India because Islamabad fears that Washington, perhaps working with India or Israel, seeks to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Fundamentally, Pakistan believes the U.S. rejects its status as a nuclear-armed state, whereas Washington has accepted and even supported the other two states that have acquired nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Israel and India. With a civilian nuclear deal, Washington can trade the nuclear acceptance Pakistan craves for the cooperation the U.S. needs.

A nuclear deal will not be an easy sale either in Washington or in Islamabad. Details of the India-U.S. deal are still being negotiated more than five years after the idea was initially floated. A deal with Islamabad will be even more protracted because of A.Q. Khan's activities and the clout of domestic lobbies in Washington. It is possible that even this deal may not provide Pakistan adequate incentives to eliminate terror groups or provide access to persons like A.Q. Khan.

Yet there is value in putting this on the table now. Ties between Washington and Islamabad have never been more strained, yet are critical to key interests of both states. Washington needs a plan that is as bold and as the challenges that Pakistan presents."


Ms. Fair is an assistant professor of South Asian political military affairs in the security studies program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.


Read carefully, if you will, and let me know what you see between the lines particularly related to this comment by you-

"Pakistan also needs to come up with a plan of how they would manage to get such a deal through the IAEA And the Nuclear Suppliers Group. What can you offer them for their co-operation?"

Thanks.:usflag:
 
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What's with this Pakistani obsession with a nuclear deal? Seems like a severe case of the "me too" syndrome. No Pakistani, leader or otherwise has ever articulated clearly why they think they need a nuclear deal except to say ' India has been given one, so we should be offered it too". I don't recall any Pakistani ask for this deal before the U.S. concluded it with India. If generating electrical power was the main concern then surely it stands to reason that such a requirement existed even before India signed the deal. Pakistan's argument has been full of petulance like a child wanting something just because someone else has it.
The reasons for obtaining NSG waivers are related to energy requirements, solidifying Nuclear State status as well as ensuring that Pakistan is not at a disadvantage with respect to India in terms of Indian using its NSG waiver to fuel its power reactors while utilizing its own fuel for weapons purposes.

There is a reason Pakistan has been blocking progress at the UN disarmament conference.

In terms of utilizing nuclear power for energy purposes, the requirement did indeed exist before India signed the nuclear deal, which is why Pakistan signed agreements with China on developing the Chasma nuclear complex before India signed the nuclear deal, and has been interested in expanding that complex from 3 to 6, and explore 1000 MW reactors to meet growing energy demand. The problem arises from the fact that China became part of the NSG after it signed the Chasma nuclear deals with Pakistan, so now China too is legally bound to follow NSG guidelines for any nuclear deals made after it joined the NSG.

This means that for Pakistan to implement is plans for utilizing nuclear power plants to alleviate parts of its power shortfall (plans conceived long before India obtained the nuclear deal) it must also obtain an NSG waiver.

The 'me too' mantra/rant is rather typical of Indians looking to belittle Pakistan instead of trying to understand (perhaps deliberately ignoring) the reasons behind the necessity for a NSG waiver for Pakistan, and is, needless to say, an inaccurate assessment.

As for why it took so long to approach the idea of a waiver - US sanctions and then the AQ Khan network scandal. Had it been merely an issue of sanctions Pakistan could have approached the NSG sooner for a waiver. However, the AQ Khan scandal meant that Pakistan had a lot of work to do in terms of dismantling the network and putting in place sophisticated safeguards to secure its nuclear infrastructure, and it took a long time before those systems and processes were in place, and even longer to convince the world of their strength (which could be argued to be an ongoing process).

That said, the Indo-US nuclear deal was not a sure shot either. India was lucky that it found a partner in Bush looking to enhance the Indo-US relationship and turn it into a strategic one. Most analysts were of the opinion that had India dragged negotiations for a few months and the democrats had taken power, the US legislature would not have approved the Indo-US nuclear deal given the strong anti-proliferation sentiment on the left. The approval of the deal provided Pakistan with the opportunity to start making its case on similar lines, now that it had made progress on nuclear safeguards.
Pakistan seriously needs to be clear if they actually need such a deal and can start firstly by saying goodbye to the Iranian pipeline.
Actually the US is offering to subsidize the construction of power infrastructure from the CAR's to Afghanistan and Pakistan (about 1000 MW) in exchange for Pakistan dropping the IP Pipeline.
Be prepared to put existing plants under international safeguards.
The Chasma nuclear complex and KANNUP are under IAEA safeguards.
Sort out the financial implications of such a deal which are going to be huge. Building nuclear plants is not going to be cheap and the suppliers will only be interested if as they say 'you show them the money'. India is planning to invest $100 billion on new nuclear plants which was one of the primary reasons for getting such a deal.
As mentioned above, Pakistan has already signed deals with China for help in constructing the Chashma complex (3 plants of 300 MW each), so the financial implications are well know given that we have already financed nuclear power plants. But continued purchase of Chinese technology is now contingent upon an NSG waiver similar to that obtained by India.

Pakistan also needs to come up with a plan of how they would manage to get such a deal through the IAEA And the Nuclear Suppliers Group. What can you offer them for their co-operation? You cannot just go there claiming that you somehow feel entitled to such a deal and therefore should be given one. India was able to swing the votes because of the strength of its economy, the promise of future deals and by waving (discreetly) a very big stick of severe economic consequences to countries that were holding out (NZ, Ireland, Canada, Sweden). What's your big stick? Threatening by holding a gun to one's own head has its limitations as a negotiating ploy.
India held no stick here - the only stick that mattered was that of the US. You flatter yourself that India was able to browbeat the smaller countries into giving India concessions, it was a US show the entire way. Had India that sort of clout, the Australians would not be still refusing to sell you Uranium.

But, yes, we do expect the NSG to issue a waiver to Pakistan based on the merits of Pakistan's case and the safeguards put in place, and not because of any 'stick' Pakistan has to wave, since I do not recall 'stick waving' as being a part of the NSG charter or what have you. So long as the safeguards are in place to the satisfaction of the NSG, double standards and discrimination should not be expected.
India also had George Bush who went out of his way and did some serious muscle flexing especially with China to get India the deal. Do you actually see Obama staying up all night like Bush did ? On behalf of Pakistan? What is Pakistan going to offer in return?
We have already sacrificed a lot in the WoT, and cooperation continues to increase. And what could be offered is potential nuclear trade, perhaps not as large as a billion people economy, but trade nonetheless. And if issues other than safeguards come into play, then lets admit that the process is discriminatory and applies double standards.
Finally, no one will risk a nuclear deal on a nation where terrorists have a free run. The idea of protecting some militants solely because they are not fighting the Pakistani state as of now has run its course. Sooner or later Pakistan has to make a decision. Whether it wants to join the international community as a proud responsible country which is willing to play by the book or whether it wants continue what it is doing now i.e. to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds.
An NSG waiver does not bind the NSG states into selling Pakistan technology, it merely frees the States into doing so. Pakistan already has an extensive nuclear infrastructure (both peaceful and weapons related) that is has managed to secure quite well despite the terrorist threat (which by the way is much diminished from last year). Pakistan has managed the purchase of nuclear power plants from China without issue and put them under IAEA safeguards, and given the tight economy, would likely go that route again were it given an NSG waiver, given favorable costs and familiarity with technology.

Most of the issues related to security and safeguards mentioned by you are issues of concern that Pakistan will have to address to the satisfaction of the NSG member states, but to do that there needs to be a dialog between the NSG and Pakistan and the initiation of a process that results in an NSG waiver for Pakistan. Anything other than that is double standards and discrimination.
 
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The tragedy is America is never mean when it comes to bestowing titles upon Pakistan in the shape of major non NATO ally and the front State against WOT, but when it comes to rewarding the same ally, it resorts to penny packets. Pakistan has been been acquiring American Arms and Ammo since the early 50s, but to the date, what facility or favour has been discharged by the Americans to have the same equipment produced or assembled locally with the exception of perhaps M-113 APCs. Compare this with the benefits Pakistan achieved while dealing with China, France and even Sweden. Basically the Americans like to have their cake, eat it and expect to get paid for enjoying it.
Any wonder some circles which matter resort to claims that "Americans are always there when they need us".
 
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By C. CHRISTINE FAIR For the Wall Street Journal Feb. 10, 2010

"Pakistan terrifies the United States because it is a unique nexus of nuclear proliferation and Islamist militancy. But with success in Afghanistan elusive, Washington needs Islamabad more than ever, and vice versa. The two countries have never been able to achieve a durable relationship based on mutual trust. That could be fixed, however, if the U.S. were willing to consider a radical new approach: a policy centered on a conditions-based civilian nuclear deal.

Nuclear cooperation could deliver results where billions of dollars of American aid have failed. Pakistan has long benefited from Washington's largess—including more than $15 billion in aid and lucrative reimbursements since 9/11—while only marginally delivering on U.S. expectations. Islamabad has refused to work against the Afghan Taliban and homegrown terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, or provide Washington access to A.Q. Khan to verify that his nuclear black markets have been dismantled.

Pakistan has bristled at U.S. attempts to tie better behavior to security assistance, such as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation. That law provides for $7.5 billion in civilian aid. But it conditions unspecified amounts of security assistance on Pakistan's continued cooperation with Washington to dismantle nuclear supply networks such as Khan's. And it demands a sustained commitment to combat terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba.

More so than conventional weapons or large sums of cash, a conditions-based civilian nuclear deal may be able to diminish Pakistani fears of U.S. intentions while allowing Washington to leverage these gains for greater Pakistani cooperation on nuclear proliferation and terrorism. This deal would confer acceptance to Islamabad's nuclear weapon program and reward it for the improvements in nuclear security that it has made since 2002. In the long shadow of A.Q. Khan and continued uncertainty about the status of his networks, it is easy to forget that Pakistan has established a Strategic Plans Division that has done much to improve safety of the country's nuclear assets.

In exchange for fundamental recognition of its nuclear status and civilian assistance, Pakistan would have to meet two criteria. First, Pakistan would have to provide the kind of access and cooperation on nuclear suppliers' networks identified in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation. Second, Pakistan would have to demonstrate sustained and verifiable commitment in combating all terrorist groups on its soil, including those groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba that Pakistan often calls "freedom fighters" acting on behalf of Kashmir and India's Muslims.

Such a civilian nuclear deal could achieve the goals that Kerry-Lugar-Berman could not because it would offer Pakistan benefits that it actually values and which only the United States can meaningfully confer. Finding means of addressing these joint concerns is critical to U.S. international and regional interests. Pakistan currently operates on the assumption that its possession of nuclear weapons confers a degree of protection against American or Indian attempts to crack down on Pakistan's home-grown terror groups. Ample experience has shown that "jihad under the nuclear umbrella" is a reliable means to secure Islamabad's interests against a larger and more powerful set of adversaries.

In the future Pakistan is likely to become more reliant, not less, on nuclear-protected jihad to secure its interests. Pakistan's fears of India are chronic and are likely to deepen as India continues its ascent on the world stage. Despite India's past restraint, a militant attack in India remains one of the most likely precipitants of an Indo-Pakistan war. The specter of further nuclear proliferation to states or non-state actors remains a serious concern.

That's where a civilian nuclear deal between the U.S. and Pakistan could prove so important. The U.S. is currently limited in its ability to shore up Pakistan's confidence against India because Islamabad fears that Washington, perhaps working with India or Israel, seeks to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Fundamentally, Pakistan believes the U.S. rejects its status as a nuclear-armed state, whereas Washington has accepted and even supported the other two states that have acquired nuclear weapons outside of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Israel and India. With a civilian nuclear deal, Washington can trade the nuclear acceptance Pakistan craves for the cooperation the U.S. needs.

A nuclear deal will not be an easy sale either in Washington or in Islamabad. Details of the India-U.S. deal are still being negotiated more than five years after the idea was initially floated. A deal with Islamabad will be even more protracted because of A.Q. Khan's activities and the clout of domestic lobbies in Washington. It is possible that even this deal may not provide Pakistan adequate incentives to eliminate terror groups or provide access to persons like A.Q. Khan.

Yet there is value in putting this on the table now. Ties between Washington and Islamabad have never been more strained, yet are critical to key interests of both states. Washington needs a plan that is as bold and as the challenges that Pakistan presents."


Ms. Fair is an assistant professor of South Asian political military affairs in the security studies program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.


Not debating the article, if this is what the Americans are thinking, I don't see US-Pakistan nuke deal.

A bit off topic, what is the status of Israeli nukes? Everyone know they are there, but has US actually acknowledged them?
 
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An NSG waiver does not bind the NSG states into selling Pakistan technology, it merely frees the States into doing so. Pakistan already has an extensive nuclear infrastructure (both peaceful and weapons related) that is has managed to secure quite well despite the terrorist threat (which by the way is much diminished from last year). Pakistan has managed the purchase of nuclear power plants from China without issue and put them under IAEA safeguards, and given the tight economy, would likely go that route again were it given an NSG waiver, given favorable costs and familiarity with technology.


Most of the issues related to security and safeguards mentioned by you are issues of concern that Pakistan will have to address to the satisfaction of the NSG member states, but to do that there needs to be a dialog between the NSG and Pakistan and the initiation of a process that results in an NSG waiver for Pakistan. Anything other than that is double standards and discrimination.


Double standards in the nuclear regime ? you are joking,right? The entire nuclear regime is based on the acceptance of multiple standards. I don't agree with it but that's how it is. Protesting that would get you nowhere.

Safeguards are not the only issue the NSG is going to concern itself with. If that were the case, India might have got a deal long ago. This decision is primarily political. Pakistan will have to offer something else other than a promise of stricter safeguards. The Pakistani nuclear programme doesn't have a lot of credibility on non proliferation issues. Most people don't buy the theory that A.Q.Khan acted independently. In any case the fact that he is a free man now does not inspire a lot of confidence in Pakistan's assertions.

India held no stick here - the only stick that mattered was that of the US. You flatter yourself that India was able to browbeat the smaller countries into giving India concessions, it was a US show the entire way. Had India that sort of clout, the Australians would not be still refusing to sell you Uranium.

I agree and have admitted that the U.S. did most of the heavy lifting. As for the "Indian stick", true it may have not been as big as the American one but the fact that you could point out the consequences of being shut out of the Indian economy certainly did not hurt. Ask the Canadian,Swedish and Australian prime ministers. All of them made a trip to India and spent a lot of time pointing out their final votes at the NSG. Don't worry about Australia, they will almost certainly reverse their position, most likely after their election.

yes, we do expect the NSG to issue a waiver to Pakistan based on the merits of Pakistan's case and the safeguards put in place, and not because of any 'stick' Pakistan has to wave, since I do not recall 'stick waving' as being a part of the NSG charter or what have you. So long as the safeguards are in place to the satisfaction of the NSG, double standards and discrimination should not be expected.

We have already sacrificed a lot in the WoT, and cooperation continues to increase. And what could be offered is potential nuclear trade, perhaps not as large as a billion people economy, but trade nonetheless. And if issues other than safeguards come into play, then lets admit that the process is discriminatory and applies double standards.


This is the "entitlement" attitude at work here. No body has to give you anything and walking around like the world owes you something is not going to get you anywhere. The WOT has been milked to death by Pakistan. You cannot ask for such major deals by offering nothing new in return.

Its not just about safeguards otherwise the Iranian issue would not exist. Any country could walk out after obtaining whatever they want. Its the nature of the regime and the level of trust that the international community has on you that are at work here. Pakistan unfortunately does not inspire much confidence on these counts.
 
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Double standards in the nuclear regime ? you are joking,right? The entire nuclear regime is based on the acceptance of multiple standards. I don't agree with it but that's how it is. Protesting that would get you nowhere.

Safeguards are not the only issue the NSG is going to concern itself with. If that were the case, India might have got a deal long ago. This decision is primarily political. Pakistan will have to offer something else other than a promise of stricter safeguards. The Pakistani nuclear programme doesn't have a lot of credibility on non proliferation issues. Most people don't buy the theory that A.Q.Khan acted independently. In any case the fact that he is a free man now does not inspire a lot of confidence in Pakistan's assertions.
Oh, but pointing out double standards is important, because even the NSG won't merely come out and accept that it is applying double standards, it'll hide behind excuses such as safeguards etc. and those excuses can be worn down through 'engagement and dialog' on a potential waiver.

The problem with blatant double standards and discrimination is that you then force the other party to utilize 'alternate means', and legitimize those means, to obtain what it wants. Alternate means, in nuclear trade, open the door to proliferation since little is accounted for as a result of most of the process being clandestine.

Since the whole point behind denial of technology by the NSG is 'proliferation', proliferation itself as a result of denial of technology can be used as an effective bargaining chip - plus the fact that Pakistan is already a nuclear state, so proliferation holds little meaning in our context.

India did not 'get the deal a long time ago' because the West still thought it could put the South Asian nuclear genie back in the bottle ala South Africa and Brazil. But once India was given the waiver, that ended any hopes of that particular goal being achieved.

As for assuring the NSG on security and safeguards, that is precisely what a dialog with the NSG on those issues, as part of a process to obtain a waiver, is supposed to do, as I pointed out.
I agree and have admitted that the U.S. did most of the heavy lifting. As for the "Indian stick", true it may have not been as big as the American one but the fact that you could point out the consequences of being shut out of the Indian economy certainly did not hurt. Ask the Canadian,Swedish and Australian prime ministers. All of them made a trip to India and spent a lot of time pointing out their final votes at the NSG. Don't worry about Australia, they will almost certainly reverse their position, most likely after their election.
India is not shutting any one out of its economy any time soon - you simply do not have the clout and impact to do so, and with the economies that do have significant interests with India, the embargo works both ways. But whether you believe that India can punch above its weight or not is subjective and you can choose to believe what you wish.
This is the "entitlement" attitude at work here. No body has to give you anything and walking around like the world owes you something is not going to get you anywhere. The WOT has been milked to death by Pakistan. You cannot ask for such major deals by offering nothing new in return.

Its not just about safeguards otherwise the Iranian issue would not exist. Any country could walk out after obtaining whatever they want. Its the nature of the regime and the level of trust that the international community has on you that are at work here. Pakistan unfortunately does not inspire much confidence on these counts.
What entitlement attitude? Is Pakistan asking the NSG to 'donate' nuclear technology to it? DO you even understand what the NSG waiver implies or are you in too much of a hurry to flame here to really pay attention?

The only thing the NSG waiver does is allow NSG States to trade with Pakistan in nuclear technology. They may choose not to, as the Australians have done on Uranium with India. It will be up to Pakistan to arrange the financing and the necessary bilateral agreements to actually take advantage of the NSG waiver.

There is no 'entitlement' in expecting equal treatment in a free market. Your argument in fact reflects a sense of 'entitlement' where you think that opportunities should only exist for the powerful and wealthy, and the rest should be openly discriminated against -that attitude, seen increasingly amongst Indians, is the problem, not one of expecting fairness and equality in dealing with others.

And you show little understanding of complex global proliferation issues by making sweeping and generalized comparisons and bringing in Iran - Iran is under pressure because it is an NPT signatory and is suspected of deliberately violating the treaty and attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. That is a completely different dynamic compared to India and Pakistan who are not NPT signatories and already possess nuclear weapons.
 
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"What entitlement attitude? Is Pakistan asking the NSG to 'donate' nuclear technology to it? DO you even understand what the NSG waiver implies or are you in too much of a hurry to flame here to really pay attention?"

Unnecessary. Angry. You seem to make a habit of name calling. If you believe that i lack understanding, don't bother responding to my posts. If i agreed with everything you said, i would let you know. Lets keep this civilised and not get into the business of issuing character and I.Q. certificates. There are plenty of others in this forum who you could do that with.

[I]As the Buddha once said, holding on to anger is like holding a hot piece of coal in your hands with the intention of throwing it at someone else; the one person guaranteed to get burnt is you. :no:[/I]



"And you show little understanding of complex global proliferation issues by making sweeping and generalized comparisons and bringing in Iran - Iran is under pressure because it is an NPT signatory and is suspected of deliberately violating the treaty and attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. That is a completely different dynamic compared to India and Pakistan who are not NPT signatories and already possess nuclear weapons."


If it were only that simple. You are now guilty of seeing this in simplistic terms. Under the NPT, Iran is actually allowed substantial access to nuclear technology which it has been denied because of trust issues. The present standoff is due to the Iranian response to the denial which may include attempted weaponisation. All i was saying is that the nature of the regime and the general attitude of the country concerned matters in the real world.
 
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