New Threat to Pakistan with India,s New K4 SLBM test next month

[gslv mk3]

@Secur

Yes,there maybe an analog of 'Area 51' in Pakistan,where top secret research on Gas Turbines are being done.Dude please...there is simply no expertise in these .

Much more experienced China had to reverse engineer a turbofan.And you think you developed it?

And JV one gave us critical experience in development of guidance,terrain mapping.Since our dear neighbours doesnt have a 'ramjet program' , we are far ahead.

And you aredeluding yourself again.I said PHASE II ( AD 1 & 2 ).would start by 2016.PDV & AAD would be ready by then.

 

[danger007]

Economically strong India is always threat to pakistan.... we need not necessarily fire a missile to bring down...

Am waiting for this baby Inducted Indian Navy...

 

[Secur]

@Secur

Yes,there maybe an analog of 'Area 51' in Pakistan,where top secret research on Gas Turbines are being done.Dude please...there is simply no expertise in these .

Much more experienced China had to reverse engineer a turbofan.And you think you developed it?

And JV one gave us critical experience in development of guidance,terrain mapping.Since our dear neighbours doesnt have a 'ramjet program' , we are far ahead.

And you aredeluding yourself again.I said PHASE II ( AD 1 & 2 ).would start by 2016.PDV & AAD would be ready by then.

Believe what you want to believe , mate . But the thing remains the same , the defense organization neither reveal their budget nor their progress . I said " maybe it was reverse engineered " but I myself would have no concrete evidence of that . Actually the TERCOM/DSMAC are operational again with the Babur cruise missile , there's no superiority there too . Since our dear neighbor just have a program and nothing operational out of it and we know her progress , so well agree to disagree

This is what you said , I am not deluding myself . Reports from DRDO point that it would at least take a decade before the system gets operational and more time when its gets deployed en masse .The Phase 1 gets completed this decade , the phase 2 work can begin in the meantime but of course it would take longer to test and deploy than first phase . You said yourself " Induction may happen this decade " so where am I wrong , I said the same . Pakistan has plenty of time to develop counter measures in the meantime .

ABM taking a decade or two more is pure speculation,DRDO plans starting phase II ( 5000 km clasx missile interceptors ) after completing phase 1 (With PDV) this decade.So,phase,one Induction may happen,this decade.

 

[bloo]

Well then you shouldn't have compared " simulated tests " to " real world " scenarios then . The long distance does help in tracking much earlier and gives a long time window to act , you cant deny that . There is no larger area to consider since a shield isn't supposed to protect every inch of a country but if the " zone " to be protected is large , so are that country's resources too . Gives you an advantage sure but complicates thing too , when dozens of missiles are being launched . Track for all you want , how many interceptors are there to bring them down , what are their costs and what is the effectiveness ? Even the world's best do not beyond 50% successful intercept probability after decades of R&D and billions poured in . Lets hear what do you bring on the table .

Its not about time going to war tomorrow but about the thinking that the adversary is sleeping in the meantime and will not develop counters to it and somehow the Indians have overcome/bypassed all limitations faced by the lagging anti missile technology .

Something that even Americans and The former Soviets and the current Russians aren't even sure about and you seem certain for some reason here , why is that ?

Well you talk as if you know a real world scenario where an actual interceptor failed to hit a BM, for all we know it can be exactly like the tests; of course if you would care to elaborate where the "simulated tests" are missing out that will be fine with me.
The long distance also means that the missile can originate from a large area and therefore would require even more systems and complicated logistics.
As for dozen missiles:
When dozen missiles are being launched the BMD will protect against some giving us enough time to strike back, whereas on Pakistan's side there won't be a counter attack at all, everything will be done for in 1 go.
As for how many interceptors:
I've already answered that, which is more than 1 for 1 warhead.
And come on how many nuclear warheads does pakistan have that cannot be compensated for a large number of convention p-charged based interceptors.
Where did you get that figure from? Please provide link to support your claim.
As for the whole world, the rest of the world has a number of enemies spread out across the globe and not localized with area smaller than yours.
Well the string of successes gives me the confidence to vouch for it.

Incase you know the size of the warhead itself only then it can diffrentiate between them,
In a real life scenario not a simulation you will never have this kind of information that you have in the simulations.
heck, The number of missilles and warheads , chaff , decoys, will be more than your tracking system can track, deffrentiate between.your sensors and tracking systems will be overwhelmed

Not necessarily, a constellation of 7 or more IR based satellites can differentiate between such targets and decoys.
The current SBIRS Low or STSS is being tested with BMs containing decoys.
You have a very chaotic view of the battlefield.
How many nuclear warheads does Pakistan have that cannot be compensated for equal or more number of conventional p-charge warheads?
Remember Pakistan is very close to India and smaller too so there won't be hugely varying trajectories for Pakistani BMs.
So sensors (satelites,radars) set in such a position will eventually come across it.
But as I said on my earlier post, MIRV and MaRVs usually are engaged after the Ballistic missile's apogee, while in a state of acquiring redirection targets.
They don't launch before reaching the peak apogee, they hurtle down for some time after the apogee, acquiring coordinates and then do their worst, during this period the BM is neither dodging nor segregating into its consecutive MIRVs.
During this time and before the apogee, boost phase detection by longer ranged radars and IR satellites is possible and specially so when it is a neighboring country.
As for engagement, higher altitude interceptors that reach right at the apogee of the target will do the job.

 

[Secur]

Well you talk as if you know a real world scenario where an actual interceptor failed to hit a BM, for all we know it can be exactly like the tests; of course if you would care to elaborate where the "simulated tests" are missing out that will be fine with me.
The long distance also means that the missile can originate from a large area and therefore would require even more systems and complicated logistics.
As for dozen missiles:
When dozen missiles are being launched the BMD will protect against some giving us enough time to strike back, whereas on Pakistan's side there won't be a counter attack at all, everything will be done for in 1 go.
As for how many interceptors:
I've already answered that, which is more than 1 for 1 warhead.
And come on how many nuclear warheads does pakistan have that cannot be compensated for a large number of convention p-charged based interceptors.
Where did you get that figure from? Please provide link to support your claim.
As for the whole world, the rest of the world has a number of enemies spread out across the globe and not localized with area smaller than yours.
Well the string of successes gives me the confidence to vouch for it.

No , we do not . But we do know that the simulated tests have a lot of variables which wont be known in real world are predetermined/selected , a luxury not available in reality . Here , you know where the missile originates from , what is its speed , where is it going to hit and what does it carry and that it doesn't have any counter measures , not at least from what I heard of Indian ABM system . Do you think you will know all this in an actual war scenario ?

How Effective Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense is Against Countermeasures? - Defense Update - Military Technology & Defense News

While the US administration openly stated confidence in its Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), research analysts from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) warn that such weapons may not be sufficient to protect from a deliberate attack launched by North Korea, since the current level of missile defense technology has not matured yet to the level enabling the defense systems to engage realistic-complex targets, or discriminate between real decoys and real warheads.

David Wright, co-director and senior scientist at UCS say it is likely that the US will face a ‘reactive enemy’ that will be able to develop and deploy decoys and other countermeasures to make it more difficult for U.S. defenses to defeat such missiles.“None of the intercept tests conducted so far of the U.S. ground-based or ship-based systems has included realistic countermeasures that you should expect in a real-world attack from North Korea.” Wright stressed, “The Pentagon still doesn’t know how to solve this problem… That’s why the large difference in technical sophistication between the U.S. and North Korea does not automatically tip the balance in favor of the U.S. in this challenge.”

“People frequently downplay the countermeasures issue, in part because it makes the problem so difficult. But unfortunately it is real.” Wright concludes, “The bottom line is that it makes no sense to add interceptors and/or an east-coast deployment site until the system has been shown to be effective against a real-world threat.”

History of Russia's Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) System (2002) | Union of Concerned Scientists

Despite the improvements, US military and intelligence reports say the Moscow system would still be relatively easy to defeat. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces told the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that although the Soviets had spent over 10 years and billions of dollars developing an ABM system, the United States could penetrate it with a small number of Minuteman ICBMs equipped with "highly effective chaff and decoys," he went on to say that, "if the Soviets should deploy more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new penetration aids as counters."2 The Department of Defense has said that the Soviet system is no more advanced than was the US Safeguard system, which was developed in the early 1970's, but deactivated as soon as it was deployed in 1975 because of its military ineffectiveness and high cost.3 A 1989 report on Soviet Military Power also concluded that "with only 100 interceptor missiles, the system can be saturated, and with only the single Pillbox radar at Pushkino providing support to these missiles, the system is highly vulnerable to suppression."

Main US anti-ballistic missile defence system appears to have less than a 50:50 chance of an interception - Hyperbola

The US Missile Defence Agency has admitted that its latest test of its anti-ballistic missile interceptor missile failed to strike its target. The test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defence System missile occured on 5 July. It involved launching a target “ballistic” missile from the Kwajelein Atoll launch site in the Pacific followed by the launch intereptor missile carrying an upgraded (Capability Enhancement 1) Exoatrmospheric Kill Vehicle from the Vandenberg Air Force base in California. Unfortunately the planned interception and destruction of the target missile failed to take place.

Now that should you give you more confidence , you can succeed every time like that since you set the " variables " and strike the target down , it isn't the same during the nuclear exchange . The whole world is focusing on a couple of relatively low tech enemies and even against that , it isn't confident but Indians are , that is what amazes me .

Pakistan has around 100-120 warheads ( ever increasing ) and hundreds of missiles ready to go " hot " in 15 minutes peacetime value ( estimation ) , the question is how many interceptors do you have , how much does one cost , what is their successful intercept probability and effectiveness ?

 

[Secur]

The Dangerous Delusion of Nuclear Missile Defense by George Simmons Roth

It is very difficult to shoot down an incoming missile warhead with an anti-ballistic missile. Ballistic missile warheads are very small (ours are typically about six feet long and eighteen inches wide at the base and rather resemble a large artillery shell) and travel 10 times faster than a rifle bullet (a typical ballistic missile warhead travels at about 15,000 mph). It is the equivalent of trying to shoot down a bullet with a bullet. In about seventeen tries since 1991, anti-ballistic missile interceptors (sometimes called ABMs) have successfully intercepted eight incoming missile warheads for a success rate of just under 50%. And this was under unrealistic conditions where the defenders knew everything there was to know about the "dummy" warhead's characteristics, trajectory, launch time, and no countermeasures were used by the offense!

Metallic chaff can be dispensed, blinding the radar. Some of the decoys could carry small active transponders (which can send out false radar echoes), further confusing the radars. Warheads can be coated with radar absorbing materials rending them invisible to radar. Also, special heat-absorbing aerosols can further confuse the infrared sensors. Even worse, the warheads can be jacketed in containers of refrigerated Freon, and so eliminate any heat signatures (which the Russians have done with their latest warheads). All of these counter-measures are relatively easy to implement2.

Warheads can also be made to maneuver, and do so in unpredictable ways. making interception practically impossible. This is not just a theory, for the Russians have such a missile right now, the SS-27 (or what the Russians call the Topol-M). This type of warhead is called a MARV (Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle), and while only the Russians have it now, other nations are likely to follow. Even these methods are by no means the limit of tricks the offense can use.

A single nuclear weapon detonated at a high altitude generates a huge, expanding envelope of ionizing radiation two-hundred miles across which will blind radar for more than three hours. During this period of radar blockage, enemy warheads can sail overhead undetected by any ABM defenders; radars are very vulnerable and can be easily destroyed in a pre-emptive attack. Nuclear weapons also cause an "E.M.P." effect (or Electro-Magnetic Pulse), which disables micro-electronic systems at long ranges.Nuclear warheads can also be salvage fused (rigged to detonate on impact) in case of collision with an interceptor .

Brief History of Ballistic Missile Defense and Current Programs in the United States - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The major technical problems that remain unresolved and eventually forced the cancellation of these ambitious plans are the same obstacles that have ruled out an effective ballistic missile defense for forty years. The basic problems are:

the ability of the enemy to overwhelm a system with offensive missiles; the questionable survivability of space-based weapons; the inability to discriminate among real warheads and hundreds of thousands of decoys; the problem of designing battle management, command, control and communications that could function in a nuclear war; and low confidence in the ability of the system to work perfectly the first and, perhaps, only time it is ever used.

@Alpha1 Something that might again interest you .

 

[Secur]

@AhaseebA

This perhaps ?

On 25 April 2012, the ISPR revealed more information about the missile. The missile weight is approximately 10,000 kg, slightly heavier than its predecessor and can carry a single 1000 kg warhead.[11] In addition, the Shaheen IA primarily contains sophisticated automated refueling and advanced stealth technology features that were not present in its previous version to avoid detections from radars. All three Shaheen missiles, Shaheen I, Shaheen 1A and Shaheen II are reportedly equipped with the latest PSAC (Post-Separation Attitude Correction) system. This is a unique feature which consists of small thrusters that can adjust the warhead trajectory for greater accuracy and evading anti-ballistic missile defence systems. The features of the missile could also serve as a testbed of features which could be implemented on the yet to be deployed Shaheen III.[12][13]

 

[gambit]

@gambit, can you explain how a missile possesses ability to avoid counter measurement. Please limit the discussion to anti-ship cruise missile of Brahmos type against counter measurements on a modern destroyer like a aegis destroyer like aleigh burke or a type 45 destroyer that has some stealth feature.

Am going to tread very carefully here...

Signals Intel (SIGINT) is extremely important on how to program a missile to recognize, avoid, or 'fight' thru countermeasures. SIGINT is tedious and boring. A misconception about SIGINT is that the target must be provoked into transmission or increased transmission from normal in order to gather information. Absolutely not true. Normal behaviors give us baseline data and information about the target and from this we can deduce what is extraordinary.

For example...

If a ship have both volume (left) and elevation (right) scans, we would see a pattern of EM activities over time. Those activities may or may not be symmetrical. One side of the ship but not the other. An aircraft carrier and an Aegis-type ship may have the same activities but different intensities. Since the carrier is more concerned with close distance air traffic controls, we would see volume and elevation radar scans and communication transmissions. The Aegis ship probably would have less communication transmissions and its radar activities would be more powerful for long distance monitoring. There might be a replenishment ship nearby and its EM activities would probably be limited to communication. If we put many ships together into a fleet, we would have a generalized idea of fleet EM behaviors of different fleet actions, such as launch/recovery of aircrafts, and night/day periods.

In short, before we can program an attacker to recognize extraordinary EM activities as countermeasures, we have to program it to recognize normal EM behaviors.

When we finally decided to classify as countermeasures those extraordinary EM behaviors, we can program the missiles its options and this is no less an intellectually and technically challenging task than SIGINT and classification.

For example...If the missile first detect normal EM fleet behaviors and home in on a target based upon its individual EM behavior -- aircraft carrier or Aegis cruiser -- then one second later the missile detect several extremely high EM activities that are out of statistical bounds of normal behaviors, the questions for options would involve:

- Fuel state
- Distance
- Closing speed

All three factors affect the decision making process. High closing speed mean the missile may not have enough time to maneuver (avoid) countermeasures and must fly through the countermeasures, temporarily blind at the same time. Low fuel limit maneuvering options and degree of maneuvers.

How easily and quickly your missile can be deceived by enemy countermeasures depends on the quality of your SIGINT. It does not mean you have to seek out enemy and potential enemy fleets to perform SIGINT. If you have an aircraft carrier, perform SIGINT on yourself to know how an aircraft carrier would produce certain EM behaviors. If you know how to produce chaff, perform SIGINT on your own chaff to know how chaff behaves. What is the missile's hardware memory size? The larger the memory capacity, the more the missile can be programmed to recognize diverse EM behaviors, from normal to extraordinary.

Your missile can have the best flight controls system and the most powerful propulsion on the market, but if it have poor knowledge on the many possible EM behaviors of targets, be it ships or tanks or air bases, it will fail every time it encounters countermeasures, even against the most rudimentary.

The question: ...how a missile possesses ability to avoid counter measurement... heavily depends on the human intelligence to recognize what is normal and what is extraordinary and translate that knowledge into machine language. The technical sophistication of that translation is another issue.

 

[bloo]

No , we do not . But we do know that the simulated tests have a lot of variables which wont be known in real world are predetermined/selected , a luxury not available in reality . Here , you know where the missile originates from , what is its speed , where is it going to hit and what does it carry and that it doesn't have any counter measures , not at least from what I heard of Indian ABM system . Do you think you will know all this in an actual war scenario ?



How Effective Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense is Against Countermeasures? - Defense Update - Military Technology & Defense News

While the US administration openly stated confidence in its Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), research analysts from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) warn that such weapons may not be sufficient to protect from a deliberate attack launched by North Korea, since the current level of missile defense technology has not matured yet to the level enabling the defense systems to engage realistic-complex targets, or discriminate between real decoys and real warheads.

David Wright, co-director and senior scientist at UCS say it is likely that the US will face a ‘reactive enemy’ that will be able to develop and deploy decoys and other countermeasures to make it more difficult for U.S. defenses to defeat such missiles.“None of the intercept tests conducted so far of the U.S. ground-based or ship-based systems has included realistic countermeasures that you should expect in a real-world attack from North Korea.” Wright stressed, “The Pentagon still doesn’t know how to solve this problem… That’s why the large difference in technical sophistication between the U.S. and North Korea does not automatically tip the balance in favor of the U.S. in this challenge.”

“People frequently downplay the countermeasures issue, in part because it makes the problem so difficult. But unfortunately it is real.” Wright concludes, “The bottom line is that it makes no sense to add interceptors and/or an east-coast deployment site until the system has been shown to be effective against a real-world threat.”

History of Russia's Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) System (2002) | Union of Concerned Scientists

Despite the improvements, US military and intelligence reports say the Moscow system would still be relatively easy to defeat. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces told the House Armed Services Committee in 1987 that although the Soviets had spent over 10 years and billions of dollars developing an ABM system, the United States could penetrate it with a small number of Minuteman ICBMs equipped with "highly effective chaff and decoys," he went on to say that, "if the Soviets should deploy more advanced or proliferated defenses we have new penetration aids as counters."2 The Department of Defense has said that the Soviet system is no more advanced than was the US Safeguard system, which was developed in the early 1970's, but deactivated as soon as it was deployed in 1975 because of its military ineffectiveness and high cost.3 A 1989 report on Soviet Military Power also concluded that "with only 100 interceptor missiles, the system can be saturated, and with only the single Pillbox radar at Pushkino providing support to these missiles, the system is highly vulnerable to suppression."

Main US anti-ballistic missile defence system appears to have less than a 50:50 chance of an interception - Hyperbola

The US Missile Defence Agency has admitted that its latest test of its anti-ballistic missile interceptor missile failed to strike its target. The test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defence System missile occured on 5 July. It involved launching a target “ballistic” missile from the Kwajelein Atoll launch site in the Pacific followed by the launch intereptor missile carrying an upgraded (Capability Enhancement 1) Exoatrmospheric Kill Vehicle from the Vandenberg Air Force base in California. Unfortunately the planned interception and destruction of the target missile failed to take place.

Now that should you give you more confidence , you can succeed every time like that since you set the " variables " and strike the target down , it isn't the same during the nuclear exchange . The whole world is focusing on a couple of relatively low tech enemies and even against that , it isn't confident but Indians are , that is what amazes me .

Pakistan has around 100-120 warheads ( ever increasing ) and hundreds of missiles ready to go " hot " in 15 minutes peacetime value ( estimation ) , the question is how many interceptors do you have , how much does one cost , what is their successful intercept probability and effectiveness ?

As I said before Pakistan is not a huge country, there will not be vast trajectories so yes we do know where it originated from.
Do you even read what I post?
Speed-It can be easily definable when it is painted in the radar or detected by the satellite.
All the high value targets will be protected by the BMD as stated by VK Saraswat.
As for what it carries-we don't know which is why every warhead will be dealt with equal vigor, read my first post for the link.
As for countermeasures, no we are not ready for it now, the only thing we can do right now is make high altitude interceptors which will kill the targets around the target missiles apogee so that they don't get the chance to deploy the countermeasures.


I don't know how the writer didn't consider the tests conducted via SBIRS, maybe he is seeing all of it as a whole.
The SBIRS Low which has now been absorbed by MDA into the STSS program is specifically designed to discriminate among decoys and warheads and it has had a string of successes including a minuteman test where, "First demonstration of track sensor generating multiple tracks for separating objects", was successful.
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/PS_SAC-D_Hearing.LTG_O'Reilly.25_MAY_2011.pdf
Northrop Grumman-Built STSS Demonstration Satellites Show 'Force Multiplier' Capability in Aegis Campaign Test NYSE:NOC

No its not perfect but yes, it is going there, in regards to decoys and other countermeasures.


You are comparing a NK-USA engagement to an Indo-Pak engagement, there is a hell of a lot of difference.
As for setting variables.
You don't know that. The 6th AAD test featured a manoeuvrable target which was successfully intercepted.
As for cost, it is not yet known but I doubt it will be more than a ballistic missile + nuke.
And money unlike Pakistan is the last thing India needs to worry about.

As for successful intercept probability and effectiveness.
There have been 8 tests the 4th was aborted coz the target missile deviated travelling only 27km, 5th was a failure and rest were all successes the 8th test had the BMD track 2 target missiles and engage them simultaneously.

 

[Basel]

You were talking about NCW capability Chinese have,I said India has tbe same-high resolution spy sats too.
And unlike Beidou,to make use of Chinese military communication sats,you should have your own ground,infra & secure data links.Do you have them,yet?
If not,its a pure speculation.And claims about ToT is vague.We never recieved any ToT in,our,missile / space program.

Pakistan have the infrastructure and now it has been upgraded, all our missiles specially cruise missile will use beidou.

 

[Chronos]

Pakistan have the infrastructure and now it has been upgraded, all our missiles specially cruise missile will use beidou.

This is off topic.

But I love your avatar.

And you are fairly polite in your posts as well. Keep going

Oh and keep of the Jingoistic Indian members here, they can drive you insane

Hopefully you get to meet sensible Indians like me

 

[Basel]

This is off topic.
But I love your avatar.
And you are fairly polite in your posts as well. Keep going

Thank you for your comments, I always try to be unbiased because it will help to see real picture and don't let one slip in dark side.

 

[Chronos]

Thank you for your comments, I always try to be unbiased because it will help to see real picture and don't let one slip in dark side.

I do hope that Indian and Pakistani armaments do go to waste. Hopefully, there will never be a war between us.

We both have grave internal challenges. India faces massive internal issues of it's own. Despite the rhetoric here, we can hop our politicians are wiser than that...

You know what, we are doomed.

 

[Basel]

I do hope that Indian and Pakistani armaments do go to waste. Hopefully, there will never be a war between us.
We both have grave internal challenges. India faces massive internal issues of it's own. Despite the rhetoric here, we can hop our politicians are wiser than that...
You know what, we are doomed.

I also hope that both countries can workout their differences peacefully and our resources are not wasted on armed build up.

After all once we were one country then why now we can workout to live peacefully, for example when a family extends some children got separated due to having their own families but they don't become rivals, same can seen in India - Pakistan scenario.

If both countries can workout their issues with justice then this region can become worlds most powerful region by all means.

 

[Jf Thunder]

BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD KILL ALL THEIR POLITICIANS, THEN ALL PROBLEMS WILL BE SOLVED