SBD-3
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Why are you trying to cloud the fact that who introduced Pakistan to religious extremism?
New political move to divide the power in Army
- Thread starter HAIDER
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FaujHistorian
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Two global entities.
1. Haram khor Saudi Mullahs
---- Turned Sunni Pakistanis into Mullah balls' sucking robots
2. Fork tongue Irani Ayatullahs
---- Turned Shia Pakistanis into Ayatullah balls' sucking robots
SBD-3
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What about Maulana Zia Ul Haq and his Afghan Jihad Adventure?
FaujHistorian
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SBD-3
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But then why Did we wage America's proxy war. And more importantly adopted it as our own as the US and USSR left the region.....
FaujHistorian
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You have Pakistani flags, and yet you talk like a foreigner Irani Ayatullah. Why?
Read some history about central Asian states and Russian bear.
Don't regurgitate your ignorance in public. Respect yourself.
Thank you
SBD-3
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Like i said before, criticizing the national policies doesn't make me anti-national. If whatever I said is not true then please by all means, feel free to correct me that such things never happened. However, resorting to emotional appeals and judging other's patriotism doesn't make your point stronger.
FaujHistorian
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Criticism without proper study of history and geography is counterproductive to nth degree.
SBD-3
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I am sorry but what is the "history" you're referring to?
FaujHistorian
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the history that you need to study.
the history of central asian states and Russia.
the history of Afghanistan.
Without this study, you will end up (even when you didn't mean it) spreading ignorance.
peace
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Opinion
The higher command
Ikram Sehgal
Saturday, December 07, 2013
We need services’ integration, and we need it now. We also need to remove some anomalies that tend to slur the army’s image unnecessary. Current military minds than mine can work out the modalities of making the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) effective.
The government must remove the anomaly that makes the COAS position much stronger than his superior in rank, the chairman JCSC. Not for political purposes but for professional military reasons! One does not grudge them their task of taking apart the 19th-century military mindset and putting it out to pasture. This has no place in the 21st century, certainly not after World War II.
For whatever reasons, Kayani lacked the self-confidence to vacate the powerful but junior COAS chair and take the calculated risk of being sidelined as chairman JCSC. He thereby failed to use his dominant personality and influence to effect the changes that require an integrated higher defence command instead of the lip-service that it is now.
Instead Kayani opted to serve under his junior (Gen Khalid Shameem Wyne, previously Kayani’s CGS and a good professional soldier but who was almost never heard of or heard from again as chairman JCSC) for a second three-year term as COAS. With the advent of other aspects of modern warfare, including nuclear capability and the missiles to go with it, cyber security and its ramifications etc, what we have today are separate fiefdoms with the related additional overheads on a multiple track instead of an integrated command structure.
The ultimate irony is that all this is in Gen Kayani’s initiative for the evolution of a new doctrine to counter India’s ‘Cold Start doctrine’; and proactive strategy is based on coordination and command by a higher defence organisation. India seeks to change the traditional model of war-waging from ‘mobilisation and then going to war’ to ‘going to war/attacking and then mobilising’.
The new doctrine seeks to counter the way India may mobilise its forces and fight the future war in order to achieve its politico-military objectives through a process of refining the existing concepts and developing new approaches to fighting a war (and all this while fighting an extensive but successful counter-insurgency). Gen Kayani vigorously pushed this new doctrine culminating in a series of war games and field exercises at corps, command and army levels since 2009 – namely the Azm-e-Nau Series. Was this to be in theory only?
All this was done with the objective of: (1) validating, consolidating and implementing our fighting concept(s) leading to refinement of different combat support and service support concepts to include logistics, interdiction, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, etc: (2) increased integration between the three services; (3) intrinsic training of formations as per the assigned roles, despite the army’s extensive commitment on the western borders; (4) the development of logistic infrastructure to support operations and relocation of forces; (6) efficient and responsive system of mobilisation of reservists; and (7) incorporation of available resources in civil sector for movement and deployment of forces. More than anything the Azm-e-Nau Series confirmed the need for an integrated higher command.
The Pakistani nuclear command and control setup presently consists of the National Command Authority, consisting of the country's ten highest decision makers; the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is the secretariat to the NCA and is in charge of developing and managing Pakistan's nuclear capability in all dimensions; and the Army Strategic Forces Command (SFC) responsible for planning and control as well as operational directives for nuclear weapons deployment and use.
With all strategic air defences under the SFC, the army, navy and air force retain their inherent tactical air defences, including the PAF's missile command and the navy’s strategic command, under a unified command and control mechanism under the JCSC. The SFC is tasked to command all of Pakistan's land-based strategic forces as well land-based space operations (such as military satellites), information operations (such as information warfare), missile defence, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and strategic deterrence and combating weapons of mass destruction.
Almost equal in numbers to the navy and the air force, the SPD has done a magnificent job under Lt-Gen (retd) Kidwai. The ASFC and SPD must be integrated into a separate service called the Strategic Forces (SF) as an additional service to the other three services. The four-star appointment for the SF can be from the army, navy or air force.
Constructive reforms should include: (1) making the Strategic Forces (SF) into a separate service; (2) the JCSC becoming the GHQ – with a joint operations chief (JOC) for all four services instead of what it really is, an ‘Army HQ’; (3) the chairman JCSC should preside over all senior promotions, from one star to three stars in all four services; (4) all postings of three stars must be by the service concerned but with the concurrence of the JCSC; (5) all military procurement must be standardised under the JCSC’s aegis; (6) the JCSC should formulate overall war plans incorporating the combined fighting potential of all the services, and the mechanism for implementing the war plans; and (7) for saving in duplication of overheads, all things basic must be unified, like those already being done – eg, medical and engineering services. What about standardisation of small arms, vehicles, the myriad types of which defy adequate description?
The other issue one has with Kayani (and all his predecessors) is to eliminate the major cause of the army’s bad image by terminating the policy of doling out plots to officers on a graded scale with rise in rank. Every serviceman should certainly be given a house on retirement (according to scale) commensurate to his rank without having to pay anything more than what has been deducted compulsorily during his service; the balance should be a one-time grant. To pay the balance the officers are forced to commute their pensions.
Lt-Cols and above have the advantage of selling their allotted plots and paying for the allotted house but 85 percent are mostly majors, who have to take loans post retirement because even their commuted pension is not enough to pay the balance due. Most majors (and equivalent) being between 45-50 years old have to look for jobs to supplement their commuted pension. The special allocation for martyrs and bravery in action must continue. You serve your country and you deserve a roof over your head, but why the need for many more roofs over your head? There is a lot of resentment prevailing, not only among the civilian populace, but among a majority of the army itself.
To quote my article, ‘Chairman JCSC’ (November 8, 1997), “Those who have the country's best interest at heart will always have the courage to enact change. That is the essence of leadership, the ability to be a non-conformist in the face of routine, particularly when the stakes are high.” Is the exercise of personal power more important for an individual or making sure that the country gets the best defence?
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: ikram.sehgal@wpplsms.com
The higher command
Ikram Sehgal
Saturday, December 07, 2013
We need services’ integration, and we need it now. We also need to remove some anomalies that tend to slur the army’s image unnecessary. Current military minds than mine can work out the modalities of making the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) effective.
The government must remove the anomaly that makes the COAS position much stronger than his superior in rank, the chairman JCSC. Not for political purposes but for professional military reasons! One does not grudge them their task of taking apart the 19th-century military mindset and putting it out to pasture. This has no place in the 21st century, certainly not after World War II.
For whatever reasons, Kayani lacked the self-confidence to vacate the powerful but junior COAS chair and take the calculated risk of being sidelined as chairman JCSC. He thereby failed to use his dominant personality and influence to effect the changes that require an integrated higher defence command instead of the lip-service that it is now.
Instead Kayani opted to serve under his junior (Gen Khalid Shameem Wyne, previously Kayani’s CGS and a good professional soldier but who was almost never heard of or heard from again as chairman JCSC) for a second three-year term as COAS. With the advent of other aspects of modern warfare, including nuclear capability and the missiles to go with it, cyber security and its ramifications etc, what we have today are separate fiefdoms with the related additional overheads on a multiple track instead of an integrated command structure.
The ultimate irony is that all this is in Gen Kayani’s initiative for the evolution of a new doctrine to counter India’s ‘Cold Start doctrine’; and proactive strategy is based on coordination and command by a higher defence organisation. India seeks to change the traditional model of war-waging from ‘mobilisation and then going to war’ to ‘going to war/attacking and then mobilising’.
The new doctrine seeks to counter the way India may mobilise its forces and fight the future war in order to achieve its politico-military objectives through a process of refining the existing concepts and developing new approaches to fighting a war (and all this while fighting an extensive but successful counter-insurgency). Gen Kayani vigorously pushed this new doctrine culminating in a series of war games and field exercises at corps, command and army levels since 2009 – namely the Azm-e-Nau Series. Was this to be in theory only?
All this was done with the objective of: (1) validating, consolidating and implementing our fighting concept(s) leading to refinement of different combat support and service support concepts to include logistics, interdiction, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, etc: (2) increased integration between the three services; (3) intrinsic training of formations as per the assigned roles, despite the army’s extensive commitment on the western borders; (4) the development of logistic infrastructure to support operations and relocation of forces; (6) efficient and responsive system of mobilisation of reservists; and (7) incorporation of available resources in civil sector for movement and deployment of forces. More than anything the Azm-e-Nau Series confirmed the need for an integrated higher command.
The Pakistani nuclear command and control setup presently consists of the National Command Authority, consisting of the country's ten highest decision makers; the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is the secretariat to the NCA and is in charge of developing and managing Pakistan's nuclear capability in all dimensions; and the Army Strategic Forces Command (SFC) responsible for planning and control as well as operational directives for nuclear weapons deployment and use.
With all strategic air defences under the SFC, the army, navy and air force retain their inherent tactical air defences, including the PAF's missile command and the navy’s strategic command, under a unified command and control mechanism under the JCSC. The SFC is tasked to command all of Pakistan's land-based strategic forces as well land-based space operations (such as military satellites), information operations (such as information warfare), missile defence, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and strategic deterrence and combating weapons of mass destruction.
Almost equal in numbers to the navy and the air force, the SPD has done a magnificent job under Lt-Gen (retd) Kidwai. The ASFC and SPD must be integrated into a separate service called the Strategic Forces (SF) as an additional service to the other three services. The four-star appointment for the SF can be from the army, navy or air force.
Constructive reforms should include: (1) making the Strategic Forces (SF) into a separate service; (2) the JCSC becoming the GHQ – with a joint operations chief (JOC) for all four services instead of what it really is, an ‘Army HQ’; (3) the chairman JCSC should preside over all senior promotions, from one star to three stars in all four services; (4) all postings of three stars must be by the service concerned but with the concurrence of the JCSC; (5) all military procurement must be standardised under the JCSC’s aegis; (6) the JCSC should formulate overall war plans incorporating the combined fighting potential of all the services, and the mechanism for implementing the war plans; and (7) for saving in duplication of overheads, all things basic must be unified, like those already being done – eg, medical and engineering services. What about standardisation of small arms, vehicles, the myriad types of which defy adequate description?
The other issue one has with Kayani (and all his predecessors) is to eliminate the major cause of the army’s bad image by terminating the policy of doling out plots to officers on a graded scale with rise in rank. Every serviceman should certainly be given a house on retirement (according to scale) commensurate to his rank without having to pay anything more than what has been deducted compulsorily during his service; the balance should be a one-time grant. To pay the balance the officers are forced to commute their pensions.
Lt-Cols and above have the advantage of selling their allotted plots and paying for the allotted house but 85 percent are mostly majors, who have to take loans post retirement because even their commuted pension is not enough to pay the balance due. Most majors (and equivalent) being between 45-50 years old have to look for jobs to supplement their commuted pension. The special allocation for martyrs and bravery in action must continue. You serve your country and you deserve a roof over your head, but why the need for many more roofs over your head? There is a lot of resentment prevailing, not only among the civilian populace, but among a majority of the army itself.
To quote my article, ‘Chairman JCSC’ (November 8, 1997), “Those who have the country's best interest at heart will always have the courage to enact change. That is the essence of leadership, the ability to be a non-conformist in the face of routine, particularly when the stakes are high.” Is the exercise of personal power more important for an individual or making sure that the country gets the best defence?
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: ikram.sehgal@wpplsms.com
hasnain dear brother,
The most dangerous scenario in the world is that of a two front war.It is almost impossible to handle it,Nazi Germany failed when it took on western europe and the soviets at the same time .The soviets and indians were both responsible for dhaka fall as both were allied and pakistan would have been broken again if the soviets werent countered.The so called proxy war was in the interest of pakistan
bc040400065
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Sorry no need to divide the army in two, just because nawaz feels safe in that scenario, but we have to see our country's interest not that of nawaz. We need to unify our 3 services rather than dividing them more in to regional forces.
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