Abstract: India’s first domestically developed fighter aircraft Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) featuring fourth generation technologies has come in for criticism for both cost escalation and time slippage. The supersonic light weight Tejas fighter was, not long ago, written off as a failure. And now India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has picked holes in the overall performance of this combat aircraft meant to replace the ageing Mig-21 fighters in service with the Indian Air Force (IAF).Despite all these negative features, the development of Tejas from scratch was a commendable achievement.
India’s home grown, fourth generation supersonic fighter aircraft, Tejas LCA, right since its inception has remained the target of criticism from a variety of sources. The most recent censure of Tejas has come from India’s public audit watch dog, Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). In a critical analysis of the national security preparedness in terms of air defence, the CAG has come down heavily on the Tejas fighter as it stands now. According to CAG, the limited capability of Tejas makes it difficult for the fighter to penetrate the enemy lines effectively. In the opinion of the CAG, Tejas does not meet the operational requirements of IAF which is already hamstrung by the problem of squadron depletion. A look back at the saga of Tejas reveals that way back in 1985, IAF had issued Air Staff Requirement (ASR) for a light weight multi role fighter aircraft as a replacement to the ageing and obsolete Mig-21 fighter jets forming a part of the front line combat aircraft formation. At that point of time, IAF was both keen and optimistic that such a domestically developed fighter could be inducted into services by mid-1990s.
Production efficeincy needs to be ramped up by HAL for the manufacture of TEJAS
Giving details, the CAG report reveals that “The Mark 1 version of Tejas LCA does not meet the ASR. The deficiencies are now expected to be met in LCA MKII expected to be ready by Dec.2018. The MKII version of the fighter taken up for development in 2009 is expected to address many of the shortcomings noted in the Mark 1 version of the fighter that includes increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, pilot protection from the front and reduced speed.” Highlighting major deficiencies in the fighter aircraft Tejas Mark 1, being show cased as a shining symbol of India’s mastery of state of the art aeronautical technology, CAG has pointed out to the “53 significant shortfalls” in meeting ASR. In particular, it observes that the poor performance of the three electronic warfare suites developed by Indian agencies could be a major handicap in so far as the capability of Tejas to penetrate enemy lines is concerned.
CAG has observed that the counter measure dispensing system meant to protect the fighter against radar and heat seeking missiles, could not perform as per expectations. The poor defence mechanism of the Tejas cannot but be a matter of concern for IAF. “LCA Mark-1 remains deficient in full electronic warfare capabilities as specified in ASR,” said the CAG report. The fighter which received initial operational clearance in Dec.2013 is due for final operational clearance by either Dec.2015 or early 2016.
The Naval version of Tejas taking off during a trial run
CAG has also questioned the claims on the quantum of indigenous contents in Tejas by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) whose constituent Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) was the focal point for the design and development of this fighter aircraft. According to the CAG, against the claim of 70% indigenous content in the aircraft by ADA, “it actually worked to 35% as of January this year”. Going ahead, the CAG noted that systems such as the Kaveri engine, Multi-Mode Radar (MMR), Radome, multi-functional display system and flight control system actuators taken up for indigenous development could not be realized resulting in LCA’s dependence on the import of these systems.
DRDO's counter measure dispensing unit
The CAG has also picked up holes in the performance of Tejas by pointing out to the deficiencies in two vital air defence systems of the fighter. As observed, the self-protection jammer meant to block the radar system of the adversaries that was to go into LCA Tejas MK I was too bulky to be incorporated into the aircraft. This has been compounded by the poor performance of the radar warning receiver that alerts pilots on hostile enemy signals. Both these systems were developed by the Bangalore based Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) that functions under DRDO.
Graphical concept of Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA)
Certainly Tejas MKI will have limited utility on account of its power plant that is capable of generating a thrust of less than 100-kN. As such, the thrust is on the up-gradation of the fighter into Mk II category. The Mk II version of Tejas will have many advanced features including a new flight control computer, upgraded avionics, retractable in-flight refueling on-board oxygen generation, an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, new electronic warfare suite and the ability to reach supersonic velocity in level flight. The follow on Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a fifth generation stealth fighter in the 20-tonne class taken up for development by ADA has many advanced features including a very small radar cross section, serpentine shaped air intakes, internal weapons bay and the use of composites. This single seat fighter with thrust vectoring features for attaining super cruise capabilities is expected to be ready by 2025.
The inordinate delay in LCA Tejas development schedule had forced IAF to go in for alternative temporary measures such as upgrading its Mig BIS, Mig-29, Jaguar and Mirage aircraft to overcome squadron depletion. The LCA Tejas project was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs. 560-crore. The cost had eventually gone up to Rs.10397-crore. The CAG has also expressed concern over the poor capability of HAL to produce the Tejas fighter aircraft at a rate required by IAF.
As it is, not long back critics had dismissed Tejas as a “dream gone sour”. But then to describe Tejas as a “flop and failure” would be very uncharitable. Notwithstanding “shortcomings and deficiencies” Tejas stands out as a bold attempt by India to develop a state of the art fighter literally from scratch. Clearly and apparently, challenges involved in developing a frontline combat aircraft is enormous. Realizing a fighter jet calls for imaginative exploitation of human talent, research and testing facilities and industrial infrastructure. Against this backdrop, the Tejas project despite its “cost overrun and slippages” stands out as a symbol of India’s quest for self-reliance in the critical area of fighter aircraft technology. In India’s case, Tejas building was a learning experience and the testing and integration of the components and subsystems into the fighting platform was in itself a sort of achievement.
More importantly, expertise acquired and infrastructure built during the process of developing the Tejas fighter could serve as a robust platform to build advanced futuristic combat aircraft. Reports suggest that the import lobby had worked overtime to scuttle the Tejas project. Further, serious difference of opinion between IAF and ADA as well as a poor industrial support infrastructure did also contribute to the slowing down of the Tejas developmental cycle. Perhaps the most sterling achievement of team LCA was that by braving all negative comments, discouraging remarks and scathing criticism from a variety of sources, it managed to realise an airborne fighting platform. And deficiencies and shortcomings in various on-board systems of the aircraft can be set right in a phased manner after obtaining feedbacks from IAF.
It is high time that IAF is made a stake holder and partner in all the futuristic fighter aircraft development programs with a view to avoid the possibility of projecting changes midway through the developmental cycle. Clearly and apparently, IAF must be directed to come out with all the features and requirements at the design stage of the fighter aircraft project. For incorporation of changes in the midway makes for a delay, cost escalation and technological complexities.
Incidentally the first Tejas was handed over to IAF on Jan.17, 2015. The handing over of the first Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft which has been configured to Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) standards marked the initiation of the process for squadron formation. Dr. Kota Harinarayana, who initiated the program for the development of Tejas virtually from scratch as the Director of the Bangalore based ADA which was set up by DRDO to fast track the Tejas project said that “Developing a fighter is far more complicated than developing a commercial aircraft. It takes time. For every fighter jet in any part of the world, the time taken for research, development and production is around 25-30 years. I agree that it took a little longer but considering the fact that when the project was given the go ahead there were several sanctions, restrictions, lack of infrastructure and technology. I feel the effort was worth it”.
http://www.claws.in/1396/need-to-plug-loopholes-in-tejas-speedily-and-efficiently-radh
