N-deal with Pak could hit ties, India cautions China

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

And which country is Building that??? I guess its China, with whom you guys are luking for a CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL and at the back yard, Plutonium based Reactors are being Build to weaponise the missiles.

No evidence has been provided so far that China is helping construct the Khushab II and III reactors (which are both almost complete).

So since the Heavy Water Reactors at Khushab are almost complete, the argument that the proposed deal with China over two LWR's will help Pakistan's 'Plutonium production', is obviously incorrect.

Now stop ranting and go educate yourself and offer some comments with some credible sources to back them up.

 

[karan.1970]

People please can we try stay on topic. If anything this has finally removed the veil of righteous justice cast on the web of hypocrisy that is the NSG and UNSC.

Nice poetic style of writing sir.. Anyway, the whole concept of Nuclear non proliferation is based on the principle of Have's and Have Nots. To expect anything else is a little naive.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I never commented on the ligitimacy of the concerns (since thats a different discussion), but only on TK's incorrect comment around absence of Pakistani opposition to Indo-US deal.

But the opposition had a legitimate context of discrimination and the possibility of an Indian nuclear weapons expansion by many magnitudes. The Pakistani position was that any exemption had to be uniform for all nations, or put in place uniform criteria for other nations to follow, instead of the arbitrary and discriminatory route it in fact took. Even many US politicians, Western experts and several NSG member nations opposed the exemption because of the precedent that it would set and the fact that it would make denying similar exemptions to other nations harder, views that are again reflected in the commentary out of the West now, since Pakistan is pushing for its own nuclear trade.

Not really. There is difference between discretion and discrimination. All subjective decisions automatically do not become discriminatory (except for ones who those decisions go against). For example, constitution ammendments are not against the rules if passed by the majority as defined by the constitution. IN the same manner, NSG's exception for India was approved by the rules defined in NSG's constitution. Really does not matter if Pakistan thinks those decisions are discriminatory/arbitrary or not since neither India nor Pakistan is a part of NSG.

I am not discussing general cases of 'discretion vs discrimination'. In the context of the Indian nuclear exemption, your earlier post merely restated my point that the exemption was discriminatory and arbitrary - whether that would be the case in another situation is irrelevant, but it obviously was the case in this particular situation.

Now 'constitutional amendments' are not 'against the rules', unless they violate a basic premise of the constitution itself. For example if a constitution declares 'all men to be equal', you cannot pass a constitutional amendment declaring 'Africans to be inhuman'. Also, where exactly in the NSG charter and 'constitution' was this amendment made?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Anyway, the whole concept of Nuclear non proliferation is based on the principle of Have's and Have Nots. To expect anything else is a little naive.

Does not mean nations at the receiving end of the stick don't have the right and means to bypass the 'discrimination' and 'raise the issue', as Pakistan has done and is doing.

 

[RescueRanger]

Nice poetic style of writing sir.. Anyway, the whole concept of Nuclear non proliferation is based on the principle of Have's and Have Nots. To expect anything else is a little naive.

Yes agreed, but when a party (a) can bend the rules as an exception for party (b) it sets a precident that is not easily forgotten. Don't you think?

 

[toxic_pus]

Semantics - it was not a 'nuclear bomb' only because it was not necessarily in the form of a deliverable weapon i.e a missile warhead or an air dropped bomb. There is no such thing as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' since there is no use for a nuclear explosion to run nuclear reactors for power generation, which was the intent of the CIRUS reactor.

India validated that it could perform a nuclear explosion - the only thing left to do after that was to miniaturize the device into a deliverable weapon.

Nonsense.

Firstly, there is no such thing as 'peaceful nuclear explosion' today. But there was however such thing as 'peaceful nuclear explosion' circa 1956, when the agreement was made. By 1970, US had conducted 14 and USSR, 17 PNEs. These were used to enhance mining capabilities and study of effects on mineral resources.

You are judging yesterday's paradigm by today's standards.

Secondly, the 'intent' of CIRUS was scientific study, not exclusively restricted to power generation. Besides, CIRUS was not used in any way other than generating electricity. It was the irradiated Uranium from CIRUS that was used to fuel that devise. And that Uranium came from India's own Uranium mine at Jaduguda. Canada, as per agreement, had not control over irradiated Uranium.

Thirdly you are talking of miniaturizing a nuclear device into a nuclear bomb as if it is Chinese origami.

 

[karan.1970]

But the opposition had a legitimate context of discrimination and the possibility of an Indian nuclear weapons expansion by many magnitudes. The Pakistani position was that any exemption had to be uniform for all nations, or put in place uniform criteria for other nations to follow, instead of the arbitrary and discriminatory route it in fact took. Even many US politicians, Western experts and several NSG member nations opposed the exemption because of the precedent that it would set and the fact that it would make denying similar exemptions to other nations harder, views that are again reflected in the commentary out of the West now, since Pakistan is pushing for its own nuclear trade.


I am not discussing general cases of 'discretion vs discrimination'. In the context of the Indian nuclear exemption, your earlier post merely restated my point that the exemption was discriminatory and arbitrary - whether that would be the case in another situation is irrelevant, but it obviously was the case in this particular situation.

Since India has no role in NSG I really dont want to defend the exception it granted India based on its stated non proliferation record. Again, you may question that record, but NSG members uninimously voted in its favor.
My comment here (again) is to the fact that Pakistan objected to the Indian deal. Merits of that objection can be discussed till cows come home, just like the discussion on whether NSG discriminated or simply took a judgement call. What you call discriminatory, NSG called as discretionary and what you call arbitrary, NSG believed to be a judgement call based on facts presented to it. You and I may disagree or agree with the same.

Now 'constitutional amendments' are not 'against the rules', unless they violate a basic premise of the constitution itself. For example if a constitution declares 'all men to be equal', you cannot pass a constitutional amendment declaring 'Africans to be inhuman'. Also, where exactly in the NSG charter and 'constitution' was this amendment made?

Good point, however not entirely true. What you need to remember is that the keepers of constitution are allowed to make changes to it. To protect the spirit of constitution, there are checks and balances like hte need for a higher percentage of aye sayers etc for the ammendments, and that is what the founding fathers expect will act as a protection against an idiotic ammendment (if some one proposes it in the 1st place) on the lines of your example. And there are appeal processes as well.

Similarly in the case of NSG, it was not a normal majority but a consensus that was required for the waiver to be a success. So unless you are saying all 45 member states were acting arbitararily, this negates the contention..

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Since India has no role in NSG I really dont want to defend the exception it granted India based on its stated non proliferation record. Again, you may question that record, but NSG members uninimously voted in its favor.
My comment here (again) is to the fact that Pakistan objected to the Indian deal. Merits of that objection can be discussed till cows come home, just like the discussion on whether NSG discriminated or simply took a judgement call. What you call discriminatory, NSG called as discretionary and what you call arbitrary, NSG believed to be a judgement call based on facts presented to it. You and I may disagree or agree with the same.


Good point, however not entirely true. What you need to remember is that the keepers of constitution are allowed to make changes to it. To protect the spirit of constitution, there are checks and balances like hte need for a higher percentage of aye sayers etc for the ammendments, and that is what the founding fathers expect will act as a protection against an idiotic ammendment (if some one proposes it in the 1st place) on the lines of your example. And there are appeal processes as well.

Similarly in the case of NSG, it was not a normal majority but a consensus that was required for the waiver to be a success. So unless you are saying all 45 member states were acting arbitararily, this negates the contention..

If it is a 'subjective, once case decision' then it is arbitrary. If it was a decision based on the 'facts presented to the NSG and a certain set of criteria being met' then that criteria and conditions should have been made part of the NSG rules and charter. Without making those 'facts and criteria' a part of the NSG rules and 'constitution' governing exemptions, the NSG just violated one of its basic principles of not authorizing nuclear trade with non-NPT signatories - i.e there was no 'constitutional amendment' to bring the decision to give India an NSG exemption in consonance with a basic principle of the NSG.

Hence not only is the decision discriminatory and practices double standards, but I would argue it is a violation of the NSG's own charter.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Nonsense.

Firstly, there is no such thing as 'peaceful nuclear explosion' today. But there was however such thing as 'peaceful nuclear explosion' circa 1956, when the agreement was made. By 1970, US had conducted 14 and USSR, 17 PNEs. These were used to enhance mining capabilities and study of effects on mineral resources.

You are judging yesterday's paradigm by today's standards.

Secondly, the 'intent' of CIRUS was scientific study, not exclusively restricted to power generation. Besides, CIRUS was not used in any way other than generating electricity. It was the irradiated Uranium from CIRUS that was used to fuel that devise. And that Uranium came from India's own Uranium mine at Jaduguda. Canada, as per agreement, had not control over irradiated Uranium.

Thirdly you are talking of miniaturizing a nuclear device into a nuclear bomb as if it is Chinese origami.

The Indian excuse carried no 'water' (heavy or light, pardon the pun) with the Americans or Canadians:

Likewise, a 1956 Indo-Canadian agreement prohibited the use of plutonium produced in the reactor for non-peaceful purposes. Despite these restrictions, the CIRUS reactor provided the plutonium for India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosions." Canada and the United States subsequently ended all nuclear cooperation with India, including Canadian fuel shipments.

NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear Facilities

The excerpt above would indicate that regardless of where India obtained the Uranium from, the Indo-Canadian agreement established usage restrictions on the Plutonium produced from the reactors.

Also:

However, the following recently declassified documents show that the United States and Canadian governments interpreted their agreements as “precluding all nuclear explosions on the grounds that any such explosion in tantamount to a nuclear weapons test” and made this interpretation clear to India before the 1974 bomb test.

Prospects of an Indian Nuclear Test
Memoradum from U.S. Department of State Director of Intelligence and Research
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/19720223_INR_Report_Indian_Nuclear_Test.pdf
February 23, 1972

U.S. Government Aide Memoire Presented to Indian Atomic Energy Commission
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/19701116_US_Aide_Memoire_Indian_AEC.pdf
November 16, 1970

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

China-Pak nuclear deal: ‘India opened a Pandora’s box’​

Indrani Bagchi, TNN, Jun 22, 2010, 02.39am IST

NEW DELHI: The proposed China-Pakistan nuclear deal could spell trouble for India's own membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, severely upsetting the calculations of the government here.

India had hoped that the New Zealand plenary meeting scheduled for later this week might move the process along for India to be eventually recognized as a formal member of the group.

India had told the NSG that following the Indo-US nuclear deal, its laws and regulations had been harmonized with the global body, and that it was ready to be a member of the group. This was emphasized by the government in its last meeting with the NSG troika earlier this year.

Instead, there is a growing anger, albeit impotent, within the 45-member group as they confront a virtual fait accompli by China "informing" them of its decision to build two new nuclear reactors for Pakistan, a proliferation rogue. But such is the growing clout of China internationally that, Indian officials say, there is a lot of grumbling, but little outright opposition. The US so far is the only country to openly oppose the proposed arrangement, but that too happened after the Iran sanctions vote in the UN Security Council, where China's cooperation was crucial. France, sources said, is likely to raise its own objections at the NSG meeting later this week.

China is unlikely to ask for a full waiver for Pakistan from the NSG, along the lines of the India deal. That would require a huge amount of political investment of the kind the US made for India. Instead, China is likely to push these two reactors through under a kind of diplomatic amnesia because there is a paper trail that says only two reactors in Pakistan had been "grandfathered" by China. With China becoming more muscular in international politics, this kind of a "thin-end-of-the-wedge" kind of deal might just go through.

Of course, the Indian government is readying its own diplomatic initiative against the proposed deal -- but quietly, mainly working with "friends" in Europe, many of whom batted for India during its own deal. Openly, India has not yet revealed its hand, and is still squeamish about coming out against the deal, given it is not a member of the NSG and its own deal is virtually hot off the press. Therefore, India will wait for the NSG to take a view this week.

During the recent visit of President Pratibha Patil to China, the Indians used the formal banquet to tell Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi that the deal would be a very bad idea. Yang's response was textbook -- the Pakistan deal was peaceful and under IAEA safeguards. India has desisted from a formal objection to the Pak deal.

A lot of the anger of countries like Austria, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries against the China-Pakistan deal is directed against India. "You opened a Pandora's box," many countries have said accusingly. India received a country-specific waiver from the NSG in 2008 for nuclear commerce, but it was a bitter pill for many countries for whom the existing non-proliferation regime is a national mantra, including, ironically New Zealand, where the China-Pak deal is likely to be discussed.

But there is little appreciation for India's line that its nuclear deal was a reward for an unblemished record in non-proliferation, and that India was a class apart from Pakistan.

China-Pak nuclear deal: ?India opened a Pandora?s box? - India - The Times of India

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

BTW, in the context of this thread, still no credible justification provided by the Indians on Indian opposition to the proposed sale of two reactors to Pakistan by China.

 

[schneider]

No, HEU is used as the main component in Pakistan's nuclear warheads. Pakistan's Plutonium is obtained from the Khushab reactors.

And even if HEU was used to 'produce Plutonium', as I pointed out, the production of HEU has to do with the fuel enrichment process, and not the Light Water NPP's being proposed for the Chashma complex.

So you have no link between the NPP's China has helped construct at Chashma or is proposing to construct and Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

my point is if you are using HEU through enrichment you could only enrich either weapong grade U-235 or U-238, but both of these Isotopes have a very high Critical Mass and Super Critical Mass that is around 40-50kgs, which is outdated to use.

Then comes U-233, Critical mass is apprx. 14 kgs, best suitable. and this Isotope is Produced in the REACTOR. But out of 4 Pakistan reactor, 2 are under- IAEA scanner. And Khushab Reactor is Plutonium based, the only one left is the 10 MW research reactor PINSTECH. And Reports say Pakistan's Plutonium enrichment is done in either Khushab and PINSTECH.
So there are 200% percent chances that Pakistan is now shifting to Plutonium based weapons which can be easily carried with SRBM'S and Cruise Missiles. And To enhance the explosive yield by 300% LI6 is being added in Plutonium Based warhead as Pakistan does not posses any Thermo Nuclear Warhead.

 

[toxic_pus]

The Indian excuse carried no 'water' (heavy or light, pardon the pun) with the Americans or Canadians:

Likewise, a 1956 Indo-Canadian agreement prohibited the use of plutonium produced in the reactor for non-peaceful purposes. Despite these restrictions, the CIRUS reactor provided the plutonium for India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosions." Canada and the United States subsequently ended all nuclear cooperation with India, including Canadian fuel shipments.

NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear Facilities

The excerpt above would indicate that regardless of where India obtained the Uranium from, the Indo-Canadian agreement established usage restrictions on the Plutonium produced from the reactors.

Also:


However, the following recently declassified documents show that the United States and Canadian governments interpreted their agreements as “precluding all nuclear explosions on the grounds that any such explosion in tantamount to a nuclear weapons test” and made this interpretation clear to India before the 1974 bomb test.

Prospects of an Indian Nuclear Test
Memoradum from U.S. Department of State Director of Intelligence and Research
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/19720223_INR_Report_Indian_Nuclear_Test.pdf
February 23, 1972

U.S. Government Aide Memoire Presented to Indian Atomic Energy Commission
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/19701116_US_Aide_Memoire_Indian_AEC.pdf
November 16, 1970

Ho hum.

Canada shamelessly reneged on its agreement, the high priests formed their exclusive club & overhauled NPT requirements(only in response to Indian nuclear test), used strong arm bullying tactics to ostracize India.So?

None of the above proves that '(t)he material was 'stolen' from its original purpose (civilian use) to construct a nuclear bomb.'

In any case, nothing in the agreement contained any restriction on usage of Uranium. Canadian and US interpretation was arbitrary and ridiculously self-serving.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

And Khushab Reactor is Plutonium based, the only one left is the 10 MW research reactor PINSTECH. And Reports say Pakistan's Plutonium enrichment is done in either Khushab and PINSTECH.
So there are 200% percent chances that Pakistan is now shifting to Plutonium based weapons which can be easily carried with SRBM'S and Cruise Missiles. And To enhance the explosive yield by 300% LI6 is being added in Plutonium Based warhead as Pakistan does not posses any Thermo Nuclear Warhead.

OK, so you now established that Pakistan's Plutonium is produced at Khsuhab and PINSTECH, and that Pakistan is shifting to Plutonium based nuclear weapons - what does that have to do with the Chasham NPP's that have been constructed and are being proposed?

How do they provide fuel for Pakistan's nuclear program, and therefore are a concern for India - that is not something that you have established even remotely so far.

 

[schneider]

^^

They can be used to produce weapon grade material to inscrease the arsenal.