The writer, for all his swagger, seems to have done little research himself.
He says he told the DCC that of the five ‘places’ (whatever the term means), the Indians had only taken one back; had taken two or three posts in one, and that three were completely ‘untouched’ because they did not even know we were there
Which is spot on, acknowledged by renowned and impartial military observers and endorsed by an Indian general for accuracy. Cloughley (and other commentators) write:
”The Indian Army’s assaults on the heights in the Dras and Kargil sectors cost its gallant regiments dearly. The NLI and other Pakistani soldiers fought well and tenaciously before evacuating the 14 posts from which they were driven. Withdrawal from the remaining 120 or so defended localities was on orders from the Pakistan side of the LoC.”
The writer is obviously trying to project sarcasm for what the ‘commando’ said. But as we can see Musharraf’s account here is verifiable from objective sources.
They were ‘weak’ said the Commando because they had ‘moved all their forces to Kargil as also all their artillery’. ALL their forces; ALL their artillery?! Little wonder that we got ourselves in the sort of trouble that we did under his able command, what?
Again this was true, the Indian artillery was in a serious state of dysfunction at the time. The writer should read up about the Bofors scandal:
‘…the shortages of spares for Bofors 155mm guns, which was caused by an embargo that followed bribery in contract negotiations. Depots and barracks in India were scoured, and over a hundred guns were cannibalized to ensure that those hastily moved to and around Indian-administered Kashmir could continue firing. Ammunition was a problem, too, and expensive to acquire at over $1000 per round…” The fact that India moved large chunks of men and equipment, particularly artillery, from its strike formations up to the Kargil front has been verified by intelligence reports so what Musharraf suggested about the Indians being in a bad position given their depleted offensive potential is far from as outrageous as this writers is trying to make it out to be.
‘Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale. The problem for the Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face. Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of forces. That got Musharraf’s attention and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out.
If this doesn’t prove beyond a shadow of doubt that the Commando played fast and free with his office and the authority flowing from it then nothing will
In the Kargil case much research has shown the facts to be largely stacked up against Nawaz Sharif. But this narration by General Zinni is perhaps the only thing used by Musharraf’s critics to suggest that Musharraf might’ve encouraged a withdrawal. But this is far from conclusive, General Zinni was a military representative from his country and it is quite understandable that his interactions were primarily with our Army chief (Musharraf was always very charismatic and confident) given Sharif’s indecisive and coy behavior at the time (he himself admitted that he is inept at military affairs). Musharraf probably would have had relayed the American suggestions without offering any of his own directions, for which he was repeated asked by Sharif according to many resources. Diplomats in Washington who met Sharif and who were familiar with the affair were not of the opinion that Nawaz was sent by his army or that he was trying to save the army. They do say that he was fairly upset, jumpy and not taking the pressure well – particularly that which was exerted by the Americans and Indians.
Professionals usually start their research and only when they’re done do they draw conclusions, but then there are some in Pakistan who draw conclusions and then set out to look for ‘proofs’ in the hopes of getting their own partial beliefs through in the name of 'journalism'. Kamran Shafi’s biased and unbalanced views are best demonstrated in the last paragraph:
There is only one way out of the clutches of the establishment and its ‘agencies’ (and their boys) which are the prime reason of our travails…
Completely deluded.
