The Ronin
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by Colonel Md Ziaul Hoque, afwc, psc
"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur”.
- Giulio Douhet
Introduction :
The changing and varied nature of battlefield with wide spectrum of modern man-portable anti-armour weapon system has brought nature of threat and task of mechanized forces more challenging. Nowadays, battles are drawn into urban areas in an obstacle-prone terrain where heavy tanks are at peril. Heavy tanks often become prey to enemy due to complex terrain. Russian initial invasion of Grozny in Chechnya with heavy tanks proved to be liabilities due to the inherent shortcomings and complexities of terrain.
It is a painstaking task to dislodge foot infantry who are sitting in well-prepared position surrounded by restricted terrain. However; its weakness is more vivid in defensive operations where terrains are less restricted. They can dig in and may very well deny attacking formations out of their prepared positions. Moreover, their lack of mobility makes it hard for them to re-orientate or relocate in order to counter mobile forces that are not directly attacking their front. Standard infantry is also unable to trade space due to less mobility. They either win or overrun in many situations.
The concept of mechanized infantry practiced through the ages with chariots and cavalry where soldiers fought hand-to-hand for decisive result. The modern mechanized force took its shape from the German concept of ‘Blitzkrieg’ during the World War II adopted for annihilating French and Polish Army. This was the classic combination of tanks and motorized infantry.
In blitzkrieg, mechanize formations moving at a rate at least four times that of dismounted infantry were sure guarantors of tactical and operational success. In above-mentioned instances, the concept of mechanized forces easily achieved due to massing of combat forces and firepower at the decisive point, as stated by Karl von Clausewitz. The operational concept executed in field by incorporating the technological advancement. Through the mechanization, battles and campaigns acquired degree of mobility that was never seen before in the field of warfare. Mechanize force is one of the critical assets to the commander for seeking decision in the battlefield.
The threat based capability and emerging geo-political condition surely necessitates the requirement of force structure and humble beginning of mechanized infantry in Bangladesh Army. However, development of technology in the contemporary world will also prompt any capable nation to secure latest technology for upsetting enemy plan, which is a threat to independence and sovereignty. Bangladesh Army may face more challenges, related to non-traditional, asymmetric wars and natural disasters. However, traditional threats should always get preference over asymmetric threats. Future war will be short, intense, net centric and in the form hybrid warfare.
The commander will largely depend on firepower, mobility and concentration of forces in the battlefield to support armour and foot infantry. It is instructive to analyze the reasons for the slow demise of the heavy tank and increasing numbers of infantry battalions equipped with versatile combat vehicles. The aim of this article is to examine the contemporary trends of mechanized forces in various armies of the world with a view to drawing suitable lessons for Bangladesh Army.
Evolution of Mechanized Infantry :
In 1918 during the Battle of St. Quentin, A7Vs were accompanied by 20 storm troopers from Rohr Assault Battalion, but it is unspecified if they were acting as dismounts or were accompanying the tanks on foot. During the battle, tank crews reported to have dismounted and attacked enemy positions with grenades and flamethrowers on numerous occasions.
Another example of the use of such a method of fighting is the capture of VillersBretonneux (30 March – 5 April 1918), in which A7Vs would suppress the defenders with machine gun fire and assault teams would dismount and attack them with grenades. During and at the end of World War I, armies faced the difficulties in massing firepower and maintaining impetus while launching offensive. Infiltration tactics frequently used in order to break the solid defence line of enemy, but most of the offensives stalled by 1918.
The foot infantry quickly became exhausted and fresh formations could not be brought forward for maintaining momentum of success over the battlefields quickly enough to maintain the pressure on the regrouping enemy. It was widely acknowledged that armour played significant role during the World War II despite its vulnerability in the western front. However, motorized infantry gave mobility in the battlefield, but their trucks required either a good road network or firm open terrain, such as desert. They could not negotiate battlefield hindered by different types of obstacle belts and craters. Tracked or wheel vehicles or combination of both to be the solution for the battlefield.
J. F. C. Fuller advocated for "tank fleets" as a components of mobile warfare for future battlefield. Other proponents of mobile warfare such as Heinz Guderian from Germany, Adna R. Chaffee Jr from the United States and Mikhail Tukhachevsky from the Soviet Union suggested that tank units required close support from infantry and other arms and such supporting arms needed to maintain the same pace as the tanks.
Having achieved spectacular successes in the offensive with tank-heavy formations during the Six Day War, the Israel Defence Forces found in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 that a doctrine that relied primarily on tanks and aircraft had proven inadequate. As an improvised arrangement, paratroopers were provided with motorized transport and used as mechanized infantry in coordination with the armour in Yom Kippur War.
Deep Penetration by armour formations with huge firepower and manoeuvring capability might not achieve desired goal without consolidating the gain and holding the ground physically by infantry. Battle winning fact of having both Infantry and armour in the same pace was intensely felt between World War I and ll which ultimately ensued a transformation from armoured infantry (panzer grenadier) to motorized infantry and then to Armoured Personal Carrier (APC) based battle taxi infantry to the present day Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV).
To improve speed a military force can be mechanized being equipped with armoured and motor vehicles like APC and ICV. Infantry and armour accolades and augments the capability of each other retaining their primary role. Finally, the mechanization process of infantry commenced with the beginning of World War II owing to its pre-eminence in a volatile and mechanized battlefield.
Evolving Threat Matrix :
After the World War II, the world saw increased mechanization by the super powers and the developing countries. With the end of the Cold War, increasing technological improvements and uncertain political conditions, the future strategic environment cannot be predicted with any degree of assurance.
The extent of the mechanization varied due to a number of factors. The structuring of Bangladesh Army today has manifested as to how Bangladesh protect their national interests in the coming years. Bangladesh Army has planned for a particular level of mechanization/force structuring based on the threat envisaged in its strategic interests.
The armed conflicts are likely to take a hybrid form, covering the entire spectrum. Hybrid warfare is set to be the most common form of warfare in the 21st century. The internal turbulences with threats of insurgencies and Low intensity conflict (LIC) have insisted Bangladesh Army for few mechanized components as critical assets.
Moreover, minimizing the number of soldiers exposed to risks, mechanized forces support the adoption of manoeuvre strategies, which emphasize shorter and lower cost wars.The Mechanized Infantry plays a lead role in United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) owing to its versatility. Bangladesh is no exception to that, she is always at the forefront to assist UN for establishing peace around the globe by deploying peacekeepers with latest armaments and equipment.
The doctrinal perspectives to prosecute future wars and the prevailing nuclear equations indicate that future wars in the regional context will be “limited in nature and scope”. Technologies are gradually placing a higher premium on basic infantry skills to higher-level integration of theatre wide operation.
Warranting victory in a limited high technology war in search of short and swift engagements will solely hinge on firepower, mobility and force projection. Advanced technology and its waves will be the sore issue in vindicating the future conflicts. Strategic, operational and tactical distinctions are likely to be distorted by rapidity and intricacy of operation. Future battlefield is likely to be non-linear and fluid as there will be multidimensional and concurrent engagements of forces in the entire spectrum of the combat zone.
Paradigm Shift from Battle Taxi Concept to ICV Concept :
The Mechanized Infantry Battalions are authorized with APC BTR-80 and for few particular weapon systems Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV) are incorporated. At present our training system of mechanized infantry are basically based on the above fighting vehicles. The integral weapons and with its present capability, these equipment has got protection only against small arms fire but very limited anti-tank protection.
Moreover, as it is wheel based, therefore, their movement is restricted within roads/tracks and their cross-country mobility is subjected to terrain and weather conditions. All the attributes and limitations mentioned above regarding APCs commensurate with ‘Battle Taxi Concept’. Seeking a decisive result with a mechanized force as striking force in a defensive battle (Covering Forces Operation, Reserve Operation and Counter Offensive Operation) through ‘Battle Taxi Concept’ will be a difficult proposition.
Similarly, in offensive operations, especially during attack following the ‘Battle Taxi Concept’, it will be possible to utilize them well short of objective method but will be quite difficult to employ them short of objective, on objective and beyond objective due to the inherent limitations of APCs.
In the battlefield, tanks and mechanized infantry will operate in support of each other in the form of Combat Team (CT), Combat Group (CG) and Combat Command (CC). With the existing armament, protection and maneuver capability of APCs, it will be difficult to provide such intimate support.
The APCs being the main stay of Mechanized Infantry will not be able to deliver decisive punch for the commander having less anti-tank protection, absence of required armaments for effective engagement of enemy tanks and infantry from a long range and less maneuver capability considering the terrain configuration and weather condition of Bangladesh.
Therefore, to employ mechanized infantry in a more effective manner, Bangladesh Army may take a robust approach for procuring ICVs instead of APCs to support the doctrine of Mechanized Infantry. However, APCs may be employed in LIC, counter terrorism operations and United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO).
Training Modalities :
Combined arms team concept implies that, units and sub units are organized for combat with mixed grouping of all arms and are customized for specific tactical mission. The nucleus of such a team is armour and Mechanized Infantry. Around this nucleus, a team/ group is formed supported by elements of self-propelled Artillery, Air Defence Artillery, Engineers, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME), Signal and air assets (Attack helicopter). At present training modules are conducted in isolation, not keeping harmony between armour and mechanized infantry as combined arms concept (CT/CG/CC).
In addition, ongoing training (Mechanized Infantry Course -UN, conducted by SI&T and ACC&S) on mechanized forces focused on UN employment rather than their conventional employment. Therefore, it is necessary to redesign the overall training concept keeping in mind the classic role of mechanized forces.
Bangladesh Army may take a closer look for developing a separate center and school for mechanized infantry. A separate institutional training and formation training curriculum for the officers and men need to be developed in order to strengthen the effectiveness of mechanize forces. Besides, few designated training areas (Sarnaw Deep and Hathazari Field Firing Range) need to be developed to conduct CT/CG/CC level maneuver exercise with live firing, at least once in a year/alternative year.
Efficacy of Mechanized Infantry :
In Operation DESERT SHIELD, during the built-up phase of the first Gulf War, the army was concerned about the lack of mobility, protection and firepower offered by rapid deployment (i.e. airborne) formations19; and about the slowness of deployed regular armoured units. Increasingly, the US Army in its several conflicts all over the world is using lighter vehicles. The total ratio of heavy tanks to ICVs/APCs/Light Armour Vehicle (LAVs) works out to 6344: 19772, or approximately 1:3.11. The UK has relied upon its mainstay on Challenger tanks till date.20 However, a relative doctrinal shift has been observed in its plan of further expansion and restructuring of UK Armed Forces.
Emphasis has been laid on employment of heavy mechanized superiority compared to pure armour elements. Under the proposal of future army, the UK Armed Forces will have an overall ratio of heavy tank units to lighter mechanized units of approximately 5:11 or 1:2.221. After the 1965 war, the Indian Army felt the necessity to provide matching mobility to the infantry units operating with the armoured formations. Indian Army moved from ICV to IFV concept in 1980 by incorporating BMP I (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty) from Russia in order to support maneuver of the Infantry.
Indian Army has transferred technology for producing BMP II by Ordnance Factory Medak under the supervision of Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). Mechanized Infantry has a separate training centre at Ahmednagar known as Mechanized Infantry Regimental Centre (MIRC) co-located with Armour Centre and School (AC&S). The centre endows with all possible training infrastructures where recruits and officers of Mechanized Infantry Regiment are being trained.
Each nation maintains its armed forces and shapes it in a manner that the military hardware best suits to meet its envisaged threats. Traditionally, heavy tanks or armour has dominated the armies of the world. The ratio between tanks and infantry depends on many factors. The most important factors are the type of combat and nature of engagement. If the engagement is in maneuver warfare over open terrain, the infantry is there to support the tanks.
In that case, the ratio of infantry to tanks depends a lot on the specific type of terrain and how many close assaults that are anticipated. However, in recent years, due to the changing nature of warfare, shrinking reaction time, rapid urbanization in almost all parts of the world and emergence of new threat heavy tanks have not been used in many conflict scenarios. It is instructive to analyze this aspect.
Cutting-edge military hardware and software is must to furnish any army with the delivery time and to keep pace with the emerging armies. The theory of warfare is in the process of continuous transformation and qualitative expansions in weaponries are on the rise.
A military commander gets the aptitude to reach unprecedented levels of acquaintance, swiftness and harmonization from a wide range of new digital information technologies. Future wars will be predominantly asymmetric in nature based on the technology and economic aspects, which is exposed by a contemplation of the current trends of warfare. To cultivate finest power at the point of resolution against the nemesis a cohesive employment of all arms is essential.
The combined arms concept envisages employment of two or more arms in mutual support of each other to achieve the desired results that neither can obtain on their own. The Mechanized Infantry best compliments the firepower and shock action of armour, the pre- dominant arm to be employed in the northwestern part of Bangladesh.
Today, the terrorists are not insurgents, but a lethal and potent tool in the hands of ideologically deviant, with a capability to disrupt the social fabrics and law order situation of Bangladesh. Since the training, ethos and regimentation of mechanized infantry are reflecting this aspect, therefore they can be employed to counter asymmetric threat if necessary.
Most countries have adopted for a force structure that can quickly become effective at a place and time where it is required. Such a force must have the ability to face the plethora of threats that are envisaged in near future. The mission of Mechanized Infantry Battalion as specified in the proposed TO&E ‘To close with and destroy the enemy’ is similar to Standard Infantry Battalion.25 Thus, it clearly emerges that the role of the mechanized infantry needs review keeping the trends world over and emerging future battlefield with existing capabilities of ICVs/APCs.
Since Mechanized Infantry Battalion will always deploy in consonance with Armour Regiment, therefore the mission may be reviewed as ‘To close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver’. The mechanized force of Bangladesh Army is likely to operate across the wide spectrum of threats, which must have the following:
All training and exercises should be organized as Combat Team, Combat Group and Combat Command in order to create mechanized psyche in Bangladesh Army.
The Mechanized Infantry training should be developed according to their trade and reorientation of basic training for soldiers and need review keeping in mind the existing terrain and the emerging threat scenario.
Training area including live firing is a necessity to build cohesion amongst Mechanized Infantry and armour. Shorno Dweep (SD) is one of the options for such training however there may be more training area adjacent to formation and school where units can undertake routine exercises.
The mechanized infantry needs to evolve from the ‘Battle Taxi Concept’ to the ‘ICV Concept’ backed by its robust ‘all terrain’ capabilities.
The mechanized force should have adequate number of ICVs that must confer versatility by having the capability to operate in closed and obstacle-ridden terrain.
The actual ratio of tank units to Mechanized Infantry units would depend on a caseto-case basis. However, the ratio of Mechanized Infantry Battalion and Armour Regiment will vary considering classical maneuver warfare in open and close terrain.
Possibility of employing mechanized forces particularly in LIC and counterterrorism operations, also need to be considered.
ICVs may be utilized in seaborne role in conjunction with the Bangladesh Navy along the southern coastlines for amphibious operations. Mechanized Infantry has the capability to deliver decisive combat power on beachheads and may be required for future landing operations.
Recommendations:
From the roles enunciated for Mechanized Infantry in above paragraphs, it clearly emerges that Mechanized Infantry will be the ‘Arm of the Future’ owing to its inherent capabilities to undertake operations in different operational environments. The footprint of Mechanized Infantry needs to be increased considering emerging geo-strategic environment. A set of recommendations is proposed to overcome the forthcoming challenges in regards to Mechanized Infantry of Bangladesh Army:
The existing mission i.e. ‘To close with and destroy the enemy’ of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion may be reviewed with the proposed mission i.e. ‘To close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver’, considering its role and employment concept.
Bangladesh Army may incorporate ICVs in its inventory for Mechanized Infantry in order to shift from ‘Battle Taxi Concept’ to ‘ICV Concept’.
There may be a separate center and school for Mechanized Infantry for conducting different types of courses and training for officers and men. Besides, there may be a dedicated training area for mechanized forces, where conduct of live firing is possible.
Bangladesh Army needs to develop separate training modalities for Mechanized Infantry considering environment of the combined arms concept.
Conclusion :
The importance of Mechanized Infantry cannot be stressed further. ICV/APC is an integral part of the mechanized forces and it has prescribed tasks. The tanks have relied heavily on the Mechanized Infantry since World War II for their survival. This reliance is stated in a memorandum by the German Oberkommando des Heers (Commander of the Army), "There can be no doubt that, without the closest cooperation of the panzer grenadier and the tank, the latter is of limited value ... It is even said by some that commanders would prefer to lose tanks rather than their infantry....". Instead of questioning the relevance of Mechanized Infantry, there is a need to increase its numbers and provide it with a better platform for allowing it to perform its task in a better way.
The patterns of mechanized warfare have not changed much; rather it became well-accepted concept in 21st Century. There is a necessity for effective training at formations and schools for making mechanized forces operationally ready with their armament and equipment, to deliver the maximum. Thus, the role of the Mechanized Infantry in Bangladesh Army needs due attention. The mechanization effort should continue as per the Forces Goal 2030 for preparing Bangladesh Army to face challenges of 21st Century.
Source- Bangladesh Army Journal 61st Issue.
"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur”.
- Giulio Douhet
Introduction :
The changing and varied nature of battlefield with wide spectrum of modern man-portable anti-armour weapon system has brought nature of threat and task of mechanized forces more challenging. Nowadays, battles are drawn into urban areas in an obstacle-prone terrain where heavy tanks are at peril. Heavy tanks often become prey to enemy due to complex terrain. Russian initial invasion of Grozny in Chechnya with heavy tanks proved to be liabilities due to the inherent shortcomings and complexities of terrain.
It is a painstaking task to dislodge foot infantry who are sitting in well-prepared position surrounded by restricted terrain. However; its weakness is more vivid in defensive operations where terrains are less restricted. They can dig in and may very well deny attacking formations out of their prepared positions. Moreover, their lack of mobility makes it hard for them to re-orientate or relocate in order to counter mobile forces that are not directly attacking their front. Standard infantry is also unable to trade space due to less mobility. They either win or overrun in many situations.
The concept of mechanized infantry practiced through the ages with chariots and cavalry where soldiers fought hand-to-hand for decisive result. The modern mechanized force took its shape from the German concept of ‘Blitzkrieg’ during the World War II adopted for annihilating French and Polish Army. This was the classic combination of tanks and motorized infantry.
In blitzkrieg, mechanize formations moving at a rate at least four times that of dismounted infantry were sure guarantors of tactical and operational success. In above-mentioned instances, the concept of mechanized forces easily achieved due to massing of combat forces and firepower at the decisive point, as stated by Karl von Clausewitz. The operational concept executed in field by incorporating the technological advancement. Through the mechanization, battles and campaigns acquired degree of mobility that was never seen before in the field of warfare. Mechanize force is one of the critical assets to the commander for seeking decision in the battlefield.
The threat based capability and emerging geo-political condition surely necessitates the requirement of force structure and humble beginning of mechanized infantry in Bangladesh Army. However, development of technology in the contemporary world will also prompt any capable nation to secure latest technology for upsetting enemy plan, which is a threat to independence and sovereignty. Bangladesh Army may face more challenges, related to non-traditional, asymmetric wars and natural disasters. However, traditional threats should always get preference over asymmetric threats. Future war will be short, intense, net centric and in the form hybrid warfare.
The commander will largely depend on firepower, mobility and concentration of forces in the battlefield to support armour and foot infantry. It is instructive to analyze the reasons for the slow demise of the heavy tank and increasing numbers of infantry battalions equipped with versatile combat vehicles. The aim of this article is to examine the contemporary trends of mechanized forces in various armies of the world with a view to drawing suitable lessons for Bangladesh Army.
Evolution of Mechanized Infantry :
In 1918 during the Battle of St. Quentin, A7Vs were accompanied by 20 storm troopers from Rohr Assault Battalion, but it is unspecified if they were acting as dismounts or were accompanying the tanks on foot. During the battle, tank crews reported to have dismounted and attacked enemy positions with grenades and flamethrowers on numerous occasions.
Another example of the use of such a method of fighting is the capture of VillersBretonneux (30 March – 5 April 1918), in which A7Vs would suppress the defenders with machine gun fire and assault teams would dismount and attack them with grenades. During and at the end of World War I, armies faced the difficulties in massing firepower and maintaining impetus while launching offensive. Infiltration tactics frequently used in order to break the solid defence line of enemy, but most of the offensives stalled by 1918.
The foot infantry quickly became exhausted and fresh formations could not be brought forward for maintaining momentum of success over the battlefields quickly enough to maintain the pressure on the regrouping enemy. It was widely acknowledged that armour played significant role during the World War II despite its vulnerability in the western front. However, motorized infantry gave mobility in the battlefield, but their trucks required either a good road network or firm open terrain, such as desert. They could not negotiate battlefield hindered by different types of obstacle belts and craters. Tracked or wheel vehicles or combination of both to be the solution for the battlefield.
J. F. C. Fuller advocated for "tank fleets" as a components of mobile warfare for future battlefield. Other proponents of mobile warfare such as Heinz Guderian from Germany, Adna R. Chaffee Jr from the United States and Mikhail Tukhachevsky from the Soviet Union suggested that tank units required close support from infantry and other arms and such supporting arms needed to maintain the same pace as the tanks.
Having achieved spectacular successes in the offensive with tank-heavy formations during the Six Day War, the Israel Defence Forces found in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 that a doctrine that relied primarily on tanks and aircraft had proven inadequate. As an improvised arrangement, paratroopers were provided with motorized transport and used as mechanized infantry in coordination with the armour in Yom Kippur War.
Deep Penetration by armour formations with huge firepower and manoeuvring capability might not achieve desired goal without consolidating the gain and holding the ground physically by infantry. Battle winning fact of having both Infantry and armour in the same pace was intensely felt between World War I and ll which ultimately ensued a transformation from armoured infantry (panzer grenadier) to motorized infantry and then to Armoured Personal Carrier (APC) based battle taxi infantry to the present day Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV).
To improve speed a military force can be mechanized being equipped with armoured and motor vehicles like APC and ICV. Infantry and armour accolades and augments the capability of each other retaining their primary role. Finally, the mechanization process of infantry commenced with the beginning of World War II owing to its pre-eminence in a volatile and mechanized battlefield.
Evolving Threat Matrix :
After the World War II, the world saw increased mechanization by the super powers and the developing countries. With the end of the Cold War, increasing technological improvements and uncertain political conditions, the future strategic environment cannot be predicted with any degree of assurance.
The extent of the mechanization varied due to a number of factors. The structuring of Bangladesh Army today has manifested as to how Bangladesh protect their national interests in the coming years. Bangladesh Army has planned for a particular level of mechanization/force structuring based on the threat envisaged in its strategic interests.
The armed conflicts are likely to take a hybrid form, covering the entire spectrum. Hybrid warfare is set to be the most common form of warfare in the 21st century. The internal turbulences with threats of insurgencies and Low intensity conflict (LIC) have insisted Bangladesh Army for few mechanized components as critical assets.
Moreover, minimizing the number of soldiers exposed to risks, mechanized forces support the adoption of manoeuvre strategies, which emphasize shorter and lower cost wars.The Mechanized Infantry plays a lead role in United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) owing to its versatility. Bangladesh is no exception to that, she is always at the forefront to assist UN for establishing peace around the globe by deploying peacekeepers with latest armaments and equipment.
The doctrinal perspectives to prosecute future wars and the prevailing nuclear equations indicate that future wars in the regional context will be “limited in nature and scope”. Technologies are gradually placing a higher premium on basic infantry skills to higher-level integration of theatre wide operation.
Warranting victory in a limited high technology war in search of short and swift engagements will solely hinge on firepower, mobility and force projection. Advanced technology and its waves will be the sore issue in vindicating the future conflicts. Strategic, operational and tactical distinctions are likely to be distorted by rapidity and intricacy of operation. Future battlefield is likely to be non-linear and fluid as there will be multidimensional and concurrent engagements of forces in the entire spectrum of the combat zone.
Paradigm Shift from Battle Taxi Concept to ICV Concept :
The Mechanized Infantry Battalions are authorized with APC BTR-80 and for few particular weapon systems Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV) are incorporated. At present our training system of mechanized infantry are basically based on the above fighting vehicles. The integral weapons and with its present capability, these equipment has got protection only against small arms fire but very limited anti-tank protection.
Moreover, as it is wheel based, therefore, their movement is restricted within roads/tracks and their cross-country mobility is subjected to terrain and weather conditions. All the attributes and limitations mentioned above regarding APCs commensurate with ‘Battle Taxi Concept’. Seeking a decisive result with a mechanized force as striking force in a defensive battle (Covering Forces Operation, Reserve Operation and Counter Offensive Operation) through ‘Battle Taxi Concept’ will be a difficult proposition.
Similarly, in offensive operations, especially during attack following the ‘Battle Taxi Concept’, it will be possible to utilize them well short of objective method but will be quite difficult to employ them short of objective, on objective and beyond objective due to the inherent limitations of APCs.
In the battlefield, tanks and mechanized infantry will operate in support of each other in the form of Combat Team (CT), Combat Group (CG) and Combat Command (CC). With the existing armament, protection and maneuver capability of APCs, it will be difficult to provide such intimate support.
The APCs being the main stay of Mechanized Infantry will not be able to deliver decisive punch for the commander having less anti-tank protection, absence of required armaments for effective engagement of enemy tanks and infantry from a long range and less maneuver capability considering the terrain configuration and weather condition of Bangladesh.
Therefore, to employ mechanized infantry in a more effective manner, Bangladesh Army may take a robust approach for procuring ICVs instead of APCs to support the doctrine of Mechanized Infantry. However, APCs may be employed in LIC, counter terrorism operations and United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO).
Training Modalities :
Combined arms team concept implies that, units and sub units are organized for combat with mixed grouping of all arms and are customized for specific tactical mission. The nucleus of such a team is armour and Mechanized Infantry. Around this nucleus, a team/ group is formed supported by elements of self-propelled Artillery, Air Defence Artillery, Engineers, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME), Signal and air assets (Attack helicopter). At present training modules are conducted in isolation, not keeping harmony between armour and mechanized infantry as combined arms concept (CT/CG/CC).
In addition, ongoing training (Mechanized Infantry Course -UN, conducted by SI&T and ACC&S) on mechanized forces focused on UN employment rather than their conventional employment. Therefore, it is necessary to redesign the overall training concept keeping in mind the classic role of mechanized forces.
Bangladesh Army may take a closer look for developing a separate center and school for mechanized infantry. A separate institutional training and formation training curriculum for the officers and men need to be developed in order to strengthen the effectiveness of mechanize forces. Besides, few designated training areas (Sarnaw Deep and Hathazari Field Firing Range) need to be developed to conduct CT/CG/CC level maneuver exercise with live firing, at least once in a year/alternative year.
Efficacy of Mechanized Infantry :
In Operation DESERT SHIELD, during the built-up phase of the first Gulf War, the army was concerned about the lack of mobility, protection and firepower offered by rapid deployment (i.e. airborne) formations19; and about the slowness of deployed regular armoured units. Increasingly, the US Army in its several conflicts all over the world is using lighter vehicles. The total ratio of heavy tanks to ICVs/APCs/Light Armour Vehicle (LAVs) works out to 6344: 19772, or approximately 1:3.11. The UK has relied upon its mainstay on Challenger tanks till date.20 However, a relative doctrinal shift has been observed in its plan of further expansion and restructuring of UK Armed Forces.
Emphasis has been laid on employment of heavy mechanized superiority compared to pure armour elements. Under the proposal of future army, the UK Armed Forces will have an overall ratio of heavy tank units to lighter mechanized units of approximately 5:11 or 1:2.221. After the 1965 war, the Indian Army felt the necessity to provide matching mobility to the infantry units operating with the armoured formations. Indian Army moved from ICV to IFV concept in 1980 by incorporating BMP I (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty) from Russia in order to support maneuver of the Infantry.
Indian Army has transferred technology for producing BMP II by Ordnance Factory Medak under the supervision of Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). Mechanized Infantry has a separate training centre at Ahmednagar known as Mechanized Infantry Regimental Centre (MIRC) co-located with Armour Centre and School (AC&S). The centre endows with all possible training infrastructures where recruits and officers of Mechanized Infantry Regiment are being trained.
Each nation maintains its armed forces and shapes it in a manner that the military hardware best suits to meet its envisaged threats. Traditionally, heavy tanks or armour has dominated the armies of the world. The ratio between tanks and infantry depends on many factors. The most important factors are the type of combat and nature of engagement. If the engagement is in maneuver warfare over open terrain, the infantry is there to support the tanks.
In that case, the ratio of infantry to tanks depends a lot on the specific type of terrain and how many close assaults that are anticipated. However, in recent years, due to the changing nature of warfare, shrinking reaction time, rapid urbanization in almost all parts of the world and emergence of new threat heavy tanks have not been used in many conflict scenarios. It is instructive to analyze this aspect.
Cutting-edge military hardware and software is must to furnish any army with the delivery time and to keep pace with the emerging armies. The theory of warfare is in the process of continuous transformation and qualitative expansions in weaponries are on the rise.
A military commander gets the aptitude to reach unprecedented levels of acquaintance, swiftness and harmonization from a wide range of new digital information technologies. Future wars will be predominantly asymmetric in nature based on the technology and economic aspects, which is exposed by a contemplation of the current trends of warfare. To cultivate finest power at the point of resolution against the nemesis a cohesive employment of all arms is essential.
The combined arms concept envisages employment of two or more arms in mutual support of each other to achieve the desired results that neither can obtain on their own. The Mechanized Infantry best compliments the firepower and shock action of armour, the pre- dominant arm to be employed in the northwestern part of Bangladesh.
Today, the terrorists are not insurgents, but a lethal and potent tool in the hands of ideologically deviant, with a capability to disrupt the social fabrics and law order situation of Bangladesh. Since the training, ethos and regimentation of mechanized infantry are reflecting this aspect, therefore they can be employed to counter asymmetric threat if necessary.
Most countries have adopted for a force structure that can quickly become effective at a place and time where it is required. Such a force must have the ability to face the plethora of threats that are envisaged in near future. The mission of Mechanized Infantry Battalion as specified in the proposed TO&E ‘To close with and destroy the enemy’ is similar to Standard Infantry Battalion.25 Thus, it clearly emerges that the role of the mechanized infantry needs review keeping the trends world over and emerging future battlefield with existing capabilities of ICVs/APCs.
Since Mechanized Infantry Battalion will always deploy in consonance with Armour Regiment, therefore the mission may be reviewed as ‘To close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver’. The mechanized force of Bangladesh Army is likely to operate across the wide spectrum of threats, which must have the following:
All training and exercises should be organized as Combat Team, Combat Group and Combat Command in order to create mechanized psyche in Bangladesh Army.
The Mechanized Infantry training should be developed according to their trade and reorientation of basic training for soldiers and need review keeping in mind the existing terrain and the emerging threat scenario.
Training area including live firing is a necessity to build cohesion amongst Mechanized Infantry and armour. Shorno Dweep (SD) is one of the options for such training however there may be more training area adjacent to formation and school where units can undertake routine exercises.
The mechanized infantry needs to evolve from the ‘Battle Taxi Concept’ to the ‘ICV Concept’ backed by its robust ‘all terrain’ capabilities.
The mechanized force should have adequate number of ICVs that must confer versatility by having the capability to operate in closed and obstacle-ridden terrain.
The actual ratio of tank units to Mechanized Infantry units would depend on a caseto-case basis. However, the ratio of Mechanized Infantry Battalion and Armour Regiment will vary considering classical maneuver warfare in open and close terrain.
Possibility of employing mechanized forces particularly in LIC and counterterrorism operations, also need to be considered.
ICVs may be utilized in seaborne role in conjunction with the Bangladesh Navy along the southern coastlines for amphibious operations. Mechanized Infantry has the capability to deliver decisive combat power on beachheads and may be required for future landing operations.
Recommendations:
From the roles enunciated for Mechanized Infantry in above paragraphs, it clearly emerges that Mechanized Infantry will be the ‘Arm of the Future’ owing to its inherent capabilities to undertake operations in different operational environments. The footprint of Mechanized Infantry needs to be increased considering emerging geo-strategic environment. A set of recommendations is proposed to overcome the forthcoming challenges in regards to Mechanized Infantry of Bangladesh Army:
The existing mission i.e. ‘To close with and destroy the enemy’ of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion may be reviewed with the proposed mission i.e. ‘To close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver’, considering its role and employment concept.
Bangladesh Army may incorporate ICVs in its inventory for Mechanized Infantry in order to shift from ‘Battle Taxi Concept’ to ‘ICV Concept’.
There may be a separate center and school for Mechanized Infantry for conducting different types of courses and training for officers and men. Besides, there may be a dedicated training area for mechanized forces, where conduct of live firing is possible.
Bangladesh Army needs to develop separate training modalities for Mechanized Infantry considering environment of the combined arms concept.
Conclusion :
The importance of Mechanized Infantry cannot be stressed further. ICV/APC is an integral part of the mechanized forces and it has prescribed tasks. The tanks have relied heavily on the Mechanized Infantry since World War II for their survival. This reliance is stated in a memorandum by the German Oberkommando des Heers (Commander of the Army), "There can be no doubt that, without the closest cooperation of the panzer grenadier and the tank, the latter is of limited value ... It is even said by some that commanders would prefer to lose tanks rather than their infantry....". Instead of questioning the relevance of Mechanized Infantry, there is a need to increase its numbers and provide it with a better platform for allowing it to perform its task in a better way.
The patterns of mechanized warfare have not changed much; rather it became well-accepted concept in 21st Century. There is a necessity for effective training at formations and schools for making mechanized forces operationally ready with their armament and equipment, to deliver the maximum. Thus, the role of the Mechanized Infantry in Bangladesh Army needs due attention. The mechanization effort should continue as per the Forces Goal 2030 for preparing Bangladesh Army to face challenges of 21st Century.
Source- Bangladesh Army Journal 61st Issue.
