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Maos famous handshake and thawing of freeze
By Brajesh Mishra
I was in New York in 1968 when instructions came that I was to go to Beijing. I was to be the chargé daffaires and the posting had perhaps something to do with the fact that in 1960-61 I was Deputy Secretary (China) at headquarters. Perhaps it also had something to do with the political family to which I belong. I remember after my posting was announced, one newspaper, The Patriot, wrote that there must be something deep in the posting of Brajesh Mishra to China. Perhaps, said The Patriot, Mrs Indira Gandhi wants to improve relations and knowing that Brajesh Mishra is the son of his father (Dwarka Prasad Mishra), she thinks that she will get political support for improving relations with China.
I dont think Mrs Gandhi had anything in her mind about my pedigree before posting me to Beijing, but she certainly wished to improve relations with China. In fact, when I called on her before leaving for Beijing, she instructed me in one sentence: I am in a box so far as relations with China are concerned, and I want us to get out of that box. And then we talked about other matters. So her intention was quite clear and this was in 1969 when she had not yet established her supremacy in the Congress. It was going to happen later that year. Yet less than seven years after the 1962 war, she was conscious that the two countries had to at least normalise the relations even if they could not go back to the earlier days.
So, I got to Beijing in April 1969. Somebody from the Embassy came to Hong Kong to escort me to Beijing. I was received only once by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of Asia, Han Nianlong, and that too in 1971, that is two years and many months after my arrival in Beijing. Kishan Rana (a career diplomat who went on to hold some major posts at home and abroad) had joined me by that time; China had gained her place at the UN. Mrs Gandhi wrote letters to heads of State Governments explaining our case in regard to a letter for Premier Zhou Enlai, which I delivered to Han Nianlong. That was the only time he received me.
Those days there was a lot of propaganda against India. I used to go very often to the Chinese Foreign Office to meet the Director of the Asia Division who later became Chinas Ambassador to Turkey. We used to engage in discussions about India-China relations and how to improve them. This went on for about a year when on May 1, 1970 the heads of missions were lined up on the ramparts of Tiananmen Square and to our surprise Chairman Mao was present there. So there we were, lined up in order of precedence, and I was virtually the last one just after the British CDA.
Chairman Mao went to each head of mission, shaking hands. He came to the British CDA, who congratulated Chairman Mao on the satellite which the Chinese had sent up and Chairman Mao replied, My greetings to the Queen, and we wish her the same success. Then he came to me and said: My greetings to President Giri and to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and then he said, Shall we keep on quarrelling like this? He kept quiet for a moment and then flashed his famous Mao smile followed by the handshake which everybody knows about. That was his desire to be friends again. Basically I took it to mean that the Chinese Government was reciprocating the Government of Indias desire to improve relations.
From then on, things began to improve. There was more forthrightness in talking to us and this went on until elections, which Mrs Gandhi won with a thumping majority. Zhou Enlai, at one party, asked me to congratulate Mrs Gandhi. And then came the problem in East Pakistan. The way I perceived it, the Chinese stepped back as soon as it became clear that India-Pakistan relations were going to take a nosedive over the problems in East Pakistan. In August 1971, I came to Delhi for consultations. On August 9 the India-USSR Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded. Obviously all this had an effect upon Chinese thinking.
But I want to share an open secret. Even at that time, despite the lukewarm attitude in Beijing and despite the corresponding negative thoughts in the Foreign Office in Delhi, Mrs Gandhi was quite clear that the efforts to improve relations must continue. In 1971, during one of my meetings with Mrs Gandhi, I got a clearance from her to propose exactly the same thing. I went back to Beijing in September 1971. The Lin Biao incident had taken place and the leadership was busy with the aftermath and there wasnt much of a response. Then, by October, things began to hot up between India and Pakistan. China had become a permanent member of the Security Council, and obviously that was not the time, as far as the Chinese were concerned, to think of exchange of Ambassadors between India and China.
So, during the India-Pakistan war, the situation was tense and there was apprehension that the Chinese might intervene and we spent two weeks and more wondering as to what was going to happen. But in this connection, I must go back to the time before the war.
About a week before the war began, I had a conversation with the Director of the Asia Division, the gentleman who became Chinas Ambassador to Turkey afterwards. We had a long discussion and I explained what was happening in East Pakistan. Towards the end, he said to me: Mr CDA, you should understand that China will act in accordance with international law. I dont know what kind of expression I had on my face: I had probably given him the impression that I hadnt understood what he was saying. So, as we came out he walked up to the gate to see me off and repeated that sentence.
There was a feeling, I gathered, that China was not going to intervene, militarily at least, in the conflict. The war was over by December 16 and on December 17 I was called to the Foreign Office and handed over a note of protest against Indian troops crossing the Sikkim border. We wondered as to why this kind of note was issued because the Indian Army was engaged in various fronts and would not be foolish enough to cross the Sikkim border. But Kishan told me not to bother, that this was just a show of solidarity with Pakistan. This note we sent to Delhi.
After the war, it took a long time for the Chinese to make up their minds that the time was ripe for the process of normalisation of relations to begin. I had left by that time, but I must recount another incident which touched me quite a lot. November 29 used to be the Albanian Day and Albania was the most important friend of China during that period. The Albanian Ambassador was the most important diplomat and a reception was organised by him at Peking Hotel. I was there.
The normal practice was that after the second course, the host would make a speech and the Chinese would reply. After the second course, there was no speech. It was only after the ice cream was served that the speeches began, and of course the Chinese guest attacked India on the India-Pakistan conflict and I walked out. This kept on happening from November 29 till December 16. I must have attended four or five banquets during that period, and no speech was made when the second course was served. Speeches took place only after ice cream. Later, a Pakistani diplomat told me that the Chinese had indicated that they would like the Indian CDA to complete his meal before he walked out. Hence, I would enjoy all the courses plus the ice cream and then walk out my wife following suit with a full stomach.
I have dealt with this India-Pakistan-China triangle because even today it bedevils our relationship with China. I wanted to tell you as to how it affected the improvement in Sino-lndian relations even at that time. Since it is a long-standing problem, this triangle has to be looked into. Its not going to be easy to normalise relations without finding a solution to this problem. The border question has to be settled, the level of trust and confidence necessary between two friends will not be there finally until the border question is settled fairly and equitably.
But we must not forget that the other problem which faces us is what is perceived in India as Chinas support to Pakistan against India. Maybe our perceptions are wrong, maybe theres another side to the story, but this is the perception in this country by and large. And having worked for more than four years in Beijing trying to mend the relationship, I believe that trying to begin the process of normalisation, full normalisation, is not going to be possible until this (China-Pakistan collaboration) problem is taken care of. Either India accepts the point of view of China, or China modifies its stand.
This is not to say that the process of normalisation in other spheres should not continue; it must, of course. Maybe that process of normalisation would bring about a situation where it would be easier to solve the border question, and to deal with the India-Pakistan-China triangle. Maybe the intervention of trade, economic relations and other kinds of co-operation will help us in arriving at a normal situation and we must pursue these. After all let us not forget that we are saying the same thing to Pakistan and Bangladesh, we are saying to Pakistan that of course we must discuss Kashmir, but let us also proceed in other spheres, and we are saying to Bangladesh that of course we must have a satisfactory agreement on sharing of river water but let us also proceed elsewhere.
We in India need also to recognise that China has become a global player, economically and politically. Therefore, we need to recognise that China has certain other preoccupations, and we need to recognise that in those other preoccupations there could be a question mark in Chinas mind as to what Indias attitude would be.
(Excerpted from the transcript of a lecture by Brajesh Mishra at IGNCA, New Delhi, in 1998. The author passed away in New Delhi on September 28, 2012. Courtesy: Across The Himalayan Gap)
By Brajesh Mishra
I was in New York in 1968 when instructions came that I was to go to Beijing. I was to be the chargé daffaires and the posting had perhaps something to do with the fact that in 1960-61 I was Deputy Secretary (China) at headquarters. Perhaps it also had something to do with the political family to which I belong. I remember after my posting was announced, one newspaper, The Patriot, wrote that there must be something deep in the posting of Brajesh Mishra to China. Perhaps, said The Patriot, Mrs Indira Gandhi wants to improve relations and knowing that Brajesh Mishra is the son of his father (Dwarka Prasad Mishra), she thinks that she will get political support for improving relations with China.
I dont think Mrs Gandhi had anything in her mind about my pedigree before posting me to Beijing, but she certainly wished to improve relations with China. In fact, when I called on her before leaving for Beijing, she instructed me in one sentence: I am in a box so far as relations with China are concerned, and I want us to get out of that box. And then we talked about other matters. So her intention was quite clear and this was in 1969 when she had not yet established her supremacy in the Congress. It was going to happen later that year. Yet less than seven years after the 1962 war, she was conscious that the two countries had to at least normalise the relations even if they could not go back to the earlier days.
So, I got to Beijing in April 1969. Somebody from the Embassy came to Hong Kong to escort me to Beijing. I was received only once by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of Asia, Han Nianlong, and that too in 1971, that is two years and many months after my arrival in Beijing. Kishan Rana (a career diplomat who went on to hold some major posts at home and abroad) had joined me by that time; China had gained her place at the UN. Mrs Gandhi wrote letters to heads of State Governments explaining our case in regard to a letter for Premier Zhou Enlai, which I delivered to Han Nianlong. That was the only time he received me.
Those days there was a lot of propaganda against India. I used to go very often to the Chinese Foreign Office to meet the Director of the Asia Division who later became Chinas Ambassador to Turkey. We used to engage in discussions about India-China relations and how to improve them. This went on for about a year when on May 1, 1970 the heads of missions were lined up on the ramparts of Tiananmen Square and to our surprise Chairman Mao was present there. So there we were, lined up in order of precedence, and I was virtually the last one just after the British CDA.
Chairman Mao went to each head of mission, shaking hands. He came to the British CDA, who congratulated Chairman Mao on the satellite which the Chinese had sent up and Chairman Mao replied, My greetings to the Queen, and we wish her the same success. Then he came to me and said: My greetings to President Giri and to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and then he said, Shall we keep on quarrelling like this? He kept quiet for a moment and then flashed his famous Mao smile followed by the handshake which everybody knows about. That was his desire to be friends again. Basically I took it to mean that the Chinese Government was reciprocating the Government of Indias desire to improve relations.
From then on, things began to improve. There was more forthrightness in talking to us and this went on until elections, which Mrs Gandhi won with a thumping majority. Zhou Enlai, at one party, asked me to congratulate Mrs Gandhi. And then came the problem in East Pakistan. The way I perceived it, the Chinese stepped back as soon as it became clear that India-Pakistan relations were going to take a nosedive over the problems in East Pakistan. In August 1971, I came to Delhi for consultations. On August 9 the India-USSR Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded. Obviously all this had an effect upon Chinese thinking.
But I want to share an open secret. Even at that time, despite the lukewarm attitude in Beijing and despite the corresponding negative thoughts in the Foreign Office in Delhi, Mrs Gandhi was quite clear that the efforts to improve relations must continue. In 1971, during one of my meetings with Mrs Gandhi, I got a clearance from her to propose exactly the same thing. I went back to Beijing in September 1971. The Lin Biao incident had taken place and the leadership was busy with the aftermath and there wasnt much of a response. Then, by October, things began to hot up between India and Pakistan. China had become a permanent member of the Security Council, and obviously that was not the time, as far as the Chinese were concerned, to think of exchange of Ambassadors between India and China.
So, during the India-Pakistan war, the situation was tense and there was apprehension that the Chinese might intervene and we spent two weeks and more wondering as to what was going to happen. But in this connection, I must go back to the time before the war.
About a week before the war began, I had a conversation with the Director of the Asia Division, the gentleman who became Chinas Ambassador to Turkey afterwards. We had a long discussion and I explained what was happening in East Pakistan. Towards the end, he said to me: Mr CDA, you should understand that China will act in accordance with international law. I dont know what kind of expression I had on my face: I had probably given him the impression that I hadnt understood what he was saying. So, as we came out he walked up to the gate to see me off and repeated that sentence.
There was a feeling, I gathered, that China was not going to intervene, militarily at least, in the conflict. The war was over by December 16 and on December 17 I was called to the Foreign Office and handed over a note of protest against Indian troops crossing the Sikkim border. We wondered as to why this kind of note was issued because the Indian Army was engaged in various fronts and would not be foolish enough to cross the Sikkim border. But Kishan told me not to bother, that this was just a show of solidarity with Pakistan. This note we sent to Delhi.
After the war, it took a long time for the Chinese to make up their minds that the time was ripe for the process of normalisation of relations to begin. I had left by that time, but I must recount another incident which touched me quite a lot. November 29 used to be the Albanian Day and Albania was the most important friend of China during that period. The Albanian Ambassador was the most important diplomat and a reception was organised by him at Peking Hotel. I was there.
The normal practice was that after the second course, the host would make a speech and the Chinese would reply. After the second course, there was no speech. It was only after the ice cream was served that the speeches began, and of course the Chinese guest attacked India on the India-Pakistan conflict and I walked out. This kept on happening from November 29 till December 16. I must have attended four or five banquets during that period, and no speech was made when the second course was served. Speeches took place only after ice cream. Later, a Pakistani diplomat told me that the Chinese had indicated that they would like the Indian CDA to complete his meal before he walked out. Hence, I would enjoy all the courses plus the ice cream and then walk out my wife following suit with a full stomach.
I have dealt with this India-Pakistan-China triangle because even today it bedevils our relationship with China. I wanted to tell you as to how it affected the improvement in Sino-lndian relations even at that time. Since it is a long-standing problem, this triangle has to be looked into. Its not going to be easy to normalise relations without finding a solution to this problem. The border question has to be settled, the level of trust and confidence necessary between two friends will not be there finally until the border question is settled fairly and equitably.
But we must not forget that the other problem which faces us is what is perceived in India as Chinas support to Pakistan against India. Maybe our perceptions are wrong, maybe theres another side to the story, but this is the perception in this country by and large. And having worked for more than four years in Beijing trying to mend the relationship, I believe that trying to begin the process of normalisation, full normalisation, is not going to be possible until this (China-Pakistan collaboration) problem is taken care of. Either India accepts the point of view of China, or China modifies its stand.
This is not to say that the process of normalisation in other spheres should not continue; it must, of course. Maybe that process of normalisation would bring about a situation where it would be easier to solve the border question, and to deal with the India-Pakistan-China triangle. Maybe the intervention of trade, economic relations and other kinds of co-operation will help us in arriving at a normal situation and we must pursue these. After all let us not forget that we are saying the same thing to Pakistan and Bangladesh, we are saying to Pakistan that of course we must discuss Kashmir, but let us also proceed in other spheres, and we are saying to Bangladesh that of course we must have a satisfactory agreement on sharing of river water but let us also proceed elsewhere.
We in India need also to recognise that China has become a global player, economically and politically. Therefore, we need to recognise that China has certain other preoccupations, and we need to recognise that in those other preoccupations there could be a question mark in Chinas mind as to what Indias attitude would be.
(Excerpted from the transcript of a lecture by Brajesh Mishra at IGNCA, New Delhi, in 1998. The author passed away in New Delhi on September 28, 2012. Courtesy: Across The Himalayan Gap)
