Libya no-fly zone: Gaddafi's forces and rebels are hard to tell apart from the air
No one wants to make a mistake and have innocent civilian deaths on their hands, but nobody wants another Srebrenica
John Nichol
guardian.co.uk, Saturday 19 March 2011 18.21 GMT
Libyan rebels have had some successes, but NATO troops find it hard to distinguish between government and rebel forces. Photograph: Anja Niedringhaus/AP
What has been announced for Libya is very different to the no-fly zone that I patrolled over Bosnia for three months as a Tornado F3 navigator during 1994-95. Indeed, the measures being spoken about do not amount to a no-fly zone at all. It seems to be more of a UN protectorate centring on Benghazi. But it is already possible to see where the dangers may be.
It is clear that some Libyan fast jets are attacking civilian targets, and there is little doubt that they could be stopped. But the real damage is being carried out by Gaddafi's troops, armed with basic tanks, guns and machetes.
It is not yet clear what the resolution term "all means necessary" will entail: will aircraft be authorised to attack Gaddafi's forces on the ground and the military command and control structure? This would be a huge escalation of Nato involvement.
Srebrenica was a classic example of when enemy forces are allowed to go about their bloody business unimpeded, as 8,000 civilians, mostly men and boys, were murdered by Bosnian Serbs, and 25,000 to 30,000 refugees ethnically cleansed. My UN colleagues, on the ground and in the air, sat by as it happened.
But in Libya, giving Nato or UN aircraft the authority to attack Gaddafi forces will produce unique problems: many are not using easily identifiable military equipment, and trying to distinguish friend from foe will be immensely challenging.
Our aircrew are experienced and dedicated professionals trained for the task ahead of them, but the difference between a pick-up truck carrying Gaddafi forces and a pick-up truck carrying evacuees is not easy to spot from the air. Nobody wants to make a mistake and have innocent civilian deaths on their hands.
There is also the issue of helicopters. The no-fly zone in Bosnia prevented many fast-jet incursions; the helicopters were another matter. We would spot them disgorging troops that we knew would soon be entering a town to massacre civilians. Yet none were shot down because the issues of positive identification were legion – all sides were happy to disguise helicopters with Red Cross markings or UN logos. Who was willing to take the risk of killing civilians?
Other problems include command, control and co-ordination. Who is going to explain to rebels in Benghazi how to tell the difference between an RAF Tornado and a Libyan Flogger jet? We know that a Libyan jet was brought down yesterday, but who was flying it – a rebel pilot or a Gaddafi loyalist? All the pictures that we have seen of rebels manning anti-aircraft guns suggest that they are quite happy to blaze away at anything.
The air defence system may need to be destroyed. This poses many problems, including the possibility of civilian casualties – and the nigh-on impossible task of locating all mobile missile systems. One answer suggested by our political leaders is that missile sites might be engaged only after they have fired on allied aircraft. I suspect this will find little favour among the men and women flying our aircraft.
The other issue is what happens if Gaddafi forces adhere to their ceasefire. Will Nato aircraft still have the authority to attack military targets? Are we prepared to stay for the long haul? How long is Nato prepared to protect Benghazi, when it could become the only free Libyan city?
That could go on for months or, conceivably, even years. The costs would be enormous and, to put it bluntly, the military wouldn't have the resources.
The military is this country's insurance policy, yet only a few months ago, many politicians said the armed forces needed to make drastic cuts. The events in the Middle East would seem to suggest that the opposite is true.
Many eyebrows were raised in the Ministry of Defence at recent decisions to cut military resources, especially Royal Navy carriers and RAF Harrier forces, both of which would have been crucial in any long-term operations in the Gulf or the Mediterranean.
Perhaps most importantly, has anybody defined what the final military objective must be? Even if Gaddafi's regime collapses or fails under Nato pressure, we will be left with the question: "what comes next?"
This question was never asked in Iraq or Afghanistan, and one can only hope that the politicians have learned from those disastrous mistakes.
John Nichol served in the Gulf, Bosnia and the Falklands. His latest book, "Medic – Saving Lives From Dunkirk To Afghanistan", is published by Penguin, price £9.99.