The report is dated but it makes some important observations - The Pakistan army is unwilling to win this war, as the report highlights the constant complain of the Pakistan Army that the civilian leadership when not aloof, chooses to not engage on "strategic" issues - India remains a concerns that enables the Pakistan army to justify it's unwillingness to secure Pakistan against the Islamist enemy, indeed, it put to lie, the Pakistan Army complain that civilians refuse to engage it on a "strategic" level, perhaps the the substance of the complaint is that "not on the terms of the Pakistan army".
Additionally, while the Pakistan army speak of "strategic" concerns, the creation out of the FC, a military unit heavily influenced by foreigners, appears, apparently, to be lost on the "strategic" thinkers, to the degree that such exist in the Pakistan army.
An awareness on Human Terrain/Human Geography is certainly welcome, however, this development in the case of the Pakistan army, given it anti-intellectual ethic, remains a work in progress, if not entirely suspect. The tension between an academic and real world experience and compulsions of military training have been a problem for Armies such as those of the US as well.
From another angle or perspective, we can assert that the Pakistan government is as much an element of insurgency as is the TTP and the space given to extremist thought in society in general.
I would invite other readers to set straight my understanding with regard to the Pakistan army and the elimination of Islamist combatants, I found it interesting that Mr. Nawaz choose not to dedicate my space to this issue - seems to me that the best COIN or LIC successful policy is the making of large numbers of the enemy, dead - but if that does not find an echo in the Pakistan army, it may be cause for concern.