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Kiyani Demands US Limit Drone Attacks and Operations

I think the purpose of this thread has died with Pasha coming back from US empty handed because non of the demands have been met and agreed upon more over US has declared they've in place a CIA network and they no longer depend on ISI.

So lets discuss...What would be ISI/Army Strategy from now on we'll have to wait for a few incidents.
 
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I think the purpose of this thread has died with Pasha coming back from US empty handed because non of the demands have been met and agreed upon more over US has declared they've in place a CIA network and they no longer depend on ISI.
Reports of the US setting up its own network in Pakistan have been in circulation for a while now, so I would have to argue that the ISI was not ignorant of what the US was doing in that regard. What the ISI has done to counter that expansion in terms of ensuring it does not act against Pakistani interests is something that we will likely not find out for a long time, if ever, just as we will not find out the true scope and details of this 'US intelligence network in Pakistan' for a long time, if ever.

On the issue of Pasha returning 'empty handed', while that does appear to be the case currently, I would have to say that final judgement will depend on actual events as we move forward. Will drone attacks resume with the same frequency we saw in the early part of the year? Will we continue to hear about large numbers of civilian casualties as a result of a 'trigger happy' American drone program?

The numbers will tell the story soon enough, regardless of the rhetoric on either side.
 
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^^ So what do you make out of Rehman Malik's statement 'we do not have technology to shoot drones'

CIA don't hire people in street.. CIA network means minister, senators, bureaucrats and it is easy to catch them.. just check who is packing up from Pakistan i.e. selling his assets and buying flat and taxis in london.

There are so many easy ways to capture anti state elements....
 
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^^ So what do you make out of Rehman Malik's statement 'we do not have technology to shoot drones'

CIA don't hire people in street.. CIA network means minister, senators, bureaucrats and it is easy to catch them.. just check who is packing up from Pakistan i.e. selling his assets and buying flat and taxis in london.

There are so many easy ways to capture anti state elements....
is that not treason?
 
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F-16 Service ceiling: 60,000+ ft
Predator drone Service ceiling: 25000ft

Rehman malik's service ceiling 100,000ft
 
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you must be kidding heheheh ...... i mean you are asking pak arm forces to attack his own master ...... dog will never attack to his master .... slave is always a slave ............ may ALLAH forgive us for our wrong deeds .........
one of the best posts on PDF very well said brother brilliant brother just brilliant !!!
 
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^^ So what do you make out of Rehman Malik's statement 'we do not have technology to shoot drones'

CIA don't hire people in street.. CIA network means minister, senators, bureaucrats and it is easy to catch them.. just check who is packing up from Pakistan i.e. selling his assets and buying flat and taxis in london.

There are so many easy ways to capture anti state elements....

I didn't see rehman's malik statement 'we do not have technology to shoot drones'

Can you give me a link?
 
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Why kiyani was silent uptill now? No country allow attack inside their soil , it is violation of international law also
 
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http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=42073&Cat=9&dt=4/17/2011

Who could have imagined that a serving commander of the Pakistan Army in the Waziristan badlands would have consciously knocked the popular myth that American drone strikes in Fata are part of the problem and not part of the solution of terrorism? But that’s exactly what happened on March 8.

Maj Gen Ghayur Mehmud, GOC 7th Div North Waziristan, did not mince words in his printed brief ‘“Myths and Rumours about US Predator Strikes” handed out to journalists from his command post in the area. He made two main points: (1) A majority of those killed by drone strikes are “hardcore Taliban or Al Qaeda elements, especially foreigners,” while civilian casualties are “few”. (2) But by scaring local populations and compelling displacement through migration, drone attacks create social and political blowbacks for law enforcement agencies. Obviously, the first consequence is good and welcome as part of the national “solution” strategy and the second is problematic and should be minimised because it creates local “problems” of a tactical nature.

Gen Mehmud hasn’t been fired or reprimanded. This means he had the green signal from the GHQ to make his brief. His statement explains the consciously nurtured “duality” of official policy versus popular position on drone strikes and confirms the Wikileaks summary that both secret authorisation and popular criticism go hand in hand in Pakistan where both civilian and military leaders are on the same page.

To be sure, the tactical issues are not insignificant. The Pakistani military would dearly love to own some Predators or at least have a measure of command and control over them, so the demand is worth making publically all the time even though it routinely falls on deaf American ears – for obvious reasons, this devastating technology isn’t available to any state except Israel.

Similarly, the Pakistan military would like to have a critical advance say on the choice of drone targets so that “hardcore Al-Qaeda elements and foreigners” noted by Gen Ghayur are usefully targeted but some Pakistani “assets” among the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omer, Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hizbe Islami and Siraj Haqqani’s Taliban network are spared for long-term application in Afghanistan. Disagreement with the Americans over this particular issue compels military spokespersons to blow hot (in public) and cold (in front of the Americans) over all drone strikes.

Sometimes, when it gets uncomfortably hot under the collar, then General Ashfaq Kayani has to weigh in for public consumption – as he did recently when, the day after Raymond Davis was freed (courtesy ISI) amidst howls of protest from the media, a drone strike killed over 40 pro and anti-military tribesmen in a jirga for local conflict resolution in Fata.

Pakistan and America have some strategic interests in common, like eliminating Al-Qaeda from Waziristan. But there are disagreements about who is a “good” Taliban and who is not. This is not strange at all. The answer to this question will determine who will rule or share power in Afghanistan in the next five years and who will not. It will also have a bearing on Afghanistan’s strategic and tactical allies in the neighbourhood in the future – India or Pakistan. Therefore Pakistan’s military, which loves to hate India even as America is itching to embrace India, believes it cannot shrug away any openings or opportunities for leveraging its concerns and interests.

This perspective explains how the Raymond Davis case was handled (exploited) by the ISI and the import of DG-ISI’s recent dash to Washington for a meeting with the CIA chief. The ISI wants greater tactical input/output into CIA operations in Pakistan (to protect its strategic assets at home like the Lashkar-e-Tayba and the Haqqani network) even as it strategically allows the US to operate drones and run special agents freely from two bases in Pakistan where visas and landing rights are not an issue. Who knows how many Americans land or take off from these bases, how many carry weapons and what they do in their bulletproof SUVs when they cruise the length and breadth of Pakistan?

Under the circumstances, the DG-ISI’s “request” in Langley was about reposing “trust” in joint operations rather than any overt threat to deny existing facilities and rights. The US has responded with a drone strike in South Waziristan which is supposed to be strictly out of bounds. This signals its intention to remain focused on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda even as it “considers” Gen Pasha’s request for greater sensitivity to Pakistan’s needs and interests. No more, no less.

A recent editorial in The Wall Street Journal, a pro-US establishment paper, sums up the American position bluntly. It is titled: The Pakistan Ultimatum: choose whose side it is on. “Maybe the Obama Administration can inform its friends in Islamabad that, when it comes to this particular fight, the U.S. will continue to pursue its enemies wherever they may be, with or without Pakistan’s cooperation... Pakistan can choose to cooperate in that fight and reap the benefits of an American alliance. Or it can oppose the U.S. and reap the consequences, including the loss of military aid, special-ops and drone incursions into their frontier areas, and in particular a more robust U.S. military alliance with India... After 9/11 Pakistan had to choose whose side it was on. It’s time to present Pakistan with the same choice again.

So it’s time for Pakistan’s military leaders to make up their minds and deal with its consequences. They must be upfront with America – because it’s a greatly beneficial “friend” to have and a deadly “enemy” to make – and honest with Pakistanis – because they’re not stupid and can eventually see through duplicity, as they did in the Raymond Davis case.

The military cannot forever hunt with America and run with an anti-American Pakistani public they have helped to create. They cannot instruct the DG-ISPR in Islamabad to convey the impression of tough talking in Langley while asking the GOC 7 Division in Waziristan to give a realistic brief to the media about the critical benefits of drone strikes amidst all the “myths and rumours” of their negativity. This double-dealing confuses the public, annoys a strategic partner, and discredits the military all round when it is exposed.

More significantly, it makes it difficult for Pakistanis to swallow the hard realities and the harder decisions necessary to change them for the sake of the state’s survival and the nation’s growth.

The duality or contradiction in the military’s private and public position vis a vis its relationship with civilians in Pakistan and its relationship with America is a direct consequence of two inter-related factors: First, the military’s threat perception of India’s rising military capability, and second, its fear of losing control over India-centred national security policy to the civilians who are keen to start the process of building permanent peace in the region, thereby diluting the military’s pre-eminent role in Pakistan’s polity.

The military’s scheme of things requires a permanent state of relative hostility towards, and distrust of, India. That is why its national security doctrine is fashioned on the premise that it is India’s military capacity to harm Pakistan rather than its intentions to build a permanent peace that matter.

Of course, this is a perfect and unending rationalisation of its economic and political hold over Pakistan since India’s conventional weaponry is forecast to grow by leaps and bounds on the basis of a robust economy and nationalist unity. But Pakistan’s limping economy is groaning under the burden of the arms race engendered by this philosophy and its civilian polity is fracturing in the grab for diminishing resources. That is why its civilians are increasingly plucking up the courage to stare the army in the face for their political, provincial and economic rights.

The military’s policy of renting itself out to America for its own sake and also complaining about it at the same time for the sake of the Pakistani public is clearly bankrupt. Isn’t it time, therefore, to consider a different paradigm, one in which conflict resolution and peace with India deliver an economic dividend that can be reaped by all in an environment free from destabilising extremism and war in the neighbourhood? In pursuit of an untenable philosophy, what use are dubious non-state “assets” that can become extreme liabilities in an impending national meltdown?

Under the circumstances, General Kayani could do worse than go on the national hookup and defend the truth of the briefing given by his subordinate Maj Gen Ghuyur Mehmud. He will be surprised how quickly a majority of Pakhtuns in particular and Pakistanis in general will back him to the hilt and help change the national paradigm. This is more our war than it is America’s because we live and die here and not far away across two great oceans.
 
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U.S. Rift With Pakistan Grows Over Drone Strikes

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — The differences between the United States and Pakistan that broke into the open last week over the scale of C.I.A. operations here signaled a fundamental rift, plunging the relationship, sometimes strained, sometimes warm, to its lowest point in memory.

The rupture over Pakistan’s demands that the Americans end drone strikes — which the Obama administration rejected — and scale back their intelligence presence within Pakistan exposed the tentative nature of the alliance forged after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. And it is increasingly apparent that the two countries have differing, even irreconcilable, aims in Afghanistan.

With the Afghan endgame looming, suspicion is overwhelming faint cooperation between the United States and Pakistan, as each side seeks to secure its interests, increase its leverage to obtain them, and even cut out the other if need be, American and Pakistani officials say.

No one in Pakistan or in Washington now speaks of returning to the strategic alliance made by President George W. Bush and Gen. Pervez Musharraf immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks, when the primary goal was to operate joint intelligence efforts to capture operatives of Al Qaeda. Military officials from both sides say that arrangement was never bound to be a longstanding affair.

“There was never a level of trust,” said a former American military official who served in a senior position in Pakistan. “I’m convinced now they don’t want our help.”

The American official did not want to be identified while discussing the delicate nature of a relationship that, whatever its failings, both nations are reluctant to jettison completely.

But politicians on both sides are disappointed with the results of billions of dollars in American military and civilian assistance since 2001, and the Obama administration acknowledged to Congress in a report this month that the results of the spending fell short of expectations.

In any case, the money has done little to pave over the accumulating strategic differences between the two nations.

Broadly, the Americans seek a strong and relatively centralized Afghan government commanding a large army that can control its territory. Almost all those ends are objectionable to Pakistan, which while it calls for a stable Afghanistan, prefers a more loosely governed neighbor where it can influence events, if need be, through Taliban proxies.

The particular differences revolve around which Taliban factions should be included in any settlement; the role of India, an ally of the United States but the enemy of Pakistan; and the size of the new Afghan Army, which the Americans want big and the Pakistanis want small.

The situation is further complicated, American and Pakistani officials said, by discord within the Obama administration over how the United States should withdraw troops from Afghanistan, and what role, if any, Pakistan should play in the exit.

The overall commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus, is determined to batter the Taliban as much as possible, a policy that the Pakistanis disagree with, both sides say. Pakistan prefers that the State Department tilt toward reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Even within the Pentagon, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, who has met with the Pakistani military chief, Gen. Afshaq Parvez Kayani, on more than two dozen occasions, has more tolerance for the Pakistani point of view than does General Petraeus, a senior American official said. With his position in Washington, Admiral Mullen could still prevail on persevering with Pakistan.

These American nuances are well known at the Pakistani Army headquarters in Rawalpindi, where General Petraeus is referred to as Mr. Petraeus — a calculated omission of his military title as a way to mock his perceived political ambitions, according to a recent visitor to the headquarters.

For months, Pakistan’s diplomats and military officials have complained that they were being kept in the dark by the Obama administration’s maneuvering, no matter how preliminary, for a negotiated solution in Afghanistan.

“There is no transparency; they are not telling us who they are talking to,” a Pakistani government official said. Another official, in Pakistan’s security apparatus, said: “We don’t know what the Americans’ endgame is in Afghanistan.”

As their nervousness about American intentions have increased in recent months, the Pakistanis have sought to improve their leverage — threatening C.I.A. operations in Pakistan, cracking down on Taliban leaders to coerce their cooperation, and trying to befriend President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, who has also felt on the outs with Washington.

In the latest iteration of this new Pakistani-Afghan relationship, General Kayani and the head of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, accompanied Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani on a visit to Kabul on Saturday, the most public of a number of visits to Afghanistan by General Kayani in the past year.

American diplomats in Islamabad and Kabul declined to comment on the Pakistani visit to Afghanistan, and appeared to know little about the intention of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission unveiled with considerable fanfare by the two sides in Kabul as a vehicle to end the war.

To some extent, the Americans have been coaxing the Afghan and Pakistani leadership to talk to each other, but not at the cost of keeping the United States out of the loop, or of concocting solutions that are against American interests, American officials said.


The Pakistanis’ efforts to improve relations with Mr. Karzai, whom until recently they had given the cold shoulder, was but the latest example of attempts to sidestep the United States in order to safeguard Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.

The Pakistanis may well have scored an early gain with Mr. Karzai, reportedly persuading the Afghan president that a 400,000-strong Afghan Army favored by the Americans was unsustainable and should only number 100,000, a Pakistani familiar with General Kayani’s thinking said. For their part, American officials say they are reluctant to include Pakistan in the early maneuverings on peace in Afghanistan because they are concerned that Pakistan will block concessions that the United States wants from the Taliban.

In particular, the United States wants to keep pressure on the network led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, a longtime asset of Pakistan, whose fighters cross from North Waziristan into Afghanistan to strike at American and NATO soldiers.

The impression of the United States leaving Pakistan out in the cold is particularly disconcerting to General Kayani because he was granted a three-year extension on his term last July by his generals, partly on the grounds that he would win a seat for Pakistan at the Afghanistan negotiating table.

In a nod to General Kayani, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met the general on the sidelines of a conference in Munich in February and pledged that Pakistan would be included in the negotiations, a Pakistani and an American official said.

But distrust is carrying the day, as the dispute over the drone campaign showed. For some time, in fact, Pakistani security officials say, the Americans have refused to share information on their targets and have gathered intelligence on them on their own, using their own network of agents and informants.

The senior American official in Washington acknowledged that in many instances the Pakistanis had been cut out because they were not trusted. In the past, targets had escaped from the drones after word of the attack was leaked. That would presumably be by the Pakistani side, which still favors a strategy of choosing between “good” Taliban, those who do Pakistan’s bidding in Afghanistan, and “bad,” those who do not.

“The feeling of being allies was never there,” a senior Pakistani military officer, who has interacted closely with Washington since 2001, said. “I’ve said to the Americans: ‘You are going to fail in Afghanistan and you are going to make us the fall guy.’ I still think this is going to happen.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2&partner=rss&emc=rss
 
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