Kashmir: what next?

[fawwaxs]

Now that Islamabad and New Delhi have agreed to restart talks, it would be a legitimate question for Kashmir’s peacemakers to ask: ‘The peace process has restarted: what next?’

‘Process’ is about catalysing change. Even if does not yield the expected results, a process is important since it contributes to the upstaging of many long-held fixations. Take, for example, President Obama. Who would have thought a decade ago that an African-American would be US president?

The terrorists who carried out the carnage in Mumbai and other equally outrageous acts in Pakistan should know that it is impossible to keep change hostage, even to odious rage. A subtle generational change is taking place in South Asia. It is propelled by rising income levels, access to technology, increased connectivity and choices in a globalising environment; these changes are pushing matters forward.

This forward thrust is visible in the way New Delhi and Islamabad reacted to the Mumbai incident. Leaving aside the media frenzy, the anger and outrage, the two countries did not sever diplomatic ties. Unlike the past, they did not cut off air links or mobilise forces along the border. In fact, many Kashmir-specific confidence-building measures such as the intra-Kashmir bus-service and cross-border trade kept moving, and people-to-people contact remained active though at a more limited level.

My optimism for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue stems as much from the unjust situation of people of Kashmir for the past six decades as the inherent incapacity of the parties involved to settle it otherwise. War, though engaged upon more than once, is the instrument least likely to induce an acceptable outcome.

Hence the world needs to understand what drives those young boys lobbing stones in Srinagar when they chant ‘azadi’ or ‘freedom’. After all, Kashmiri leaders interpret the word differently. To some it means freedom from India, to others it is freedom from both India and Pakistan; then there are those who believe that the resistance is to end repression. One, two or all three could be correct. But whatever these youths want, they have been wanting it so much and for so long that the hand of fate is conspiring to help them achieve it.

First, President Obama’s revised ****** strategy and the subsequent London Conference in late January made it clear that Pakistan is the only viable exit road from Afghanistan — and naturally, the road to Islamabad’s fullest cooperation passes through Kashmir. Gen Ashfaq Kayani’s straight-talking at Nato the other week defined this paradigm in clearer terms when he informed the world that as long as Pakistan had issues to settle with India, it simply could not ignore the Indian threat.

Nato, tired and roughed-up in the merciless Afghan terrain, is fully aware that if there is one military out there that has the mettle to tame the Taliban in the medium and long run, either peacefully or by other means, it is the Pakistan Army. So they had to be listening to Gen Kayani’s words carefully and indeed they did: at stake is not just the beaten track of Central Asia but the prestige of the world’s supposedly greatest military alliance — Nato. Who would take it seriously any more if it was seen as being defeated by a primitive and ragtag militia called the Taliban?

Secondly, the appointment of Shiv Shankar Menon as the national security adviser to the Indian prime minister could be a good omen for the peace process. Coming from once troubled southern India, the former envoy to Islamabad and Beijing served as India’s foreign secretary during eventful times in the last round of the peace process.

Menon is reviled by the media hawks and a section of the establishment for his pro-peace inclination; he belongs to a new generation of diplomats that see the dividends of peace in a broader context. I met him with a group of former diplomats and PPP and PML politicians in 2006, on the sidelines of a peace conference in Delhi, and found him keen to help his government build bridges with Pakistan and work towards dispute resolution.

Thirdly, the emergence of Gilgit-Baltistan as a semi-autonomous and secondary provincial set-up, followed by the November elections in which all the mainstream parties participated, demonstrates Pakistan’s ability to take bold steps. Gilgit-Baltistan, together with Ladakh, constituted about 75 per cent of the former princely state’s territory in 1947.

Ladakh, comprising the Buddhist-dominated Leh and the Muslim-majority Kargil, already enjoys a special governance structure under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils — something different and above other regions of the state. Similarly, the Amarnath Temple Trust land scandal in 2008 exposed the deep divisions between Jammu and the true Kashmir.

In the light of these and other changes, it is now up to Islamabad and New Delhi, as well as other capitals that have a stake in building peace in the region, to take a fresh look at Kashmir’s demand for azadi.

If the choice is to deal with the dispute in its historical and legal entirety, then an inside-out process — that reconciles the competing interests of an already fractured state — is required before moving towards a final solution.

However, if the option is to narrow the focus to the question of azadi in the regions where it is in real demand, then the broadest spectrum of leadership in Srinagar and Muzaffarabad should be brought on board fully and specifically. But burying heads in the sand will not make the issue go away.

So when Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi says that he failed to find any paper trail of earlier deliberations by his predecessors, he probably meant that he would like to do it all over again and perhaps in a different way — which, under the circumstances, is plausible.

Those who participated in earlier peace-building efforts know that at that time, it was India that blew up any chance to make peace; this time, the onus of failure to capitalise on yet another opportunity may fall on the already strained PPP government.In an ideal world, parliament and the cabinet debates and the political leadership steers the process; but in our part of the planet nothing will work unless the two foreign offices synchronise and update their institutional memory with their respective GHQs. After all, Kashmir is a matter of peace — or a nuclear war.

DAWN.COM | Editorial | Kashmir: what next?

 

[Halaku Khan]

^^^ Pakistan has to adjust its expectations. Musharraf had reached a good understanding of the situation, but the present regime is undoing the progress Musharraf had made.

Pakistan's protestations about tyranny, human rights etc have zero credibility. India can very well point out how Pakistan suppresses democracy in Azad Kashmir As admitted by former ISI chief Javed Ashraf Qazi in the Pakistan parliament, Pakistani terrorist groups have been slaughtering thousands of Kashmiris on Indian side of LoC. So Pakistan is in no position to talk, especially given track record in East Pakistan and Balochistan.

India is under no obligation to hold any plebiscite. The UN resolutions were not binding. The resolutions themselves left many issues undefined, to be settled in subsequent negotiations. At best we can argue endlessly about why those subsequent negotiations failed.

India does allow Pakistani employees (Hurriyat) to contest elections. Unlike how Pakistan bars the JKLF in Azad Kashmir Hurriyat people are afraid of facing the people. People routinely ignore Hurriyat boycott calls and participate enthusiastically in elections.

Pakistan will be making a mistake if it underestimates Indian reslove regarding Kashmir. If Pakistan continues a war of terrorism, it is not that there are no responses available.

India and Afghanistan are here to stay. Pakistan can't wish away its neighbours. If Pakistan thinks their Talib proxies have any support in Afghanistan they are in great delusion. Basically Pakistan has to make a choice about whether it wants to live as a normal country, in peace with its neighbours, or whether it sees itself as a neo-caliphate.