Hi,
Kargil was a major success for pakistan---. It told the world---with minimum capabilities a dedicated military force can take on a massive power in a hostile environment and hold it back for awhile and let the political powers do their thing---. In this case---the political power houses were 'chicken'.
It also showed pakistan---that if the military was better equipped in upto date weapons systems---india could not have done much other than go to a full fledged war---.
This should have been an eye opener for pakistanis and they should have focused on strengthening their short-comings---like the air force and surface to air counter measures---.
But instead of focussing in the right direction and thinking like israel after the 73 war---pakistanis started blaming each other---.
These young indian kids and retd indian army people can come and say whatever---but the thrashing that the indian mililitary got at the hands of such an ill-eqipped endeavour was a joke amongst the world militaries---.
The weaknesses of the indian army and its might were blown open---in the middle of the skirmish---indian army ran out of 155mm shells---.
Pakistanis---if they had any brains---would have looked at it this way---if with such minimal resources---we held off indian military for so many days---what would have happened if our resources would have been ten folds---.
Mastan you make a crucial mistake.
The reason why it took so many deaths of the Indian military to clear the mountain tops was not because of military incapability, it was because of the policy of GoI.
As the correct reports of the true nature of Kargil came in, that it was the PA that was manning the tops and not terrorists as originally thought, the first report and operations that the Indian Military requested the GoI was to cross the LoC, surround the mountains tops, interdict their supply lines completely and then conduct the ground campaign against the intruders.
That meant a full scale war and the Indian military asked permission for it. The military was
denied this. This is the most basic 101 in any mountain war operations. The Indian political leadership decided that the gains of fighting from one side and charging up the mountain from one side gave more international and political benefit than what made military sense - what the military first suggested.
The GoI knew and the military knew the losses of taking mountain tops from frontal assaults would mean very high losses. It was deemed that this is acceptable for the political benefits accrued.
Now if you think Pakistan could pull a kargil on a much larger scale - a competent and trained military force against a large enemy and
still accomplish the ratio's that PA managed, you would be wrong.
In a full scale war, the political leadership of India will not impose such one sided conditions on the Indian military.
The thrashing that you refer to that the Indian military got was because it was frontally charging a well entrenched and bunkered and supplied enemy up a mountain top - from one direction only. Remove the limits put up on India by GoI of the day, and you would have had very different kill ratio's.
Almost any military force would achieve similar results, 10:1 is a standard basic considered for charging mountains. However, once IAF wisened up after initial setbacks and started using LGB's the situation changed.
In anycase, the PA had to withdraw not because of political pressure, it was because holding those posts had become untenable in the face of constant bombing and attacks. The political deal gave PA cover to withdraw.
So when you do the analysis, do take into account the military capabilities and the limitations imposed on Indian military as well. Had the Indian military been given a free hand, Pakistan would have been hard pressed on all fronts and - losing on all fronts.
