Karachi Burned for Seven Days

[Adux]

'Karachi burned for seven days'

January 18, 2007
'And if war comes again, I assure you that we shall carry it right into the enemy's biggest ports, like Karachi. I know this harbour quite well for I started working there. And you have my word that given the opportunity, the Indian Navy will make the world's biggest bonfire of it.'
-- Admiral S M Nanda, then Chief of Naval Staff, at a press conference in Jamnagar, November 1971.

The oldest of seven children, Sardarilal Matharadas Nanda was born in Punjab on October 10, 1915, but grew up at Manora, a small island off Karachi where his father was posted. Commissioned as an acting sublieutenant in the Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve, he climbed up through the ranks to become the Chief of Naval Staff in March 1970. A year later, India and Pakistan went to war.

In a move that made naval history, Admiral Nanda towed three Russian missile boats, which did not have the necessary range to reach Karachi and return, halfway out to sea before unleashing them on Pakistan's primary port. Karachi burned for seven days. The admiral had kept his promise.

1971 War: 35 Years On

In an exclusive interview with Deputy Managing Editor Ramananda Sengupta in his plush home on New Delhi's Prithviraj Road, the admiral, whose memory at 91 is enviable, recollects how he braved government and military apathy and opposition to become The Man Who Bombed Karachi, which is also the title of his autobiography.

Let us start from the beginning. After being kept out of the earlier wars, why was the navy brought into play in 1971?

During the 1965 war and 1962 war with China, the Navy was kept in Bombay. We didn't do anything. With the result that nobody bothered about the navy, and everyone thought it was an ornamental service.

During my time as the chief, I found, to start with, that the emphasis was all the time on the requirements of the army and air force, and not of the navy.

In 1971, when the three service chiefs would meet the prime minister (Indira Gandhi), she would ask the army chief first, then the air force chief, about their views on the situation. And then she would look at her watch and say, 'Admiral, you have anything to say?'

And I'd say 'No ma'am, I have nothing to say.'

But inside I was thinking that you can write off the navy if it does not take part. That was not acceptable to me. So I had made up my mind that if there was war, the navy would take part.

One day, when things hotted up in Bengal, after one such meeting, same questions, same last query, I told her that I would like to see her in her office.

'Come over,' she said. We were both in South Block. I told her 'Madam, things are hotting up, and there is a possibility of war breaking out anytime. I have made up my mind that I am going to attack Karachi. I want political clearance from you. I don't want to be told at the last minute that I cannot do it. Militarily it is my responsibility.'

She thought a bit, and then said, 'Well Admiral, if there's a war, there's war.'

'Thank you very much madam, I have got my answer,' I replied.

So I called my directors of naval operations and naval intelligence, said I have spoken to the prime minister, and I think we have clearance to plan what to do if the war breaks out. I am planning to attack Karachi, and we've got to make preparations.

Everybody looked at me, and they said Karachi is a very heavily defended port. They've got six inch guns, while our guns are only four inch. So we will be well within their range before they come into our range. So I said we have these Russian-made Osa Class missile boats with Styx missiles, which are for harbour defence. What is their range? What are their capabilities? Do they have ship to surface missiles?

First they said the boats did not have the range to reach Karachi and return. Then they said if we hit Karachi with our missiles, then there will an uproar all over the world over the civilian casualties.

So I said look, 'What is a ship? It is steel. A missile locks on to steel.' I knew Karachi quite well. They have a one-mile long area on the coast which have oil tanks, made of steel. I said 'Why can't let our missiles lock on the oil tanks?' They were not so sure.

Now a soldier must have faith in his weapons systems. I needed to test these missiles. But where was the target going to come from? So I asked the Russians how they tested their missiles. They said we have a special type of a ship with compartments in it, so that if a missile hits it, does not sink. Can we get a ship like that, I asked. It will take us two years to build it, they replied. I said forget it.

We had a British made practice target, which was made out of a hull on which is fitted a large frame, or target, on which we fire the guns. So I had some aluminum balls prepared to be fitted on the target. Then we towed this target some 30 miles out to sea, and came back.

Then I got into a helicopter, and gave the order to fire the missile. It went right through the target, 30 miles away. Then I called all the ships to close in and see the effect for themselves. That put their faith into the system. Having done that, we had further meetings.

The commander of the Western Naval Command still didn't believe in the system, and opposed it, saying it was too much of a risk.

On December 3, the Pakistan air force attacked us in the evening. By that time, we had our own forces, including the three missile boats, ready. But they did not have the range to go into Karachi and come back.

So on the evening of December 4, we towed these boats out half the way, they dropped their tow lines and raced towards Karachi. We hit Karachi, sank two warships and damaged a third.

We did this again on December 8, and sank two more ships. One or two missiles hit the oil tanks near the harbour, which set the entire complex ablaze.

Karachi burned for seven days.

What did we do with our aircraft carrier, Vikrant?

Vikrant is a funny story. During the 1965 war, it was in dry dock, and could not be used. During 1971, there was a crack in a boiler, because of which they could not fire the steam catapult needed to send out the aircraft.

Three months before the war, Naval Headquarters decided it was not operable at all. The aircraft were moved ashore. Then I went out to Bombay, and the captain explained that if the aircraft could not be catapulted out, it would fall into the sea, and kill everybody.

I said 'What's the bloody point of having an aircraft carrier if it cannot be used during a war?'

So I decided to take a risk. I ordered a steel band to be put around the boiler which had a crack. Then I said we need to get to a place where we have strong winds, and check out whether the aircraft falls into the sea or not.

I took the carrier out to sea myself and asked the engineer officer, the chief of the Western Naval Command, Admiral Krishnan, and M K Roy, Director of Naval Intelligence, to come with me.

My staff said I must get permission from Naval HQ. I said I am the Chief of Naval Staff, you don't need to ask anybody else. I am giving the orders and I am taking the responsibility for them.

We waited till the wind was strong enough. The aircraft was finally ordered to take off. And it was a success. We did that three or four times.

But there was still aversion. Somebody said 'Sir, there are people in the boiler room, and if it blows up it will kill all of them.'

So I said how does the boiler work? It works on oil. How does it come into the boiler? There is a pipe which brings it in. Who controls the valve of that pipe? The tanks are down below, but the valve is on the upper deck.

I said vacate the boiler room. Have someone man the valves. So if the boiler blows up or catches fire, it will damage the boiler room, but not the men. So that was done.

You took the Vikrant to the other coast, into the Bay of Bengal?

Yes, because people were still not sure how to use an aircraft carrier. They thought it was taking too much of a risk, particularly with a crack in the boiler. I discussed the issue with my engineer officer, and he said 'Sir, whatever you order, we will do.' This was about August or September, before the war began.

So I said we have to take the risk. We discussed all possible scenarios. They wanted to keep the Vikrant in Bombay, but I said no, and sent it to Cochin. Then when things started hotting up, I sent her to Madras. The aircraft, which were kept ashore, were flown to Madras. And we were operational.

 

[niaz]

Some how I missed this posting by Addux. This is Indian version actual damage was far less than it appeared from outside.


I was there in the middle of it all so let me share my experiences with the forum members.

It is true that there is a row of tanks all along the oil pier at Keamari. The tank farms belonged PBS ( Pakistan Burmah Shell), Caltex, Esso, Dawood petroleum (DPL) and Pakistan national oil PNO) ( this was before nationlization of oil industry by Bhutto). This was on the north of the coast road. There was a piece of land on the southside along the sea opposite PBS terminal where there were storage tanks for the imported crude belonging to Pakistan Refinery (PRL).

Esso's terminal was divided in two parts, kerosene terminal and gasoline terminal with Karachi grease plant in the middle. I was at that time working as sales development engineer in the Industrial Sales department. I received a phone call at my house from the GM in evening and I was asked to come to the office located at Dawood Centre next to PIDC house right away.

All the managers and engineers were gathered and we were told that they have received info that PAF has attacked IAF bases and an attack by IAF is expected any time. We were asked if we were willing as it was not part of our job description, every one agreed to volunteer.

They divided all technical staff into 6 groups on shift basis. ( 3 groups for each of the Esso terminals) and all were posted to Keamari. Each shift was headed by an engineer who was familiar with the terminal. I was posted at Kerosene terminal and when I asked what was my brief, I was told that it my job to control any fires that broke out and it was to be my decision when to order evacuation, if the fire got out of hand.

As I was approaching the terminal gates early next morning I saw two aircraft approaching from the sea, I took them to be Sabres at first, but when there was a siren and Hunters dived I realized that we were under attack. Aircrafts strafed with incidiery bullets first target was DPL tanks and then ESSO terminal where I was crouched behind a wall. Three fuel oil tanks at DPL terminal were hit and caught fire and one light diesel tank in Esso terminal.

We spent next few days to try to put out the fire and cool other tanks. Fuel oil gives out lot of smoke and there was so much of it that it covered the whole skyline. This saved us from further hits as IAF were attacking every evening and at dawn.

The fires were just about coming under control when; again early morning while approaching the terminal, I came across a river of fire. A styx missile had hit a tank full of crude. The crude was flowing on to the road and going into the sea while on fire. It took most of the morning to contain the fire, it was decided that safest way was to let it burn out. Naturally there was lot of smoke and this time even the flames could be seen from far off.

End result was that a total of five tanks ( out of nearly hundred along the the coast road) were attacked. 3 belonging to DPL with fuel oil, one to Esso with LDO and one of PRL crude; approxinately 10 to 15 thousand tons. All the jet fuel (actually a high quality kerosene), gasoline and diesel was safe so war effort was not affected.

The damage was very light when all things considered but it gave the appearance that the whole coast line was burning.

Since the mobile phone was not invented, even having a phone was a previleage. While people like myself were able to phone home to assure their loved ones. Labourer's families were in panick and rickshaw after rickshaw was coming all day with crying women trying to check the welfare of their husbands/sons/fathers.

I felt deeply about the misery caused by war to the families of the poor who were there only trying to eke out a living. Loss of the bread earner meant rest of the family becoming destitute.

I did it not do it out of bravery but because someone had to do it. I was not alone, there were nearly two hundred staff of all the oil companies who were assigned to their respective terminal. I will do it again if left with no other choice, but I will try to avoid war if at all possible. Thankfully there was only one loss of life at the PRL terminal.

 

[Adux]

I thought it was interesting read, and i am happy to know a person with your views also has a brave and dutiful heart.

I am sure there were some exgarration from the indian side, and i am also aware that 71 war Pakistan Navy was crippled

 

[Venkat]

Niaz

That was an interesting account of the Karachi oil tanks blaze.

A friend of mine is writing a book on the 71 war and I forward your account to him. He is keen to quote you on this. Is it okay with you?

PM me the details on how you want to be quoted exactly etc.

regards

Venkat

 

[niaz]

Niaz

That was an interesting account of the Karachi oil tanks blaze.

A friend of mine is writing a book on the 71 war and I forward your account to him. He is keen to quote you on this. Is it okay with you?

PM me the details on how you want to be quoted exactly etc.

regards

Venkat

Sorry but I seem to have missed this post. Better late than never !.

I dont mind if you quote me verbatim including my name. But who am I? If I were some well known personality, it would mean something. My suggestion is that you refer as

" One of the Esso employees who was posted at the Keamari Oil Terminal; target of IAF bombing; described his story as...."

 

[Venkat]

Sorry but I seem to have missed this post. Better late than never !.

I dont mind if you quote me verbatim including my name. But who am I? If I were some well known personality, it would mean something. My suggestion is that you refer as

" One of the Esso employees who was posted at the Keamari Oil Terminal; target of IAF bombing; described his story as...."

Thank you , i will email him this.

 

[blain2]

From a critical analysis standpoint, I think the fact that IN and IAF were able to hit Karachi and not encounter any PAF resistance was the most disturbing aspect. The fact that missiles hit the tanks and there was fire and smoke is enough for an adversary to think that they put the entire of Karachi on fire.

 

[Bull]

From a critical analysis standpoint, I think the fact that IN and IAF were able to hit Karachi and not encounter any PAF resistance was the most disturbing aspect. The fact that missiles hit the tanks and there was fire and smoke is enough for an adversary to think that they put the entire of Karachi on fire.

Guess i read that there were lots of problem btw PAF and PA abt cordination.

 

[blain2]

Guess i read that there were lots of problem btw PAF and PA abt cordination.

This particular issue was not as much a PA and PAF thing. Air defence of Karachi is PAF's responsibilities. The fact that PAF was pretty much unscathed at the end of the war lends credence to the theory postulated by some that PAF was actually preserving its assets to help out with a PA offensive that never materialized during the 1971 war.

 

[Venkat]

The fact that missiles hit the tanks and there was fire and smoke is enough for an adversary to think that they put the entire of Karachi on fire.

Not just the adversary, but also the whole general population of karachi.

 

[Venkat]

The fact that PAF was pretty much unscathed at the end of the war lends credence to the theory postulated by some that PAF was actually preserving its assets to help out with a PA offensive that never materialized during the 1971 war.

Whats the point? Saddams Air Force pretty much survived the First Gulf War 1990, but what did he achieve?

I buy a new car and dont use it because i am afraid i might have an accident somewhere, there is something seriously wrong in the planning.

Now if the excuse is that the PAF was preserving itself for a PA Offensive, then the PAF was suckered by the PA, just as the Eastern Command (Niazi) was suckered by Yahya that Yellow from the north and white from the south was going to come to their help..

 

[blain2]

Whats the point? Saddams Air Force pretty much survived the First Gulf War 1990, but what did he achieve?

I buy a new car and dont use it because i am afraid i might have an accident somewhere, there is something seriously wrong in the planning.

Now if the excuse is that the PAF was preserving itself for a PA Offensive, then the PAF was suckered by the PA, just as the Eastern Command (Niazi) was suckered by Yahya that Yellow from the north and white from the south was going to come to their help..

The point simply is that the strikes against Karachi did not have any military significance...yep they did provide propaganda points to India that it hit Karachi unopposed, but that was the extent of it (I would even say that it was quite similar to PN strike against Dwarka in 65 when PN ships were able to hit the site with 350 rounds from their main guns). International Shipping had already tapered off even before the war so it was not in any sense a case of choking Pakistan due to IN action.

As far as getting "suckered" into things..we are not talking about street hustlers here
There was a consideration that in order to gain leverage on the eastern borders, PA may have to make a major ingress across the IB and considerable PAF support would be needed for it. This consideration outweighed defence of coastal POL storage (in the end too, nothing substantial was hit).

Also Saddam's airforce ran away from Iraq. PAF was held back to ensure that its assets would be utilized where they were needed the most and stayed in country on their bases. You pick and chose your battles instead of contesting them all especially when you have a limited number of aircraft.

 

[Venkat]

Yahya and his advisors incluing ZA Bhutto were on the level of street hustlers with their wining and dining.

Comparing the 71 attack on Karachi with the attack on Dwaraka is a far stretch. The 71 Karachi attacks sank two PN Ships and several sailors killed. The Dwarak attack achieved zero. How can both be the same?

 

[blain2]

Yahya and his advisors incluing ZA Bhutto were on the level of street hustlers with their wining and dining.

Comparing the 71 attack on Karachi with the attack on Dwaraka is a far stretch. The 71 Karachi attacks sank two PN Ships and several sailors killed. The Dwarak attack achieved zero. How can both be the same?

I don't drink myself but do not consider their wineing and dining to have been anything like that..I am sure most of folks in the Indian Armed Forces do this at the same level as was done by Yahya. People can say Yahya drank and Yahya liked women, but he was an honest soldier and did his best to keep the country together. Politicians in East and West Pakistan had other ideas.

On your point about comparing the attacks, both operations had a tactical value. IN did destroy one PN destroyer, PNS Khyber, and the loss of life due to that was not several sailors, rather 222 sailors and officers. However again, its impact on Karachi was superficial. Pakistan's industry (which was predominantly Karachi based) escaped unscathed from the Indian attack. As mentioned by Niaz earlier, the damage to the POL facilities was limited.

Dwarka operation had certain goals and it achieved most of them for the PN in 1965 (the primary amongst them was to keep the IN carrier out of the theater and put pressure on IN to not to come close to Karachi). Secondly it did take out the shore based radar facilities which were targeted.

 

[Venkat]

but he was an honest soldier and did his best to keep the country together. .

Woudnt it have worked if he had just respected the results of elections and let mujib be the PM for a change and NOT listen to Bhutto?

If not , why not?

Secondly it did take out the shore based radar facilities which were targeted.

I really doubt if any shore based radar facilities were 'taken out'

The Shelling of Dwarka - Ex-Sgt Ramesh Madan  [www.bharat-rakshak.com]