I thought its impossible to buy Soryu at this stage.
Not just for India but for anyone..
US2 may be because of dual use .
Well they tried and lost in Australia.
Japan's Failed Australian Submarine Bid: Is America at Fault?
Zac Rogers
May 6, 2016
Reports emerged last week that Japan’s bid to build Australia’s new submarines had been
all but eliminated, or was languishing in third place behind the French and German bids, as the Australian government prepared to announce the winner. Subsequently, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced on Tuesday the successful bidder for the $50 billion contract was the French firm DCNS. Sources cited by the ABC reported
technical and engineering problems with Japan’s bid. The widely understood sticking point for the European bids, namely U.S. reluctance to share the details of its
AN/BYG-1 Combat Management System with European firms has evaporated. President Obama is reported to have indicated as much to Prime Minister Turnbull, with a “senior source” suggesting that there would be
no implications for the alliance, no matter which bidder won. Australia is the only country in the world the United States shares this system with. A frantic eleventh-hour effort to rescue the bid
by the Japanese—who appeared to be unaware of the perilous state of their bid until very recently—failed. Losing this massive opportunity was a significant blow for Japan, which was also recently outbid by China to build Indonesia’s fast rail. All this while two JMSDF ships and a submarine were in Australian waters for an eleven-day exercise with the RAN.
Most commentators agree former Prime Minister Tony Abbott jumped way too early and publicly with his overt support of the Japan bid in his eagerness to strengthen ties with Japan. The Competitive Evaluation Process that was subsequently announced was widely perceived as an attempt to regain the veneer of due process,
if little more. Notwithstanding this popular perception, the European bidders stayed the course. German firm ThyssenKrupp AG said in March it
favoured domestic Australian construction as the best option, a tantalising prospect for the Turnbull government now with an election looming.
France’s DCNS, moreover, promised smooth intellectual property flows and extensive local industry engagement. This, in the context of Turnbull’s innovation agenda, may have been the clincher. Political concerns over the Japanese bid had
always centred on Japan’s lack of experience in the defence export game, and uncertainty regarding its domestic political landscape. In these contexts of political overtures, election cycles, domestic imperatives, and commercial risks, we might be obliged to take all this at face value. An unpredictable high-stakes game, prone to misperception, bound to defy expectation right up to the last moment.
In the broader regional strategic context, on the other hand, not so obliged. The $50 billion acquisition of Australia’s twelve new submarines is no ordinary business deal. It’s a strategic move of regional import. A successful Japanese bid would have been widely perceived as representing the backbone of a burgeoning
quasi-alliance between the two countries. The
actual extent of this has been hotly
debated recently. Suffice to say the perceptual impact, at least, of a Japan-Australia deal on such a strategic acquisition would have been felt regionally, and the epicentre of that impact would be in Beijing. China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs used the strong imagery of WWII to caution Canberra against a Japanese sub deal
in February. The United States, for its part, has been widely understood to favour a deeper Australia-Japan relationship, as a cross-brace to its two most significant regional alliances. The submarine deal would further enable regional U.S. influence in both the military-technical and political domains. In addition, the United States clearly wants both Australia and Japan individually to take on a greater share of the security burden in the Asia-Pacific.
So what, then, can we make of this apparent about-face in the strategic context? If, as reported (and quite oddly) Obama felt it necessary to remind Australia of its sovereign autonomy regarding its decision on the submarine acquisition, one interpretation of this might be as an indirect invitation to scuttle the Japan bid. Otherwise why say it? In turn, this would obviously represent a significant concession to Beijing. If so, why now? What else might help explain such a move by the Obama administration? U.S.-China relations in the South China Sea are bad, and could
worsen, so it makes little sense as a U.S. concession. Courting Chinese support for the
Paris climate change accord also seems an incomplete explanation.
At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in late March, which ostensibly focused on the
stiffening of standards regarding the physical protection of nuclear materials, Obama held extended one-on-one
sideline meetings with President Xi, President Park, and Prime Minister Abe. North Korea’s recent missile and nuclear weapons testing reportedly dominated the agenda. The North’s actions of late, including calls by the leadership to put nuclear weapons on
hair-trigger alert, and subsequent reassurances (unconfirmed) that it indeed had the
capability to do so, have caused observers to consider whether or not the game had finally begun to change for the Kim regime. These extraordinary measures go beyond a level of provocation necessary for Pyongyang to extract what it has wanted in the past. In addition, South Korea is now seriously considering the American offer to provide a THAAD missile defence system to Seoul, a move strongly opposed by Beijing. China,
for its part, has reportedly been more strictly implementing the recent UN regime of sanctions against its historical ally, perhaps signalling a shifting of attitudes, if not an exhaustion of patience, with Kim Jong-Un by Beijing.
On March 30 of this year, President Obama wrote an Op Ed in the
Washington Post that includes the following statement: “The United States will continue working with allies and partners for the
complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” The relative successes of Obama’s diplomatic outreach to longtime foes in Iran and Cuba have aroused speculation that the president might be eyeing a final
diplomatic coup with North Korea. Any such approach would depend greatly on China’s acquiescence if not active support. The question being raised here is to what extent is Washington prepared to go to guarantee that support? What concessions would Obama need to make to Xi to extract such a grand deal? Part of the image forming of an
Obama doctrine has been the President’s willingness—to the chagrin of U.S. partners—to seek grand bargains with powerful states, often in lieu of said partner’s knowledge or input. Such have been Israeli and Saudi complaints about the Iran deal, at least. Is there a connection between the demise of Japan’s submarine bid and Obama’s greater diplomatic aspirations in northeast Asia? The late-hour scuttling of Japan’s bid seems to have surprised the Japanese as much as it has most observers. Obama’s outreach to Iran and Cuba has reflected a fundamental willingness by the President to sideline past behaviour in the quest for progress. One of the biggest obstacles to U.S.’s engagement of Pyongyang has been its traditional aversion to be seen rewarding bad behaviour with diplomatic overtures. It’s clear that President Obama sees this stance as ineffective and redundant. If an overture to Pyongyang is in the offing, with China, South Korea, and Japan onside, was the scuttling of the Japanese submarine bid part of the price, unbeknownst to Japan until very recently of course? All it would have taken, as the French bid which promises a full Australian-based build is both politically and economically attractive to the Australian government, was the hint that “Option J” was no longer necessarily an American preference.
But the timing is extraordinary. The ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal at the Permanent Count of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague on claims brought by the Philippines against China is due in four to six weeks.
Analysts are concerned China may be preparing to take preemptive action in advance of the ruling, by beginning dredging and construction activities on Scarborough Shoal and possibly declaring an ADIZ over the Spratly islands. If this occurs, regional tensions could reach
new heights. Coming in the wake of news about the failure of Japan’s much touted submarine bid and the perception of weakening regional solidarity that has
already accompanied it, the price tag for an Obama-led diplomatic coup in North Korea will have multiplied. But would a denuclearized Korean Peninsula be worth the price of the Australia-Japan submarine deal, in perceptions at least? Washington would take that deal any day of the week. The fact is, regional solidarity does not, and
never did, rest on the submarine deal. It would reveal, however, just how fungible the White House’s red lines in the South China Sea are, however much the Pentagon disagrees. If it’s true that the
State Department gagged Admiral Harry Harris recently over his SCS comments, that would be why. But these trends suggest the time for Washington to fully declare the extent of its commitment to the countries that circumscribe the South China Sea is getting uncomfortably close. If
Hugh White is correct, we should prepare for a great deal more discomfort.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/japans-failed-australian-submarine-bid-america-fault-16080
Why Japan Lost the Bid to Build Australia’s New Subs
How did the onetime frontrunner fail in its bid to build Australia’s next-generation submarine?
By
Franz-Stefan Gady for The Diplomat
April 27, 2016
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Japan, the onetime frontrunner for a $50 billion ($38.8 billion) contract to build Australia’s new submarine fleet in partnership with Australian industry under the so-called SEA 1000 Future Submarine Programme, failed in its bid to assemble the boats.
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced yesterday that French shipbuilder Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS) will be awarded the contract–Australia’s largest defense deal ever– to build 12
Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A subs, a diesel-electric derivative of DCNS’
Barracuda-class nuclear attack submarine, for the Royal Australian Navy.
Japan’s Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani appeared bewildered over Australia’s decision yesterday. “We will ask Australia to explain why they didn’t pick our design,” he said,
according to Reuters.
Japan with its 4,000-ton
Soryu-class diesel-electric attack stealth submarine fitted with a new lithium-ion battery propulsion system was long considered to be both the Australian government’s and analysts’ favorite pick.
Why the dramatic reversal of fortune for Japan’s defense industry?
Like with any large defense deal, the reasons for picking the military hardware of one country over that of another are manifold and not only confined to technical and military considerations, but are also subject to political and geostrategic calculi.
There are five major reasons why France won.
First, Japan heavily betted on the close relationship between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who purportedly promised Tokyo a sweetheart deal in which the submarines would be domestically constructed in Japan in order to bolster the Australia-Japan strategic relationship–and ultimately lost. It was only reluctantly that Abbott eventually agreed to a
competitive evaluation process in February 2015 inviting, next to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation (KSC), French shipbuilder DCNS and the German company ThyssenKrupp AG (TKMS) to compete.
Once Abbott was ousted from power, Japan was merely one of three bidders and no longer received the political support it was accustomed to from the new Australian government under Malcolm Turnbull and had to revamp its strategy to win the bid. Japanese defense industry representatives were simply outmaneuvered by their French and German counterparts. Australia’s
Senate Economics Legislation References Committee already rejected the
Soryu-class as a suitable
Collins-class replacement option once before in November 2014.
Second, picking DCNS over the MHI and KSC—both Japanese shipmakers building the
Soryu-class boats—is also politically more opportune for Malcolm Turnbull at this stage. Australians are likely to head to the polls on July 2 in federal elections, in what is predicted to be a tight race between the governing Liberal-National Coalition and the Australian Labor Party. During the press conference yesterday, Turnbull said that the 12 submarines in their entirety (save some specialized parts) will be built in Adelaide, the capital city of South Australia and home base of the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC).
South Australia is facing deindustrialization with the state’s last auto plant to be shut down at the end of 2016. As a consequence, creating new jobs will be vital for the Liberal-National Coalition to retain seats in the state and the decision to go with DCNS, according to Turnbull, will create more than 2,800 jobs. “Australian built, Australian jobs, Australian steel, here right where we stand,” he emphasized. DCNS purportedly agreed that all major work on the submarines will be done in Adelaide using domestic materials. Japan, however, initially
was reluctant to build the submarines in Australia, given Tokyo’s general reluctance to transfer sensitive military technology abroad. Japan softened its stance on this issue over the last few months, but, as
I have written previously, somewhat unconvincingly.
Third, Japan’s defense industry was not enthusiastic about selling
Soryu-class submarines overseas. The two companies producing the submarine, MHI and KSC, currently have only the capacity to meet the domestic demand for submarines. Overall, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force plans to induct a total of 11
Soryu-class submarines by 2020. As of now,
seven Soryu-class subs have been commissioned. Due to the Japanese defense industries inexperience in dealing with international clients, there was also a growing concern in Australia that this could lead to a work culture clash, which would make collaboration on the project unnecessarily difficult.
Also, as
The Diplomat reported previously, Japan still lacks experience in selling its military hardware including transferring sensitive defense technology to another country. Furthermore, “the Australian Defense Department appears concerned that any deal signed with Japan could be negated by the powerful Japanese bureaucracy, which allegedly [according to defense department sources] also showed ‘less enthusiasm (…) for the deal and that would undo it in the long run’” as I
wrote last week.
Fourth, the United States has tacitly been supporting the Japanese bid, but recently signaled Turnbull that its opposition to a potential European submarine supplier has plummeted. “Quiet U.S. pressure to opt for the Japanese submarines–U.S. officials allegedly indicated that the United States would not allow its most advanced weapons systems to be installed on European-made subs–has also apparently been dropped. U.S. President Barack Obama made it clear to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull that the submarine deal was a sovereign issue of Australia and that the selection of France or Germany would not in any way affect the Australia-U.S. alliance,” I
wrote last week.
Given that the Australian evaluation team and an expert advisory panel included senior former U.S. Navy officers, it is fair to assume that the U.S. Navy will allow its submarine systems, including a tactical control system, a Raytheon combat system (if selected), as well as weapons systems (e.g., Mark-48 torpedoes, Harpoon anti-ship missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles) to be installed on the Shortfin
Barracuda Block 1A subs.
Fifth, while it is difficult to assess any submarine bid on an unclassified level, there is a fair argument to be made that the new
Barracuda-class better meets Australia’s needs than the Japanese stealth submarines, although it remains to be seen how difficult a swap from nuclear power to a conventional system will be for DCNS. “This decision was driven by DCNS’s ability to best meet all of our unique capability requirements,” said Malcom Turnbull and Australia’s Minister for Defense Marine Payne in a joint statement published yesterday.
“These included superior sensor performance and stealth characteristics, as well as range and endurance similar to the
Collins Class submarine. The Government’s considerations also included cost, schedule, program execution, through-life support and Australian industry involvement.” DCNS has built more than 100 submarines for nine different navies and its ships are sailing on all five oceans–a major advantage over Japan, which has no submarine export experience.
There were a number of very specific technical requirements outlined by the Australian government as I
reported previously:
The requirements outlined in the bid including a 4,000-ton displacement, a range and endurance similar to the Collins-class submarines, sensor performance and stealth abilities better than the Collins, and a combat system and heavyweight torpedo developed jointly by the U.S. and Australia as the preferred combat system and armament, makes an off-the-shelf solution not an option.
As I outlined before, the Australian submariner community remained skeptical of the
Soryu-class submarines throughout the bidding process:
Among other things, they point out that on average Japanese subs are constructed to last for around 19 years, whereas the Australian governments expects at least a 30-year active service life span. The Japanese boats also have much less accommodation space than Collins-class submarines.
Additional objections where raised over the shorter patrol range of the
Soryu-class sub in comparison to the
current Collins-class and the
Soryu’s lower transit speed. (Japan did issue a report claiming that concerns over the submarine’s limited cruising range were unfounded.) Furthermore, I explained: “[A]nother concern is the integration of a U.S. combat system and weapons (Mk 48 Mod 7 CBASS heavyweight torpedoes) into the Japanese hull.”
There has also been repeated safety concern over the use of advanced lithium-ion batteries. A former submarine engineer
explained last week: “In the life of 100,000 [lithium-ion] cells and a fleet of 12 submarines there is likely to be a failure that cannot be stopped or controlled, with a catastrophic outcome. The Boeing 787 battery fires and the burning of the U.S. Navy’s Advanced Seal Delivery System are reminders that contemporary lithium-ion is not yet safe enough for submarines.”
It is important to understand that yesterday’s announcement was just a statement in principle and did not include the signing of a contract. The next few months will be crucial in figuring out the particulars including detailed technical specifications, construction schedules, technology transfer agreements, and what parts of the sub will in fact be build in Australia.
The botched bidding process was an important lesson for Japan. Its defense industry apparently still has a long way to go after lifting a self-imposed weapons export ban in April 2014, to become a major player in the global arms market. Given that the only customer of Japan’s defense industry has been its own government, it is not surprising that Japanese defense contractors lack experience in marketing, technology transfers or that they shrug off opportunities to expand their business abroad.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-japan-lost-the-bid-to-build-australias-new-subs/
