Apples and Oranges comparison. If you do not understand difference between Afghanistan and Japan then do not comment on this topic. Let us have informed members have conversations in this thread instead.
This does not makes an iota of difference in Pacific waters.
This remains to be seen. Yes, Chinese defenses have improved a lot in recent years. However, ACC do not operate in isolation*, and F-35A/B/C are designed to operate and deliver results in heavily defended spaces**. These jet fighters are not developed for Afghanistan.
*Each ACC is granted a suitable escort when involved in a military operation.
JMSDF is one of the best equipped forces in Pacific waters.
The pair of ships could shoot down North Korea missiles, as well as challenge Chinese claims and aid Japan in projecting power beyond its shores.
www.thedrive.com
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) commissioned its 12th and final Soryu-class diesel-electric attack submarine (SSK) in a ceremony held on 24 March in Hyogo...
www.janes.com
Overview of Japan's submarine capabilities and import-export behavior.
www.nti.org
**F-35A/B/C = VLO + incredibly advanced sensor systems + significant EW capabilities in single package.
FYI
"Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter Chinese ASBMs
This appendix provides additional discussion of the issue of the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter China’s ASBMs.
Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a “game changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered. There are several potential approaches for countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination.
The ASBM is not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs.
Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e., “hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., “soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.
Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect, identify, and track those ships. The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block IIA version), the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile, and accelerating development and deployment of the hypervelocity projectile (HVP), electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and solid state lasers (SSLs).
Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar."
Learn more in following source:
Expansion of the Chinese PLAN in both quantitative and qualitative respects posit greatest threat to USN in Pacific waters. China understands this deep down.
China is up against AUKUS and Japan in the Pacific, however.
Defense and Diplomacy shall proceed hand-in-hand. One cannot outfight an entire alliance of well-equipped countries in conventional warfare.