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Jammer Competition Spurs New Technology

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The growing overlap of elec*tronic warfare and cyber-invasion is generating excitement around the U.S. Navy’s competition for the Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ) and the U.S. Air Force’s reentry into the world of airborne electronic attack.

A key enabling technology is a six-sided active, electronically scanned array (AESA) that more than doubles the field of view of today’s electronically scanned antennas on advanced aircraft such as the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor.

Other technologies include broadband AESA, advanced radars, digitized exciters and techniques generators that produce exotic waveforms and algorithms for electronic and cyber*warfare. Perhaps more importantly, today’s concepts and technology are stepping-stones to wider apertures, cooler amplifiers and faster processing, say aerospace industry officials involved in the competition. Initial operating capability for the NGJ in the Boeing EA‑18G Growler fleet is 2018. The Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is to add an advanced electronic attack capability in a Block 5 aircraft sometime after 2020.

“The technology suite that goes into the Next-Generation Jammer [for the Growler] is relevant to other solutions,” agrees Rick Martin, Boeing’s director for electronic warfare at the company’s Phantom Works organization.

The NGJ might be a “major improvement” because for the first time broadband electronically scanned arrays (ESAs) could be added to the Growler platform, says Eduardo Palacio, vice president of programs for ITT Electronic Systems.

Boeing and ITT officials will not talk about the key antenna technology in their NGJ pod design. But others with insight into the program say that it involves a sophisticated arrangement of six planar AESAs in an elongated, hexagon shape to create a continuous, scalloped and overlapping, 360-deg. coverage area with less range and accuracy degradation at array join points.

The antenna arrangement is designed to overcome the intrinsic weakness of ESAs, which is its effective field of regard of about 120 deg. for each planar array of transmitter/receiver modules. So far, various teams have addressed the problem differently. Northrop Grumman’s radar for the Boeing 737-based Wedgetail has two side-looking antennas and fore and aft gap-fillers based on unusual “endfire” arrays. The Israel Aerospace Industries-modified Russian A-50 delivered to India has three arrays in a ro*todome. The Gulfstream-based IAI-Elta airborne early warning aircraft delivered to Israel and Singapore has two side and two fore-and-aft arrays cooperating in different bands. However, none provides uniform coverage in all directions.

The Boeing/ITT NGJ package will be linked, but separate from the Growler’s advanced AESA radar. Some proposals in the competition include the AESA radar as part of the NGJ design. Critics contend that a radar’s duty cycle is very different (pulses instead of continuous power) from that of a jammer/electronic attack system.

“At some point, the radar will run into its limitations,” Palacio says. That could be the amount of power required for a target or targets that need to be handled. “The mission of NGJ will be to deal with a large number of threats [by using] a large amount of [radio-frequency] energy and focus on the [EA] mission,” he says.

“The Growler has a very sophisticated AESA radar, but how many tasks are you going to place on that radar and [its limited] field of regard?” Martin says. “The radar is looking forward, and ideally you would like the pilot to use it to sterilize the environment and protect the aircraft with air-to-air targeting. The aircrew in the back would have a full 360-deg. jamming capability with multiple, simultaneous beams engaging surface and air-to-air targets [such as missiles or aircraft].”

The AESA elements cover a wider frequency band than the horn antennas in the current ALQ-99 jamming pods. ITT is not commenting on whether this would make it possible to change today’s architecture, in which each pod can be loaded with a different combination of traveling-wave-tube and antenna modules to cover different frequencies. “It’s a trade space,” says Palacio. “There are lots of things that would allow me to maintain the current operational capability.”

ITT and Boeing expect to be selected for the forthcoming maturation phase of the program, along with the three other contending teams led by Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and BAE Systems. That phase is likely to start this summer and continue for 18-21 months, with contractor work proceeding in parallel with the Navy’s definition of a specification.

The NGJ package (in some form) is expected to be carried by the F-35 as the successor to the Growler, although that will not happen until after 2020, and more likely closer to 2040, as the EA-18G aircraft start using up their airframe lives. Moreover, it was recently revealed that because of a reduction in fighter aircraft, stealthy platforms such as the F-22 and F-35 will be provided jamming and electronic attack support by nonstealthy F-15C (modified with AESA radars and EA systems) and semi-stealthy *Growlers for decades. The new force-structure model has the potential to extend Growler production and use for years, say industry analysts.

The ITT-Boeing team is convinced that the NGJ project should focus first on developing a replacement jamming pod system for the Growler.

“We need to take it one level of uncertainty at a time,” says Palacio.

Martin points out that the EA-18G took six years and $1.2 billion to develop, starting with a stable Super Hornet Block 2 configuration. “To develop a platform, a complete electronic attack suite [for F-35] in eight years violates mathematics,” he says.

Packaging the NGJ into various pod configurations could expand its applications for advanced aircraft.

“A podded solution gives the advantages of flexibility and field of view,” Martin says. “Advanced programs may want to take advantage of that. The challenge with any system is working out the power, cooling and volume, as well as survivability integration challenges that come with an internal solution.”

Options for external packaging include stealthy and nonstealthy pods or a smaller conformal design that can be added without changing the platform signature, Martin says.

“If the solution becomes internal, then we have to consider [more expensive] conformal apertures and the right radome—all the things associated with a JSF-like structure,” Palacio says.

There is another argument that the NGJ package installed on an F-35 will not be as powerful an electronic attack platform as the Growler without adding upgrades that would be too expensive and time-consuming to field. Whereas, on the Growler, the NGJ pod will be part of an integrated EA system that includes an advanced digital receiver, data fusion on the platform, multi-source integration and optimized crew/vehicle interfaces, along with jammer and weapons management.

“The digital receivers are tailored to identify and geo-locate where the threat emitters are,” Martin says. “There are other data sources coming into the platform that allow you to fuse all the information into an operational picture for electronic attack. All of that is in play before you ever hit a button to jam something.

“In 2040, the [EA-18G] will still be out there, but we’ll know by then what it takes to transition to an all-up, stealthy EA weapons system for an aircraft,” he says. “It’s going to be supporting a broad range of missions, some we have even conceived of yet. Cyber is out there.”

Credit: US Navy

Jammer Competition Spurs New Technology | AVIATION WEEK
 
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Would like to clarify a very important point about this: Low radar reflectivity (or observability) is NOT a part of electronic warfare (EW). Repeat -- NOT a component of EW.

Fielding a wall of noise is like being behind a shield. Everybody can see the shield. They know there is someone behind the shield and moving it in front of them. In contrast, being low radar reflective (or observable) is like being an elite ghillie suited sniper. No one is aware of his presence and even if they suspect he is out there they cannot see him. He produces nothing or extremely little signs of being distinguishable from the background. The sniper is 'stealth-ed', so to speak. He shoot, someone die, and everybody scatters. No one has anytime to find out the shooter's direction. The F-22 and F-35 is that sniper. Anyone who carries an EW pod is like the ancient soldier who carries a shield.
 
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Gambit
To create that shield , the EA platform must be able to separate the Snipers's signal(sidelobe/backlobe) from Clutter noise. That requires a significant consistency in time( freq variability) and space(Beam sharpening) from Sniper and a occasional sufficient wrt toBackground Peak .
But sniper would rarely Peak and will remain hidden in Clutter horizon more so implying Frequency Hopping and Agility which depends on Electronic choreography software . This Freq variability will seldom provide a meaningfull Pulse signal or pattern for EA platform to process or analyse that signal/sidelobe.
And the Digital Threat library of Passive sensor / Jammer is not updated to tackle all modern LPI radars which even third world country like in Asia have.

Isnt it always a game over for EA if it cant create a shield 99% of times. Then what's the use of F18G against modern AESA radars.
 
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Gambit
To create that shield , the EA platform must be able to separate the Snipers's signal(sidelobe/backlobe) from Clutter noise. That requires a significant consistency in time( freq variability) and space(Beam sharpening) from Sniper and a occasional sufficient wrt toBackground Peak .
But sniper would rarely Peak and will remain hidden in Clutter horizon more so implying Frequency Hopping and Agility which depends on Electronic choreography software . This Freq variability will seldom provide a meaningfull Pulse signal or pattern for EA platform to process or analyse that signal/sidelobe.
And the Digital Threat library of Passive sensor / Jammer is not updated to tackle all modern LPI radars which even third world country like in Asia have.

Isnt it always a game over for EA if it cant create a shield 99% of times. Then what's the use of F18G against modern AESA radars.
True...The F-22's emissivity, both from its own radar in LPI mode and from its own body, rarely peak above the clutter rejection threshold and when it does so peak, its electronic presence is sufficiently fleeting that it most likely be rejected as an anomaly. But for the interested readers, am going to clarify clutter rejection threshold and an item called 'clutter mapping'...

las_vegas_skyline.jpg


The above is the Las Vegas skyline. Electronically speaking, each of those structure is unique and the entire city can be electronically mapped. Now imagine a helo moving among these structures at 300 meters altitude, some buildings are higher and some lower than the helo's altitude. From a radar's perspective, nothing is invisible, but we do not want to see everything. We want to find the helo. So we program the system to reject any structure lower than 10 meters in height. That 10 meters is the 'clutter rejection threshold'. Basically, we instruct the system to automatically reject any structure at 10 meters or below. But there are still structures taller than 10 meters that will return along with our helo. Those structures would create 'false alarms', meaning they would alert us to investigate:

- No...That is the Wynn Tower.
- No...That is the condo building.
- No...That is Caesar's Palace.
- No...That is World Market Place.
- No...That is Stratosphere.

And so on...Each time we eliminate a 'false alarm' -- a 'No' -- it is called 'constant false alarm rate' (CFAR) processing. Clutter rejection threshold and CFAR must exist in every radar detection process, else we would be inundated with returns. But we cannot afford to spend so much time investigating every target that is above our clutter rejection threshold, so we raise the limit to 20 meters, this would eliminate some more structures from our returns.

Radar CFAR thresholding in clutter and multiple target situations
Radar detection procedures involve the comparison of the received signal amplitude to a threshold. In order to obtain a constant false-alarm rate (CFAR), an adaptive threshold must be applied reflecting the local clutter situation. The cell averaging approach, for example, is an adaptive procedure.
There is much much much more to CFAR but the above basic explanation should be sufficient for the readers to the complexity of radar detection. It is clear then that there is an inverse relationship between rejection threshold and CFAR returns. The more we considered to be 'clutter' or 'junk', the less we have to investigate anything above 'junk'. If we raise the rejection threshold to 500 meters, we would eliminate our target as part of 'clutter'.

We also know that the helo is capable of descending to below our clutter rejection threshold. That is part of target characteristics and target characteristics severely complicate CFAR algorithms. So sometime past in the history of radar detection, someone came up with the idea of 'clutter mapping'.

Clutter-map CFAR detection for range-spread targets in non-Gaussian clutter. I. System design - Clutter-map, CFAR, detection, for, range-spread, targets, in, non-Gaussian, clutter., I., System, design, Abstract<br /> , The, problem, of, consta
Abstract:Abstract The problem of constant false-alarm rate (CFAR) detection of possibly range-spread targets in clutter-dominated environment, whether Weibull or lognormal is presented. The proposed scheme is a member of the clutter-map CFAR family, which relies on a combination of space and time processing as well as on the relevant properties of the location-scale distributions; it ensures CFAR against noise with biparametric variations without incurring masking effects from slow, extended targets or multiple interferers. We also give guidelines for designing the system parameters, along with approximate formulas for setting the appropriate threshold multipliers to achieve a given false-alarm rate (FAR) under Weibull and lognormal clutter.
Basically, since we know, electronically speaking, what Las Vegas look like, we will create a digital library of every major structure of the city. For simplicity's sakes, we will confine this digital signature only to height, or altitude, and Doppler, at this time. Target characteristics tells us that if the helo descends to below 10 meters altitude, it will be picked up by ground observers anyway, so there is no need for us to have our clutter rejection threshold below 10 meters. We will instruct our system to process every return above 10 meters height against this digital library and if there is a match -- ignore it. Caesar's Palace casino will not be moving, but the helo will. So armed with a 'clutter map', or the electronic signature, of the city, we can afford to lower our clutter rejection threshold and let the system reject anything that does not match our target. We have not change the rejection threshold and CFAR relationship, we just provide the system with what we know to be a 'building' and a 'helo' and let it do its job at a much faster rate. Just like CFAR...There is much much much more to 'clutter mapping' but this basic explanation should suffice for now.

Radar detection is a statistical process, meaning the system must have a consistent return over time before it can tell the operator that there is a valid 'target'. That time span could be one microsecond, one second or one minute. But no matter what, whatever it is must provide an echo over time. The problem that the F-22 and its brethen poses is that they are designed to throw the aircraft into the clutter region and as low as possible. The US have never claimed our 'stealth' aircrafts to be invisible. We just say that they are very difficult to detect and when they are detected, it would be at a very close distance to the seeking radar. Too close for the enemy's comfort.

So what is the electronic clutter map out there?

Set A:

1- Beethoven's Fifth + F-22
2- Mahler's Sixth + F-22
3- Stairway to Heaven + F-22
4- Back In Black + F-22
5- Mozart's Piano 24 + F-22
6- Brahm's First + F-22
7- Walk This Way + F-22
8- Cell phone + F-22
9- Cell phone + F-22
10- Cell phone + F-22

Set B:

1- Cell phone + F-22
2- Cell phone + F-22
3- Cell phone + F-22
4- Cell phone + F-22
5- Cell phone + F-22
6- Cell phone + F-22
7- Cell phone + F-22
8- Beethoven's Fifth + F-22
9- Walk This Way + F-22
10- Mozart's Piano 24 + F-22

The F-22's faint echo is masked in every pairing in both sets. Since it is not possible to predict what any cell phone conversation will electronically look like, we are forced to instruct the system to eliminate any set of signals that have the characteristics of a cell phone conversation. But for every song listed above, we know its exact digital signature. It is clear then that Set A would statistically give us better odds, not certainty, of distinguishing the F-22.

rcs_examples.jpg


The B-2, F-117, F-22 and F-35 are somewhere between 'Small insect' and 'Large insect'. If the F-22 opens its weapons bay at an opportune moment for the seeking radar, it may come up as 'Man' or even as 'Small fighter', but it would be so fleeting that most likely the seeking radar would dismiss it as an anomaly. To go back to the physical clutter map, if we want to find a bird, we cannot dismiss a hill or a tree as clutter or junk. Our clutter map mus be as detailed down to the size of that bird. That mean we have to know the exact details of every tree, every rock, every shrub...etc...etc...And when the bird move, its Doppler component will alert us to its existence.

So is it possible to create a 'clutter map' of the electronic spectrum? Theoretically -- Yes. Practically -- No. Currently, we simply do not have the capability to create a clutter map of every region we control on Earth down to each discrete signal: From music to television to cell phone to cosmic background radiation. Somewhere in that mess is the faint echo of an F-22. Its body return and its LPI mode radar transmissions would be dismissed by the seeking radar as clutter or junk.

In air combat, the admonition for pilot is: 'Lose sight, lose fight.' This is applicable to radar detection as well. The further out I can see my enemy, the better the odds I could reposition myself advantageously. But the problem with the F-22 is how can you 'lose sight' of it if you electronically never had the F-22 in the first place? You cannot lose something you never had possession. In simulated air combat, we decided to be generous and say that missiles do not miss. If a pilot has radar lock on his target, that is a 'kill'. We do not want to actually kill our pilots in peacetime training, do we? The current inadequacy of clutter rejection threshold and clutter mapping, if possible, is why in simulated air combat the F-22 has a lopsided double-digit kill ratio. If there is a shooting fight between the F-22 and whoever, the enemy will not know his fate until it is too late.
 
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Gambit.


Is the radar obsorabable material are used to suck those radar ways. Correct? . If the full plane made like this. Then how the radar waves return from the plane :undecided:
 
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