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Featured Iran's Anti-Ship ballistic Missile Capability

An aircraft carrier such as Nimitz class and the latest Ford class feature hundreds of compartments (each can be sealed) coupled with layers of armoring, firefighting arrangements, and numerous Passive/Active defenses to counter a wide range of external threats which are not openly discussed in the Public domain (kinda surprising, right?). These ships are also among the fastest moving in the world - it is virtually impossible to keep tabs on them in OPEN OCEAN.

It doesnt matter if the deck is broken.

These ships do not travel alone either - they are shielded by a number of well-equipped destroyers, cruisers, and even submarines while on the move. Secondly, all those aircraft and helicopters stationed on the aircraft carrier have a purpose - that is to create situational awareness for the entire strike package and attack enemy forces when spotted.

It doesnt matter cause of the high velocity the ballistic missile comes in.


Iranians drills cannot simulate all of the above - not even close. No country can in fact (impossible).

Why do you think China is pouring funds into developing and replicating American CSG level capabilities for PLAN even though it have substantial investment in ASBM and such? A question worth pondering...

Cause the world is greater than the range of chinese ASBM or other chinese ballistic missiles.
 
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It doesnt matter if the deck is broken.
The incident of USS Enterprise in 1969 was very instructive in regards to making aircraft carriers survivable in the long-term. The USS Enterprise endured 18 powerful explosions in a row causing 8 large holes in its flight desk and deep into the ship as well as rupture of a massive fuel tank in the process. The aircraft carrier could still be made operational in a span of hours. Remember this - The aircraft carrier was far less capable on many counts back then.

You will be surprised.

It doesnt matter cause of the high velocity the ballistic missile comes in.
Right.


Please be under no illusion.

Cause the world is greater than the range of chinese ASBM or other chinese ballistic missiles.
And same logic does not hold in case of Iran?

ASBM is more like a tool of deterrence than being an established platform for taking out moving ships in OPEN WATERS (probability of scoring hits is POOR in comparison to cruise missiles). Iranian investment in this regime make sense for creating deterrence near it shores given its security considerations and perceptions but it would be a mistake to bet on this regime to defeat USN in a hypothetical conflict (God forbid).

ASBM as a strike platform might intimidate much weaker regional navies but it won't deliver against USN.
 
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The incident of USS Enterprise in 1969 was very instructive in regards to making aircraft carriers survivable in the long-term. The USS Enterprise endured 18 powerful explosions in a row causing 8 large holes in its flight desk and deep into the ship as well as rupture of a massive fuel tank in the process. The aircraft carrier could still be made operational in a span of hours. Remember this - The aircraft carrier was far less capable on many counts back then.

You will be surprised.


Right.

Well, "8 large holes in the flight deck" and "be made operational in a span of hours"....me think Hollywood was also on board....

Ah, i see, it was in a habor when it happened ^^

And

"The USS Enterprise was repaired over several months at Pearl Harbor and returned to action later in the year."



Please be under no illusion.

Well, SM6....max 3.5 mach...ah, i see, target was a FTM-27... mach 5 incoming as far as i know...

uuhhh, i mismatch FTM-27. For the incoming BM there is no info.


And same logic does not hold in case of Iran?

ASBM is more like a tool of deterrence than being an established platform for taking out moving ships in OPEN WATERS (probability of scoring hits is POOR in comparison to cruise missiles). Iranian investment in this regime make sense for creating deterrence near it shores given its security considerations and perceptions but it would be a mistake to bet on this regime to defeat USN in a hypothetical conflict (God forbid).

ASBM as a strike platform might intimidate much weaker regional navies but it won't deliver against USN.

Thats all what Iran needs: Holding Carrier at a distance of 1000 km of her shores makes the carriers F18/F35 useless for wave attack cause of the range and cause no air base would exist around Iran where they can fly after.
 
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Well, "8 large holes in the flight deck" and "be made operational in a span of hours"....me think Hollywood was also on board....

Ah, i see, it was in a habor when it happened ^^

And

"The USS Enterprise was repaired over several months at Pearl Harbor and returned to action later in the year."
FYI

In 1969, the USS Enterprise – a nuclear-powered carrier still in the active fleet today – suffered a catastrophic accident during which nine of its 500-pound bombs detonated. The amount of explosive power released was roughly equal to that of half a dozen Russian cruise missiles. Although 27 sailors were killed and over 300 injured, the Enterprise could have resumed strike operations within hours. Carrier designs were subsequently made even more resilient, while safety and damage-control procedures were tightened. - Dr. Loren Thompson (Lexington Institute)

Nimitz class aircraft carriers, and modern Ford class aircraft carriers, are much more survivable in the present. This is the point.

Well, SM6....max 3.5 mach...ah, i see, target was a FTM-27... mach 5 incoming as far as i know...
Brilliant...

1. Interceptors are supposed to be FAST ENOUGH to intercept incoming missiles.
2. MRBMs attain impressive speeds on average.

acronyms-attack-missiles4.png


The MRBM class target that was defeated in the FTM-27-E2 test is two stage solid propellant and equipped with an MaRV configured to engage moving ships in order to simulate flight characteristics of Chinese DF-21D class ASBM. Please step out from that bubble of yours.

Thats all what Iran needs: Holding Carrier at a distance of 1000 km of her shores makes the carriers F18/F35 useless for wave attack cause of the range and cause no air base would exist around Iran where they can fly after.
They are fully equipped to defeat ASBMs (and more) while going on the offensive at the same time while operating close to Iran (or any regional power whatsoever). I suggest you dig into the theme of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of the USN to understand how many operations this force is capable of executing in one go.
 
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FYI

In 1969, the USS Enterprise – a nuclear-powered carrier still in the active fleet today – suffered a catastrophic accident during which nine of its 500-pound bombs detonated. The amount of explosive power released was roughly equal to that of half a dozen Russian cruise missiles. Although 27 sailors were killed and over 300 injured, the Enterprise could have resumed strike operations within hours. Carrier designs were subsequently made even more resilient, while safety and damage-control procedures were tightened. - Dr. Loren Thompson (Lexington Institute)

Nevertheless, Nimitz class aircraft carriers and modern Ford class aircraft carriers are much more survivable in the present. This is the point.

Well, Hollywood is in the house. In reallity it was

"Twisted and scarred by the blaze, with fifteen of her jets reduced to smoldering wrecks, the Enterprise limped back into Pearl Harbor, where she underwent fifty-one days of repairs costing $126 million ($866 million in 2017 dollars)."




Brilliant...

1. Interceptors are supposed to be FAST ENOUGH to intercept incoming missiles.
2. MRBMs attain impressive speeds on average.

acronyms-attack-missiles4.png


The MRBM class target that was defeated in the FTM-27-E2 test is two stage solid propellant and equipped with an MaRV configured to engage moving ships in order to simulate flight characteristics of Chinese DF-21D class ASBM.

Please step out from that bubble of yours.

Well, DF-21 has max 8 mach and in terminal phase it is "gliding" with reduced velocity due to that gliding.

These "speed" numbers in your table are max speed numbers what are not equal terminal phase speeds. You have to look for the terminal phase speed. The successor MRBM DF-26 for example has a terminal phase speed of over mach 10. If you take a look in your table and compare it with the MRBM Khorramshahr: ~ Mach 16 (5600 m/s), then you see that your table is out of date. Also US itself says that SM-6 has its highest chance (what is it? Highest chance? Same as "highest chance" of PAC2 or PAC3?) to take out the incoming missile before in terminal phase.


They are fully equipped to defeat your ASBMs (and more) while going on the offensive at the same time while operating close to Iran. I suggest you dig into the theme of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of the USN to understand how many operations this force is capable of executing in one go.

Entire world respect and understand capabilities of USN but Iranians...

Well, if US ballistic missile defence is such great and successful, me wonder why US do not take on China or Russia in direct war but always do mimimimimi about them....
 
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Well, Hollywood is in the house. In reallity it was

"Twisted and scarred by the blaze, with fifteen of her jets reduced to smoldering wrecks, the Enterprise limped back into Pearl Harbor, where she underwent fifty-one days of repairs costing $126 million ($866 million in 2017 dollars)."

This is argument for the sake of argument, and you continue to miss the point.

REPEAT - The incident of USS Enterprise in 1969 was very instructive in regards to making aircraft carriers survivable in the long-term. The USS Enterprise endured 18 powerful explosions in a row causing 8 large holes in its flight desk and deep into the ship as well as rupture of a massive fuel tank in the process. The aircraft carrier could still be made operational in a span of hours. Remember this - The aircraft carrier was far less capable on many counts back then.

Do not try to play tricks with me and stick to the point.

Well, DF-21 has max 8 mach and in terminal phase it is "gliding" with reduced velocity due to that gliding.
DF-21D can exceed MACH 11 in sheer speed, and it is equipped with an MaRV configured to engage a moving ship. This MaRV is propelled to impressive speed levels by two stage solid fuel rocket propellants (Boost - Midcourse). Initial re-entry speed is estimated 3.7 KM/sec (very close to MACH 11 mark). Assuming hampering impact of atmospheric conditions, re-entry speed of the MaRV released by DF-21D will remain noticeably above MACH 5 anyways (around MACH 8 mark).

The degree to which re-entry speed of an RV (or MaRV) is hampered by atmospheric conditions is contingent upon its weight-to-drag ratio, or ballistic coefficient (beta). An RV (or MaRV) with high beta will not experience much deceleration than the one with low beta. Technicalities of the MaRV released by DF-21D is CLASSIFIED information nevertheless.

These "speed" numbers in your table are max speed numbers what are not equal terminal phase speeds. You have to look for the terminal phase speed. The successor MRBM DF-26 for example has a terminal phase speed of over mach 10. If you take a look in your table and compare it with the MRBM Khorramshahr: ~ Mach 16 (5600 m/s), then you see that your table is out of date. Also US itself says that SM-6 has its highest chance (what is it? Highest chance? Same as "highest chance" of PAC2 or PAC3?) to take out the incoming missile before in terminal phase.
See above.

DF-26 is IRBM class and should be able to approach MACH 18 mark in sheer speed in Midcourse phase.

Khorramshahr is liquid fueled?

The Table shared is representative of the performance parameters of majority of ballistic missiles in service worldwide - good enough for consultation. There can be outliers in each class of ballistic missiles in terms of peak speed attainable subject to propellant designs in use.

SM-6 represent a different class of interceptors than Patriots (PAC-2 and PAC-3 variants) - capable of defeating some of the most complex threats closing in. The upcoming SM-6 Block 1B variant is hypersonic with significantly expanded range and will open a whole new set of possibilities for neutralizing threats in the class from a distance.

Evolutionary trajectory = SM-1 class -- SM-2 class -- SM-6 class.

SM-6 class is absolutely capable of defeating high-performance ballistic missiles equipped with maneuverable warheads, and Khorramshahr won't be a problem. This assertion is based on solid quantifiable information on hand.

Missile defense capabilities of the USN are not limited to SM-6 class in the present. They have fielded SM-2 class interceptors, SM-6 class interceptors, and SM-3 class interceptors for the needful. SM-3 class provide sufficient window and flexibility to enable intercept of all classes of ballistic missiles in the Midcourse phase (Exo-atmospheric) and represent FIRST LINE of defense for the needful. The others such as SM-2 and SM-6 provide sufficient window and flexibility to defeat incoming ballistic missiles in the Terminal phase (Endo-atmospheric) and represent SECOND LINE of defense for the needful. Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities are also in the equation to create DUPLICATE signatures of the host navy ships and confuse incoming ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in them. These technologies delivered near Yemeni shores in 2016 against C-802 class of cruise missiles directed towards American navy ships.

Well, if US ballistic missile defence is such great and successful, me wonder why US do not take on China or Russia in direct war but always do mimimimimi about them....
You expect USA to invade another superpower out of the blue? By the same token, why doesn't Russia or China take their chances with USA? Juvenile statement TBH.

USN is equipped to handle naval arm of either country (Russia or China) and prevail in a hypothetical naval conflict - if this was your concern.

USN is a continuously evolving force that is being accorded huge amount of resources to meet its maintenance requirements as well as to make sure that it remains equipped to challenge all manner of threats (emerging and imagined) through the years. No regional power is in the position to keep up and achieve parity in comparison let alone be in the position to defeat USN.

Iranian investments and security considerations make sense from Iranian standpoint - I do not disagree with these considerations. Iran is the position to build credible regional defenses and strive for creating an aura of deterrence against superior enemies near its borders. This aura should not be mistaken for superiority over some of the best equipped naval forces in the world however (logical; technical; resources).
 
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Good discussions so far, lets keep it up.

War is all about who you are fighting, why, where and how. In this discussion, lets make sure we keep the "where" part in mind closely. This will not be a naval vs naval warfare in open oceans, rather we are discussing Iran's A2/AD capability starting from the Persian Gulf and extending beyond; context makes all the difference. I have been following American missile defence programs closely and to be frank with you, I am not convinced they are on the sort of level people are thinking. Yes they have made good developments, but their capability is not on the level to reliably and consistently deal with these "new" missile threats, more specifically "lower tier" and full on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Iranian missiles today in the form of Zolfiqar, Haj Qassem etc are "lower tier" hypersonic glide vehicles, in the sense that they are somewhere in between purely ballistic missiles and full on HGVs. Have a read of the very interesting paper below to see the important differences between the types of missiles today:

THE MISSILE THREAT: A TAXONOMY FOR MOVING BEYOND BALLISTIC

Screen Shot 2020-10-04 at 15.33.37.png


These definitions are important because when we talk about the ability of a missile defence to defend against missiles, we need to consider the different types. I have not seen much evidence to think the likes of SM-6 could deal with the newer Iranian systems to that extent. That is not to say it is impossible for them to destroy the targets at all, but remember to be useful, these missile defences have to reliably and consistently destroy their targets. There is no evidence the likes of SM-6 can deliver that against these likes of Zolfiqar Bair, H-Qassem, K1/2 etc in the manner I outlined above . The Americans have yet to simulate these new missiles and to show the success of these defences against them.

More-over, do not forget that a major part of Iran's tactics is to overwhelm the enemy's air defences. Meaning even if in this hypothetical scenario the Americans could deliver a 100% 1:1 kill ratio (not even close to reality), they would eventually be saturated (recall the "where"). Other issues such as decoys, E-warfare etc are nothing new to Iran. If one could speak Persian you could see ample articles on these issues in the Iranian corners of the internet. So I think this notion that these Anti ship ballistic missiles not possessing a major threat to the US navy does not mirror reality right now. But this is a cat and mouse game where the other side is constantly creating new defences so likes of Iran and China must and will keep up.
 
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Good discussions so far, lets keep it up.

War is all about who you are fighting, why, where and how. In this discussion, lets make sure we keep the "where" part in mind closely. This will not be a naval vs naval warfare in open oceans, rather we are discussing Iran's A2/AD capability starting from the Persian Gulf and extending beyond; context makes all the difference. I have been following American missile defence programs closely and to be frank with you, they are not on the level that you are assuming. Yes they have made good developments, but their capability is not on the level to reliably and consistently deal with these "new" missile threats, more specifically "lower tier" and full on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Iranian missiles today in the form of Zolfiqar, Haj Qassem etc are "lower tier" hypersonic glide vehicles, in the sense that they are somewhere in between purely ballistic missiles and full on HGVs. Have a read of the very interesting paper below to see the important differences between the types of missiles today:

THE MISSILE THREAT: A TAXONOMY FOR MOVING BEYOND BALLISTIC

View attachment 676071

These definitions are important because when we talk about the ability of a missile defence to defend against missiles, we need to consider the different types. I have not seen much evidence to think the likes of SM-6 could deal with the newer Iranian systems, they fall short kinetically. That is not to say it is impossible for them to destroy the targets at all, but remember to be useful, these missile defences have to reliably and consistently destroy their targets. There is no evidence the likes of SM-6 can deliver that against these likes of Zolfiqar Bair, H-Qassem, K1/2 etc in the manner I outlined above . I think @PeeD @AmirPatriot could share theirs thoughts if they are free. The Americans have yet to simulate these new missiles and to show the success of these defences against them.

More-over, do not forget that a major part of Iran's tactics is to overwhelm the enemy's air defences. Meaning even if in this hypothetical scenario the Americans could deliver a 100% 1:1 kill ratio (not even close to reality), they would eventually be saturated (recall the "where"). Other issues such as decoys, E-warfare etc are nothing new to Iran. If one could speak Persian you could see ample articles on these issues in the Iranian corners of the internet. So I think this notion that these Anti ship ballistic missiles not possessing a major threat to the US navy does not mirror reality right now. But this is a cat and mouse game where the other side is constantly creating new defences so likes of Iran and China must and will keep up.

SM-6 becomes potent against AshBM because the Aegis ship itself is the target: The AshBM needs to hit it and here the ABM interceptor is often not at a heavy kinematic disadvantage anymore. Plus the ship knows that its the target and can exploit this.

MaRV energy defeat mechanisms work best against a ABM system that needs to defend an area.

So SM-6 has a good chance against Khalije Fars.
Against Zolfaghar-Basir its performance reduced and against a anti-ship Haj Qasem, even further.
Still it's not as hopeless as other ABM systems trying to perform area defense against fast MaRVs.

So naval counter-ABM is a different game.
 
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This is argument for the sake of argument, and you continue to miss the point.

REPEAT - The incident of USS Enterprise in 1969 was very instructive in regards to making aircraft carriers survivable in the long-term. The USS Enterprise endured 18 powerful explosions in a row causing 8 large holes in its flight desk and deep into the ship as well as rupture of a massive fuel tank in the process. The aircraft carrier could still be made operational in a span of hours. Remember this - The aircraft carrier was far less capable on many counts back then.

Do not try to play tricks with me and stick to the point.

Your "red" doesnt matter cause your "green" is a lie. If there is a big hole in the deck of the carrier caused by a MRBM coming in with > mach 10 - you cant repair such an impact at sea "in a span of hours". Thats Bullshit!

So for me the discussion ends here.
 
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Keep something in mind, when I posted the incident 1967 USS Forrestal fire it was to show how volatile these ships are, there was another incident the year previous to that called the USS Enterprise fire where a small rocket explosion caused a chain explosion destroying 15 planes and killing/injuring 100's of people. These incidents occurred above deck, and the point is how vulnerable the surface of these fleets are to destruction. Whether the ship itself sinks etc or not is irrelevant because likes I had said, this is not the main goal. The main goal is to take the ships out of commission. In the case of carriers, simply damaging their runways etc will be enough to do that and then you can decide what to do with the ships afterwards, sink (if need be), take over etc.
 
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Your "red" doesnt matter cause your "green" is a lie. If there is a big hole in the deck of the carrier caused by a MRBM coming in with > mach 10 - you cant repair such an impact at sea "in a span of hours". Thats Bullshit!

So for me the discussion ends here.
The green is part is merely revelation of Dr. Loren Thompson whose quote I shared in post # 19 - not a lie. Your interpretation of the incident on the other hand...

The USS Enterprise experienced a series of powerful explosions in short order (multiple 500 pound munitions exploding in a row >> one ASBM in terms of causing damage to the flight deck and beyond). The damage control parties went to work in earnest, getting the fire under control in less than an hour, and fully extinguishing it after three hours - earlier incidents of Oriskany (CVA 34) and Forrestal (CVA 59) were instructive in this regard. Casualties were surprisingly low due to compartmentalization factor. The USS Enterprise remained functional through the ordeal and returned to port on the same day for repairs - there was no need to tow it. Now this was the case in 1969 when aircraft carriers were relatively lacking in survivability - this incident was particularly instructive in regards to improving survivability of aircraft carriers in the long-term. Modern aircraft carriers feature higher levels of compartmentalization, higher levels of armoring, superior damage control measures, and superior defenses in comparison.

Carriers are nearly impossible to sink. Because of their vast size, U.S. aircraft carriers have hundreds of water-tight compartments. They also have thousands of tons of armoring, and redundancy built into major on-board systems such as the electrical wiring. So that one weapon that might penetrate a layered defense isn’t likely to do great damage to the carrier. The vessel won’t sink, and the crew will probably be able to work around whatever damage is incurred to continue performing their mission. The size of the carrier that some pundits fear makes it vulnerable to attack actually makes it more resilient than any other warship.

LINK: https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorent...he-safest-places-to-be-in-a-war/#9abb9b32f7ac

The ASBM is expected to breach the flight deck upon impact given its velocity but the extent of damage will be mitigated through extensive levels of compartmentalization and armoring. Flight deck width is massive as well (252 feet across). There will be casualties as well but it is possible for a modern aircraft carrier to absorb an ASBM strike or two and keep functioning. This is assuming that an ASBM gets through in the first place.

Good discussions so far, lets keep it up.

War is all about who you are fighting, why, where and how. In this discussion, lets make sure we keep the "where" part in mind closely. This will not be a naval vs naval warfare in open oceans, rather we are discussing Iran's A2/AD capability starting from the Persian Gulf and extending beyond; context makes all the difference. I have been following American missile defence programs closely and to be frank with you, I am not convinced they are on the sort of level people are thinking. Yes they have made good developments, but their capability is not on the level to reliably and consistently deal with these "new" missile threats, more specifically "lower tier" and full on Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Iranian missiles today in the form of Zolfiqar, Haj Qassem etc are "lower tier" hypersonic glide vehicles, in the sense that they are somewhere in between purely ballistic missiles and full on HGVs. Have a read of the very interesting paper below to see the important differences between the types of missiles today:

THE MISSILE THREAT: A TAXONOMY FOR MOVING BEYOND BALLISTIC

View attachment 676071

These definitions are important because when we talk about the ability of a missile defence to defend against missiles, we need to consider the different types. I have not seen much evidence to think the likes of SM-6 could deal with the newer Iranian systems to that extent. That is not to say it is impossible for them to destroy the targets at all, but remember to be useful, these missile defences have to reliably and consistently destroy their targets. There is no evidence the likes of SM-6 can deliver that against these likes of Zolfiqar Bair, H-Qassem, K1/2 etc in the manner I outlined above . I think @PeeD @AmirPatriot could share theirs thoughts if they are free. The Americans have yet to simulate these new missiles and to show the success of these defences against them.

This report is a good share, particularly for those who are not in touch with rocket sciences in theory and practice.

There is also the tendency to assume in Public discourses that missile defense programs are shaped by traditional and/or limited set-of-assumptions and actual rocket sciences are overlooked in practice. This is FALSE.

American companies are putting together a wide range of rocket designs to serve as targets for the missile defense regime, and these rocket designs are not bereft of maneuverability considerations - supposed to simulate a wide range of existing and even emerging threats (prototypes).

American companies continue to receive contracts for developing simple and complex targets for the missile defense regime. Examples below.



Some countries spend that much on procuring a new strike platform.

It is obvious that Americans adhere to a costly testing regime to make sure that American defensive applications will deliver results when the situation demands it - reliability and consistency are important considerations in short.

Testing record of SM-6 class interceptors have not received much publicity (intentional censorship) because these interceptors were pitted against complex targets on average (Category 3 - 5) and defeated each.


During FTM-27 Event 1, in December 2016, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer (which hosts the Aegis BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade) engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. FTM-27 Event 1 was the first demonstration of Aegis BMD Sea-Based Terminal capability against complex ballistic missile targets. - DOT&E

During FTM-27 Event 2, in August 2017, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. The test, which was a follow-on from FTM-27 Event 1, further demonstrated aspects of the Baseline 9.C1 Sea-Based Terminal engagement capability. - DOT&E

SM-6 class interceptors are equipped with cutting-edge seekers (AMRAAM technologies incorporated) to obtain lock(s) on incoming target(s) and capable of executing extremely high-G maneuvers while in the process to engage them (vastly superior maneuverability factor).

sbt2.png


SM-6 seeker and terminal guidance electronics derive from technology developed in the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile program. - DOT&E

SM-6 retains the legacy Standard Missile semi-active radar homing capability. - DOT&E

SM-6 receives midcourse flight control from the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) via ship’s radar; terminal flight control is autonomous via the missile’s active seeker or supported by the AWS via the ship’s illuminator. - DOT&E

While inherent capabilities of the interceptor are important considerations, they benefit from inputs coming from the incredibly sophisticated Aegis Combat System for the needful.

More-over, do not forget that a major part of Iran's tactics is to overwhelm the enemy's air defences. Meaning even if in this hypothetical scenario the Americans could deliver a 100% 1:1 kill ratio (not even close to reality), they would eventually be saturated (recall the "where"). Other issues such as decoys, E-warfare etc are nothing new to Iran. If one could speak Persian you could see ample articles on these issues in the Iranian corners of the internet. So I think this notion that these Anti ship ballistic missiles not possessing a major threat to the US navy does not mirror reality right now. But this is a cat and mouse game where the other side is constantly creating new defences so likes of Iran and China must and will keep up.
FYI

In order for enemies to attack a carrier, they must successfully complete a complex sequence of events that the Navy calls a "kill chain." First the carrier must be found; then its location must be fixed; then a track of its movement must be established; then the carrier must be engaged; and finally, the results of the engagement must be assessed. In practice, each of these steps consists of a series of subsidiary tasks. Like broken links in a chain, if any of the tasks in the kill chain is not accomplished in a timely fashion, the entire process breaks down. In the event of hostilities, the Navy plans to disrupt every step in an enemy’s kill chain, from strikes against sensors searching for carriers to jamming of enemy command links to interception of weapons seeking to engage the carrier. Several features of the carrier strike group severely impede any adversary’s ability to execute an effective attack:

  • Carriers are always moving, so even if found they can disappear into hundreds of square miles of ocean within minutes.
  • Carrier air wings can intercept and destroy enemy combat systems long before they get anywhere near the carrier.
  • Carriers deploy with surface, air and undersea escorts that can defeat diverse overhead, surface and submerged threats.
  • Carrier sensors are netted with those of other friendly assets to assure optimum detection and targeting of nearby threats.
  • Carriers are nearly impossible to sink given their extensive armoring and hundreds of watertight compartments.

Source: https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/...-Logic-of-Aircraft-Carrier-Strike-Groups2.pdf
 
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Carriers are always moving, so even if found they can disappear into hundreds of square miles of ocean within minutes.

Why dont you tell me before that you mean it all ironical?
 
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An aircraft carrier such as Nimitz class and the latest Ford class feature hundreds of compartments (each can be sealed) coupled with layers of armoring, firefighting arrangements, and numerous Passive/Active defenses to counter a wide range of external threats which are not openly discussed in the Public domain (kinda surprising, right?). These ships are also among the fastest moving in the world - it is virtually impossible to keep tabs on them in OPEN OCEAN.

These ships do not travel alone either - they are shielded by a number of well-equipped destroyers, cruisers, and even submarines while on the move. Secondly, all those aircraft and helicopters stationed on the aircraft carrier have a purpose - that is to create situational awareness for the entire strike package and attack enemy forces when spotted.

Iranians drills cannot simulate all of the above - not even close. No country can in fact (impossible).

Why do you think China is pouring funds into developing and replicating American CSG level capabilities for PLAN even though it have substantial investment in ASBM and such? A question worth pondering...

You guys outclass me here by a mile lol, I won't really be able to hold a candle to anything you're saying but i'll throw in my two-cents xD

I was always under the impression that the China is developing adjacent CSG capabilities to the USN for power projection purposes more so than anything else.

But I do agree with what you're saying overall. Hitting a large moving target, at open sea, covered in layers of defenses is a monumental task even for the best of militaries out there. Iran's Ballistic Missile strategy is more tailored (IMO) to obliterate any fixed target rather than moving targets.

Quite frankly I'm impressed that Iran can hit a target at sea but a moving one is a different story altogether. I'd imagine Iran would need to fire way more than one AshBM at any moving target to increase the chance of hitting it. Destroying carriers was never the goal though, disabling them and rendering them operational nonfunctional is what Iran plans on doing, if they can reliably pull it off, which remains to be seen.
 
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Some countries spend that much on procuring a new strike platform.

It is obvious that Americans adhere to a costly testing regime to make sure that American defensive applications will deliver results when the situation demands it - reliability and consistency are important considerations in short.

Testing record of SM-6 class interceptors have not received much publicity (intentional censorship) because these interceptors were pitted against complex targets on average (Category 3 - 5) and defeated each.


During FTM-27 Event 1, in December 2016, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer (which hosts the Aegis BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade) engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. FTM-27 Event 1 was the first demonstration of Aegis BMD Sea-Based Terminal capability against complex ballistic missile targets. - DOT&E

During FTM-27 Event 2, in August 2017, an Aegis Baseline 9.C1 destroyer engaged a complex medium-range ballistic missile target with a salvo of two SM-6 Dual I missiles. The test, which was a follow-on from FTM-27 Event 1, further demonstrated aspects of the Baseline 9.C1 Sea-Based Terminal engagement capability. - DOT&E

SM-6 class interceptors are equipped with cutting-edge seekers (AMRAAM technologies incorporated) to obtain lock(s) on incoming target(s) and capable of executing extremely high-G maneuvers while in the process to engage them (vastly superior maneuverability factor).

sbt2.png


SM-6 seeker and terminal guidance electronics derive from technology developed in the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile program. - DOT&E

SM-6 retains the legacy Standard Missile semi-active radar homing capability. - DOT&E

SM-6 receives midcourse flight control from the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) via ship’s radar; terminal flight control is autonomous via the missile’s active seeker or supported by the AWS via the ship’s illuminator. - DOT&E

While inherent capabilities of the interceptor are important considerations, they benefit from inputs coming from the incredibly sophisticated Aegis Combat System for the needful.


FYI

In order for enemies to attack a carrier, they must successfully complete a complex sequence of events that the Navy calls a "kill chain." First the carrier must be found; then its location must be fixed; then a track of its movement must be established; then the carrier must be engaged; and finally, the results of the engagement must be assessed. In practice, each of these steps consists of a series of subsidiary tasks. Like broken links in a chain, if any of the tasks in the kill chain is not accomplished in a timely fashion, the entire process breaks down. In the event of hostilities, the Navy plans to disrupt every step in an enemy’s kill chain, from strikes against sensors searching for carriers to jamming of enemy command links to interception of weapons seeking to engage the carrier. Several features of the carrier strike group severely impede any adversary’s ability to execute an effective attack:

  • Carriers are always moving, so even if found they can disappear into hundreds of square miles of ocean within minutes.
  • Carrier air wings can intercept and destroy enemy combat systems long before they get anywhere near the carrier.
  • Carriers deploy with surface, air and undersea escorts that can defeat diverse overhead, surface and submerged threats.
  • Carrier sensors are netted with those of other friendly assets to assure optimum detection and targeting of nearby threats.
  • Carriers are nearly impossible to sink given their extensive armoring and hundreds of watertight compartments.

Source: https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/...-Logic-of-Aircraft-Carrier-Strike-Groups2.pdf

Good read my friend. Few points to say here. Americans are certainly not an easy nut to crack, given their tremendous budgets for one thing. The developments you outlined above are all being watched and considered very closely by Iran, I can confirm this by just the OSINT data. Broadly speaking, I think the realities of warfare tend to almost always depart from ones theories and predictions. The existence of hidden tactics and assets by all these sides in question is one factor causing this. Therefore our discussion here was in essence in isolation away from these hidden factors. In terms of how these systems we've discussed would actually perform in the complex environment of real world wars is something we can hope to never find out. One alternative way to measure the potency of these systems is that deterrence factor we've discussed already. I think there is no question Iran has obtained (at minimum) deterrence and has now shifted to the next level where it is causing its adversaries to actively seek deterrence against it. I assumed you are not a Persian speaker, if you were I could have provided you with discussion with Iranian military officials that give insights into these issues in a much deeper ways that anyone us outside of those spheres.
 
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