I think the real question is why Iran decided to threaten Azerbaijan,
Naturally I thought they wanted to intimidate Azerbaijan but recently I've heard rumors that the real intention was to pull Armenia away from the west which sounds plausible but also foolish.
Why would you want to anger Turkey which you have much bigger economic ties with and a real strategic actor in your region in hopes that Pashinyan government would stop sucking American cock.
As for Hakan Fidan's statement. It doesn't even need to be said. Iran or any other country interferes in Azerbaijan, we will go to war. Everybody knows that. I've said the same thing many times on this forum.
I think he just wanted to reassure Azerbaijan.
At this point maybe Iranian officials are right when they say their air defense systems are best in the world. Russia is struggling to protect their bases, maybe they should order some Iranian SHORADs (Mersad, Zubin, tactical Sayyad, 9 dey, etc)
This latest attack was when a navy ship and Kilo sub were docked. Supposedly Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by UK were used.
I don't believe that the solution for Russia lies in buying SHORAD systems from Iran. The problem is simply that Russia is a vast country, and potentially every point could be targeted by these drones. There are too many points to defend in the largest country on Earth in terms of area. SHORAD systems have a range of a few kilometers against very low-flying objects, making them effective within that range, but also revealing their weakness. When you consider how many other crucial areas need protection
– units on the frontlines, logistics and headquarters in the hinterland, important bridges, railway stations, and inland routes, key buildings in major cities up to St. Petersburg, vital gathering points, barracks, fuel depots, and strategic industries, oil facilities, refineries, and much more –
it becomes clear that there are likely thousands of points that need simultaneous defense, and they are geographically dispersed. This presents a significant challenge. We must assume that Russia doesn't always have all its systems available everywhere at all times. Therefore, Ukraine needs to determine where there are currently no systems available. Theoretically, Ukraine has access to the entire intelligence and reconnaissance apparatus of NATO, so they are not lacking in information. It's just a matter of striking at the right time and place.
There are also other psychological factors at play, such as the readiness of local air defense units. I don't know how they are organized in Russia, but I suspect that it's a challenge to identify a target only 30 seconds or a minute before it arrives and then react, especially if your anti-aircraft gun hasn't detected anything for months or even never before. Routine and habit can set in. Perhaps false alarms are generated so often that they start to lose their effectiveness.
There are four points that, in my opinion, clearly pose a problem, as found in military literature in this case:
1. Stratagem 23: Creating Something from Nothing:
- This includes generating constant false alarms, leading to decreased alertness or long periods of inactivity among troops.
- It involves creating illusions for tactical advantage or altering the enemy's disposition.
- Note: This stratagem is used to combat the enemy and is typically applied in situations where direct confrontation or open hostilities should be avoided or when a subtler approach is necessary. Geographically and logistically, Russia faces challenges, making the next stratagem related to geography a strategy of victory while, on the front, it is used because Ukraine is too weak to win.
2. Stratagem 22: Making a Noise in the East, Striking in the West:
- This tactic involves diverting the enemy's attention through feigned attacks, compelling them to allocate resources where they are not needed, leaving other areas vulnerable.
- Note: This is a strategy of victory and is usually applied during a conflict or confrontation to secure victory or strengthen one's position. It is used in various situations, such as in this case during a protracted conflict to test and weaken the enemy's endurance.
3. Information:
- The enemy has very good information in this area and knows their adversary well. Sun Tzu said,
"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." Ukraine clearly knows its enemy well in this regard.
4. Sun Tzu's Quote: "(...) When he seeks to concentrate, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected."
Possible Solutions:
Drawing from Sun Tzu:
Quote: "The greatest victory is that which requires no battle. The next best is to win without shedding blood. The next is to defeat the enemy in battle, but without great slaughter. The worst policy is to besiege walled cities."
1. Thwarting the Enemy's Plans:
- Meticulous Surveillance: Invest more resources in radar systems, intelligence gathering, information acquisition, and in-depth analysis of the enemy's behavior, observing their actions and forcing them to expose themselves.
- Counter-Deception: Use counter-deception tactics to confuse enemy strategies, including providing false information.
- Resource Allocation: Russia must allocate more resources to install SHORAD systems in sufficient quantities across the country.
2. Preventing Enemy Unity:
- Neutralizing Threats: Prevent the deployment and use of Ukrainian cruise missiles and drones through proactive measures.
- Disrupting Supply Routes: Disrupt the supply routes of these weapons to limit their effectiveness.
Conclusion:
While the potential import of Iranian SHORAD systems may play a part in the overall solution, it's evident that a comprehensive strategy is needed. Ukraine's actions can be likened to persistent body blows in a boxing match or low kicks in Muay Thai – they may not knock out the opponent, but over time, they accumulate damage and cause significant pain. To effectively counter this evolving threat, Russia must invest in surveillance, counter-deception, intelligence utilization, and enhance the responsiveness and detection capabilities of its air defense units. Success in this conflict demands adaptability and a dynamic approach that considers the evolving nature of warfare and the characteristics of the adversary.
