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Iran to supply Russia with “hundreds” of Drones

You can be sure that the USA and Israel are all over the use of these drones, wonder how long it will take to crack their communication/control links.

A military secret only remains a secret for so long and now that these drones are in the wild, it will be easy to see what the underlying supply chains are for these drones and how those supply chains can be underminded. The same thing happened with Russian drones, when it was realised that they were so dependent on western components(as it most of the military).
Well testing them in a battlefield is valuable opportunity that could help us to modify them while already have been used against Saudis and no supply chain has been undermined ... also there is another reason that I rather not to tell ....
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Well it would be reasonable to have some degree of scepticism about such claims until clear verifiable proof is shown. In the case of drones, it has been proven. However in the case of bavar not only has it not been proven, it is absurd to think Russia would need such system. I can deny until you prove your claim.
Yeah but i also don’t deny that it might not be true either
 
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You can be sure that the USA and Israel are all over the use of these drones, wonder how long it will take to crack their communication/control links.

A military secret only remains a secret for so long and now that these drones are in the wild, it will be easy to see what the underlying supply chains are for these drones and how those supply chains can be underminded. The same thing happened with Russian drones, when it was realised that they were so dependent on western components(as it most of the military).

If the drones are GPS guided, they can potentially jam the GPS signals in the area.
 
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Translation from some Russian Telegram sources:

We are asked why they began to use drones, and not cruise missiles, as before. One of the advantages of using Gerani2 over the CD is that it is almost impossible to notice its start. Unlike the Kyrgyz Republic, the launch data of which is immediately transmitted by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Western (neutral aga) reconnaissance aircraft hanging in the sea 24/7 it starts from trucks and does not leave such a trace.

Inability to detect the launch, flight almost near the ground, it is very difficult to shoot down, low cost (calculate how much fuel the Armed Forces of Ukraine uses to raise aircraft, move Buks, the cost of missiles) and the cost of this "toy", accuracy, the operator leads the drone and adjusts its flight.

And they also say Iran is a backward country, especially often heard it from lovers of European. "Yes, they are under sanctions, wild, etc. what can they do?"

A country with a 3 thousand-year history, a space program, the strongest UAVs.

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Our source reports that the invasion of UAVs is now becoming a mega problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the same air defense that will be calculated and destroyed.

The strategy is simple.

Several waves of raids of groups of small and relatively cheap UAVs will be used at once.
Their goal will be: reconnaissance and opening of the air defense system, jamming, the formation of false targets, the fire destruction of objects.

Such a massive attack, or in other words a "swarm", can paralyze any air defense system built without taking into account the counteraction of UAVs. It should be understood that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have few air defense installations left, and even more so they will not be able to withstand a massive raid. If the Russians also set the task of destroying all air defenses, then in 10 days and 30 attacks in which dozens of Geraniums will be used at once, as well as using aviation, which will detect air defenses and release X-type missiles, while being in their rear, the Armed Forces of Ukraine has every chance of remaining without cover.

At the same time, the further development of technology for the use of UAV groups will further complicate the conditions for the operation of air defense systems. Of course, nato advisers advise the Office of the President, but they will not be able to do anything if there are no air defense, electronic warfare and air defense systems themselves. Only to cover Odessa along the border line, we need air defense for billions of dollars, and hundreds of millions more for maintenance. There is no such money.

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Speaking about the use of Iranian Kamid-136 KAMIKAZE UAVs, it is necessary to note a number of points.

By themselves, drones, as already mentioned, do not solve anything, like any other weapon. Any weapon makes sense (well, in addition to the museum and exhibition) only acting as part of a unit, which is an element of the order of battle, which is under a single control and implements the commander's plan in battle.

In order to act accordingly, the drone must be placed as part of the so-called reconnaissance and strike complex, which ensures the detection of targets, and their immediate destruction due to the absence (maximum reduction) of time from the moment of detection of the target to the moment of opening fire.

The peculiarity of the architecture of the Personally "Shahid-136", which does not have its own camera and goes to the target at the coordinates using a satellite navigation system, suggests its use in tandem with a reconnaissance vehicle (for example, "Shahid-129" or our "Orlan", if they can be combined within the same interface).

The reason for this is that for Iran, which is also experiencing an acute shortage of components due to sanctions, it is difficult to equip every kamikaze drone with a camera, and in these conditions it is advisable to act through the "leader".

For the purposes of combat use, it thus becomes necessary to form groups that combine reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the hands of a single commander who is able to implement the information received immediately, hitting targets on the battlefield and in the near rear. It can also be used as part of existing domestic RUCs, which the respected @KaskadNerv mentioned in his post.

In the meantime, it seems that at least some of these devices are used for stationary, not requiring additional reconnaissance, targets in the deep rear, that is, acting on the instructions of the highest-level headquarters, which by definition do not have the ability to directly detect and act on targets on the battlefield. The reason is the lack of reconnaissance vehicles trained by the RUC (again we look at the Cascade post) or "I see it this way" command is a separate issue.

Such an application seems impractical.
 
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Can someone explain why Russia is deploying Shahed-136 in Odessa mostly?
Odessa is safe from an invasion at this point.
I expected them to be used in the eastern front where Ukrainians are gaining a lot of territory back.
One possibility is that it only appears this way because it is an urban center and therefore lots of civilian footage is made available. If the UAS is used in other areas like Kharkiv and used against positions in a field somewhere in Ukraine, the chance of it being caught on film is about 1%. So their usage could be wide-spread across the front, but recording is only been seen in major city area.

Something stupid, are Shahed-136 fast or slow because sometimes in the footages, they are slow and sometimes not? What is the speed of the drone?
From non-official sources, the max speed is 180 km/h. Keep in mind the distance of the recorder to the drone has a major affect on the appearance of speed. The closer, the faster it looks, the further the slower it looks. But if we stick to the numbers, max speed is 180, say on average 150, and when it dives it starts to pickup alot of speed on the way down.

You can be sure that the USA and Israel are all over the use of these drones, wonder how long it will take to crack their communication/control links.

A military secret only remains a secret for so long and now that these drones are in the wild, it will be easy to see what the underlying supply chains are for these drones and how those supply chains can be underminded. The same thing happened with Russian drones, when it was realised that they were so dependent on western components(as it most of the military).
They should already know the details by now as they've had a couple wreckages in hand before this year.

Nothing will happen vis-a-vis supply chain, Russia was not under major economic and military sanctions prior to the war, hence they'd use western parts for their military, anything worth having in a large scale would be reverse engineered to produce at scale, including the engine in this case.

asking Iranian to occupy HESA complex . really funny
Suicidal.

The Russians are so confident in their ability not to be downed by AD, they have no problem using them in broad daylight at low altitude infront of everyone. Just strolling along the city skyline. Should tell you something
 
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I know it is not true because there is no evidence. That will change when evidence is shown.
Again idk if it’s true or not either just saying to actually see it in real action instead of slow moving targets would be cool ,hitting drones that don’t maneuver or fly faster than subsonic speeds during drills isn’t that amazing, yes it’s a bit fan fiction.my grammar might suck but I have a great imagination
 
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You can be sure that the USA and Israel are all over the use of these drones, wonder how long it will take to crack their communication/control links.
no communication for attacking stationary target , the range is 2000km but Iran can only communicate with them up to 200km , so they had to decided for themselves what is the target
 
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no communication for attacking stationary target , the range is 2000km but Iran can only communicate with them up to 200km , so they had to decided for themselves what is the target
The funny thing that it's actual specifications and mode of operation is unknown and classified.

So many believe that anti-drone gun to disrupt communication will work, based on our open source info, it won't if it is fully in autonomous mode with pre-determined target. They also are not aware of the infrared nose cap. I don't know whether Iran should release details about it, or just keep it in shadow and leave us trying to fit the pieces together
 
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no communication for attacking stationary target , the range is 2000km but Iran can only communicate with them up to 200km , so they had to decided for themselves what is the target

Why would you need constant communication for a stationary target?

It’s based on satellite coordinates you can get off of Google earth.

Not like the building is magically going to move location.

And you can communicate with the drone wherever there is a leader in the air (MALE UAV) or a ground relay station.


What is peculiar is the reason why Russia is using high end S-136 for stationary attack. It is ment for air defense and radiation (radar) sources. Due to honeycomb RAM and it’s radiation seeker it is more a high end solution.

Why Russia isn’t using Arash-1 or Ababil-2 for such strikes? Much cheaper than S-136


Irans-Ababil-2-drone-640x427.jpg
 
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What is peculiar is the reason why Russia is using high end S-136 for stationary attack. It is ment for air defense and radiation (radar) sources. Due to honeycomb RAM and it’s radiation seeker it is more a high end solution.

Why Russia isn’t using Arash-1 or Ababil-2 for such strikes? Much cheaper than S-136
They can afford to pay for the higher end models. S-136 is not meant for air defense and radar specifically, can be used for anything and everything, probably different anti-radar variants exists.

Now, I've read something interesting recently on Russian Telegram channel, I have no clue if they are "in the know" or just are unaware of the IR sensor, or if their is a non-IR sensor version but...

Translation
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Speaking about the use of Iranian Shahid-136 kamikaze UAVs, a number of points should be noted.

By themselves, drones, as already mentioned, do not solve anything, like any other weapon. Any weapon makes sense (well, apart from museum and exhibition ones) only if it acts as part of a subunit, which is an element of a battle order, which is under single control and implements the commander’s plan in battle.

In order to act accordingly, the drone must be placed in the so-called reconnaissance-strike complex, which ensures the detection of targets and their immediate defeat due to the absence (maximum reduction) of time from the moment the target is detected to the moment the fire is opened.

The peculiarity of the architecture of Shahid-136 personally, which does not have its own camera and goes to the target by coordinates using a satellite navigation system, suggests its use in tandem with a reconnaissance vehicle (for example, Shahid-129 or our Orlan, if they succeed combine within one interface).

The reason for this is that for Iran, which is also experiencing an acute shortage of components due to sanctions, it is difficult to equip each kamikaze drone with a camera, and in these conditions it is advisable to act through the “leader”.


For the purposes of combat use, therefore, it becomes necessary to form groups that combine reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the hands of a single commander, capable of implementing the information received immediately, hitting targets on the battlefield and in the near rear. It can also be used as part of existing domestic RUKs, which were mentioned in his post (https://****/KaskadNerv/611) by dear @KaskadNerv.

In the meantime, it seems that at least some of these devices are used for stationary targets that do not require additional reconnaissance, deep in the rear, that is, acting on the instructions of top-level headquarters, which, by definition, do not have the ability to directly detect and act on targets on the battlefield. Is the reason for the lack of reconnaissance vehicles prepared by the RUK (again we look at the post of the Cascade) or "as I see it" command - a separate issue.

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They seem to state that a reconnaissance UAV acts as the mothership essentially to direct the suicide UAVs to their targets in this particular case. This is just a telegram account so I can't verify the authenticity but this is worth noting. What does the forum think?
My thoughts make me consider that these drones due to their long flight time capacity, can be launched and used to loiter around for long periods of time, and the recon UAV, can then direct them to a target(s) it finds while these S-136 are loitering around.

In this infographic this concept might have already been referred to as "Net based mission" but what was not shown in the infographic was the mother drone. The mission is directed by the mother drone operator Which could be a low RCS Shahed-191 which Russia is purported to receive, or anything like MH-6 or their own Orlans.

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Funny how all the "game changing" western supplied weapons like the Javelin, the Ceaser, M777 , and HIMARs turned out to be serioues disapontments, but the wonder weapon has turned out to be the unsung Iranian kamikazi drone....
 
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