Interesting article about Kargil

[blain2]

I dont need such reports from such sources. After the Kargil experience, its more than assured, that all the Indian posts have been vacated and PA driven out.

Oh please enough of the jingoistic talk. Its a LoC, not an IB (hopefully you understand the difference). Both sides will have a different understanding of the posts they have. There may be posts that IA thinks belongs to them that are in PA possession. Also the Kargil conflict mostly resulted in certain large complexes being cleared of Pakistani elements. There were very many other posts which remain uncontested by one side or the other.

 

[Contrarian]

Listen mate, it does not matter what posts Pakistan occupies or not. But at the end of the day, all the posts that PA occupied that were PREVIOUSLY occupied by India during the Kargil episode have been cleared. Period.

 

[blain2]

Listen mate, it does not matter what posts Pakistan occupies or not. But at the end of the day, all the posts that PA occupied that were PREVIOUSLY occupied by India during the Kargil episode have been cleared. Period.

Nice! So your "Period" reclaims everything in India's honor and nothing is left of the conflict right? Nice...

 

[Always Neutral]

Dear All who have posted comments on this article jingoistics aside do you feel the article is believeable ? Its seems very hard to understand from a military point of view! I am just highlighting some of the statements the Retd Brig made. My queries as a reader of military history are in bold. The aim is not to decry the poster of this article but just to understand how some of the authors not the posters claims.

A GOOD GAME AT KARGIL
by: Brig.(Retd) M. Shafi Khan

1. On 14 December 1971,1 had the luck to mop up Chamba operation in Hot Spring Sector - Rajauri Area. A captain (Indian officer) a General's son was one of 170 PWs. This captain was presented to me with these words: "this beast surrendered". When Havildar Aziz approached him, he picked up his Sten and shot him dead. I looked at him with all the scorn. I told him that he deserved very severe punishment but he will not be disposed off summarily. He was in the hands of soldiers for 6-7 hours before he was produced before me. He returned to his country untoudhed.

What does he mean ? Who is the capt ? Who is Aziz ? How does an Indian Pow have a sten gun or did Aziz shoot him ? Maybe my English is not as good as it was but I can't understand what the good old Brig is trying to convey. Lastly who was in the hands of the soldiers for 6-7 hours ?

2. 1971 was the worst of the experiences but in East Pakistan, India with eight divisions could not claim to have captured even one company position.

Eight Divisons = 160,000 men against One Company= 220 Men ? Reminds on the Greek Movie called 300. If the Indian Army did not capture East Pakistan who did ?

3. When Dacca airport was damaged by digger bombs and flying became impossible the only six F86 on ground fought back with their rockets from static position and together with the anti aircraft battery kept the sky clear of Indian Air Force.

How did the six F86 from static positions fight the Indian Airforce. The author must have been watching the movie Jewel On the Nile starring M. Douglas.

3. Such records belong only to Pakistanis. The operation in Hot Spring (1971 mentioned earlier) is yet another example of only 29 men in defence with only four guns, decimated a brigade attack which had air and 110 guns in support--the end result was 170 Indian PWs who were rounded up by the civilians of the area.

29 men = platoon against a brigade of 5000 men ? hard to believe !

Please don't misunderstand my post but what the Brigadier is claiming is very hard to believe and as I repeat Dear White Baaz this may not be a genuine article. It may be written by someone who wants to show the Pakistan Army in bad light.

Just my thoughts.

Regards

 

[Adux]

Dear All who have posted comments on this article jingoistics aside do you feel the article is believeable ? Its seems very hard to understand from a military point of view! I am just highlighting some of the statements the Retd Brig made. My queries as a reader of military history are in bold. The aim is not to decry the poster of this article but just to understand how some of the authors not the posters claims.

A GOOD GAME AT KARGIL
by: Brig.(Retd) M. Shafi Khan

1. On 14 December 1971,1 had the luck to mop up Chamba operation in Hot Spring Sector - Rajauri Area. A captain (Indian officer) a General's son was one of 170 PWs. This captain was presented to me with these words: "this beast surrendered". When Havildar Aziz approached him, he picked up his Sten and shot him dead. I looked at him with all the scorn. I told him that he deserved very severe punishment but he will not be disposed off summarily. He was in the hands of soldiers for 6-7 hours before he was produced before me. He returned to his country untoudhed.

What does he mean ? Who is the capt ? Who is Aziz ? How does an Indian Pow have a sten gun or did Aziz shoot him ? Maybe my English is not as good as it was but I can't understand what the good old Brig is trying to convey. Lastly who was in the hands of the soldiers for 6-7 hours ?

2. 1971 was the worst of the experiences but in East Pakistan, India with eight divisions could not claim to have captured even one company position.

Eight Divisons = 160,000 men against One Company= 220 Men ? Reminds on the Greek Movie called 300. If the Indian Army did not capture East Pakistan who did ?

3. When Dacca airport was damaged by digger bombs and flying became impossible the only six F86 on ground fought back with their rockets from static position and together with the anti aircraft battery kept the sky clear of Indian Air Force.

How did the six F86 from static positions fight the Indian Airforce. The author must have been watching the movie Jewel On the Nile starring M. Douglas.

3. Such records belong only to Pakistanis. The operation in Hot Spring (1971 mentioned earlier) is yet another example of only 29 men in defence with only four guns, decimated a brigade attack which had air and 110 guns in support--the end result was 170 Indian PWs who were rounded up by the civilians of the area.

29 men = platoon against a brigade of 5000 men ? hard to believe !

Please don't misunderstand my post but what the Brigadier is claiming is very hard to believe and as I repeat Dear White Baaz this may not be a genuine article. It may be written by someone who wants to show the Pakistan Army in bad light.

Just my thoughts.

Regards

You forgot the most important thing

1 pakistani = 10 Indians

The problem always neutral, is that pakistani's arent a very objective lot, too much emotion and they are toys in the hands of their army; who talks a lot but has never delievered anything, they have been talking kashmir for 60 years, they still have got an inch.

 

[Majnun]

Musharraf is doing the best for Pakistan. And the Kargil conflict did bring Kashmir to the attention of the world but the Pakistanis, with limited resources could have gone on for much longer than the huge Indian army. If they put full strength into Kargil they could, very simply stated, have taken Srinagar eventually. Musharraf was asked by Nawaz Sharif whether or not to accept a ceasefire. Musharraf said that decision was his(Sharif's) but that, militarily, the situation was definitely in Pakistan's favour.

 

[MIG_ACE]

Musharraf is doing the best for Pakistan. And the Kargil conflict did bring Kashmir to the attention of the world but the Pakistanis, with limited resources could have gone on for much longer than the huge Indian army. If they put full strength into Kargil they could, very simply stated, have taken Srinagar eventually. Musharraf was asked by Nawaz Sharif whether or not to accept a ceasefire. Musharraf said that decision was his(Sharif's) but that, militarily, the situation was definitely in Pakistan's favour.

Since Mushy was going to overthrow NS anyways, it was stupid of him to accept NS's decision isn't it??

Stop your generals and politicians from fighting with each other and then think about capturing srinagar.

 

[PakSniper]

Since Mushy was going to overthrow NS anyways, it was stupid of him to accept NS's decision isn't it??

Stop your generals and politicians from fighting with each other and then think about capturing srinagar.

If you opened your head, you would know, Mushy at the time had no reasons for a coup, it was after he didn't let his plane down, learn your time of events.

About Pols & Generals bickering, get your game together, those two sides always argue, in every country and Pakistan is not the exception, so next time think before opening your mouth.

About, capturing Srinagar, the Militants were more than enough, till this day we still hold key-points around the area, we captured.

 

[ejaz007]

One thing is for sure Kargil operation was a success for Pakistan. Indians were caught sleeping and did not knew about the operation. Their intelligence and army failed to detect it. Then a small number of fighters kept Indian army busy for a number of days. India resorted to the use of whatever weapons they had to dislodge and fighters only went back because of US pressure. Use of the best artillery guns army had, air force fighters and the best commando units failed to evict the fighters.

Perhaps most people in India are not aware that if the fighting had lasted for another weak or so Indian forces in Siachen would have been in real trouble. The only land route was in reach of these fighters and air route was very risky because of SAM’s.

It does not matter how the operation ended what matters is Pakistan army gained valuable information regarding Indian army’s efficiency and preparedness.

 

[MIG_ACE]

If you opened your head, you would know, Mushy at the time had no reasons for a coup, it was after he didn't let his plane down, learn your time of events.

About Pols & Generals bickering, get your game together, those two sides always argue, in every country and Pakistan is not the exception, so next time think before opening your mouth.

About, capturing Srinagar, the Militants were more than enough, till this day we still hold key-points around the area, we captured.

Militants enough against one million soldiers. Stop wet dreaming and then tell me to "open my head" or "think before speaking".

And by the way "you" didn't capture anything. You walked in when the IA wasn't there when the snow melted earlier than expected. And then the IA drove you out. SImple as that.

And secondly your govt. was crying itself hoarse that no pak soldier was involved.Only mujahideen. So "you" couldn't have captured anything acc. to your own govt.

 

[Flintlock]

One thing is for sure Kargil operation was a success for Pakistan.

Seriously, what have you been smoking?

Indians were caught sleeping and did not knew about the operation. Their intelligence and army failed to detect it. Then a small number of fighters kept Indian army busy for a number of days. India resorted to the use of whatever weapons they had to dislodge and fighters only went back because of US pressure. Use of the best artillery guns army had, air force fighters and the best commando units failed to evict the fighters.

Are you sure you are referring to Kargil, and not Swat by any chance? I think you are confused between the two!!

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

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KARGIL: A RINGSIDE VIEW
By Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, PVSM, UYSM
Issue: Vol 21.4

It was the 12th of June 1999. Eleven days had passed since 8 Mountain Division (Mtn Div) of which, I was privileged to be the General Officer Commanding (GOC), had assumed operational responsibility of the Drass-Mushkoh sectors from the local formation. My Div was deployed in the Srinagar Valley since 1989 when Gen Malik, later the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) during the Kargil War, had moved it from Nagaland . We had brought the insurgency under control in the valley and were now inducted in the Kargil sector to restore the situation in Drass . Thanks to the media, Tololing had become a household name and had defied capture for the better part of three weeks. 18 Grenadiers was in contact with the enemy but unfortunately and due to no fault of theirs, were unsuccessful in overcoming the opposition. The battalion, a part of 8 Mtn Div had moved into the Drass sector with 56 Mountain Brigade, its parent formation, along with 8 Sikh and 1 Naga in mid-May 99. 1 Bihar also a part of the brigade had been placed under 70 Infantry Brigade of 3 Infantry Division (Inf Div) in the Batalik sector.

kargil-map.gif

The situation by the time my Div was given charge of the Drass sector was tense. Since mid-May we had not met with any success. Casualties were mounting and there was a discernible impression that Pak was having the better of us. To say that we were surprised would be an understatement. The fog of war was taking a heavy toll on troops who were fighting in the most inhospitable terrains with shortage of weapons and equipment. It was in this background that my formation was moved across the Zojila after deinducting from the counter-insurgency grid in the valley. Our orientation was directed towards fighting insurgency and suddenly with the developments in Kargil, we had to quickly change gear to meet the conventional threat from Pak. The record of the Div in the valley was noteworthy and we had earned a name for ourselves and established a good rapport with the local population. The decision to move the formation for the Kargil operations was a difficult one. While 8 Mtn Div was the Command reserve, moving it from the valley created a vacuum and the Rashtriya Rifles formations took some time to restore the situation.

kargil-1.gif

The timing of the Pak intrusion was intriguing and perhaps was the reason for its initial success, which took the Indian Army and the country by total surprise. The perfidy of launching an operation when efforts were being made after the Lahore summit to improve relations between the two sides should serve as a lesson regarding the degree of trust with which we must respond to peace overtures by our neighbour. At the strategic level, besides embarrassing India, Pakistan’s aim was to internationalise the Kashmir issue, as it was losing its grip in the valley and had to do something sensational to bring the issue to international centre stage. Pak perceived that the political situation in India was fragile and in such an environment the Indian polity would not have the stomach to retaliate to any aggressive designs. Militarily, Pak selected areas for the intrusions which would offer minimum resistance and where they could exploit the large gaps in the defences. Also by launching such an operation, Pak aimed to secure maximum territory for strategic and tactical gains, change the status of the Line of Control (LoC), revive insurgency in the valley and elsewhere in J&K as well as isolate Ladakh from Srinagar. It was a highly ambitious plan and since it surprised the Indian Army, it met with tremendous initial success. However, at the strategic level there were many loopholes in the plan. To a trained military mind it appeared to be bereft of any consideration of the end result and the gains that would accrue. It was obviously not war gamed with a wider audience, perhaps due to the over zealousness to keep the proceedings restricted to a few confidantes. The fact that the Pak Corps commanders and the other two service Chiefs and the PM were kept out of the planning loop is itself indicative of the amateurishness in planning a major operation of this nature across the LoC.

kargil-3.gif

The terrain in which the operations were conducted was rugged with precipitous slopes and heights varying from 18000-21000 ft. The inhospitable and daunting terrain took a heavy toll of men and material. The extreme high altitude made breathing difficult and movement sapped one’s energy. Our initial failure to evict the intrusions could well be attributed to lack of acclimatization of the troops. Ladakh was served from Srinagar by the highway to Leh which remained closed from end Nov till May due to heavy snow. The road was used during fair weather period for the logistic stocking for the military garrison and the local population of Leh which was indeed a Herculean task. It was on heights dominating the highway that Pak infiltrators intruded and began to effectively interdict movement on the main road axis to Leh. The timing of the intrusion was hotly debated in the media and in military circles. While there were wild claims that the intrusions had occurred as early as Dec 1998, the stocks recovered by us from the captured posts and staff checks done by us gave ample indication of the intrusions having taken place sometime in end Feb/early Mar timeframe.

It was on 27 May, 1999 early morning that I was summoned by the Corps Commander to accompany him, during his conduct of the Defence Minister and COAS to the Drass and Kargil sectors. The decision to either launch 8 or 6 Mtn Div had been under active consideration for sometime. The SWOT analysis was well balanced for either formation to take on the task of evicting the intruders from the Drass-Mushkoh sectors, but perhaps what weighed in favour of 8 Mtn Div was that it had been operating under 15 Corps ever since the early ‘90’s and was a part of the Corps. Also troops operating in insurgency ridden areas had been blooded in battle over the years and were better suited for an immediate response; albeit after a reorientation capsule for conventional operations. It was during this visit that the COAS called me aside at Drass and gave me the operational responsibility of evicting the intruders from Drass-Mushkoh sectors. I am also certain that the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Krishan Pal had the last word in recommending 8 Mtn Div for the task. I had mentioned two issues to the COAS; first that we should be prepared for casualties, and the second that there should be no haste in progressing operations. It is to the credit of the higher leadership that while at times pressure was exerted, which is natural in such an environment, there was no one breathing down my neck to hasten the operations.

kargil-4.gif

Pak intruders had established a large number of posts on heights dominating the national highway and Mushkoh Valley. Unfortunately for Pak, the highway opened in early May, mainly due to a lighter snowfall in the winters and efforts of the Border Road Organisation. Nevertheless, the intruders effectively dominated the road and made vehicular movement difficult during daytime. The enemy was well armed and depended more on fire power than manpower. With automatic weapons, it had covered all the important nalas, ridges as well as supply routes leading onto his positions. From these positions, it sent out small parties to engage any movement of our patrols dispatched to gain information of its location, defences or troops attempting to capture the posts. The defences were well sited and coordinated, and control of fire including illumination plan was very effective. The enemy’s minor tactics of firing and quickly shifting its position was paying dividends and kept us guessing of the actual strength and main defences. Pak had consistently declared that the intruders were mujahids and no regular troops were a part of the operation. We too initially felt that the intruders may have been mujahids adequately supported by regular troops. However, it soon became clear to us, particularly after the recovery of two dead bodies by 3 Inf Div with army identifications that the intruders were without doubt regular soldiers. Also from their tactics it was evident that the claims of the intruders being mujahids was totally false. Later, my Div buried 140 Pak soldiers belonging to the Northern Light Infantry (NLI). These were the gallant men who had laid down their lives for their motherland but in return were not even accepted by their country and were denied the honour of being given the last rites by their nation. By this time it was also clear to us that there were the better part of three NLI battalions deployed in the Drass-Mushkoh sectors. Later, an Frontier Force battalion was inducted into the sector as reinforcement.

kargil-2.gif

From the deployment assessed by us and the degree of enemy’s interference on the national highway, it was evident that the Drass sector had to be given a higher priority over Mushkoh, and consequently the complete effort was diverted towards Drass while Mushkoh was planned to be adequately contained. A quick analysis of the task revealed that the sanctity of the LoC had to be restored at the earliest and most certainly well before the onset of winter to give us time to sufficiently stock and prepare ourselves for the same. Had the operations continued till the winters, the enemy would have consolidated his gains and perhaps made it extremely difficult for us to evict him in the next campaigning season. There was also a lot of talk about our failure to isolate the enemy defences. In the Drass sector the terrain did not favour this without penetrating gaps in enemy’s defences or by crossing the LoC; the former was not tactically feasible and the latter not permitted. Since isolation was not possible, I decided to give the task to the battalions to physically assault the localities where the enemy was dominating the highway. In the Mushkoh Valley, I decided to contain the ingress, and where tactically feasible, to go behind the enemy and cut off his lines of maintenance.

My battalions, artillery regiments alongwith the balance of the Div started their build-up after getting relieved by the RR units in the valley. I utilised the time between 1 Jun when we had assumed operational responsibility of this sector till 12 Jun for reorientation of the battalions from the counter-insurgency grid to conventional operations, acclimatization of troops to the second level for extreme high altitude operations and building up the logistics, in particular artillery ammunition. 2 Rajputana Rifles (Raj Rif) the earliest to arrive were put through the paces and were given the task of capturing Tololing. This feature was the deepest penetration made by the enemy in the Drass sector and proved very costly. 18 Grenadiers, who were in contact since three weeks had already lost two officers, two JCO’s and nine OR in their effort to capture the objective. The plan of 2 Raj Rif was to address the objective from two directions, with 18 Grenadiers to act as reserve. 18 Garhwal Rifles was to concentrate North of Tololing and launch a diversionary attack from that direction. By this time and using the period till commencement of the attack on Tololing, we had perfected the employment of the Bofor guns in the direct firing role. The effect of the firing was devastating and most encouraging for our troops. Hereafter, we used this technique to our advantage and with great success in all our attacks. The attack on Tololing was critical for many reasons. Most importantly, nearly a month had passed without any success and there was a palpable degradation of morale within the Army and the country. A success, therefore, was of utmost importance. 2 Raj Rif began their attack at 2100h on 12 June amidst a great deal of expectation and hope and preceded by one of the heaviest artillery support of 18 fire units. Sitting in the Operations Room of 56 Mtn Bde, I was able to monitor the progress of the attack and keep myself abreast of the situation. By midnight the attacking sub units had met with some success but it was only by early morning of 13 June that the battalion was able to secure the objective after repulsing a number of counter attacks. The enemy had suffered 20 dead of which nine of the bodies were recovered and buried. The remaining bodies could be seen lying in the nala, thrown down by their withdrawing comrades. The battalion suffered ten killed including one officer and 25 other ranks injured. It was a spectacular operation conducted in complete conformity with tactical teachings. Adequate time had been given to 2 Raj Rif for carrying out recce of the objective and orientate themselves to conventional operations. The plan evolved was sound with a high degree of success. The CO was a highly motivated professional who had moulded his battalion into a fine and competent outfit. The capture of Tololing was the turning point of the Kargil War and thence onwards we had the enemy on the run. With our victory on Tololing, the battle of the ridges commenced as we successfully went “ridge hopping” to restore the sanctity of the LoC and the honour and pride of the army and the country. Every battalion was launched with effective fire support of artillery, combat engineers, fully backed by communications and logistics. All without exception met with success in accomplishing their task.

A number of issues keep getting raised on the operations in Kargil, some of the one’s meriting consideration will be discussed in this article. Enough has been written and debated on why the intrusions took place and why was the army not aware of this development. Military intelligence has limited depth in picking up information and much is left to other intelligence agencies for acquisition of information. During the operations air photos were supplied to us by Research and Analysis Wing but there was a total mismatch in the interpretation of the air photos with the maps mainly due to difference in the scales with the result we could not with accuracy locate the information available on the photos. Intelligence was a total failure. There was no worthwhile information coming our way and we were totally dependent on the troops in contact. Another contentious issue was whether it was correct to politically lay down stringent restrictions of not crossing the LoC. While we may have earned some brownie points, but strategically and tactically we lost more than we gained. By accepting, under international pressure to restrict operations to our side of the LoC, we have wily-nily given de facto recognition of the LoC as the international border. Statements made by political leaders that there will be no redrawing of borders merely reinforces this hypothesis. Tactically by not crossing the LoC we closed our options of conflict termination in an earlier timeframe and perhaps lost the opportunity to take a large number of prisoners who would have got entrapped by our encirclement. As a result we had to go through a slogging match to recover territory and evict the enemy from dominating heights, thus prolonging the operations and suffering avoidable casualties. Linked to this is our accepting the cease-fire when we were in a commanding position. By the time the cease-fire came we had the enemy on the run, but by accepting it we offered them the easy route to withdraw to their country. As expected the enemy did not respect the terms of the cease-fire and planted anti-personnel mines along their route of withdrawal; a route along which we had to move to clear the area upto the LoC. We suffered a large number of casualties, which reflects on the unsoldierly qualities of the Pak Army. The employment of air has been under active discussion at frequent intervals. Employment of air per se was a morale raising factor for our troops and conversely it had an adverse effect on the enemy. But its effectiveness was questionable. Like us, the pilots were not acclimatized to fight in this type of terrain and did not have the right ordnance to deliver on the target. When they did use the laser guided bombs, their effectiveness improved marginally , but not enough to have an impact on our ground operations or the enemy.

A number of issues have also been raised by Gen Musharaf in his book “In the Line of Fire” which need to be contested. The General has mentioned that we had inducted more than four divisions who were pitched against his five battalions of Pak. Our 3 Inf Div was responsible for the complete Ladakh sector. 8 Mtn Div which was operating in the valley was the only additional formation inducted to restore the situation in Drass sector. 3 Inf Div, however, continued to look after the Kargil, Batalik , Turtok and Siachen sectors. Every commander needs to retain balance on ground and the induction of 8 Mtn Div was a tactical necessity and a correct decision as events later proved. Certainly some additional artillery was moved into Ladakh, but in no way were the offensive formations made redundant by denuding them of fire support. On the Pak side besides the four battalions which were identified in the Drass-Muskoh sectors; an equal number were operating against 3 Inf Div. Information fed to Gen Musharaf needs to be verified by him as evidently there are large gaps in his statements and the ground situation. The book also mentions India’s intentions of preparing for an attack since 1998 and that Pak’s Kargil operations were merely defensive in nature and in response to our preparation for an offensive. If such was the case we would not have been surprised by the intrusions and would have been adequately prepared to respond to Pak’s military designs. Except initially at no stage did the Pak Army have the upper hand against us. Militarily they were defeated with heavy casualties and our capture of Tiger Hill on 5 July, 1998 was the last nail in their coffin which forced them to accept a cease-fire. The chapter on Kargil does not stand the test of events as they unfolded and ended on an adverse note for Pak.
Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, former GOC, 8 Mtn Div.
December 3rd, 2007.

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KARGIL: A RINGSIDE VIEW | Indian Defence Review

 

[ejaz007]

I think most of you people don’t know the terrain of the area. At least my Indian friends don’t know and why should they know it’s not their country.

The possibility that a small unit can take on a much larger unit in area around Kargil, Ladakh, Liah and Drass Batalik area is not unusual. The unit that holds high grounds and has plenty of food and ammunition can do so for a quite some time. These area are extremely rough and vehicular movement, APC or tank movement is not easy and in some cases not possible. Therefore to dislodge enemy you have to move in physically and in this environment the side moving from lower position to higher position usually suffer most.

Remember Indians used all they had to dislodge what a few thousand fighters or soldiers call them whatever. Indians used their state of the art artillery systems, air force and elite commando units for a few thousand of these fighters when they had more than half million soldiers in occupied Kashmir.

Do remember this is not an ordinary battleground numbers don’t matter strategy and bold implementation of the strategy is what matters. In the case of Kargil India failed to detect an intrusion into its occupied territory and Pakistan effectively used the strategy they had planned and implemented it with perfection.

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Friend, I know and I was there.

And I am an Indian!

It is you who does not know the terrain.

Plenty of food in the High Altitude?

Good one that!

APCs and Tanks can move in a Plateau in the High Altitude, but where the battle was fought was not a Plateau. Even deploying artillery required ingenuity!

If you don't understand the military and the way the operate, do not tread the area and confuse yourself!

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

http://www.satribune.com/archives/july04/P1_book.htm
Gang-of-Four Planned Kargil, Keeping Pakistan in the Dark


Special SAT Report


WASHINGTON, July 22: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not
aware of the Kargil Operation when he received Indian PM
Vajpayee in Lahore on Feb 20, 1999, a new book written by a
senior former police officer from Pakistan, and published
by a New York Publishing house, has revealed.


The book, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army,
and America’s War on Terror, is authored by Mr Hassan
Abbas, who is currently a Research Fellow at the Harvard
Law School and a PhD. candidate at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served in the
administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1994-95)
and General Musharraf (1999-2000).


The book examines the rise of religious extremism in
Pakistan, and analyzes its connections to Pakistan Army's
policies and the fluctuating US-Pakistan relations. It
includes profiles of leading Pakistani Jihadi groups with
details of their origins, development, and capabilities
based on interviews with Pakistani intelligence officials,
and operators of the militant groups.


The book contains new historical materials on Operation
Gibraltar (1965 War with India), conspiracy behind General
Zia-ul-Haq’s plane crash in 1988, a botched military coup
by fundamentalists in army in 1993-4, the story of National
Accountability Bureau (from an insider’s perspective) and
lastly about how General Musharraf handled the volatile
situation after the 9/11 attacks.


Besides General Musharraf’s detailed profile, the book
evaluates the India-Pakistan relations vis-à-vis the
Kashmir conflict, and Dr AQ Khan’s nuclear proliferation
crisis. The book offers predictions for Pakistan's domestic
and regional prospects.


Author Hassan Abbas gives a graphic description of how the
Kargil disaster was planned and managed by the Army led by
General Musharraf who led a “Gang of Four” and quotes
Pakistan High Commissioner to UK, Maleeha Lodhi as saying:
“Even corps commanders and other service chiefs were
excluded from the decision-making process.”


“So much so that even the very able DGMO, Lieutenant General
Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the secret after the gang of
four had already taken the irrevocable decision of going
ahead with the operation,” the book says.


The chapter on the Kargil Episode asks “Who is to be Blamed”
and gives a detailed account of what happened based on
author’s interviews with many serving and retired army
officers. It says:

“In May 1999, just three months after the frozen road to
Indo-Pak dialogue had thawed enough to get a promise for
more going, Pakistan launched its operation against the
Kargil Heights in the far north of Indian-held Kashmir,
just across the LOC. These heights dominated the main
Indian supply route to Leh, where India had a small
cantonment to house one brigade. It was the Indian routine
at Kargil to descend the heights at the start of the winter
snows and reoccupy them the following spring. With these
heights in Pakistani hands, it meant that supplies to Leh
could not be maintained.


And though India did have an alternate route, it was not an
all-weather, all-season road. India would therefore have no
option but to recover the heights and open the road to Leh
or allow its garrison to perish. Though, of course, even if
India had any number of alternative roads, its pride alone
would have sufficed for them to mount an operation for the
relief of Kargil.

This operation had been discussed at least twice before in
earlier years and turned down both times. General
Zia-ul-Haq was the first army chief invited by the Military
Operations (MO) directorate to see a presentation on this
operation. After sitting through it, he resorted in his
most chaste Urdu, which he would normally do only when he
wanted to take someone to task. His ensuing conversation
with the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), as
narrated by a senior army officer, went somewhat like this:


Zia: When we take Kargil, what do you expect the Indians to
do? . . . I mean, don’t you think they will try and
recapture it?
DGMO: Yes sir, but we think that the position is
impregnable and we can hold it against far superior forces.
Zia: Now that’s very good, but in that case, don’t you
think the Indians will go for a limited offensive elsewhere
along the line of control, take some of our territory, and
use it as a bargaining chip?
DGMO: Yes sir, this is possible, but . . .
Zia: And if they are beaten back there also, don’t you
think they will attack across the international frontier,
which may lead to a full-scale war?
DGMO: That’s possible, sir.
Zia: So in other words, you have prepared a plan to lead us
into a full-scale war with India!


This sardonic observation by Zia ul-Haq caused the demise of
the first Kargil proposal. The second time the plan was
mooted, it was shot down on the same grounds, that is, it
was an easy tactical operation that was untenable in the
long run unless Pakistan were prepared to go into a
full-scale war with India, in which Kargil would be a
secondary objective.

The third and final operational plan for Kargil was put
forward by its inspirational father, Lieutenant General
Mohammad Aziz Khan, chief of the general staff (CGS).
Himself a Kashmiri, he was fully committed to the cause of
Kashmiri freedom, and not the sort of man who held any
commitment lightly. He is very religious and not known to
be a hypocrite.

The tactical parents of the Kargil plan were two. The first
was Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, the commander of 10th
Corps, in whose area of operations the objective lay. He
was a comparatively weaker personality than Aziz, with a
romance about history. It is believed that he was convinced
by the conviction of Aziz, which, combined with his own
historical dream, made him a hostage to the Kargil idea.


The second parent of the plan was Major General Javed
Hassan, commander of the Pakistani troops in the Northern
Areas (Force Command Northern Areas, FCNA) who would
actually have to carry out the operation. He had one of the
best minds in the army and even more ambition. He gave his
unstinting support to the operation, less through any sense
of conviction and more because of the promise that such a
position held of bringing him into General Pervez
Musharraf’s charmed inner circle.


Musharraf was taken in by the enthusiasm of two of his
closest generals, and, being eternally levitated by an
irrepressible streak of unreal optimism, he became the
strongest advocate of the operation. The absolute secrecy
that was one of the preconditions of the success of the
operation, to secure it against any possibility of leaks,
also made it proof against any possibility of a second
opinion, and thus against any collusion with a sense of
reality.


According to Maleeha Lodhi, “Even corps commanders and other
service chiefs were excluded” from the decision-making
process. So much so that even the very able DGMO,
Lieutenant General Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the
secret after the gang of four had already taken the
irrevocable decision of going ahead with the operation.

The next task was to bring the prime minister on board. For
this, a presentation was organized. The exact date of this
presentation is a million-dollar question, as this may
consequently decide how history will judge both Musharraf
and Nawaz. According to Niaz A. Naik’s narration of the
events to Prof. Robert Wirsing, Nawaz Sharif was given a
briefing by the army on the Kashmir issue on March 27 or
28, 1999, which probably was the one where the Kargil Plan
was discussed.


Similarly, according to Owen Bennett Jones, the army
contends that a specific briefing on the Kargil Plan was
given in the second week of March 1999, where Nawaz granted
formal approval of the plan. Most probably, both Naik and
Jones are referring to the same meeting, and it certifies
that at the time of Nawaz’s meeting with Vajpayee on
February 20, 1999, he was not aware of the Kargil
operation.

Anyhow, Nawaz came to hear the Kargil presentation
accompanied by the recently retired CGS of the army,
Lieutenant General Iftikhar Ali Khan, who was Nawaz’s
secretary of defense. Iftikhar knew Musharraf, Mahmood, and
Aziz well and should have used his rank and influence to
abort the operation, but he did not, though he certainly
showed his reservations. Nawaz’s other adviser was Majid
Malik, a minister in the cabinet and a retired lieutenant
general who had served as DGMO and CGS during his military
career a generation earlier. He had a sharp mind and asked
all the right questions of the assembled generals, and
pointed out all the weaknesses in their overall plan, and
its immediate and larger implications.


This should have educated Nawaz Sharif adequately to put the
operation on hold pending a detailed reexamination of the
project, but it did not. Sharif agreed with the plan,
though the operation was already in its final stages and
Nawaz was not aware of that. Probably in his reverie, he
was looking to the glory that would come his way when the
fruits promised by operation were harvested.


However, close associates of Nawaz contend that the said
briefing never mentioned that regular troops would be
involved in the operation, and the discussion was framed
entirely in terms of “increasing the heat in Kashmir.”


Interestingly, in the latest book on the Kargil issue,
Shireen Mazari, a Pakistani academic known for her
pro-military stance, asserts that the Kargil operation was
in fact planned to counter similar moves expected by the
Indians in the area, and this military move was in reality
a defensive action finalized after credible intelligence
reports confirmed Indian designs for incursions across the
LOC! This theory is not corroborated by any other source.

In reality, the Kargil plan was for Pakistan to send in a
mixture of Kashmiri fighters and regular/paramilitary
troops (the Northern Light Infantry Regiment) to occupy the
heights above Kargil before the Indian Army moved in to
reoccupy them at the end of the snow season and cut off the
supply route to Leh.


The operation was to be projected as a solely Kashmiri
mujahideen operation, denying absolutely any Pakistani
involvement in it or that Pakistan had any control or
influence over these elements. It is worth noting that
until the occupation of the heights became an accomplished
fact, neither any of the other service chiefs nor the rest
of the corps commanders or Musharraf’s personal staff
officers knew anything about the operation.


The result was that, when the Indian Air Force joined the
action, the Pakistan Air Force was in no position to
respond while the army’s quartermaster general and master
general of ordnance, both of whose support was vital for
any army operation, were also left totally in the dark.


Thus if Kargil had led to general war, the army would have
learned that its newest fleet of tanks, of which it was so
proud, had no APDSFS antitank ammunition! The other effect
of the secrecy surrounding Kargil was that no one in the
Pakistani diplomatic corps was equipped to deal with the
questions arising in the wake of the operation, while it
also split the generals into two groups, that is, those who
were “in” and those who were left “out.”

The masterminds of the operation were driven by the belief
that their nuclear capability provided a protective shield
to Pakistan, and that India would acquiesce to this capture
just like Pakistan was compelled to swallow India’s seizure
of the Siachen peaks in 1984. All the four generals
involved in the Kargil project had remained instructors in
different military training institutions during their
careers, teaching young officers how vital it is to weigh
the pros and cons of a military offensive in terms of
understanding the possible ramifications and enemy
reactions. It is strange that these generals forgot such a
basic military lesson and seriously miscalculated Indian
capabilities both in terms of military strength and
political influence in the international arena.

The Indians reacted in an outburst of justifiable rage,
citing Pakistan’s bad faith for having welcomed their prime
minister to Lahore while concurrent preparations for the
Kargil operation were already under way. In Pakistan there
was no widespread feeling of regret, though few knew what
had really happened.


Within the army the general feeling about India was that had
made its nuclear tests in the belief that this would force
Pakistan to show its hand, and that if this came short,
Pakistan would be pushed into the status of an Indian
satellite; but when this did not happen, Vajpayee came to
Lahore to restart a long suspended dialogue merely to lull
a nuclear Pakistan to sleep while cooking up some other
perfidious scheme against it, and any measure against such
an enemy was entirely justified. Pakistan’s explanation of
the events at Kargil, though, had a skeptical reception in
international circles to begin with, and later their
version was entirely discredited.

For India, the exposure of their neighbor’s duplicity must
have been satisfying, but surely not enough. After India’s
first abortive attacks to reclaim the heights, it started a
large military buildup by moving all its 130mm artillery
regiments to the target area and picking up a substantial
amount of smart munitions around the world. It is an
amazing commentary on the coordination between the
“mujahideen” occupying Kargil heights and those fighting
inside held Kashmir that when the Indian reinforcements
were snaking up the winding roads in endless convoys, there
was no reported attempt at an ambush by the latter to
disrupt this operation.


When the buildup was complete, India subjected the objective
to air strikes and massive artillery barrages day after
day, followed by determined and courageous infantry attacks
in very difficult conditions. The Pakistan Army top brass
had confided to various friends who had their trust that
their men on the heights were adequately provisioned and
well dug in to withstand the rigors of a long campaign. The
truth, as it later transpired, was that the digging in was
minimal because the rocky soil just did not allow this.


The result was not only that the troops were exposed to
harsh weather and the shrapnel of exploding shells, but
also to the splinters of rocks that followed the
explosions. For most, their only safety was to scramble to
the comparative security of the reverse slopes during the
bombardment, and then get back to the other side of the
hill to meet the infantry attacks that normally followed
the artillery barrages.


Pakistani reserves of supplies and ammunition were woefully
inadequate to begin with, and became alarmingly low as the
operation progressed, with many having to survive by eating
the pitiful vegetation that braved the rocky slopes. Under
these circumstances, the resistance they put up was both
heroic and magnificent, and the quality of junior
leadership again proved admirable. But Pakistani generals
again failed miserably—as the plan and preparations were
defective.

Kargil left an already friendless Pakistan in almost total
diplomatic isolation. Even China, whose president had
counseled Pakistan as recently as late 1996 to go slow on
Kashmir and concentrate instead on the economic viability
of the country, felt constrained to distance itself from
Islamabad’s latest adventure. Major General Javed Hassan,
the commander on the spot, was being threatened by words
and gestures of subordinates that could only be described
as mutinous. Lieutenant General Mahmood, on whom reality
started to dawn fatefully late in the day, saw his adequate
jaw falling at an alarming rate.


And though the conviction and inner reserves of Lieutenant
General Aziz, helped by blissful ignorance, kept him as
gung-ho as ever and also helped keep Musharraf’s optimism
afloat, the prime minister had become a case stricken by
fright. Under these circumstance, Nawaz was left to plead
desperately for a meeting with President Clinton, who found
that his schedule allowed him a few free hours on July 4,
1999.


It is widely believed that at this meeting Nawaz swore
complete ignorance about the Kargil operation till
everything terrible hit the fan. Blaming everything on his
generals, he just begged to be bailed out. Clinton told him
quite unequivocally that whether the “mujahideen” occupying
the Kargil heights listened to Pakistan or not, the
immediate step it would have to take was to evacuate
Kargil. As a sop he promised the Pakistani prime minister
that following this evacuation, he would treat the issue of
Kashmir with active interest.

In the midst of this crisis in June 1999, General Zinni,
then commander in chief of the US Centcom (Central
Command), had visited Pakistan accompanied by G. Lanpher,
deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, to
impress upon Pakistan’s military commanders the need for
de-escalation. This team also visited India during the
tour.


However, according to Shireen Mazari, some senior Pakistani
army officers are of the view that the United States
prevented India from coming to the negotiating table with
Pakistan, and in this context she also mentions the visit
of Henry Kissinger to India in early June, who was
“apparently carrying a message from the US government not
to negotiate with Pakistan.”


It is a moot point whether such was the case, but it was
obvious that US sympathies were with India in this
conflict. To any neutral observer of the international
political scene, this was a predictable outcome as US
interests were increasingly being linked with those of
India in the region, but Pakistan’s military hierarchy was
apparently oblivious of what was so clearly written on the
wall.


The evacuation of Kargil was followed by a hum of resentment
all over Pakistan. The loved ones of those who had given
their lives on the desolate and remote slopes there wanted
to know that if unilateral withdrawal was to be the end of
the whole exercise, what the point was of sacrificing the
lives of their sons and brothers? The people of Pakistan
had been subjected to the largest whispering campaign in
history to expect a great victory.


When the operation fizzled out like a wet firecracker, they
were a nation left speechless in anger and disbelief.
Musharraf and the planners could not give any excuses in
public, but privately they let it be known that the blame
for the scuttling of a brilliant operation lay on a
panic-prone prime minister, who could not stand up to the
US president. Nawaz Sharif too could not say anything in
his defense publicly, but privately he let it be known that
his generals had taken him for a ride, and that he had to
bend over backward to get the US president to help Pakistan
out of a very sticky situation."


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