fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
INSIGHT: Droning about drones Ejaz Haider
Invoking sovereignty National Assembly-style can be dangerous in Pakistan. Speeches are mouthed and passions aroused. No real attempt is made to either get expert input on policy options or to debate issue(s) dispassionately
In Davos, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has again spoken out against US drone attacks in FATA and the NWFP, saying these attacks are counter-productive. Neither the statement nor the logic is new.
Much the same has been said by President Asif Zardari. He too continues to voice this refrain. In fact, almost all top Pakistani officials have voiced opposition to US drone attacks. Everyone also denies the government knows about these attacks or has tacitly agreed to them.
US officials, both in the previous Bush administration and now in the Obama administration, insist Pakistan knows about these strikes. At a January 27 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates made clear that the drone attacks would continue. Gates also told Committee Chairman Senator Carl Levin that the decision had been conveyed to the Pakistani government.
From the American angle, drone attacks make eminent sense for several reasons.
Reports indicate the strikes have mostly been successful against high-value Al Qaeda-Taliban targets. That shows that US intelligence capability is increasing in terms both of credibility as well as actionability.
There are two obvious benchmarks for the success ratio of these strikes: the US has chosen to ignore Pakistani complaints; change of administration has made no difference to a policy directive issued by former President Bush.
Successful drone strikes mean no loss to US troops; they preclude the need for the US to mount elaborate extraction operations or raids in hostile territory. The strikes keep the Al Qaeda-Taliban leadership on the run, makes them suspicious of people around them, keeps them guessing about the extent of US intelligence penetration and creates fear among those harbouring them.
Suspicion, uncertainty and fear are not morale boosters.
If these attacks werent bagging the prize, Washington would have begun the process of falling in line with Pakistans sentiments. But they are effective, at least to the point where, having done the complex cost-benefit maths, America is prepared to ignore Pakistani complaints.
So far we have assumed that Pakistan is not in on these strikes.
I doubt that assumption very much (see Ejaz Haider, Implausible deniability; Daily Times, November 21, 2008).
Ideally, the US could have improved the optics and made it easier for Islamabad by providing the latter the UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) capability. But for various reasons it hasnt done so, not least because of lack of trust on both sides. It told Islamabad that it would strike high-value targets wherever it may find them. Islamabad has the option to either own up to them or deny that it is in the loop.
For political reasons, Islamabad seems to have taken the latter course i.e. the Americans are doing it without our knowledge. There may be technical truth in this insofar as while the US has informed Pakistan that it would make such strikes, it doesnt tell Pakistan where and when it is going to strike.
This is the only way of reconciling Pakistans position (we dont know) with the US position (we have told them). It doesnt matter that Pakistans we dont know refers to, if at all, lack of knowledge about specific strikes rather than full knowledge of the general condition that such strikes will be made.
The logic that such strikes are counter-productive is nothing but dissembling. They in fact complement ground operations.
As I wrote in the above-referred article: ...successful counter-insurgency [ops]...require operating at two levels: fighting against and mopping up insurgents strongholds on the ground and taking out their leadership through strikes, mostly clandestine. To be effective, both sets of operations need effective intelligence... Since ground operations against leadership that is constantly on the move, is scattered or is well-protected can be costly, missile strikes are a better option.
Some element of deniability would have been okay, but the lady doth protest too much, methinks. Why?
One reason could be that Islamabad is really not in the loop on this; also, that it does genuinely think these strikes are counter-productive.
The other reason could be that it wants to have greater frequency of protest than the number of strikes, this being for political and diplomatic reasons.
If its the first, then it has already protested too much and needs to do something beyond summoning the US ambassador and issuing a demarche. Start putting those red lines one by one and see where it leads.
And does it really think these strikes are counter-productive?
It is important to note here that the way in which the protest is being mounted conflates the issue of striking from the air with that of the strikes being mounted by a foreign country. This creates confusion. If drone/aerial strikes are counter-productive per se, then leaving aside the problem of sovereignty, does it matter who makes them. Pakistan, mounting those strikes, if it had the capability, would be adding no value to its counter-insurgency effort.
Something tells me that is not the case, we would be happy to strike if we had the UCAVs. So are the Americans.
And if we are in on the general, if not the specifics, then is it a good policy to protest too much, indeed more than may be required? No.
Invoking sovereignty National Assembly-style can be dangerous in Pakistan. Already the parliamentary committee on national security has condemned these attacks and asked the new American administration to stop these attacks. Speeches laced with platitudes are mouthed and passions aroused. No real attempt is made to either get expert input on policy options or to debate issue(s) dispassionately.
Add to this the folly of pushing through with a policy of denial that just doesnt wash and the situation becomes ridiculous. If you are in but cant own up, play it down.
If you are not, play it down still unless you can play it right up to the sky and into the tail of the UCAV.
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
Invoking sovereignty National Assembly-style can be dangerous in Pakistan. Speeches are mouthed and passions aroused. No real attempt is made to either get expert input on policy options or to debate issue(s) dispassionately
In Davos, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has again spoken out against US drone attacks in FATA and the NWFP, saying these attacks are counter-productive. Neither the statement nor the logic is new.
Much the same has been said by President Asif Zardari. He too continues to voice this refrain. In fact, almost all top Pakistani officials have voiced opposition to US drone attacks. Everyone also denies the government knows about these attacks or has tacitly agreed to them.
US officials, both in the previous Bush administration and now in the Obama administration, insist Pakistan knows about these strikes. At a January 27 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates made clear that the drone attacks would continue. Gates also told Committee Chairman Senator Carl Levin that the decision had been conveyed to the Pakistani government.
From the American angle, drone attacks make eminent sense for several reasons.
Reports indicate the strikes have mostly been successful against high-value Al Qaeda-Taliban targets. That shows that US intelligence capability is increasing in terms both of credibility as well as actionability.
There are two obvious benchmarks for the success ratio of these strikes: the US has chosen to ignore Pakistani complaints; change of administration has made no difference to a policy directive issued by former President Bush.
Successful drone strikes mean no loss to US troops; they preclude the need for the US to mount elaborate extraction operations or raids in hostile territory. The strikes keep the Al Qaeda-Taliban leadership on the run, makes them suspicious of people around them, keeps them guessing about the extent of US intelligence penetration and creates fear among those harbouring them.
Suspicion, uncertainty and fear are not morale boosters.
If these attacks werent bagging the prize, Washington would have begun the process of falling in line with Pakistans sentiments. But they are effective, at least to the point where, having done the complex cost-benefit maths, America is prepared to ignore Pakistani complaints.
So far we have assumed that Pakistan is not in on these strikes.
I doubt that assumption very much (see Ejaz Haider, Implausible deniability; Daily Times, November 21, 2008).
Ideally, the US could have improved the optics and made it easier for Islamabad by providing the latter the UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) capability. But for various reasons it hasnt done so, not least because of lack of trust on both sides. It told Islamabad that it would strike high-value targets wherever it may find them. Islamabad has the option to either own up to them or deny that it is in the loop.
For political reasons, Islamabad seems to have taken the latter course i.e. the Americans are doing it without our knowledge. There may be technical truth in this insofar as while the US has informed Pakistan that it would make such strikes, it doesnt tell Pakistan where and when it is going to strike.
This is the only way of reconciling Pakistans position (we dont know) with the US position (we have told them). It doesnt matter that Pakistans we dont know refers to, if at all, lack of knowledge about specific strikes rather than full knowledge of the general condition that such strikes will be made.
The logic that such strikes are counter-productive is nothing but dissembling. They in fact complement ground operations.
As I wrote in the above-referred article: ...successful counter-insurgency [ops]...require operating at two levels: fighting against and mopping up insurgents strongholds on the ground and taking out their leadership through strikes, mostly clandestine. To be effective, both sets of operations need effective intelligence... Since ground operations against leadership that is constantly on the move, is scattered or is well-protected can be costly, missile strikes are a better option.
Some element of deniability would have been okay, but the lady doth protest too much, methinks. Why?
One reason could be that Islamabad is really not in the loop on this; also, that it does genuinely think these strikes are counter-productive.
The other reason could be that it wants to have greater frequency of protest than the number of strikes, this being for political and diplomatic reasons.
If its the first, then it has already protested too much and needs to do something beyond summoning the US ambassador and issuing a demarche. Start putting those red lines one by one and see where it leads.
And does it really think these strikes are counter-productive?
It is important to note here that the way in which the protest is being mounted conflates the issue of striking from the air with that of the strikes being mounted by a foreign country. This creates confusion. If drone/aerial strikes are counter-productive per se, then leaving aside the problem of sovereignty, does it matter who makes them. Pakistan, mounting those strikes, if it had the capability, would be adding no value to its counter-insurgency effort.
Something tells me that is not the case, we would be happy to strike if we had the UCAVs. So are the Americans.
And if we are in on the general, if not the specifics, then is it a good policy to protest too much, indeed more than may be required? No.
Invoking sovereignty National Assembly-style can be dangerous in Pakistan. Already the parliamentary committee on national security has condemned these attacks and asked the new American administration to stop these attacks. Speeches laced with platitudes are mouthed and passions aroused. No real attempt is made to either get expert input on policy options or to debate issue(s) dispassionately.
Add to this the folly of pushing through with a policy of denial that just doesnt wash and the situation becomes ridiculous. If you are in but cant own up, play it down.
If you are not, play it down still unless you can play it right up to the sky and into the tail of the UCAV.
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
