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Indonesia Has Been Punching Below Its Weight (Bloomberg)

Strengthening cooperation between Iran and Indonesia

2023_05_21_138580_1684647423._large.jpg

Indonesia and Iran have experienced 73 years of diplomatic relations. (Shutterstocks)

Hossein Amir Abdollahian
Tehran ● Mon, May 22, 2023
(The Jakarta Post)




The upcoming state visit of Islamic Republic of Iran President Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi to Jakarta, in response to the invitation of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, marks not only a turning point in the bilateral relations between the two countries but also the commencement of a new chapter in the relations between the two great nations.

The stands of the two countries in the two regions of the Middle East and East Asia, cultural and civilizational commonalities and weighty potential for cooperation in various fields, alongside the new requirements of the international order, herald the opening of a new era of relations between the two countries hinged on respect and mutual understanding.

The diplomatic ties between Iran and Indonesia are now entering their eighth decade, while the relations between the two great nations have deep roots in history. The people of the two countries, centuries ago, were able to establish profound bonds with each other through Islam, and Iranian and Indonesian Muslim scholars and intellectuals had beneficial interactions in past centuries.

The linguistic ties between the two countries also serve as further evidence of the historical interactions between the people of the two nations throughout Asia. A considerable number of Persian words in the Indonesian language and shared assets such as Imam Muhammad Ghazali testify to the depth of historical connections between them and provide a basis for deepening the relations between the two nations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, within the framework of a balanced, smart and dynamic foreign policy, attaches special prominence to the development of relations with Indonesia. Fortunately, this determination exists on both sides, and the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Indonesia are resolute to create the required infrastructure and facilities for the development of relations in various fields.

The bilateral negotiations between the two countries encompass a wide range of bilateral, regional and international topics. Iran and Indonesia seek to deepen cooperation in various areas, including political, economic, trade, energy, scientific and technological, cultural, parliamentary and security fields.

Despite the excellent relations, constructive cooperation and mutual support in international forums, it must be acknowledged the current volume of trade relations between the two countries is below expectations given the available capacities. Therefore, President Raisi and his accompanying delegation in this to Jakarta provide a valuable opportunity for the public and private sectors of both countries to become more familiar with each other's economic and commercial capacities and capabilities.

The links between Iran and Indonesia, within the framework of South-South cooperation, have a historical background and demonstrate the common approach of the two countries to create a balanced world. The two countries have common positions on regional, international and Islamic issues, and continuous negotiations between the two sides on these matters are ongoing.

Recognizing the need to strengthen regional relations, we commend the performance of ASEAN and emphasize the Islamic Republic of Iran's willingness to develop relations with other member states of the regional bloc within the framework of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed between the two sides in 2017.

We consider Indonesia’s chairmanship in ASEAN an optimal opportunity for developing relations with the other member states of this progressive grouping. We also welcome the possibility of regional connections between ASEAN and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in West Asia.

Issues such as the necessity of unity among Islamic countries, promoting the true image of Islam in the world, combating extremism and Islamophobia, and supporting the interests of Muslims worldwide, including the oppressed Palestinian people, are the points that align the foreign policy of the two countries on a common path. Within this framework, we believe the Middle Eastern countries, as an environment with the highest number of Islamic countries, can overcome existing misunderstandings and, regardless of the intervention of non-regional powers, establish an intra-regional order.

Negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are taking place in this regard. We believe the two countries have embarked on the right path, and this understanding will bring tangible results for the stability and prosperity of the region and the Islamic world.

As an influential bloc in global equations, the Islamic world requires greater convergence to create opportunities for consensus, synergy and the generation of innovative ideas, benefiting the great ummah (worldwide Islamic community). Undoubtedly, countries that have noteworthy weight in the Islamic world can play a leading role in realizing the interests of the ummah.

Based on this, Iran welcomes the strengthening of cooperation with Indonesia, as one of the essential and influential predominantly Muslim countries in the world.

From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the unilateralism prevailing in the world, with the elimination of multilateral mechanisms and its detrimental effects on global peace and security, has now been marginalized. In other words, the security of the international system does not have a "prescribed" nature and has been transformed into a "synergic" and "participatory" matter with the maximum involvement of actors.

The founding fathers of the historic Bandung Conference and the proponents of the paradigm of nonalignment, decades ago, rightly took steps in this direction and expressed their opposition to any polarization that would endanger world peace and stability. In the new international context, developing and emerging countries, through cooperation and shared efforts, can play a constructive role in ensuring global peace and stability, including in the areas of food security and energy.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize the serious commitment of the authorities in my country to the development of relations with the friendly and brotherly country of Indonesia. Indonesians are noble and hospitable, and I am deeply pleased we are in Indonesia accompanying President Raeisi.

I wish felicity, prosperity and progress for Indonesia’s government and great people.

***

The writer is the Iranian foreign minister.

 
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Indonesia Proposes OPEC-Like Group for Nickel at G7 Summit​

Jayanty Nada Shofa
May 20, 2023 | 10:51 pm

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President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo attends the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, Japan on May 20, 2023. (Photo Courtesy of Presidential Press Bureau)

Jakarta. Nickel-rich Indonesia on Saturday’s G7 Summit in Hiroshima proposed the establishment of an OPEC-like organization for the silvery metal.

The OPEC, which Indonesia was once a member of, is short for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. OPEC says it aims to coordinate the petroleum policies of its member states and keep markets stable to secure regular supply for consumers. And Indonesia wants a similar cartel for nickel-producing countries.

“I hope G7 countries can become a partner in this industrial downstream. It is time to establish an OPEC-like group for other products such as nickel and palm oil,” Jokowi said at the G7 Summit, as quoted by the Presidential Secretariat.

Indonesia has been working on developing its downstream industries, meaning that the country would process or purify raw materials —such as nickel— first at home before exporting them for added value.

At the G7 Summit, Jokowi took the opportunity to promote win-win partnerships. Jokowi told the attending leaders that global south countries should not remain an exporter of raw materials as the world is no longer in the colonial era.

“Is it fair for resource-rich countries like Indonesia to be prevented from enjoying the added value of their natural resources? Or be stopped from processing their natural resources domestically?” Jokowi said.

Nickel is critical for the production of electric vehicle batteries.

The US Geological Survey shows that Indonesia and Australia are tied for having the world’s largest nickel reserves. Both countries’ nickel reserves total 21 million metric tons. In 2022, Indonesia produced an estimated 1.6 million metric tons of nickel.

Government data shows although Indonesia has substantial nickel reserves, the country is not a major exporter of its downstream products such as battery precursors or battery packs.
The G7 encompasses Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US. The European Union (EU) is a "non-enumerated member", with whom Indonesia has an ongoing dispute on nickel.

The EU filed a lawsuit against Indonesia at the World Trade Organization (WTO) for banning the export of unprocessed nickel ores. The EU feared that the ban, which has been in place since Jan. 2020, would take a toll on the European bloc’s stainless steel production. Indonesia, however, lost the lawsuit, and the Southeast Asian country has already appealed the panel ruling.

 
 
Strengthening cooperation between Iran and Indonesia

2023_05_21_138580_1684647423._large.jpg

Indonesia and Iran have experienced 73 years of diplomatic relations. (Shutterstocks)

Hossein Amir Abdollahian
Tehran ● Mon, May 22, 2023
(The Jakarta Post)




The upcoming state visit of Islamic Republic of Iran President Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi to Jakarta, in response to the invitation of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, marks not only a turning point in the bilateral relations between the two countries but also the commencement of a new chapter in the relations between the two great nations.

The stands of the two countries in the two regions of the Middle East and East Asia, cultural and civilizational commonalities and weighty potential for cooperation in various fields, alongside the new requirements of the international order, herald the opening of a new era of relations between the two countries hinged on respect and mutual understanding.

The diplomatic ties between Iran and Indonesia are now entering their eighth decade, while the relations between the two great nations have deep roots in history. The people of the two countries, centuries ago, were able to establish profound bonds with each other through Islam, and Iranian and Indonesian Muslim scholars and intellectuals had beneficial interactions in past centuries.

The linguistic ties between the two countries also serve as further evidence of the historical interactions between the people of the two nations throughout Asia. A considerable number of Persian words in the Indonesian language and shared assets such as Imam Muhammad Ghazali testify to the depth of historical connections between them and provide a basis for deepening the relations between the two nations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, within the framework of a balanced, smart and dynamic foreign policy, attaches special prominence to the development of relations with Indonesia. Fortunately, this determination exists on both sides, and the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Indonesia are resolute to create the required infrastructure and facilities for the development of relations in various fields.

The bilateral negotiations between the two countries encompass a wide range of bilateral, regional and international topics. Iran and Indonesia seek to deepen cooperation in various areas, including political, economic, trade, energy, scientific and technological, cultural, parliamentary and security fields.

Despite the excellent relations, constructive cooperation and mutual support in international forums, it must be acknowledged the current volume of trade relations between the two countries is below expectations given the available capacities. Therefore, President Raisi and his accompanying delegation in this to Jakarta provide a valuable opportunity for the public and private sectors of both countries to become more familiar with each other's economic and commercial capacities and capabilities.

The links between Iran and Indonesia, within the framework of South-South cooperation, have a historical background and demonstrate the common approach of the two countries to create a balanced world. The two countries have common positions on regional, international and Islamic issues, and continuous negotiations between the two sides on these matters are ongoing.

Recognizing the need to strengthen regional relations, we commend the performance of ASEAN and emphasize the Islamic Republic of Iran's willingness to develop relations with other member states of the regional bloc within the framework of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed between the two sides in 2017.

We consider Indonesia’s chairmanship in ASEAN an optimal opportunity for developing relations with the other member states of this progressive grouping. We also welcome the possibility of regional connections between ASEAN and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in West Asia.

Issues such as the necessity of unity among Islamic countries, promoting the true image of Islam in the world, combating extremism and Islamophobia, and supporting the interests of Muslims worldwide, including the oppressed Palestinian people, are the points that align the foreign policy of the two countries on a common path. Within this framework, we believe the Middle Eastern countries, as an environment with the highest number of Islamic countries, can overcome existing misunderstandings and, regardless of the intervention of non-regional powers, establish an intra-regional order.

Negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are taking place in this regard. We believe the two countries have embarked on the right path, and this understanding will bring tangible results for the stability and prosperity of the region and the Islamic world.

As an influential bloc in global equations, the Islamic world requires greater convergence to create opportunities for consensus, synergy and the generation of innovative ideas, benefiting the great ummah (worldwide Islamic community). Undoubtedly, countries that have noteworthy weight in the Islamic world can play a leading role in realizing the interests of the ummah.

Based on this, Iran welcomes the strengthening of cooperation with Indonesia, as one of the essential and influential predominantly Muslim countries in the world.

From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the unilateralism prevailing in the world, with the elimination of multilateral mechanisms and its detrimental effects on global peace and security, has now been marginalized. In other words, the security of the international system does not have a "prescribed" nature and has been transformed into a "synergic" and "participatory" matter with the maximum involvement of actors.

The founding fathers of the historic Bandung Conference and the proponents of the paradigm of nonalignment, decades ago, rightly took steps in this direction and expressed their opposition to any polarization that would endanger world peace and stability. In the new international context, developing and emerging countries, through cooperation and shared efforts, can play a constructive role in ensuring global peace and stability, including in the areas of food security and energy.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize the serious commitment of the authorities in my country to the development of relations with the friendly and brotherly country of Indonesia. Indonesians are noble and hospitable, and I am deeply pleased we are in Indonesia accompanying President Raeisi.

I wish felicity, prosperity and progress for Indonesia’s government and great people.

***

The writer is the Iranian foreign minister.


 

Japan’s Emperor Naruhito arrives in Indonesia for first state visit​

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Japan's Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako boarding an aircraft bound for Indonesia, at Haneda airport on June 17. PHOTO: EPA-EFE

UPDATED
9 MINS AGO

JAKARTA - Japan’s Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako arrived in the Indonesian capital Jakarta on Saturday for their first state visit since ascending the Chrysanthemum Throne in 2019.

The June 17 to 23 trip to South-east Asia’s biggest economy includes a meeting with Indonesian President Joko Widodo at a palace south of Jakarta and a visit to a military cemetery honouring Indonesian and Japanese soldiers.

Japan ruled Indonesia for more than three years during and after World War II, capturing it from the Dutch East Indies without a fight and breaking the image of Dutch superiority.

The Japanese surrender at the end of the war paved the way for Indonesian independence in 1945 despite Dutch attempts to wrest back its former colony.

“Since the war, Japan has worked hard to contribute to international peace and prosperity with Asian countries including Indonesia,” Emperor Naruhito told reporters on Thursday before the trip.

“Based on the countries’ history of diplomacy, I hope this visit will help deepen the friendly relationship between our nations.”

The royal couple will visit a military cemetery in south Jakarta, where 28 former Japanese soldiers who stayed and fought for Jakarta in the Indonesian War of Independence between 1945 and 1949 are buried.

They will also pay a visit to a new mass rapid transit train depot constructed in the capital with Japan’s help, and a Tokyo-funded pump station that prevents flooding.

As well as travelling to the central Javan city of Yogyakarta to meet the provincial monarch, the emperor is scheduled to visit Borobudur, the world’s largest Buddhist temple.

The couple have gradually resumed public duties after limiting them during the Covid-19 pandemic.

In 2022, they made their first trip abroad since the enthronement to attend Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral in London.

Previous Japanese monarchs last visited Indonesia in 1962 and 1991. AFP

 



From Japan

 
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Peng Liyuan meets with Indonesian first lady in Chengdu​

 

Indonesia is key to Australia’s regional vision​


Indonesia will never join Australia in trying to balance China. But we cannot succeed without paying heed to the broader strategic value of our huge northern neighbour.

Originally published in The Australian Financial Review.

By Hervé Lemahieu
25 July 2023

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The fanfare that greeted Joko Widodo – known as Jokowi – on his final trip as Indonesia’s president to Australia was well founded.

Over the past decade, Jokowi’s government has injected a new level of maturity and ease in the historically often temperamental Australia-Indonesia relationship.

Pragmatic and active engagement at senior levels of both governments has become the norm – crisis management is the exception. Even Indonesia’s concerns with AUKUS did not fundamentally derail this.

But as the Jokowi presidency enters its twilight, the search for depth in bilateral ties continues. Economic ties with our neighbour of 275 million people are anaemic. People-to-people links are underdone. And public attitudes in both democracies are largely indifferent to each other.

Above all, Australia will need to do more to convince Indonesia that it shares common ground strategically with its largest neighbour despite our markedly different outlooks on the region.
We’re a world away from Indonesia occupying the place it did in Australia’s strategic imagination circa 1995. Keating-era mythologies about the pre-eminence of the partnership have ossified into platitudes. But Australia has moved on from that era in profound ways.
Indonesia will remain a hedger of China even as Australia becomes ever more the balancer.
For Indonesians, the evidence of our divergence is plain to see from Canberra’s hardening views of China, intention to project force at greater distance, and decisive moves to bolster America’s balancing role in the region.

A cold acknowledgement has set in on both sides of the Torres Strait that Indonesia will remain a hedger of China even as Australia becomes ever more the balancer.

The differences in our regional strategies are not merely tactical. They are epistemic.

Indonesia is wary of China. But it does not view China as an existential threat. On balance, and despite standing up to Beijing in its territorial dispute over the Natuna Islands, Jakarta views US-China competition rather than Chinese unilateralism as the root of regional instability.
It follows that US-anchored minilateral coalitions such as the Quad and AUKUS are more often seen to contribute to the polarisation of the region.

Strategic returns​

Many in Australia would gladly settle for a version of benign coexistence with Indonesia that allows both countries to agree to disagree and move on with their respective ventures. The high bar of bilateral success is often touted as Indonesia’s tolerance (with qualifications) for Australia’s quest for nuclear-powered submarines.

It’s tempting to think of Australia’s Indonesia diplomacy as the political premium we pay for getting on with the job of balancing China elsewhere in the region.

Critics point to India’s China-driven strategic congruence with the United States or the Philippines’ status as a US ally and its geography on the front lines of a potential flashpoint with Taiwan as reasons for why those countries offer more worthwhile strategic returns for Australia today.
By contrast, Indonesia’s strategic value to Australia is often defined only narrowly: in terms of the need to maintain maritime security and stable relations with the nation framing our northern approaches.

But discounting the broader strategic value of Indonesia for Australia would be mistaken for several reasons.

For one, it masks how Indonesia itself has changed under Jokowi. The country has historically fallen well short of its potential as a major power. But Jokowi – aided by his impressive foreign minister Retno Marsudi – has in recent years been a surprisingly activist leader on the global stage. Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, a contender to replace Jokowi in 2024, has similarly played an unusually international role.

Indonesia has started to fill the diplomatic void in a region that is if not quite Sino-centric, certainly increasingly post-American. Data from the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index shows China, Japan and Indonesia each leads the US with a higher tempo of top-level diplomatic activity regionally.

Retno leads the international response on the Myanmar crisis, the region’s most protracted diplomatic and humanitarian impasse. But Indonesia’s role is not limited to South-East Asia.
Jokowi notably held the G20 together in Bali last year by securing consensus on the “adverse effects” of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – a diplomatic coup, given rife divisions among the world’s most important economies. He also deserves credit for starting to defuse US-China tensions by facilitating talks at the G20 between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.

Indonesia, in other words, is not just relevant to Australia because it is proximate to us. It is relevant because it has growing global clout. It may not be the most aligned country for Australia. But on the basis of its heft alone, there is a good case for why its position on a range of issues should count for as much any of our leading strategic partners.

Continuity in outlook​

In a “bazaar world order” we will need friends like Indonesia as much as we do India – both leaders of the disparate but increasingly salient Global South. And unlike the infamously yo-yo fluctuations of Philippine external policy – breathing hot and cold on its US alliance – we can at least count on a modicum of continuity in Indonesia’s approach to the world.

As the late Allan Gyngell was fond of saying, statecraft is the art of managing differences between states, so our country always has options. Fleshing out a broader common agenda with Indonesia will help us create space and more options.

Australia would be wise to see the broader strategic significance in both offers made by Jokowi this week: on lithium and visas.

Indonesia seeks our support for Indonesia’s nascent electric vehicle industry by obtaining lithium from Australia. This would start to unlock greater economic complementarity curiously missing between our two economies. It would also dovetail with efforts to diversify supply of Australian commodities through a China-plus-one strategy.

The second initiative, on visas, seeks to ease requirements for Indonesians travelling to Australia. Personal bonds between leaders in both governments are important in managing differences. But so too will be sustained people-to-people engagement.

Indonesian officials at the highest levels see promise in Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s articulation of Australia’s search for a “strategic equilibrium” – balancing our deterrence objectives with restoring regional partnerships outside the US alliance framework.
Jakarta is quite prepared to work with this Australian dichotomy. So must we be.

Hervé Lemahieu
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Areas of expertise: Strategy and geopolitics; global governance; Australian foreign policy; Southeast Asia; Data analysis


 

The Future of Geopolitics Will Be Decided by 6 Swing States​

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Published on June 8, 2023
By
Tareq Hasan



The world is witnessing a new era of great power competition between the United States and China, with Russia playing a spoiler role. The outcome of this rivalry will shape the global order for decades to come. But the fate of this contest will not be decided by the actions of Washington, Beijing, or Moscow alone. It will also depend on how a group of influential countries in the global south navigate the shifting geopolitical landscape.

These countries are the geopolitical swing states of the 21st century. They are relatively stable and prosperous nations that have their own global agendas independent of the great powers, and the will and capabilities to turn those agendas into realities. They are more demanding, flexible, dynamic, and strategic than they could have been in the 20th century, when they had to choose between alignment or non-alignment with one bloc or another. And they will often choose multi-alignment, a strategy that will make them critical—and sometimes unpredictable—forces in the world’s next stage of globalization, and the next phase of great power competition.

These geopolitical swing states fall into four overlapping categories:

– Countries with a competitive advantage in a critical aspect of global supply chains.
– Countries uniquely suited for nearshoring, offshoring, or friendshoring.
– Countries with a disproportionate amount of capital and willingness to deploy it around the world.
– Countries with developed economies and leaders with global visions that they pursue within certain constraints.

Six countries stand out as exemplars of these categories: Turkey, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil. These countries have more power today than ever before for several reasons: They have more agency, they benefit from regionalization, and they can leverage U.S.-China tensions.

More Agency

The geopolitical swing states have more agency than ever before because they have grown more confident and capable in pursuing their own interests and values on the global stage. They have developed their own sources of soft and hard power, such as cultural influence, economic clout, military strength, diplomatic networks, and technological innovation. They have also diversified their partnerships and alliances, seeking to balance their relations with both the U.S. and China, as well as other regional and global actors.

Turkey has emerged as a regional powerbroker and a global player in defense, energy, humanitarian aid, and mediation. It has pursued an assertive foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has sought to expand Turkey’s influence in its neighborhood and beyond. Turkey has intervened militarily in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Somalia; challenged Greece and Cyprus over maritime rights in the Eastern Mediterranean; supported Qatar against a Saudi-led blockade; hosted millions of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan; mediated between Iran and the West; and built close ties with Russia despite being a NATO member.

India has risen as a major economic and strategic power in Asia and the world. It has pursued a multi-aligned foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has sought to enhance India’s role as a leading voice for democracy, development, and diversity. India has deepened its strategic partnership with the U.S., joined the Quad alliance with Japan, Australia, and the U.S., engaged with China on trade and border issues despite tensions; expanded its outreach to Africa and Latin America; invested in connectivity projects in its neighborhood; and championed initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia has transformed its economy and society under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who has sought to diversify Saudi Arabia’s sources of income away from oil dependence, modernize its social norms and institutions, and assert its leadership in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Saudi Arabia has launched an ambitious Vision 2030 reform program, led a military intervention in Yemen against Iranian-backed rebels, normalized relations with Israel, hosted major summits such as the G20, invested heavily in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and biotechnology, and established strategic partnerships with China, India, and Russia, while maintaining its alliance with the U.S.

More Regionalization

The geopolitical swing states have also benefited from regionalization, the process by which regions become more integrated and interdependent economically, politically, and culturally. Regionalization offers opportunities for these countries to enhance their influence and interests in their respective regions, as well as to cooperate with other regional powers on common challenges and opportunities. Regionalization also creates a buffer against the pressures and uncertainties of the global system, allowing these countries to pursue their own models of development and governance.

South Africa has played a pivotal role in advancing regional integration and cooperation in Africa, as well as representing African interests and perspectives on the global stage.
It has been a founding member and a leader of the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). It has also participated in peacekeeping and mediation efforts in countries such as Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. South Africa has leveraged its position as the most industrialized and diversified economy in Africa to attract foreign investment and trade, especially from China, India, and the EU.

Indonesia has emerged as a key player in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region, as well as a bridge between Asia and the Islamic world. It has been a driving force behind the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (AASP). It has also engaged in dialogue and cooperation with other regional actors such as China, Japan, India, Australia,
and the U.S. on issues such as maritime security, counterterrorism, climate change, and pandemic response. Indonesia has leveraged its position as the largest economy and the most populous Muslim-majority country in Southeast Asia to promote its vision of a democratic, tolerant, and prosperous region.

Brazil has been a leader in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as a voice for the global south on issues such as trade, environment, and human rights. It has been a founding member and a driving force behind regional organizations such as Mercosur, Unasur, and Celac. It has also engaged in dialogue and cooperation with other regional actors such as the U.S., China, India, and the EU on issues such as energy security, infrastructure development, and social inclusion. Brazil has leveraged its position as the largest economy and the most populous country in Latin America to advance its interests and values in the region and beyond.

More Leverage

The geopolitical swing states have also gained more leverage in the global system by exploiting the opportunities and challenges created by U.S.-China competition. They have sought to maximize their benefits from both sides, while minimizing their costs and risks. They have also tried to shape the rules and norms of the emerging global order, according to their own preferences and principles. They have not hesitated to challenge or defy either of the great powers, when they perceive their interests or values are threatened or violated.

Turkey has sought to balance its relations with both the U.S. and China, while pursuing its own strategic autonomy. It has maintained its NATO membership and cooperation with the U.S. on issues such as counterterrorism, Afghanistan, and Iran, while also resisting U.S. pressure on issues such as human rights, democracy, and Syria. It has also expanded its economic ties with China, especially under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while also expressing concern over China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Turkey has also defied both the U.S. and China by acquiring Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems, despite facing sanctions and criticism from both sides.

India has deepened its strategic partnership with the U.S., especially under the Quad framework, while also maintaining its engagement with China on trade and border issues, despite tensions. It has welcomed U.S. support for its bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, its membership in multilateral export control regimes, and its role as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific region. It has also increased its trade with China, especially in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and renewable energy, while also pushing back against China’s assertiveness along their disputed border, where a deadly clash occurred in 2020. India has also defied both the U.S. and China by joining RCEP, despite U.S. withdrawal from the pact and China’s dominance in it.

Saudi Arabia has maintained its alliance with the U.S., especially on security and energy issues, while also diversifying its relations with China on economic and technological issues. It has relied on U.S. support for its military intervention in Yemen, its confrontation with Iran, and its normalization with Israel, while also facing U.S. pressure on issues such as human rights, democracy, and nuclear proliferation. It has also increased its investment in China, especially under the BRI framework, while also seeking Chinese cooperation on issues such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. Saudi Arabia has also defied both the U.S. and China by pursuing its own nuclear program, despite U.S. opposition and Chinese competition.

Implications

The rise of these geopolitical swing states will have significant implications for the global order and the great power competition.

The global order will become more multipolar and complex, as these countries will shape the rules and norms of the emerging system according to their own preferences and principles. They will not accept a binary choice between the U.S. and China, but will seek to preserve their strategic autonomy and flexibility. They will also demand more voice and representation in global institutions and forums, such as the U.N., the IMF, the WTO, and the G20.

The great power competition will become more nuanced and dynamic, as these countries will leverage their relations with both the U.S. and China to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs and risks. They will also exploit the opportunities and challenges created by U.S.-China rivalry to advance their own interests and values. They will not hesitate to challenge or defy either of the great powers, when they perceive their interests or values are threatened or violated.

The global challenges and opportunities will require more cooperation and coordination among these countries and the great powers, as these countries will play a key role in addressing issues such as climate change, pandemic response, cyber security, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, trade, development, and human rights. They will also offer new markets, sources of innovation, and partners for cooperation to both the U.S. and China.

Conclusion

The geopolitical swing states of Turkey, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil are the middle powers of the global south that will decide the future of geopolitics. They have more agency, they benefit from regionalization, and they can leverage U.S.-China tensions. They have their own global agendas independent of the great powers, and the will and capabilities to turn those agendas into realities. They are more demanding, flexible, dynamic, and strategic than they could have been in the 20th century. And they will often choose multi-alignment, a strategy that will make them critical—and sometimes unpredictable—forces in the world’s next stage of globalization, and the next phase of great power competition. The U.S., China, and Russia should not take these countries for granted or ignore their interests and values. They should engage them with respect and pragmatism, seeking areas of convergence and managing areas of divergence. They should also recognize that these countries are not passive bystanders or pawns in their rivalry, but active players and partners in shaping the global order. The geopolitical swing states should not be complacent or reckless in their actions. They should be aware of the risks and responsibilities that come with their power and influence. They should also be constructive and responsible in their contributions to the global order. They should not only pursue their own interests and values, but also uphold the common interests and values of humanity.

 
Indonesia should, in theory, be a natural partner for Washington. It is a large, vibrant democracy with historically strong military ties to the US. But in recent years, under President Joko Widodo, the archipelago has been receptive to the economic overtures from Beijing.

Allowing China’s influence to continue would be a mistake for the US. The ambivalence from Jakarta is understandable given it is the largest economy in Southeast Asia, with relatively strong prospects. And it no longer feels that it needs to kowtow to either Beijing or Washington to ensure its relevance.

 
 

Getting ready for a richer Indonesia​

11 September 2023
Editorial Board, ANU

Whether US scepticism about ASEAN is justified or not, President Biden’s no-show at the ASEAN meetings in Jakarta last week was a major lost opportunity to build goodwill in Indonesia by showing support for outgoing president Joko Widodo and his administration’s efforts to strengthen ASEAN’s decision-making ability and give substance to the values and interests expressed in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

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Treating Indonesia as an afterthought, while prioritising engagement with Asian partners more eager to curry favour over aiding US efforts to check Chinese power, could prove costly for the United States in the coming decades. Biden skipped the ASEAN–US Summit and the East Asia Summit meeting of leaders in Jakarta while choosing to visit Vietnam instead. As two new and important Australian publications, Sam Roggeveen’s ‘The Echidna Strategy’ and the Moore Report on Australia’s Southeast Asian strategy emphasise, Indonesia’s large and youthful population and its strong growth prospects set it up to be a globally-significant economy and a major regional power over the coming decades.

The importance of Indonesia to the regional strategic landscape isn’t lost on Australia, by contrast, even if Australian policy is still struggling to adapt to the changing balance in each country’s economic and geopolitical importance. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was in Jakarta to attend the ASEAN meetings and spruik his government’s new trade and investment strategy for Southeast Asia. The economic case for deepening the Australia–ASEAN relationship is made clear by figures quoted by the Moore report — excluding the financial hub of Singapore and Timor Leste, home to large LNG investments, a puny 0.8 per cent of Australia’s stock of overseas investment goes into the Southeast Asian region.

Indonesia looms large as a tantalising market for Australian investment and exports. There are roughly 13 million households with an annual income of over US$15,000, the report says, but in two decades there will be an extra 50 million. The report identifies well-known barriers to greater trade and investment with Indonesia and the region and proposes some common-sense, though piecemeal, fixes for the underperformance of Australia–Indonesia and Australia–Southeast Asia economic ties.

The growing ability of the Indonesian economy to underwrite a bigger and more powerful defence force will see Indonesia emerge as one of a number of significant military powers that, though they might not cohere into an outright containment coalition of the kind the United States would like to see, will collectively counterbalance China’s power even as its strategic role eclipses that of the United States.

That scenario forms a key part of the argument that Roggeveen makes in his book on Australian security policy, which offers a vision for Australia that isn’t simply based upon on shoring up US primacy in Asia (the rationale that underpins AUKUS and much of current Australian security thinking). Roggeveen sees a more powerful Indonesia as an asset for Australia in finding security in a post-American Asia and proposes a quasi-alliance relationship based upon a shared interest in preventing any country — read, China but not only China — from being the dominant maritime power in Southeast Asia.

It’s a compelling idea. But like many ideas put forward to deepen the Australia–Indonesia economic relationship, it’s haunted by the question of what’s in it for Indonesia.

In 1995, when Australian prime minister Paul Keating and Indonesian president Suharto signed a landmark bilateral Security Agreement, Australian GDP was roughly twice that of Indonesia (not to mention almost half as big as China’s). Any vision for an economic and political relationship that Australia, or any other regional middle power, pursues with Indonesia over the coming decades will have to be attuned to Indonesia’s growing status as a globally-important economy and, potentially, a big power in strategic terms.

Posing as a benefactor won’t work over the long run, because Indonesia is already thinking of itself as a developed economy in-waiting, with the fiscal capacity to take care of its own development challenges.

Indeed, as John West details in this week’s lead article, Indonesia is ‘the first emerging G20 economy and ASEAN member to seek OECD membership.’ The effort of seeking OECD membership alone might prompt welcome reform that would lift Indonesia’s economic potential, because the OECD’s accession process ‘scrutinises the quality of many policies, notably openness to international and domestic competition and governance quality, including for state-owned enterprises.’

For Australia, a vision of the relationship with Indonesia based upon just closer bilateral ties isn’t going to cut it — the overarching logic of the relationship has to be a global one built for the global stage, asserting both countries’ interest in multilateralism and open trade. Indonesia’s bid for OECD accession offers the opportunity to put this ethos into practice. As Rania Teguh and Fajar B Hirawan argue, ‘by partnering with Indonesia through its accession, Australia could also position itself to support Indonesia with necessary reforms as it pursues advanced economy status by 2045’.

Politics in Indonesia always threatens to hold good policy back, given the sway of vested interests, corruption and nationalist economic ideologies. But the rise of a more affluent and better-educated electorate, as this evidence suggests, offers a chance to steadily diminish the importance of patron–client politics at the grassroots and create the demand for a more serious contestation over different national policy visions in the longer run.

The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

 
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