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You can always learn it by yourself. I can even give you some pointers here. Unfortunately Indonesian mindset has always been "accident based approach" rather than "prevention based approach" which render the whole learning into a USELESS exercise. Furthermore learning and practising are two different things. And Practising require DISCIPLINE.

And TBH I've already given up teaching Indonesian about disaster mitigation / preparedness, because every time I do so the respond I've got was always the same, that they should just pray it wont happen. So be it I said, I most likely survive major disaster but they don't (as in their dead and I'm alive)
Menurut mereka hidup mati di tangan Tuhan sih dah susah:confused: padahal tindakan preventif penting
 
Australia Kirim Delegasi Pelajari Teknologi Produksi PT. Pindad

November 7, 2019 A Ziyadi

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Asisten Direktur Bidang Ekspor PT Pindad (Persero), Hery Mochtady menerima kunjungan Rombongan Delegasi Militer Australia yang dipimpin oleh LTCOL Thomas Dowsett di Ruang Rapat Direktorat Kantor Pusat PT Pindad Bandung (1/11). Dalam kunjungan kali ini, Delegasi Militer Australia terdiri dari :

WCGR Alexander McCreath, CAPT Mark Montague, CAPT William Taylor, LCDR Alex Binns, LCDR David Clarkson, LCDR Alastair Walsh, MAJ Alastair Hee, MAJ Arlo Meany, MAJ Edith Santosa, dan WOI Brook Buchan. Delegasi Militer Australia juga didampingi oleh Kolonel S. Iskandar Hardoyo, Mayor Edith Purnama dan Ibu Evi Savitri.

FB_IMG_1573081691872.jpg


Maksud kunjungan kali ini ditujukan untuk studi banding mengenai teknologi industri pertahanan dan alutsista di Indonesia. Selain itu, kunjungan dimaksudkan untuk melihat langsung fasilitas produksi dan kompetensi PT Pindad (Persero) dalam memproduksi produk alutsista berkualitas termasuk untuk membahas mengenai teknologi dan manajemen produksi.

Hery Mochtady menyampaikan rasa bangga dapat dikunjungi oleh Delegasi Militer Australia. Thomas Dowsett juga memberikan apresiasi atas sambutan PT Pindad (Persero) dan tertarik dengan berbagai produk PT Pindad. Dalam sambutannya, Hery Mochtady juga memberikan paparan berbagai produk unggulan inovasi PT Pindad (Persero) seperti Medium Tank, Berbagai varian Armoured Vehicle, seperti Anoa, Komodo dan Badak. Dijelaskan juga berbagai produk senjata seperti SS2 dan produk industrial seperti excavator dan tempa cor.

Baca Juga: KSAL Resmikan Markas Komando Pasukan Marinir 2 di Marunda

Terjadi diskusi menarik, karena Delegasi Militer Australia ingin tahu lebih dalam mengenai fasilitas produksi dan manajemen produksi di Pindad. Selain itu, Delegasi Militer Australia juga ingin mengetahui bagaimana Pindad bisa memiliki kompetensi serta teknologi untuk produksi dan maintenance berbagai produk alutsista dan memenuhi kebutuhan militer Indonesia.

Setelah diskusi yang menarik dan cair, serta penjelasan mengenai profil dan berbagai produk PT Pindad (Persero), Rombongan Delegasi Militer Australia melaksanakan plant tour untuk melihat secara langsung proses produksi produk hankam maupun industrial. Delegasi Militer Australia terlihat antusias saat mengunjungi fasilitas produksi kendaraan khusus, terutama saat melihat Harimau Medium Tank. Kegiatan diakhiri dengan kegiatan menembak dengan berbagai senjata buatan Pindad.

Sumber: pindad.com
 
The military and strategic implications of Indonesia’s new capital
6 Nov 2019|Evan Laksmana
35387070893_46a946f922_c.jpg


Since it was announced in August, Indonesia’s plan to relocate its capital to East Kalimantan in Borneo has engendered much debate, but few have examined the potential military and strategic implications of the move.

The Indonesian military (TNI) will significantly increase its presence across Kalimantan—effectively ‘militarising’ Borneo. The map below shows the current deployment of most major TNI assets and bases across Kalimantan.

Laksmana-map-cropped.jpg

Laksmana-map-legend-e1573006575830.png

Map created by the author using Google Maps.

The deployment suggests the clustering of current TNI forces—roughly around 20,000 personnel—in the eastern, western and northern parts of Kalimantan. It is also army-heavy at the moment. The few naval and air force bases are relatively small and underdeveloped for major platform deployments; the air force has only one major base, while the navy has two.

This posture will change significantly as major leadership and force elements move to Kalimantan with the new capital. The TNI General Headquarters will move, along with its supporting staff and units, from intelligence groups and military police to special forces and press officers.

The army leadership and its supporting infrastructure will follow suit. To supplement the two existing regional commands (KODAMs), the Army will create a new Capital Security Regional Command (KODAM PIK). The new army headquarters and KODAM PIK will require around 15,000 personnel, including an infantry and a cavalry brigade as well as special forces units.

While most of these troops are territorial forces, the proposal will eventually bring the total number of combat-ready troops across Kalimantan to three brigades (around 7,000–8,000 personnel). Army analysts have also suggested that Kalimantan needs new forces across the island, including one KODAM and its accompanying units for each of the five provinces.

The navy will also move its headquarters and supporting units. Current proposals call for a new ‘armada-level’ force, a new division-level marine unit and a third primary naval base in Kalimantan. The area also needs new port facilities and bases to host and maintain major platforms as well as a new naval airfield. The navy’s transport command and hydrographic service could possibly be relocated there as well.

The air force will move its headquarters and supporting units and create major bases and facilities. Radar and missile defence units along with a special forces battalion and two aviation squadrons could be established near the new capital. Major platforms will be deployed in the area, including possibly up to 16 new F-16V fighter aircraft.

The government would need to spend more than US$9 billion—almost equal to next year’s total defence budget—to pay for these shifts in the coming years. If the plans materialise, Kalimantan will be the first ever non-Java military centre of gravity for Indonesia.

But the new capital will also be closer to potential conflict flashpoints. It will share borders with Malaysia and Brunei. It will also be closer to the tri-border area (with Malaysia and the Philippines) that analysts have called a ‘key hub’ for transnational terrorist and criminal activities.

Eastern Kalimantan also sits at the heart of the Makassar Strait—a central feature of the second of Indonesia’s three strategic archipelagic sea lanes (ASL II), which includes the Lombok Strait. Some consider the Lombok and Makassar straits as an alternative to Malacca Strait as a direct route between the Indian and Pacific oceans.

The Makassar Strait stretches about 400 nautical miles from its northern gateway to its southern access. Each year, 420 mostly large ships (over 100,000 tonnes deadweight) travel through the Lombok and Makassar passageway carrying around 36 million tonnes of cargo worth US$40 billion.

Given these interests, the TNI arguably needs to increase its presence across Kalimantan. That would complement its growing presence in Sulawesi in recent years, which includes a new submarine port in Palu and a third infantry division of the army’s Strategic Reserve Command near Makassar. Control and safety over ASL II will thus come from the TNI’s presence in both Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

But military presence alone is insufficient. Indonesia should also boost its defence diplomatic engagement and activities.

Indonesia should put more resources into expanding and institutionalising its trilateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines. That will not only be crucial for the new capital’s security but also assuage concerns over the TNI’s heavy presence.

Indonesia should have regular consultations with Malaysia and Brunei. It might also consider starting a dialogue with the members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and the UK.

Indonesia certainly has no expansionist designs, but historical acrimonies cast a long shadow on both sides. To avoid starting another round of security dilemmas, the TNI’s shift to Kalimantan should be paired with opening up new avenues of dialogue and cooperative activities.

Finally, if Jokowi (and presumably his successor in 2024) carries on with the move, Indonesia’s defence policy will be hamstrung for the next decade. Any available resources for procurement, welfare improvement and organisational development will be diverted to the Kalimantan deployment plans.

For now, the TNI will focus on organisational restructuring. In September, it appointed the first three commanders of the new Joint Regional Defence Commands, which aren’t yet fully staffed and operational, much like other newly created units in recent years. But Indonesia’s regional power and profile will be significantly boosted if all of the plans for the TNI outlined above materialise.

The new capital will have significant strategic implications. The TNI and the Indonesian political leadership should carefully assess their options in Kalimantan and consider the broader regional—not just the bureaucratic or domestic—circumstances.
 
i see some of the singaporeans in maxdefense starting to worrying out by a powerpoint slide of our wishlist ..... it's still a wishlist that we don't know how many hurdle we would face to turn it into reality , yet they worried like we would invade them tommorow .

a really big oooof .......... either could turn into more advanced version of their SAM series , or new ballistic missile that can dodge such thing .
 
i see some of the singaporeans in maxdefense starting to worrying out by a powerpoint slide of our wishlist ..... it's still a wishlist that we don't know how many hurdle we would face to turn it into reality , yet they worried like we would invade them tommorow
Yea they fail to notice that in politics everything happen for a reason. Including leaks, govt official statement, etc. However from political stand point with the rumor of expiring state credit this year (which is only a month away), the uncertainty of some contracts (sukro project mostly), this RENBUT (singkatan ini loh...bikin gw mikir jorok :lol:, gak bisa diganti yah hehehe) can be viewed as how big Air Force project alone US companies can get their hands on if they can maintain good relations with us. Leverage? Well maybe, but as KASAU stated up until now they are still insist on the Sukro project to move on, tho I dont see the real confidence behind it. Why? That RENBUT list of F5 replacement is not mentioning the specific type (SU35) where it clearly is. Are they trying not to offend US or disrupt the on going negotiation? So far the possibility of Sukro is still 50:50 imho while the F16V isnt suppose to be affected by Sukro deal since we already planned to have them anyway, sadly US knows this.

But Russian fans boy can still get their hope stand! We still have the "wild card", our new menhan is certainly looking for a spotlight (as sis Nike said Narcisisstic can be a good thing). His "asam garam" in intelegent field can play an advantage in this negotiation process. So lets wait and see how he going to play this out, lots of coffee and gorengan might be needed while we wait :D
 
i see some of the singaporeans in maxdefense starting to worrying out by a powerpoint slide of our wishlist ..... it's still a wishlist that we don't know how many hurdle we would face to turn it into reality , yet they worried like we would invade them tommorow .


a really big oooof .......... either could turn into more advanced version of their SAM series , or new ballistic missile that can dodge such thing .
They have 40 f15 and 60 f16 so why they afraid us?
Also they procure f35
 
The military and strategic implications of Indonesia’s new capital
6 Nov 2019|Evan Laksmana
35387070893_46a946f922_c.jpg


Since it was announced in August, Indonesia’s plan to relocate its capital to East Kalimantan in Borneo has engendered much debate, but few have examined the potential military and strategic implications of the move.

The Indonesian military (TNI) will significantly increase its presence across Kalimantan—effectively ‘militarising’ Borneo. The map below shows the current deployment of most major TNI assets and bases across Kalimantan.

Laksmana-map-cropped.jpg

Laksmana-map-legend-e1573006575830.png

Map created by the author using Google Maps.

The deployment suggests the clustering of current TNI forces—roughly around 20,000 personnel—in the eastern, western and northern parts of Kalimantan. It is also army-heavy at the moment. The few naval and air force bases are relatively small and underdeveloped for major platform deployments; the air force has only one major base, while the navy has two.

This posture will change significantly as major leadership and force elements move to Kalimantan with the new capital. The TNI General Headquarters will move, along with its supporting staff and units, from intelligence groups and military police to special forces and press officers.

The army leadership and its supporting infrastructure will follow suit. To supplement the two existing regional commands (KODAMs), the Army will create a new Capital Security Regional Command (KODAM PIK). The new army headquarters and KODAM PIK will require around 15,000 personnel, including an infantry and a cavalry brigade as well as special forces units.

While most of these troops are territorial forces, the proposal will eventually bring the total number of combat-ready troops across Kalimantan to three brigades (around 7,000–8,000 personnel). Army analysts have also suggested that Kalimantan needs new forces across the island, including one KODAM and its accompanying units for each of the five provinces.

The navy will also move its headquarters and supporting units. Current proposals call for a new ‘armada-level’ force, a new division-level marine unit and a third primary naval base in Kalimantan. The area also needs new port facilities and bases to host and maintain major platforms as well as a new naval airfield. The navy’s transport command and hydrographic service could possibly be relocated there as well.

The air force will move its headquarters and supporting units and create major bases and facilities. Radar and missile defence units along with a special forces battalion and two aviation squadrons could be established near the new capital. Major platforms will be deployed in the area, including possibly up to 16 new F-16V fighter aircraft.

The government would need to spend more than US$9 billion—almost equal to next year’s total defence budget—to pay for these shifts in the coming years. If the plans materialise, Kalimantan will be the first ever non-Java military centre of gravity for Indonesia.

But the new capital will also be closer to potential conflict flashpoints. It will share borders with Malaysia and Brunei. It will also be closer to the tri-border area (with Malaysia and the Philippines) that analysts have called a ‘key hub’ for transnational terrorist and criminal activities.

Eastern Kalimantan also sits at the heart of the Makassar Strait—a central feature of the second of Indonesia’s three strategic archipelagic sea lanes (ASL II), which includes the Lombok Strait. Some consider the Lombok and Makassar straits as an alternative to Malacca Strait as a direct route between the Indian and Pacific oceans.

The Makassar Strait stretches about 400 nautical miles from its northern gateway to its southern access. Each year, 420 mostly large ships (over 100,000 tonnes deadweight) travel through the Lombok and Makassar passageway carrying around 36 million tonnes of cargo worth US$40 billion.

Given these interests, the TNI arguably needs to increase its presence across Kalimantan. That would complement its growing presence in Sulawesi in recent years, which includes a new submarine port in Palu and a third infantry division of the army’s Strategic Reserve Command near Makassar. Control and safety over ASL II will thus come from the TNI’s presence in both Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

But military presence alone is insufficient. Indonesia should also boost its defence diplomatic engagement and activities.

Indonesia should put more resources into expanding and institutionalising its trilateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines. That will not only be crucial for the new capital’s security but also assuage concerns over the TNI’s heavy presence.

Indonesia should have regular consultations with Malaysia and Brunei. It might also consider starting a dialogue with the members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and the UK.

Indonesia certainly has no expansionist designs, but historical acrimonies cast a long shadow on both sides. To avoid starting another round of security dilemmas, the TNI’s shift to Kalimantan should be paired with opening up new avenues of dialogue and cooperative activities.

Finally, if Jokowi (and presumably his successor in 2024) carries on with the move, Indonesia’s defence policy will be hamstrung for the next decade. Any available resources for procurement, welfare improvement and organisational development will be diverted to the Kalimantan deployment plans.

For now, the TNI will focus on organisational restructuring. In September, it appointed the first three commanders of the new Joint Regional Defence Commands, which aren’t yet fully staffed and operational, much like other newly created units in recent years. But Indonesia’s regional power and profile will be significantly boosted if all of the plans for the TNI outlined above materialise.

The new capital will have significant strategic implications. The TNI and the Indonesian political leadership should carefully assess their options in Kalimantan and consider the broader regional—not just the bureaucratic or domestic—circumstances.

Borneo is quite large and populous, to have only three brigades combatant troops is under powered even for any ASEAN standard

They're arrogant yet so afraid of losing anything, so even a tie means defeat to them.

Not arrogant IMO, more to insecure.
 
looks like those viets are starting to take the lead on radar development
75375593_2666950086696263_1460958633545170944_n_301711869.jpg


75522015_2666950080029597_8289946158759936000_n_30179588.jpg


i wonder what they were based on , belarus technology ?

and also , anyone had latest info about PT LEN joint cooperation with Thales on 3d radar development ??
 
The military and strategic implications of Indonesia’s new capital
6 Nov 2019|Evan Laksmana

The author of that article Evan Laksmana may understand one or few things about geopolitic, unfortunately when it came down in organizational and map reading (geography) he still need to learn a lot. I wont read too much anything out of him when its related to geographic aspect or military organization.

i see some of the singaporeans in maxdefense starting to worrying out by a powerpoint slide of our wishlist ..... it's still a wishlist that we don't know how many hurdle we would face to turn it into reality , yet they worried like we would invade them tommorow

CAre to provide spesific link of it, because I also routinely checking out max defense in Facebook and yet I've never notice what you had stated.

They have 40 f15 and 60 f16 so why they afraid us?
Also they procure f35

Because selling fears is the only way their military could get big funding, regardless they don't have enough manpower for manning all those toys.
 

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