Indonesia Defence Forum

[Svantana]

Indonesia, filipina, malaysia operasi militer darat gabungan di filipina selatan

 

[mandala]

Pindad/FNSS Medium Tank. Credit to Kompas.

https://kompas.id/baca/utama/2018/08/12/tni-butuh-kendaraan-handal-di-segala-medan/

 

[mandala]

Pindad/FNSS Medium Tank mobility test coverage by Ratih TV Kebumen.

 

[striver44]

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[Svantana]

 

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[striver44]

All of ASEAN Follows Duterte’s Lead as Historic Draft Agreement on South China Sea is Adopted
Written by Adam Garrie on 2018-08-03



An achievement for peace through cooperation and pooled prosperity

At the conclusion of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Summit in Singapore which has attracted non-ASEAN partners from across the world, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that after discussions with his ASEAN counterparts in Singapore, a new draft for the Code of Conduct (COC) had been mutually agreed between Beijing and the Association of South East Asian Nations regarding the positions of all parties with South China Sea claims. This agreement will serve as the basis for the rules governing maritime action and connectivity in the South China Sea until a final settlement can be reached on the issue after a period of continued respectful dialogue between Beijing and ASEAN members.

This is a milestone not only because it looks to chart a clear course towards a negotiated settlement regarding the rules of engagement and status of claims in the Sea but it also demonstrates that the quickest and most mutually just path to the harmonisation of cooperation among nations in the South China Sea region is through direct dialogue which is underscored by the reality that China and ASEAN are growing economic partners who can gain much from mutual cooperation and who stand to lose a great deal by succumbing to non-Asian meddling in a regional dispute.

Speaking shortly after the agreement was solidified, Wang Yi told the press, “I believe that the negotiations on COC can be speeded up if we exclude external interference“. As part of the new draft COC, China will station rescue and relief ships in the Sea as part of an effort to provide aid to crews who experience safety hazards in the sea. China further proposed other joint cooperative efforts between its own expert crews and those of ASEAN members throughout the wider region in a clear embrace of the spirit of peace through prosperity.

Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan who hosted the meeting said of the agreement,

“I am pleased to announce yet another milestone in the COC (Code of Conduct) process. AMS (ASEAN member states) and China have arrived at a single draft COC negotiating text, which will be a living document and the basis of future COC negotiations”.





China’s peaceful goals

This agreement makes it clear that when it comes to aggression in the South China Sea, such things can only be provoked by the presence of forces foreign to the region, namely the United States. China’s goals throughout the process are clear. Beijing seeks to confirm its sovereignty over a Sea on its maritime border for the same purposes that in the 1920s, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk sought to confirm the same status over the Turkish Straits. In 1841, the western powers effectively bullied Turkey into signing the London Straits Convention which while confirming the Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty over the Straits, also prohibited any warships other than Ottoman ships from passing through the straits during war time. This had the desired effect of provoking further hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire, all the while British and French ships had open access to all sides of the Mediterranean.

After the First World War, the victorious western powers attempted to remove Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish Straits by making them an international zone under no one state’s authority. Ataturk refused and as a result the 1936 Montreux Convention allowed for all nations with ports on the Black Sea to pass through the Turkish Straits in times of war or peace while foreign ships would be banned in war time. It is this convention which continues to govern the status of the Turkish Straits to this day.

In The South China Sea, Beijing wants essentially what Turkey wanted and got in the age of Ataturk. China has no desire to close the South China Sea to the wider world, let alone the ASEAN countries who contest sovereignty over parts of the Sea. Instead, China seeks to use its military might and traditional role as the major power of the region in order to ensure that foreign provocations from powers who do not border the Sea are not able to effectively colonise the South China Sea as the western powers attempted to colonise the Turkish Straits in the early 20th century.



!PlaceAdHere!



The dominance of US ships in the important Strait of Malacca which links the Asia-Pacific region to the Indian Ocean, has only further served to convince China of the importance of staking its sovereign claims to the South China Sea. Thus, the dispute has nothing to do with what the US deceptively calls “freedom of navigation” but has everything to do with China making sure that in a time of war, it is not a distant foreign superpower that controls crucial sea routes which border China.

To this end, China has always been willing to cooperate with ASEAN members with claims to the Sea just as Ataturk was willing to cooperate with fellow powers with ports on the Black Sea. The recent cooperative endeavours between Philippine President Duterte and the Chinese government over mutual exploitation of South China Sea resources further confirms that China’s attitude is one that is constructive rather than threatening when it comes to working cooperatively with nearby states whose soil borders the Sea.

The only time China would ever militarily confront an ASEAN state over Sea claims is in the event of the US becoming a de-facto military protectorate of an ASEAN state. In this sense, any ASEAN member state that resorts to hiding behind US power instead of negotiating a diplomatic solution to joint South China Sea claims with Beijing, is ultimately signing its death warrant in the event of a wider Sino-US war in the region.

Just as Britain and France were all too happy to see Russia and Ottoman Turkey fight throughout the 18th and 19th centuries while they busily colonised Asia and later Africa too, the US today would be all too happy to see countries like Vietnam or The Philippines fight China with US weapons. This way, the US gets to successfully cause diplomatic and money wasting problems for China, gets to test its weapons against China’s and even if the worst happens. it will be states in south east Asia rather than US soil which will be destroyed in such a conflict.

This is why the best “offence” for ASEAN states that still have disputes with China is a defensive posture not against Beijing but against Washington’s gamesmanship in the region. If the US was removed as a factor in south east Asia, it is certain that China would work with its ASEAN partners to pursue the kind of win-win solutions that Beijing and Manila have embarked on since the arrival of President Duterte and likewise, those embarked on when Ataturk and Lenin ended centuries of mutual hostility between two great Eurasian powers. It is therefore the responsibility of ASEAN nations to maintain good trading relations with both China and the US, but when it comes to military provocations, the best ASEAN can say to the US is “thanks but no thanks”. In signing this agreement, ASEAN has taken an important step towards fomenting an Asian authored, owned and executed peace process.



!PlaceAdHere!



Duterte blazes a trail for all of ASEAN – his opponents owe him a substantial apology

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was the first ASEAN head of state whose country has South China Sea claims to propose and take meaningful steps to implement joint exploration and exploitation missions in the Sea alongside Chinese vessels and experts. Duterte has made it clear that while he will always defend his country’s territory, he looks to China as an important and valued partner rather than as an adversary against whom a war simply could not be won.

This spirit of cooperation has now been collectively embraced by ASEAN in the format of the new Code of Conduct agreement between all ASEAN states and China. This spirit of cooperation in areas where there was once confrontation has also been given a commendation by the Acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of The Philippines, Antonio Carpio.

Taken in totality this means that what was once limited to a Sino-Philippine agreement over areas of the Sea in and around Philippine maritime territory, has now been expanded to a wider agreement between eleven nations in total. In this sense, President Duterte can be seen as a trail blazer whose profound shift in attitude towards China vis-a-vis most of his predecessors has now be elevated to a multilateral status in the form of the new COC which according to the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister will help pave the way for an expedited final agreement. While Duterte’s domestic opponents accused him of treachery during his bilateral discussions with Beijing, today the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Brunei have all signed a document framed by the same spirit of Sino-ASEAN cooperation that Duterte first instigated.


WTF WHY ISNT THIS IN THE NEWS??????????????????????????????????????????????????

Bunch of f*cking looser

 

[Logam42]

All of ASEAN Follows Duterte’s Lead as Historic Draft Agreement on South China Sea is Adopted
Written by Adam Garrie on 2018-08-03



An achievement for peace through cooperation and pooled prosperity

At the conclusion of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Summit in Singapore which has attracted non-ASEAN partners from across the world, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that after discussions with his ASEAN counterparts in Singapore, a new draft for the Code of Conduct (COC) had been mutually agreed between Beijing and the Association of South East Asian Nations regarding the positions of all parties with South China Sea claims. This agreement will serve as the basis for the rules governing maritime action and connectivity in the South China Sea until a final settlement can be reached on the issue after a period of continued respectful dialogue between Beijing and ASEAN members.

This is a milestone not only because it looks to chart a clear course towards a negotiated settlement regarding the rules of engagement and status of claims in the Sea but it also demonstrates that the quickest and most mutually just path to the harmonisation of cooperation among nations in the South China Sea region is through direct dialogue which is underscored by the reality that China and ASEAN are growing economic partners who can gain much from mutual cooperation and who stand to lose a great deal by succumbing to non-Asian meddling in a regional dispute.

Speaking shortly after the agreement was solidified, Wang Yi told the press, “I believe that the negotiations on COC can be speeded up if we exclude external interference“. As part of the new draft COC, China will station rescue and relief ships in the Sea as part of an effort to provide aid to crews who experience safety hazards in the sea. China further proposed other joint cooperative efforts between its own expert crews and those of ASEAN members throughout the wider region in a clear embrace of the spirit of peace through prosperity.

Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan who hosted the meeting said of the agreement,

“I am pleased to announce yet another milestone in the COC (Code of Conduct) process. AMS (ASEAN member states) and China have arrived at a single draft COC negotiating text, which will be a living document and the basis of future COC negotiations”.





China’s peaceful goals

This agreement makes it clear that when it comes to aggression in the South China Sea, such things can only be provoked by the presence of forces foreign to the region, namely the United States. China’s goals throughout the process are clear. Beijing seeks to confirm its sovereignty over a Sea on its maritime border for the same purposes that in the 1920s, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk sought to confirm the same status over the Turkish Straits. In 1841, the western powers effectively bullied Turkey into signing the London Straits Convention which while confirming the Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty over the Straits, also prohibited any warships other than Ottoman ships from passing through the straits during war time. This had the desired effect of provoking further hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire, all the while British and French ships had open access to all sides of the Mediterranean.

After the First World War, the victorious western powers attempted to remove Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish Straits by making them an international zone under no one state’s authority. Ataturk refused and as a result the 1936 Montreux Convention allowed for all nations with ports on the Black Sea to pass through the Turkish Straits in times of war or peace while foreign ships would be banned in war time. It is this convention which continues to govern the status of the Turkish Straits to this day.

In The South China Sea, Beijing wants essentially what Turkey wanted and got in the age of Ataturk. China has no desire to close the South China Sea to the wider world, let alone the ASEAN countries who contest sovereignty over parts of the Sea. Instead, China seeks to use its military might and traditional role as the major power of the region in order to ensure that foreign provocations from powers who do not border the Sea are not able to effectively colonise the South China Sea as the western powers attempted to colonise the Turkish Straits in the early 20th century.



!PlaceAdHere!



The dominance of US ships in the important Strait of Malacca which links the Asia-Pacific region to the Indian Ocean, has only further served to convince China of the importance of staking its sovereign claims to the South China Sea. Thus, the dispute has nothing to do with what the US deceptively calls “freedom of navigation” but has everything to do with China making sure that in a time of war, it is not a distant foreign superpower that controls crucial sea routes which border China.

To this end, China has always been willing to cooperate with ASEAN members with claims to the Sea just as Ataturk was willing to cooperate with fellow powers with ports on the Black Sea. The recent cooperative endeavours between Philippine President Duterte and the Chinese government over mutual exploitation of South China Sea resources further confirms that China’s attitude is one that is constructive rather than threatening when it comes to working cooperatively with nearby states whose soil borders the Sea.

The only time China would ever militarily confront an ASEAN state over Sea claims is in the event of the US becoming a de-facto military protectorate of an ASEAN state. In this sense, any ASEAN member state that resorts to hiding behind US power instead of negotiating a diplomatic solution to joint South China Sea claims with Beijing, is ultimately signing its death warrant in the event of a wider Sino-US war in the region.

Just as Britain and France were all too happy to see Russia and Ottoman Turkey fight throughout the 18th and 19th centuries while they busily colonised Asia and later Africa too, the US today would be all too happy to see countries like Vietnam or The Philippines fight China with US weapons. This way, the US gets to successfully cause diplomatic and money wasting problems for China, gets to test its weapons against China’s and even if the worst happens. it will be states in south east Asia rather than US soil which will be destroyed in such a conflict.

This is why the best “offence” for ASEAN states that still have disputes with China is a defensive posture not against Beijing but against Washington’s gamesmanship in the region. If the US was removed as a factor in south east Asia, it is certain that China would work with its ASEAN partners to pursue the kind of win-win solutions that Beijing and Manila have embarked on since the arrival of President Duterte and likewise, those embarked on when Ataturk and Lenin ended centuries of mutual hostility between two great Eurasian powers. It is therefore the responsibility of ASEAN nations to maintain good trading relations with both China and the US, but when it comes to military provocations, the best ASEAN can say to the US is “thanks but no thanks”. In signing this agreement, ASEAN has taken an important step towards fomenting an Asian authored, owned and executed peace process.



!PlaceAdHere!



Duterte blazes a trail for all of ASEAN – his opponents owe him a substantial apology

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was the first ASEAN head of state whose country has South China Sea claims to propose and take meaningful steps to implement joint exploration and exploitation missions in the Sea alongside Chinese vessels and experts. Duterte has made it clear that while he will always defend his country’s territory, he looks to China as an important and valued partner rather than as an adversary against whom a war simply could not be won.

This spirit of cooperation has now been collectively embraced by ASEAN in the format of the new Code of Conduct agreement between all ASEAN states and China. This spirit of cooperation in areas where there was once confrontation has also been given a commendation by the Acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of The Philippines, Antonio Carpio.

Taken in totality this means that what was once limited to a Sino-Philippine agreement over areas of the Sea in and around Philippine maritime territory, has now been expanded to a wider agreement between eleven nations in total. In this sense, President Duterte can be seen as a trail blazer whose profound shift in attitude towards China vis-a-vis most of his predecessors has now be elevated to a multilateral status in the form of the new COC which according to the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister will help pave the way for an expedited final agreement. While Duterte’s domestic opponents accused him of treachery during his bilateral discussions with Beijing, today the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Brunei have all signed a document framed by the same spirit of Sino-ASEAN cooperation that Duterte first instigated.


WTF WHY ISNT THIS IN THE NEWS??????????????????????????????????????????????????

Bunch of f*cking looser

...because it doesn't actually mean anything. Its a 'living document' to the proposal of the negotiation of the South China Sea COC. It's the first draft to the negotiation goals of the COC.

Steps in Negotiation (Generalised):

1. "Wacana / Discourse" = "Should we talk about this?", Ex: Indonesian Changing Capital City.
2. "Living Document / Draft Proposal" = "So... what exactly do we need to talk about?", Ex: Current Phase of South China Sea CoC
3. "Negotiation Plan" = "Ok, this is what we are going to talk about", Ex: Timor-Leste LNG Sharing Negotiation With Australia
4. "Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU)" = "We understand each other, nothing concrete, but we all agree that an agreement is possible and will work towards it." , Ex: Philippines, Malaysian, & Indonesian MOU for Land-based Military cooperation against terrorism.
5. "Head of Agreement" = "We have agreed on all major points, all that is left is to work out the details of fulfilling the agreement." , Ex: Current Freeport - Indonesian phase.
6. "Treaty" = "We agree to do this in the specific way as written down in the treaty."

Take note that ASEAN is known to be especially bureaucratic. So expect it to take years to even get to MOU level.

Here is an article by SCMP:
Don’t expect Beijing’s South China Sea ‘breakthrough’ to weaken US ties with Asean nations

While Chinese state media hailed a new code of a conduct in the disputed waters as a ‘rebuke for foreign meddling’, Southeast Asian states are likely to be keen to maintain long-standing ties to Washington, Collin Koh writes

COMMENTS: 14

UNITED STATES
How the US clouds China-Asean progress in South China Sea
7 Aug 2018
With last week’s “breakthrough” – the adoption of a single draft negotiating text for the code of conduct in the South China Sea – Beijing appeared to have successfully “muted” the Association of Southeast Asian Nations over the militarisation of the disputed waters by China.

The text also contains Beijing’s proposal that the parties notify each other of major military activities in the region, if necessary, and “shall not hold joint military exercises with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection”.

These points contributed by China would continue to promote speculation over the code of conduct’s strategic ramifications for the region; not just on the South China Sea spats, in the face of perceived intensification of Great Power rivalries, and, not least of all, on those occurring between China and the United States.

The boisterous Chinese state media was awash with praise for the document; one Xinhua commentary even hailed it as “a rebuke of foreign meddling”. For its part, Beijing might have regarded its latest feat as furnishing additional ammunition for its long-standing opposition against what it has always perceived as “external interference” in the South China Sea.

Beijing also could regard the draft negotiating text as a credible repudiation of the US Navy’s freedom of navigation operations in the disputed waters and as a pointed response to American military activity in the region, which China has long seen as anathema to its national security interests.

But does this so-called “rebuke” reflect a consensus between Asean and China?

Perhaps the issue is nuanced.

It should not have been missed that all along, concerned parties have agreed that the South China Sea dispute settlement would be reached by none other than the claimants themselves; even if the differences lay in whether an accord could be accomplished in a purely bilateral or multilateral setting.

If a dispute settlement takes a very long time to materialise, the onus is on every one to manage the South China Sea claims in a peaceful and stable manner. It is important to highlight that not only civilian, but also military shipping and aircraft, enjoy freedom of passage through the area.

But the South China Sea is, for all intents and purposes, an international maritime medium.

Excluding any country from these waters, including naval movements, is virtually unattainable. It is also hard to envision how China’s proposals for military exercises with foreign powers would eventually find region-wide acceptance.

As one scholar pointed out, this would give Beijing the power to “veto” such activities.

Granted, not just China, but also some Asean countries, have their own unilateral interpretations of the rights, duties and freedom granted under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; that includes foreign military activities undertaken within the coastal states’ exclusive economic zones.

As such, little openly worded sentiment has come out of Asean, either as a bloc or individual member states, regarding freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, thus far.

Yet it would simplistic to conclude that Asean countries support or oppose such activities.

In the foreseeable future, it is difficult to envisage the association’s members, forming “coalitions of the willing” involving external powers, undertaking joint freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, as had been suggested.

However, continued military exercises with foreign powers will most likely be retained as a national prerogative. Perhaps notifying parties in advance of the activity, as per the draft code of conduct, would serve as an apt confidence-building measure; but soliciting “no objection” from any party could be a bridge too far – at least for some Asean countries, especially those which have carefully cultivated, maintained and enhanced defence and security linkages with extra-regional powers.

In this respect, the role of the United States cannot be overlooked.

While much trepidation exists among Asean capitals regarding Washington’s long-term intent and commitment to the region, including concerns over certain inconsistencies exhibited by the current administration, by and large the US military presence in Southeast Asia is welcomed and seen as a stabilising force.

Asean desires nothing less than an inclusive architecture in which regional countries and extra-regional powers can play constructive roles to promote regional peace and stability.
For decades, Asean countries have built a web of defence and security ties with the US military. Capacity-building goes beyond merely providing hardware to include a holistic slate of joint training and exercises and information-sharing, particularly in the field of maritime domain awareness.

Given that Asean littorals, including the South China Sea claimants, can be expected to continue to endure varying shortfalls in maritime security capacity, the maintenance of links with the US, and taking advantage of opportunities to learn best practices and promote interoperability through joint exercises, looks set to remain the norm.

Examples of these links include Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training, a multilateral maritime security exercise that has involved Asean member states and the US since 2002 (back then initially called Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism).

Another case is the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise series, customarily conducted bilaterally between Asean member states and the US since 1995 – pooling annual exercises dating from the cold war era.

Likewise, one could expect a similar attitude towards the involvement of other extra-regional powers such as Australia, Canada, France, India, Japan and Britain.

They bring to this region unique expertise and know-how that help build the Asean littorals’ maritime security capacities.

Not only that, their military presence in Southeast Asia is generally regarded as contributing to regional peace and stability.

Suffice it to say that the South China Sea problem is just one of many security challenges in the region: Asean member states face other, more pressing maritime security threats on a daily basis. Continuous maritime security engagement with interested major powers, including both China and the US, would serve both immediate and long-term interests in Southeast Asia.

The code of conduct process will be “long and complex”, as one Chinese official put it, before the code is finally promulgated. The draft text is, after all, a “living document”, meaning that it will be edited and updated continually.

In the meantime, Asean countries are unlikely to take chances in coping with the uncertainty. It is more plausible to envision them continuing to maintain and even enhance defence and security engagements with extra-regional powers, not the least of which is the US.

Ultimately, the basic premise stays, that Asean desires nothing less than an inclusive architecture in which regional countries and extra-regional powers can play constructive roles to promote regional peace and stability.

Nobody is about to be left out, and the thought of excluding anyone from this collective effort to safeguard the global maritime commons, is anything but constructive.

Collin Koh is research fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: New code of conduct changes little in South China Sea
__________________

As such, the current document is just ASEAN saying "Ok China, we will allow you to put that point on the preliminary draft of things we will negotiate." No more, no less.

 

[striver44]

...because it doesn't actually mean anything. Its a 'living document' to the proposal of the negotiation of the South China Sea COC. It's the first draft to the negotiation goals of the COC.

Steps in Negotiation (Generalised):

1. "Wacana / Discourse" = "Should we talk about this?", Ex: Indonesian Changing Capital City.
2. "Living Document / Draft Proposal" = "So... what exactly do we need to talk about?", Ex: Current Phase of South China Sea CoC
3. "Negotiation Plan" = "Ok, this is what we are going to talk about", Ex: Timor-Leste LNG Sharing Negotiation With Australia
4. "Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU)" = "We understand each other, nothing concrete, but we all agree that an agreement is possible and will work towards it." , Ex: Philippines, Malaysian, & Indonesian MOU for Land-based Military cooperation against terrorism.
5. "Head of Agreement" = "We have agreed on all major points, all that is left is to work out the details of fulfilling the agreement." , Ex: Current Freeport - Indonesian phase.
6. "Treaty" = "We agree to do this in the specific way as written down in the treaty."

Take note that ASEAN is known to be especially bureaucratic. So expect it to take years to even get to MOU level.

Here is an article by SCMP:
Don’t expect Beijing’s South China Sea ‘breakthrough’ to weaken US ties with Asean nations

While Chinese state media hailed a new code of a conduct in the disputed waters as a ‘rebuke for foreign meddling’, Southeast Asian states are likely to be keen to maintain long-standing ties to Washington, Collin Koh writes

COMMENTS: 14

UNITED STATES
How the US clouds China-Asean progress in South China Sea
7 Aug 2018
With last week’s “breakthrough” – the adoption of a single draft negotiating text for the code of conduct in the South China Sea – Beijing appeared to have successfully “muted” the Association of Southeast Asian Nations over the militarisation of the disputed waters by China.

The text also contains Beijing’s proposal that the parties notify each other of major military activities in the region, if necessary, and “shall not hold joint military exercises with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection”.

These points contributed by China would continue to promote speculation over the code of conduct’s strategic ramifications for the region; not just on the South China Sea spats, in the face of perceived intensification of Great Power rivalries, and, not least of all, on those occurring between China and the United States.

The boisterous Chinese state media was awash with praise for the document; one Xinhua commentary even hailed it as “a rebuke of foreign meddling”. For its part, Beijing might have regarded its latest feat as furnishing additional ammunition for its long-standing opposition against what it has always perceived as “external interference” in the South China Sea.

Beijing also could regard the draft negotiating text as a credible repudiation of the US Navy’s freedom of navigation operations in the disputed waters and as a pointed response to American military activity in the region, which China has long seen as anathema to its national security interests.

But does this so-called “rebuke” reflect a consensus between Asean and China?

Perhaps the issue is nuanced.

It should not have been missed that all along, concerned parties have agreed that the South China Sea dispute settlement would be reached by none other than the claimants themselves; even if the differences lay in whether an accord could be accomplished in a purely bilateral or multilateral setting.

If a dispute settlement takes a very long time to materialise, the onus is on every one to manage the South China Sea claims in a peaceful and stable manner. It is important to highlight that not only civilian, but also military shipping and aircraft, enjoy freedom of passage through the area.

But the South China Sea is, for all intents and purposes, an international maritime medium.

Excluding any country from these waters, including naval movements, is virtually unattainable. It is also hard to envision how China’s proposals for military exercises with foreign powers would eventually find region-wide acceptance.

As one scholar pointed out, this would give Beijing the power to “veto” such activities.

Granted, not just China, but also some Asean countries, have their own unilateral interpretations of the rights, duties and freedom granted under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; that includes foreign military activities undertaken within the coastal states’ exclusive economic zones.

As such, little openly worded sentiment has come out of Asean, either as a bloc or individual member states, regarding freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, thus far.

Yet it would simplistic to conclude that Asean countries support or oppose such activities.

In the foreseeable future, it is difficult to envisage the association’s members, forming “coalitions of the willing” involving external powers, undertaking joint freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, as had been suggested.

However, continued military exercises with foreign powers will most likely be retained as a national prerogative. Perhaps notifying parties in advance of the activity, as per the draft code of conduct, would serve as an apt confidence-building measure; but soliciting “no objection” from any party could be a bridge too far – at least for some Asean countries, especially those which have carefully cultivated, maintained and enhanced defence and security linkages with extra-regional powers.

In this respect, the role of the United States cannot be overlooked.

While much trepidation exists among Asean capitals regarding Washington’s long-term intent and commitment to the region, including concerns over certain inconsistencies exhibited by the current administration, by and large the US military presence in Southeast Asia is welcomed and seen as a stabilising force.

Asean desires nothing less than an inclusive architecture in which regional countries and extra-regional powers can play constructive roles to promote regional peace and stability.
For decades, Asean countries have built a web of defence and security ties with the US military. Capacity-building goes beyond merely providing hardware to include a holistic slate of joint training and exercises and information-sharing, particularly in the field of maritime domain awareness.

Given that Asean littorals, including the South China Sea claimants, can be expected to continue to endure varying shortfalls in maritime security capacity, the maintenance of links with the US, and taking advantage of opportunities to learn best practices and promote interoperability through joint exercises, looks set to remain the norm.

Examples of these links include Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training, a multilateral maritime security exercise that has involved Asean member states and the US since 2002 (back then initially called Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism).

Another case is the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise series, customarily conducted bilaterally between Asean member states and the US since 1995 – pooling annual exercises dating from the cold war era.

Likewise, one could expect a similar attitude towards the involvement of other extra-regional powers such as Australia, Canada, France, India, Japan and Britain.

They bring to this region unique expertise and know-how that help build the Asean littorals’ maritime security capacities.

Not only that, their military presence in Southeast Asia is generally regarded as contributing to regional peace and stability.

Suffice it to say that the South China Sea problem is just one of many security challenges in the region: Asean member states face other, more pressing maritime security threats on a daily basis. Continuous maritime security engagement with interested major powers, including both China and the US, would serve both immediate and long-term interests in Southeast Asia.

The code of conduct process will be “long and complex”, as one Chinese official put it, before the code is finally promulgated. The draft text is, after all, a “living document”, meaning that it will be edited and updated continually.

In the meantime, Asean countries are unlikely to take chances in coping with the uncertainty. It is more plausible to envision them continuing to maintain and even enhance defence and security engagements with extra-regional powers, not the least of which is the US.

Ultimately, the basic premise stays, that Asean desires nothing less than an inclusive architecture in which regional countries and extra-regional powers can play constructive roles to promote regional peace and stability.

Nobody is about to be left out, and the thought of excluding anyone from this collective effort to safeguard the global maritime commons, is anything but constructive.

Collin Koh is research fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: New code of conduct changes little in South China Sea
__________________

As such, the current document is just ASEAN saying "Ok China, we will allow you to put that point on the preliminary draft of things we will negotiate." No more, no less.

one thing I can say......one thing lead to another, we signed this agreement today, do you think the PRC gonna stop????????? we are leaving our leverage in this SCS conflict by choosing side, while we could reap benefit by being neutral duhhhhhhhhh.
China since day one has a clear objectives that is written in this agreement and that is to cement power and influence (this time by forcing ASEAN members to basically ask for permission whenever they want to conduct military exercise with ehemmmmm USA), meanwhile most ASEAN countries proposal in the agreement focused more about unimportant things such as illegal traficking,marine biology blah blah blahhhhhhhhh

 

[pr1v4t33r]

Indonesia deploys 100,000-strong force to secure Asian Games

Indonesia is deploying 100,000 police and soldiers to provide security for the 2018 Asian Games, the biggest event ever held in its terror attack prone capital Jakarta, parts of which have been dramatically spruced up as the city readies to welcome tens of thousands of athletes and visitors.

The 18th Asian Games, which run until September 2, are being held in Jakarta, Palembang on the island of Sumatra, and in West Java. About 12,000 athletes, support staff and officials and 5000 journalists are expected.

It's the second time Indonesia has hosted the games. The first in 1962 was under the country's founding president Sukarno, who wanted to showcase Indonesia and himself as a leader of nations who would thrown off colonial Western rule. This time, Indonesia, projected to be among the world's 10 biggest economies by 2030, wants to shift perceptions that it's in the too-hard basket and pave the way for an eventual tilt at even bigger sports hosting baubles.

All venues are finished and tested with only beautification work being carried out just days before Saturday's opening ceremony, said organising committee member and Sports Ministry Secretary Gatot Dewa Broto, who pronounced the facilities "extremely wonderful."

An opening ceremony involving 5000 performers is planned with a mythological theme, flying people and, indispensably in a country of dozens of active volcanoes, a mountain that erupts, albeit a "very small eruption," Dewa Broto said.

https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/i...secure-asian-games-image-20180814-p4zxf3.html

 

[mandala]

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[anas_nurhafidz]

Frogman

 

[Mr. Woof Woof]

For this design of OPV 80 meter, I got link :

https://regional.kompas.com/read/20...ekurangan-kapal-patroli-untuk-amankan-laut-ri

Bakamla Akui Kekurangan Kapal Patroli untuk Amankan Laut RI
Kamis, 31 Mei 2018 | 12:09 WIB

BATAM, KOMPAS.com - Kepala Badan Keamanan Laut (Kabakamla) RI Laksamana Madya TNI Arie Soedewo kepada Kompas.com mengaku saat in kendala terbesar dari upaya penguatan keamanan dan keselamatan laut yaitu, minimnya armada kapal patroli yang dimiliki Bakamla RI.

Padahal jika dilihat dari cakupan wilayah kerja masing-masing zona maritim, idealnya Bakamla harus memiliki 225 kapal patroli baik besar ataupun kecil, sementara kapal yang ada diantaranya enam unit kapal patroli ukuran 48 meter dan satu unit kapal markas berukuran 110 meter serta 15 unit kapal patroli ukuran kecil tipe Katamaran.

"Sekarang kami masih sistem zona jadi masih bisa tercover dengan kapal-kapal patroli instansi keamanan dan pertahanan laut lainnya. Idealnya Bakamla ini memiliki 225 kapal," kata Arie di Batam, Rabu (30/5/2018).

Jika idealnya harus 225 kapal, sambung Arie tentunya setiap tahun Bakamla sedikitnya harus mengadakan sembilan unit kapal hingga tahun 2045 mendatang. Namun karena keterbatasan anggaran, pihaknya hanya bisa mengusulkan ke pemerintah tiga unit per tahun.

"Tahun 2019 mendatang, Bakamla akan bangun tiga unit kapal 60 meter dan enam unit kapal cepat 30 meter. Kapal ini akan diperuntukan untuk zona maritim barat dua unit, Jakarta dua unit, zona tengah satu unit dan zona timur satu unit," jelasnya.

"Bahkan saat ini ada tiga unit kapal Bakamla ukuran 80 meter yang sedang dalam pembuatan di PT Citra Shipyard yang berada di Batam, dan tiga kapal ini sudah dipesan sejak akhir tahun 2017 lalu dengan nomor lambung 8001,8002 dan 8003," katanya menambahkan.

Selain itu, diakhir masa jabatannya Arie berharap agar wacana pembangunan pangkalan khusus Bakamla yang lebih presentatif dan lengkap dengan fasilitas penunjang sebagai pangkalan terpadu bisa terwujud.

"Saya berharap Bakamla memiliki pangkalan yang lengkap dengan perkantoran, Rumkitnya, mess hingga dermaga. Sehingga pasukan Bakamlah tidak lagi tersebar kemana-mana dalam satu zona dan terpusat disuatu tempat saja. Mudah-mudahan rencana pembangunannya yang akan dilakukan di Zona Timur, yakni ambon 2019 bisa terealisasi," ujarnya.

Senada diungkapkan pihak PT Citra Shipyard yang mengaku ketiga kapal pesanan Bakamla diakhir tahun 2017 masih terus digesa pembangunannya. Pembangunan sudah mencapai 60 persen dan rencananya akan diluncurkan pada bulan Oktober 2018 mendatang.

"Oktober sudah kami launching dan masafinishing sebelum diserahterimakan sekitar dua bulan lagi. Sehingga Januari 2019 sudah bisa serah terima," kata Abi, General Manajer PT Citra Shipyard.

Dalam kunjungan itu, Kabakamla didampingi oleh panesehat Kabakamla bidang Penguatan dan Antar Lembaga Toviota Bay, Staf Khusus Bidang Operasi Laksda (Purn) Herry Setinegara, Staf Khusus Bidang Logistik Laksda TNI (Purn) Hari Pratomo.

Kemudian Deputi Kebijakan dan Strategi Irjen Pol Arifin, Deputii Informasi Hukum Kerja Sama Irjen Pol Abdul Gofur serta Kepala Unit Penindakan Hukum Brigjen Pol Frederik Kalalembang dan tim Bakamla lainnya.

Penulis: Kontributor Batam, Hadi Maulana
Editor: Aprillia Ika

Summary :

2019 Indonesian Coast Guard plan to build 3 unit of 60 meter patrol ships + 6 unit of 30 meter patrol boats.

Since end of 2017 there are 3 unit of 80 meter local OPVs has been build, hopefully will be launched on October 2018 and will be delivered to Indonesian Coast Guard January 2019. Hull number 8001, 8002, 8003.

 

[anas_nurhafidz]

Carat 2018

 

[Svantana]

View attachment 492107

For this design of OPV 80 meter, I got link :

https://regional.kompas.com/read/20...ekurangan-kapal-patroli-untuk-amankan-laut-ri

Bakamla Akui Kekurangan Kapal Patroli untuk Amankan Laut RI
Kamis, 31 Mei 2018 | 12:09 WIB

BATAM, KOMPAS.com - Kepala Badan Keamanan Laut (Kabakamla) RI Laksamana Madya TNI Arie Soedewo kepada Kompas.com mengaku saat in kendala terbesar dari upaya penguatan keamanan dan keselamatan laut yaitu, minimnya armada kapal patroli yang dimiliki Bakamla RI.

Padahal jika dilihat dari cakupan wilayah kerja masing-masing zona maritim, idealnya Bakamla harus memiliki 225 kapal patroli baik besar ataupun kecil, sementara kapal yang ada diantaranya enam unit kapal patroli ukuran 48 meter dan satu unit kapal markas berukuran 110 meter serta 15 unit kapal patroli ukuran kecil tipe Katamaran.

"Sekarang kami masih sistem zona jadi masih bisa tercover dengan kapal-kapal patroli instansi keamanan dan pertahanan laut lainnya. Idealnya Bakamla ini memiliki 225 kapal," kata Arie di Batam, Rabu (30/5/2018).

Jika idealnya harus 225 kapal, sambung Arie tentunya setiap tahun Bakamla sedikitnya harus mengadakan sembilan unit kapal hingga tahun 2045 mendatang. Namun karena keterbatasan anggaran, pihaknya hanya bisa mengusulkan ke pemerintah tiga unit per tahun.

"Tahun 2019 mendatang, Bakamla akan bangun tiga unit kapal 60 meter dan enam unit kapal cepat 30 meter. Kapal ini akan diperuntukan untuk zona maritim barat dua unit, Jakarta dua unit, zona tengah satu unit dan zona timur satu unit," jelasnya.

"Bahkan saat ini ada tiga unit kapal Bakamla ukuran 80 meter yang sedang dalam pembuatan di PT Citra Shipyard yang berada di Batam, dan tiga kapal ini sudah dipesan sejak akhir tahun 2017 lalu dengan nomor lambung 8001,8002 dan 8003," katanya menambahkan.

Selain itu, diakhir masa jabatannya Arie berharap agar wacana pembangunan pangkalan khusus Bakamla yang lebih presentatif dan lengkap dengan fasilitas penunjang sebagai pangkalan terpadu bisa terwujud.

"Saya berharap Bakamla memiliki pangkalan yang lengkap dengan perkantoran, Rumkitnya, mess hingga dermaga. Sehingga pasukan Bakamlah tidak lagi tersebar kemana-mana dalam satu zona dan terpusat disuatu tempat saja. Mudah-mudahan rencana pembangunannya yang akan dilakukan di Zona Timur, yakni ambon 2019 bisa terealisasi," ujarnya.

Senada diungkapkan pihak PT Citra Shipyard yang mengaku ketiga kapal pesanan Bakamla diakhir tahun 2017 masih terus digesa pembangunannya. Pembangunan sudah mencapai 60 persen dan rencananya akan diluncurkan pada bulan Oktober 2018 mendatang.

"Oktober sudah kami launching dan masafinishing sebelum diserahterimakan sekitar dua bulan lagi. Sehingga Januari 2019 sudah bisa serah terima," kata Abi, General Manajer PT Citra Shipyard.

Dalam kunjungan itu, Kabakamla didampingi oleh panesehat Kabakamla bidang Penguatan dan Antar Lembaga Toviota Bay, Staf Khusus Bidang Operasi Laksda (Purn) Herry Setinegara, Staf Khusus Bidang Logistik Laksda TNI (Purn) Hari Pratomo.

Kemudian Deputi Kebijakan dan Strategi Irjen Pol Arifin, Deputii Informasi Hukum Kerja Sama Irjen Pol Abdul Gofur serta Kepala Unit Penindakan Hukum Brigjen Pol Frederik Kalalembang dan tim Bakamla lainnya.

Penulis: Kontributor Batam, Hadi Maulana
Editor: Aprillia Ika

Summary :

2019 Indonesian Coast Guard plan to build 3 unit of 60 meter patrol ships + 6 unit of 30 meter patrol boats.

Since end of 2017 there are 3 unit of 80 meter local OPVs has been build, hopefully will be launched on October 2018 and will be delivered to Indonesian Coast Guard January 2019. Hull number 8001, 8002, 8003.

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http://batamtoday.com/home/read/114685/PT-Citra-Shipyard-Wujudkan-Kepri-Unggul-di-Bidang-Maritim