SEA DEFENCE REVIEW
SEA States: Mal-Indo Forces
Timothy Soh
This is a brief overview and comparison of the armed forces of both Indonesia and Malaysia. The piece here discusses only the military aspect and will avoid the political dimensions.
The prior decades
In the decades prior, Malaysia and Indonesia had strategic partners from the Cold War. For Indonesia, the Soviet Union saw an interest in maintaining a discreet friendship with the Indonesians despite their ‘Communist Purges’ in the 60’s and 70’s. This low profile relations would survive the Suharto era and prosper again with Gorbachev until today. The USSR, and later Russia, are one of the main military aid suppliers to Indonesia.
[1][2][3] The last two decades saw Indonesia rekindle ties with the US and Australia as attention on global politics pivot to this region.
[4][5][6] The highly secretive counter-terrorist outfit Densus 88 was trained by both the US and Australia.
[7]
Malaysia has, for decades, been friendly with the western hemisphere. To this day, multi-national missions still fly out of Malaysian bases as part of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements.
[8][9][10][11] Several Malaysian regiments also kept ties with their UK counterparts.
[12][13] Suffice to say, their military equipment were similarly inspired.
[14][15] Shifting political conditions (including a spat with Washington over Iraq) pressured Malaysia to tread carefully when managing ties between the West and China. Facing the need to modernise her air force which then lagged behind Singapore, Malaysia acquired Mig-29s cheaply from a new born Russia although she would come to regret the acquisition due to maintenance difficulties.
[16][17] Her further acquisitions include other Russian jets, Chinese ships, Polish tanks, Japanese planes etc.
[18][19][20]
It is important to note that all military forces in this part of South East Asia are maintained at a level which is enough to deal with neighbouring threats or sometimes even under that level because chance of a conflict between the countries here are limited. During the reign of Suharto, the Indonesian military maintained a minimal existence but nevertheless the army remained massive for the substantial amount of territory it has to protect (Indonesia has one of the largest airborne forces in the world).
Modernisation
Malaysia embarked on modernisation of their armed forces earlier than the Indonesians did. However, Indonesia is vastly richer. Indonesia’s defence spending peaked in 2016 at US$ 7.78Bn (0.87613% of GDP) while Malaysia's defence budget for 2016 was US$ 4Bn.
[21][22][23] Indonesia’s GDP for 2017 is estimated to exceed US$1Tn, coupled with lower cost of living they are getting a lot of value out of the budget.
[24]President Jokowi promised to raise defence expenditure to 1.5% of GDP should the economic growth continue on its 7% path.
[25]
Indonesia has a much larger territory to protect
Although both countries have redirected their military’s focus towards securing their South China Sea flank, the modernisation of both armed forces progress on a markedly different direction (as of 2017).
[26]
The Indonesians invested heavily on modern vehicles. They also cooperated with foreign weapon developers to develop weapon platforms for their needs. One such collaboration with FNSS of Turkey was to develop the KAPLAN series of armoured vehicles including a medium tank. Indonesia is also collaborating with the South Koreans to develop the IF-X stealth jet that will give the Indonesians a decisive edge in the region.
[27] Acquisition of new ships aim to ferry troops while providing a defensive umbrella for the naval troop carriers.
Kaplan family of tracked vehicles
Artist impression of the IF-X
The deluge of new equipment types introduced into Indonesian service is staggering. Were it not for their uniforms, you would not realise it is still the same Indonesian armed forces. The jump forward in 10 years was that big!
[28]
The Malaysians took a different approach. Their ground defence improvement revolves around their mechanised and motorised infantry units. Like Singapore, they invested in networking their troops with an advanced armoured vehicle as the nexus. With a modest budget, the Malaysians are careful with how they spend on modernisation.
Unlike the Indonesians, the Malaysians already have a functioning network centric warfare systems for the army. The armed forces is currently undergoing Phase 1 Bravo integration (2017–2020), with 2035 slated as the completion of the final Phase 4.
[29] In the area of network centric warfare for the army, Indonesia lags behind.
But Indonesia is no a frog in the well. Her modernisation of the navy with the Combat Management System allows her spread of networked equipped ships and sensors to share combat information of encroaching threats.
[30] [31] Airbus Space and Defense is now the provider of satcomms for Indonesia’s air combat, surveillance, and naval defence network.
[32]
Future Soldier System of the Royal Malaysian Armed Forces
A new breed of long range surveillance radar in service with the Indonesians are a key component of their integrated defence network.
Ground Force
The Malaysians earned a good reputation amongst UN Peace Keepers as professional and courageous fighters. They honed their operational edge and kept it current but this does not represent the entire force.
For a long time, the Indonesian military was focused on island defences and force projection over water bodies. Indonesia has 17,504 islands over 1,919,440 sq/km.
[33][34]Securing this vast territory is a herculean task. This requirement led the Indonesians to develop a ground force that specialises in projecting their power over water bodies with a large Marine Corps.
[35] While the airborne infantry corps (KOPASSUS), and KOSTRAD strategic reserve, serve as a quick reaction force to deal with any trouble pinned in place by the territorial army.
[36][37]
Natuna, as part of the Riau Islands, is a strategic location that is capable of choking the straits or defending it. Many new assets acquired by the Indonesian ground force were relocated to Natuna in a hurry.
[38][39]
NASAMS air defence systems fire the SLAMRAAM, a very accurate anti-aircraft missile based on the AIM-120 AMRAAM.[40] In July 2017, Indonesia acquired this potent medium ranged air defence system.[41]
By asset and numbers, the Malaysian army is smaller than the Indonesians. The Indonesians may have many newer vehicles but the Malaysians have fully integrated their relatively new heavy tank force whereas the Indonesians have yet to accomplish that. This is by virtue of the longer time the Malaysians have had ownership of their heavy tanks.
Indonesia’s pursuit of helicopter gunships underscores their understanding of the evolving conditions and future challenges they face. In accordance with their policy of diversification, they picked the American made AH-64E Apache, Russian made Mi-35 Hind.
[42][43] In addition, the army acquired the AS500 Fennec and H225M Cougar helicopters for ground support and ferrying of troops.
[44] This deluge of new equipment pads the army’s aviation component as the army is set to battle more piracy and insurgency in the coming years.
[45]
By comparison, the Malaysian Army aviation component is modest.
[46] This can be explained by the army’s doctrine of relying on the Air Force for heli-transport rather than having the army create a lifting wing and attending logistics.
[47] In the near future, a reorganisation might see army aviation have their own heli-transport.
Both Indonesia and Malaysia have experienced baptism under fire in Low Intensity Conflicts. Like the recent Marawi Siege in Southern Philippines, both Indo-Mal have faced their own insurgency battles. In 2013, the Malaysian military successfully defeated insurgents in the Lahad Datu siege, a siege not unlike Marawi but it covered a larger area.
[48] Indonesia also experienced insurgencies which the elite and highly secretive Detachment 88 Police Counter-Terrorist group dealt with in short time. Unfortunately, there are scant details on their operations.
[49]
Air Force
If there are areas where the Malaysians have an edge over the Indonesians, it would be their Air Force and navy. However, any lead in superiority enjoyed by the Malaysians is fast coming to an end as Indonesia will close the gap between them by 2024. There were signs that Indonesia lacked confidence in South Korea’s ability to develop a highly complex stealth fighter when they stopped paying their share of development fund for the KF-X project.
[50] But this might be a result of shifting priorities as the Indonesian military focuses on the immediate gap in their naval capabilities. The Indonesian military may also face budgetary constraints for new jets as they relocate huge sums for revamping the much neglected mechanised component of the army (they still operate the original AMX-13/75 in 2017).
The Malaysian air force currently operate top tier jets from both East and West. Up until 2014, the Royal Malaysian Air Force was numerically and technologically superior. In the near future, both countries will attain force parity.
[51][52]
From the late 90’s to the mid 2000’s, the Indonesian Air Force was in really bad shape due to American and European arms embargoes.
[53][54] This grounded almost all of their F-16, F-5, C-130, and BAe Hawk fleet while their Russian made Su-27 were only demonstration models without the avionics nor armaments to carry out interceptions.
[55]This bitter experience taught Indonesia the importance of self-sufficiency and having diversified suppliers.
[56]
Both Indonesia and Malaysia have signed for Russia’s premier multi-role jets. The former SU-35, and the latter SU-30MKM. Both aircraft are nearly identical to each other with some differences specific to their air defence doctrine.
[57]
However, many nations operating Russian jets often have problems with long downtime and short operational availability compared to the more costly American or European jets.
[58][59][60]
The Su-30MKM sports a powerful radar. The radar is so heavy they needed to add forward canards to support its weight while flying. The Su-35 has a lighter radar but a larger fuel tank to patrol Indonesia’s large airspace.
Navy
From the 1960’s to 2000’s, Indonesia owned 1 cruiser, 11 destroyers, 15 frigates, 8 corvettes, 12 submarines, 14 ASW ships, and other support vessels.
[61] During the same period, the Malaysian navy owned 2 frigates, 4 corvettes, 8 MGBs, and other support vessels.
[62] On paper, the Indonesian navy was bigger and more threatening.
Unfortunately, this could not be further from the truth. While Indonesia may have a large fleet of gunboats to patrol the long shorelines, most of her warships were non-functioning due to neglect. Many of her warships sat in dock because they were not sea worthy.
[63] Even acquisitions of newer second hand German ships were costly to refurbish, stripping the navy of her operating funds, forcing her to keep even functioning ships in dock to reduce operating cost.
For decades, the Indonesian navy’s priorities were to provide security for the waters around her islands, and to aid the ground force in their force projection across water bodies that separate her many islands. Accordingly, her naval assets reflected that.
[64]
SIGMA class frigates. Multi-mission frigates are the centre piece in Indonesia’s naval projection strategy.
In 2008, the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, enacted a directive of operating a Minimum Essential Force of around 300 ships of various classes and at least 12 submarines, “a force level that can guarantee the attainment of immediate strategic defense interests”. As it stands, the Indonesia is making acquisitions of big ticket purchases but she still struggle to meet the 2024 deadline.
[65] To this end, the navy proposed a more realistic recalibration of their MEF requirements.
[66]
The Malaysian navy, although smaller in numbers, maintained their fleet in good order. Like many modern navies around the world, Malaysia made the move to acquire multi-mission capable platforms like the French Gowind class Littoral Combat Ship.
[67][68] The navy plans to reduce her 15 classes of ships to just 5 classes, with greater number of hulls per class.
[69] It is widely believed that Malaysia’s decision to purchase Chinese hulls for their LMS class was a move to appease China in a game to juggle relations between the East and the West.
Tensions and territorial intrusions in the South China Sea forced both Indo-Mal to spend more on their naval forces to increase their staying power in protracted naval battles. Indonesia’s future naval acquisitions aim to develop the means to project to and protect the highly strategic Natuna and Riau islands chains. Reinforcing the Natuna islands is part of Indonesia’s strategy to turn Natuna into a defensive bastion.
[70][71]
Both navies regularly combat pirates in the Straits of Malacca. Due to the world’s trade lifeline flowing through their waters, both navies are forced to split their precious funds between acquiring anti-piracy assets and modern warships for defence.
Cyber Warfare
As a bonus worth mentioning. Malaysia’s long investment in cyber warfare and defence capabilities have paid off. They are acknowledged as one of the best, if not the best, in the region.
[72]
Not one to rest on their laurels, they plan to grow exponentially.
[73]
An Added Dimension
The last few years has seen an added dimension to security threats. Domestic terrorism with foreign funding. In the past domestic terrorism were grass roots level movements but today they are capable of launching distant attacks on capitals.
[74]
Defence spending is further siphoned away from traditional defence systems towards developing defensive systems against future terror attacks. Indonesia’s newly acquired networked C-RAM system protects their capital, but Malaysia for the moment remains vulnerable and have no plans to acquire anything similar for their capital.
Oerlikon Skyshield 35mm C-RAM within the integrated C4I network. Indonesia installed these systems to protect the capital from rocket and other aerial attacks.
Conclusion
It has been apparent to observers that Indonesia has a history of making haphazard purchases. Indonesia’s military procurement strategies seem to be emotionally driven; Indonesia wants to be seen to be keeping up militarily with neighbouring countries.
This article critiques the TNI for its habit of purchasing assets without a clear concept of its capability development.
While Indonesia needs to sort out her modernisation plans, Malaysia’s own modernisation effort gets hamstrung by a weak economy. The challenge for the armed services has thus been how to generate greater efficiency savings to bolster the country’s defences and address these threats even amid this difficult economic position.
[75]
Now, there is a truism that applies to both Indonesia and Malaysia.
Buying weapon systems do not necessarily correlate to increased capabilities, especially if these are sourced from different nations—this is especially true for the way Indonesia does acquisitions. Arguing that asset acquisition should be diversified due to concerns over embargoes, or for any other reason, comes with an associated risk of platform incompatibility and ineffectiveness. For this reason, Indonesia is still a long way off modernising the TNI, even after the MEF is achieved.
However the key to modernisation effectiveness is not the amount of funds invested nor equipment acquired. The key to effectiveness is the successful integration of these assets into the armed forces, often a tedious task. Therein lies the real challenge for both Indonesia and Malaysia.
Footnotes
