India's Nuclear Agreement

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

finally seems like china is making it's stand clear, it is against the deal

I disagree with that interpretation of the Chinese position. I don't think their main concern is about India securing uranium supplies or civilian nuclear technology, but rather being able to increase the restrictions on India (in terms of testing etc, that the Swiss and others have raised), so long as they are not seen as the 'villain' and cause for the collapse of the agreement.

So in that sense they are probably for the deal, and will most likely go along, even if the conditions mentioned by the Swiss and others are not included, and there is a consensus over such an approach.

Their current ambivalent and diplomatic approach could be seen by either side (for and against more restrictions) as 'supportive', and is perhaps intended to be so, in that the members demanding more restrictions may feel they have China's support and therefore perhaps stick to their demands. On the other hand, China comes across as a constructive Global partner ready to engage, by India and those in favor of the NSG draft in its current form.

 

[sunny_aus]

Time has come when whole world including US, China, India would get united to fight with the challenges human being is facing. Terrorism, Climate Change etc have made a question on the survival of the world. If India and China has more than 5000 years of civilization then United States, home of migrants of all the continents, is equipped with modern technology. An understanding among these countries can not only help to save the world but also they all can work together to improve living standards of 3rd world countries.

we are in 21st century. we don’t have enough space for any type of conflicts. The Indo-US nuclear deal will establish a type of understanding in the whole world which will finally give a direction for progress and developments. "Time" never back and if we loose "The Time" right now, we will find a world where problems like Terrorism and Climate Change will have taken that type of shape that it will be hard for us to back again in "The Present". If we lose The Present, we will become Past.

Bush, Condoleezza to pitch for deal as uncertainty looms over NSG nod


New Delhi, Sept 01: In the biggest push that the Indo-US civil nuclear deal could receive for clearance at Nuclear Suppliers Group, US President George W Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will call up the top leadership of countries opposed to NSG waiver for India.

Sources have revealed that US has asked PM Manmohan Singh to follow suit and call up leaders of dissenting NSG member countries like New Zealand and Ireland for the final push.

Ahead of the August meeting too, Bush had written letters to various NSG member-countries seeking their support.

The US has also deputed its senior officials to various NSG member-countries to persuade them to support the waiver.

American Ambassador to India David Mulford also held meetings last week with envoys of the countries having reservations to the initiative to bring them around.

Differences on revised draft

Just three days before the crucial NSG meet on India-US civil nuclear deal, some NSG member countries are reportedly unhappy with the revised draft for granting a waiver to India. The draft, amended by the US after demands by some NSG countries, has been approved by India which found the document being in consonance with its objectives of "unconditional" waiver.

Care had been taken to ensure that the substance of the draft did not exceed the parameters outlined by India, particularly on nuclear testing and enrichment and reprocessing issues, sources said.

On examining the revised draft at the highest level, the government has found the document satisfactory after which it gave a go-ahead to its circulation. Consequently, the US gave the draft to Germany, the current Chair of the NSG, which in turn circulated it among NSG members for studying.

The NSG members have five days to study the draft before the September 4-5 meeting to consider whether or not to allow India to resume civil nuclear trade with the international community.

A few countries are said to be still not satisfied with the draft, suggesting that the amendments carried out in it were only cosmetic and not as per their demands.

New Zealand and Austria are said to be among the NSG members who believe that the draft should address their concerns with regard to non-proliferation issues considering that India has a strategic nuclear programme despite not being a signatory to the NPT.

New Delhi believes that the changes made in the draft should address the concerns the skeptic countries have.

In a television interview M.K. Narayanan, the National Security Adviser expressed confidence that NSG countries will approve clean waiver for India in its next meeting at Vienna which is schedule to begin on September 4.

"The United States, Russia, France and Britain have worked hard in this direction," said Narayanan, and added, "India has already flagged off its concerns and most of the countries of the NSG are recognizing the validity of these concerns."

China not on board?

Meanwhile Monday's People's Daily, the ruling Chinese Communist Party's official paper gave a dissenting view on the nuclear deal.

The Chinese newspaper has called the nuclear agreement between India and the United States a "major blow" to non-proliferation. It reads: "Whether it is motivated by geopolitical considerations or commercial interests, the US-India nuclear agreement has constituted a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime."

Officially, China has not stated that it opposes the nuclear deal.

Zee News - NSG India US nuclear news

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Merging threads and changing Title to "India's Nuclear Agreement".

Please post all relevant information here please, instead of new threads.

 

[su-47]

I disagree with that interpretation of the Chinese position. I don't think their main concern is about India securing uranium supplies or civilian nuclear technology, but rather being able to increase the restrictions on India (in terms of testing etc, that the Swiss and others have raised), so long as they are not seen as the 'villain' and cause for the collapse of the agreement.

So in that sense they are probably for the deal, and will most likely go along, even if the conditions mentioned by the Swiss and others are not included, and there is a consensus over such an approach.

Their current ambivalent and diplomatic approach could be seen by either side (for and against more restrictions) as 'supportive', and is perhaps intended to be so, in that the members demanding more restrictions may feel they have China's support and therefore perhaps stick to their demands. On the other hand, China comes across as a constructive Global partner ready to engage, by India and those in favor of the NSG draft in its current form.

The Chinese are in a tricky position. They want good relations with India. At the same time, they are wary of India's military strength increasing, and of India's ties with USA growing stronger, since they dont want USA using India to contain China. The nuke deal serves both these purposes.

I think the Chinese are more wary of the growing Indo-US ties than the deal itself, since the nuclear deal does not significantly alter India's nuclear capabilities, and besides, Beijing and New Delhi both know that a conventional conflict, let alone a nuclear conflict, between India and China is almost non-existent.

However, China doesnt want to outright oppose the deal, since that would jeopardise the good relations build with India in the past few years.

The best thing for China would be if the deal falls apart on its own, without Chinese interference. That way, it'll be a blow for Indo-US relations, but Sino-Indian relations will be intact.

 

[Neo]

The best thing for China would be if the deal falls apart on its own, without Chinese interference. That way, it'll be a blow for Indo-US relations, but Sino-Indian relations will be intact.

This is likely to happen as both India won't bow to NSG's demand to include Hyde Act mechanism into the waiver. Both US and India seem to have miscalculated the sentiment of NSG members.

 

[EagleEyes]

US will block N-fuel in case of N-test

The Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Berman has released State Department's answers to 45 questions on the deal which indicate clearly differing perceptions on key issues between New Delhi and Washington.

Washington: In curiously timed disclosures, the US has made it clear that its assurances of nuclear fuel supplies to India are not meant to "insulate" it against the consequences of a nuclear test.

A day ahead of the meeting of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in Vienna, where the fate of the controversial Indo-US nuclear deal is expected to be decided, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Berman has released State Department's answers to 45 questions on the deal which indicate clearly differing perceptions on key issues between New Delhi and Washington.

The questions were submitted to the State Department by Berman's predecessor Tom Lantos way back in October last year and anwsers were sent on January 16 this year. For nine months, these documents were kept under wraps and have been made public just before the Vienna meeting.

The answers were considered "so sensitive, particularly because the debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the State Department requested they remain secret even though they were not classified," according to Washington Post which quoted a Spokesman for Berman as saying he had made the answers public because the US Congress must have "relevant information."

Berman recently wrote a letter to the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in which he threatened that the deal will be blocked in the US Congress if the Bush Administration does not incorporate additional conditionalties in any NSG waiver to India.

In its responses, the State Department has said that as outlined in the 123 Agreement, should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with it immediately, including the supply of fuel. It also stipulates that US can request India to return items transferred from it including fresh fuel. In addition, the US has the right to terminate the agreement on one year's written notice.

The State Department letter says the US assurances are intended to guard against disruptions of fuel supply to India that might occur through no fault of its own. It cited instances like a trade war resulting in the cut off supply, market disruptions or the failure of a company to fulfill a fuel supply contract.

In such circumstances, the US would be prepared to encourage transfers of nuclear fuel to India by other NSG members.

"The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments," the State Department said.

The State Department also took the line that ceasing nuclear cooperation with India would be a "serious step."

"The US would not take such a serious step without careful consideration of the circumstances necessitating such actions and the effects and impacts it would entail," it said.

Such circumstances would include detonation of a nuclear weapon, violation of the 123 Agreement or termination, abrogation or violation of the IAEA safeguards. The State Department contended that although the Hyde Act allows for transfers of sensitive nuclear

technology under certain circumstances, it was not the intention of the Administration to do this "outside" the deal.

It insisted that there was no plan or intention to negotiate an amendment to the proposed agreement to transfer to India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical components of such facilities.

The Department was asked whether US would limit any transfer of dual use technology to India's enrichment and reprocessing facilities to those that were participants in a bilateral or multinational programme to develop proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies.

In its response, the Administration said it was not its intention to assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items "whether under the agreement or outside the agreement."

If India were to develop such facilities, potential dual-use transfers could be considered only under the exceptions granted in the Hyde Act, it said.

It said the US has not discussed in detail with India what form "appropriate verification measures" might take if the IAEA decides that it was no longer possible for it to apply safeguards under the Indo-US agreement.

US will block N-fuel in case of N-test - International News ? News ? MSN India - News

 

[Neo]

The deal is dead!

 

[EagleEyes]

I thought it would be passed in September?

 

[Neo]

Webby, its clear that US is under pressure from other NSG members to include Hyde Act mechanism into the waiver, something India will never accept.

Obviously India overestimated USA in this case.

 

[nitesh]

count down begins, but chances look bleak

Will NSG finally seal N-deal in India's favour?-India-The Times of India

Will NSG finally seal N-deal in India's favour?
4 Sep 2008, 0934 hrs IST,Times Now

NEW DELHI: The fate of the Indo-US nuclear deal will be sealed today, at the all important Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting at Vienna.

Ahead of the crucial meeting TV channel TIMES NOW has accessed the revised India specific waiver draft, which maintains that, India has voluntarily committed itself to continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and its readiness to work with others towards the conclusion of a Multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off treaty.

This essentially means, India will refrain from testing nuclear missiles and committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India's nuclear facilities.

India is also deciding to separate civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and to file a declaration with the IAEA in accordance to the separation plan.

The draft also highlights India refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit them.

It also focuses on harmonising its export and control the list of guidelines with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and committing to adhere to the NSG guidelines.

However, what seem like specific waivers for India also lists that the governments can transfer nuclear technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA safeguard civil nuclear facilities satisfying clauses.

The participating government may transfer nuclear related dual use of equipment materials, software and related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for the use in civilian nuclear facilities, under the IAEA safeguards provided transfer satisfies clauses.

Although those opposing the N-deal will continue to maintain that the changes in the NSG Draft are cosmetic, the revised India-specific waiver draft, which will be considered by Nuclear Suppliers Group today makes it incumbent on the grouping's head to hold regular consultations over New Delhi's adherence to its guidelines on global atomic trade.

The draft, which has been changed after demands by a number of NSG countries to address non-proliferation concerns, falls short of the demand made by some NSG countries. The demands made are for periodic review of India's adherence to the grouping's guidelines as a condition for granting the waiver, which has been opposed by New Delhi. A final decision on these concerns will be taken today.

 

[dr.umer]

In Secret Letter, Tough U.S. Line on India Nuclear Deal​

Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 3, 2008

The United States will not sell sensitive nuclear technologies to India and would immediately terminate nuclear trade if New Delhi conducted a nuclear test, the Bush administration told Congress in correspondence that has remained secret for nine months.

The correspondence, which also appears to contradict statements by Indian officials, was made public yesterday by Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, just days before the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group meets again in Vienna to consider exempting India from restrictions on nuclear trade as part of a landmark U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.

The NSG, which governs trade in reactors and uranium, poses a key hurdle for the U.S-India pact. The group operates by consensus, allowing even small nations to block or significantly amend any agreement. The United States has pressed the NSG to impose few conditions on India, even though it has tested nuclear weapons and has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A significant group of nations balked at the proposal when the NSG first discussed it two weeks ago. Berman's release of the correspondence could make approval even more difficult because it demonstrates that U.S. conditions for nuclear trade with India are tougher than what the United States is requesting from the NSG on India's behalf.

About 20 nations offered more than 50 amendments to the U.S.-proposed draft text, focusing on terminating trade if India resumes testing and bans on the transfer of sensitive technologies.

The correspondence released by Berman is "going to reinforce the views of many states," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, which opposes the U.S.-India agreement. "There is no reason why this should not be an NSG-wide policy."

The correspondence concerned 45 highly technical questions that members of Congress posed about the deal. In 2006, Congress passed a law, known as the Hyde Act, to provisionally accept the agreement. But some lawmakers raised concerns about whether a separate implementing agreement negotiated by the administration papered over critical details to assuage Indian concerns. The questions were addressed in a 26-page letter sent to Berman's predecessor, the late Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.), on Jan. 16.

The answers were considered so sensitive, particularly because debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, that the State Department requested they remain secret even though they were not classified.

Lynne Weil, a spokeswoman for Berman, said he made the answers public yesterday because, if NSG approval is granted, the U.S-India deal soon would be submitted to Congress for final approval and "he wants to assure that Congress has the relevant information."

In India, Singh and his aides have insisted that the deal would not constrain the country's right to nuclear tests and would provide an uninterrupted supply of fuel to India's nuclear reactors. In August 2007, Singh told Parliament, "The agreement does not in any way affect India's right to undertake future nuclear tests, if it is necessary."

The State Department's letter to Lantos gives a different story. It says the United States would help India deal only with "disruptions in supply to India that may result through no fault of its own," such as a trade war or market disruptions. "The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of nonproliferation commitments," the letter said.

The letter makes clear that terminating cooperation could be immediate and was within U.S. discretion, and that the supply assurances made by the United States are not legally binding but simply a commitment made by President Bush.

The letter also stated that the "U.S. government will not assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies," even though the Hyde Act allowed transfers of such technology under certain circumstances. The U.S. government had no plans to seek to amend the deal to allow sensitive transfers, the letter said.

The administration is eager for NSG approval this week because there is a narrow window for final congressional action before lawmakers adjourn this month, although many of them say the prospects for quick action remain dim.

Reflecting the importance of the U.S.-India deal to Bush's foreign policy legacy, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is dispatching two top officials -- William J. Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, and John Rood, acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security -- to the NSG session.

Concerns about the deal have been raised by a group of mostly smaller states, led by Ireland and New Zealand. But this week China also publicly urged caution, saying in a foreign ministry statement that the NSG must "strike a balance between nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of energy."

 

[nitesh]

'We have right to test, US has right to react'-India-The Times of India



'We have right to test, US has right to react'
4 Sep 2008, 0126 hrs IST,TNN


NEW DELHI: When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told a meeting of the Congress Working Committee convened to discuss the India-US nuclear deal that “we have the right to test, US has the right to react”, he was being factually careful and correct.

But in explaining the deal, the PM was perhaps providing only the bare bones of a complex web of commitments that India and the US will be bound with once the 123 pact is passed into law. These include some hard-headed US assertions which can be politically unpalatable.

Government spokespersons have pointed to article 5(6) clause IV which talks of US and India jointly convening a group of “friendly supplier countries” to pursue such measures that restore fuel supplies in case of a disruption. The clause is seen as a guarantee against a Tarapur-type situation occurring in the future.

The US state department’s response to House foreign affairs committee, revealed by the panel on September 2, makes its clear that the disruptions include only those due to “no fault of India”. These would mean a trade war, market upheaval and failure to honour a contract. But what it does not include is the eventuality of India testing a nuclear device.

“US has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with India immediately, including fuel supply, as well as to request right to return of any items transferred from the US, including fresh fuel,” the letter notes, making it evident that it was only due to Indian sensitivities that the word “testing” was not in the 123 agreement.

As US spokespersons have repeatedly asserted, testing will endanger the nuclear deal. The letter leaves little room for doubt by noting, “We believe the Indian government shares our understanding of this provision.”

The rather simplistic view that Hyde Act is the concern of US and does not bind India also take a blow in the light of the Bush administration’s assertions that “we think the 123 pact is in full conformity with the Hyde Act”. It notes that Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher has previously made clear that the deal was fully consistent with the legal requirements of the Act.

The Hyde Act has prescriptive conditions on testing which are not easy for India to accept at this stage, particularly when the government has argued its capacity to carry out a nuclear explosion was not being curbed in any way.

On dual use technology, the state department has said, “...as a framework agreement it does not compel any such transfers, and as a matter of policy the US does not transfer dual-use items in sensitive nuclear facilities.”

Now, US does not transfer reprocessing and enrichment technologies and related dual use items to even its NATO allies and it has clarified that there is a reference in the 123 pact which states that transfers will be “subject to their respective applicable laws, regulations and licence policies”.

On the safeguards that will apply to Indian civilian facilities, the reply makes it evident that these would not cease if the cooperation were to end. “...safeguards in some form — IAEA or other — must always be maintained with respect to all nuclear items in India subject to the agreement.”

 

[BanglaBhoot]

US makes mockery of PM's claims

Shobori Ganguli | New Delhi

Manmohan knew American conditions but misled nation

The Bush Administration's well-kept secret of nine months is now in the public domain, reflecting how successfully President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh managed to hoodwink the Indian public into believing the India-US nuclear agreement was a dream deal.

Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard L Berman on Tuesday released a 26-page letter written by the Bush Administration in January 2008 that clearly establishes the fact that the US will not sell sensitive nuclear technologies to India and would instantly terminate nuclear trade if India lifted its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. Contrary to Singh's statements in Parliament, the letter also clarifies that while fuel supplies are not pledged in perpetuity, India has agreed that "safeguards can and should be regarded as being 'in perpetuity'."

The most damaging part of the letter, however, is the fact that it categorically states the Indian Government has all along been aware of these conditions attached to the deal. "This letter contains no new conditions and there is no data in this letter which has not already been shared in an open and transparent way with members of the Congress and with the Government of India," US Ambassador David C Mulford said. Many portions of the letter, however, fly in the face of Singh's assurances to Parliament.

Berman's disclosure comes at a time when India is desperately seeking the Nuclear Suppliers' Group's assent for a "clean and unconditional" waiver. The letter makes it apparent that the US has already placed the most stringent of conditions on India.

Reacting to the news, the Ministry of External Affairs said, "We do not as a matter of policy, comment on internal correspondence between different branches of another Government." Unwilling to be drawn into the issue of the US pulling out of the deal in case India tests a weapon, the Ministry said, "We have a unilateral moratorium on testing. This is reflected in the India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005."

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assertion in Parliament last August that "detailed fuel supply assurances" by the US for "the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors" are "reflected in full" in the 123 Agreement has been blatantly countered by the Bush Administration in the letter. It has said that the US will render help only in situations where "disruptions in supply to India...result through no fault of its own," such as a trade war or market disruptions. For the rest, it says, "The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments."

In effect, while ostensibly urging the NSG to impose fewer conditions on India, the Bush Administration has unilaterally walked away from some key assurances that Singh said the 123 Agreement carried.

The Prime Minister had told Parliament that the Agreement envisages, "in consonance with the Separation Plan, US support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime of India's reactors." But the letter to the House Committee makes it evident that India will not be allowed to build such stocks that can undercut US leverage on imposing sanctions on India.

Clearly, the letter was kept a secret all these months because Manmohan Singh was already finding the deal too hot to handle in the domestic arena. However, the letter has now been made public because, if the NSG approval is granted, the US-India deal would be submitted to the Congress for final approval and "he (Berman) wants to assure that Congress has the relevant information," said Lynne Weil, Berman's spokesperson.

The letter exposes the Prime Minister's double speak in Parliament that, "there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on further testing." He had also assured Parliament that the Agreement would not "tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India's security and defence needs." The House Committee letter says India has been categorically told that all cooperation will cease if it conducts a test.

It also states that the "US Government will not assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies," even though the Hyde Act allows transfers of such technology under certain circumstances. Although the 123 Agreement had held out the hope that sensitive nuclear technologies "may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement," the letter says the Bush Administration has no intention of seeking an amendment to the Agreement to allow sensitive transfers.

Contrast this with Singh's assertion that "We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation" as amplified in the 123 Agreement and that he had received "an explicit commitment from the United States that India should get the same benefits of civilian cooperation as (an) advanced country like the United States enjoys."

As for "explicit linkages and interlocking rights and commitments" Singh informed Parliament about, the letter says the "quoted statement is at a high level of generality."

Again, though Singh had told the country that, "An elaborate multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the Agreement," the letter says the US reserves the right to suspend all supplies forthwith. The PM had claimed in Parliament on August 13, 2007 that "India's right to take 'corrective measures' will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement."

The letter says India "has not provided the United States with a definition of 'corrective measures'." It also states that India "has not explained to the United States what it means by the term 'India-specific' safeguards agreement."


***********

PM in Parliament

India wants removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy, ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to reprocessing spent fuel. We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation.

Bush Administration letter

The United States rarely transfers dual-use items for sensitive nuclear activities to any cooperating party.

PM in Parliament

Detailed fuel supply assurances by the US for the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors are reflected in full in the 123 Agreement.

Bush Administration letter

Should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the United States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with India immediately, including the supply of fuel.

The fuel supply assurances are not...meant to insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments.

PM in Parliament

I confirm that there is nothing in these agreements which prevents us from further nuclear tests if warranted by our national security concerns. All that we are committed to is a voluntary moratorium on further testing.

There is nothing in the Agreement that would tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India's security and defence needs.

An elaborate multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the 123 Agreement.

Bush Administration letter

Article 14 of the proposed US-India agreement for cooperation provides for a clear right for the US to terminate nuclear cooperation and a right to require the return of equipment and material subject to the agreement in all of the circumstances required under the Atomic Energy Act, including if India detonated a nuclear explosive device.

PM in Parliament

India's right to take 'corrective measures' will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement.

Bush Administration letter

Until India has completed its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the parameters of 'corrective measures' are known, we will not be in a position to speak definitively to the potential effect on other provisions of the proposed agreement.

The Pioneer > Home

 

[nitesh]

The Hindu News Update Service

Vienna: The Nuclear Suppliers Group is meeting again here on Thursday to review a fresh American proposal to exempt India from the 45-nation cartel's requirement of full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports.

Full-scope safeguards means each and every nuclear facility in a country must be placed under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, something India refuses to do since it has a nuclear weapons programme.

An earlier United States proposal was shot down at a special plenary of the NSG in Vienna on August 21 and 22, with many countries demanding the imposition of stricter conditions on India. The new draft, which was finalized by the U.S. in consultation with India on Friday night and made available to NSG members the next day, was meant to reflect those demands but several countries have told The Hindu the fresh provisions are inadequate.

"This is a very disappointing text from the point of view of the three major issues raised by us last time on testing, transfer of sensitive technology and review", said a diplomat from a country which had raised strong objections in the previous meeting. "I can't see how they expect us to accept this".

The belief of diplomats from the hold-out states is that the September 4-5 meeting will also prove inconclusive and that India will have to make further compromises if it hopes to win approval for the proposed exemption.

The 'leaking' of the U.S. State Department letter containing a strong elaboration of the Bush administration's approach to nuclear cooperation with India has also queered the pitch with several countries preparing to arm themselves with passages from it for Thursday's NSG meeting. "I think it is fair to say we will be quoting from bits of the letter", one diplomat told me on Wednesday. "When Washington is clear about its own benchmarks for [nuclear] trade with India, why should the NSG be asked to settle for something less?" said a diplomat from another country.

On the other hand, diplomats from countries broadly supportive of India's position say they will press for adoption of the waiver the way it stands. "But the main battle has to be waged by your principal partner, the U.S.", a diplomat from a former Soviet Bloc state said. He added that the principle of consensus meant even one country with objections could hold up the process.

Asked whether the leaked State Department letter -- with its unambiguous language on the termination of both nuclear cooperation and all fuel supply assurances in the event of an Indian nuclear test -- might serve to allay fears in the NSG that Washington was being too "soft" on India, one diplomat said the letter was indeed reassuring. "I think the assurances contained in the State Department's response are very positive", he said. "But our concern is that they apply only to the United States. What we would like is for Russia and France to be also held to the same assurances and understandings."

The bottom line for that diplomat's country, and others with which it is consulting, he said, is that "we have to tie [the exemption] to the moratorium – that's the minimum". "If that's not there, I can't see us making headway", said another diplomat.

The new draft adds more explicit language on consultations, including a reference to "acting in accordance with Paragraph 16 of the NSG guidelines" if one or more members "consider that circumstances have arisen which require consultations".

This paragraph specifes a procedure and range of measures, including termination of supplies. 16(c) of the guidelines say, inter alia, "In the event that one or more suppliers believe that there has been a violation of supplier/recipient understanding resulting from these Guidelines, particularly in the case of an explosion of a nuclear device, or illegal termination or violation of IAEA safeguards by a recipient, suppliers should consult promptly through diplomatic channels in order to determine and assess the reality and extent of the alleged violation ... Upon the findings of such consultations, the suppliers, bearing in mind Article XII of the IAEA Statute, should agree on an appropriate response and possible action, which could include the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient".

But critics within the NSG are not satisfied. "Proposing more consultations is not enough. Because of the requirement of consensus, there is every likelihood of lack of action in the event of [a test by India] happening", said one diplomat. "So we feel the waiver should clarify that there will be disincentives for India to testing … The consequences should be clear and upfront".

The critics are also not very pleased with the 'compromise' formula in which their concerns will be reflected in a chairman's statement. "There was a version of a chairman's statement that was circulating when it was pulled at the request of the Government of India", one diplomat said. "But from our point of view, this is not a runner. We want an unambiguous, clear waiver in one text".

These countries feel the State Department disclosure has strengthened their hands, even though its full import was still being digested. "I think there is room for improvement on both sides. There is scope for compromise, also by India", one official said.

Assessment of new NSG draft

The changes in the draft waiver may be "minor" in terms of volume -- as non-proliferation critics have charged -- but the addition and subtraction of key words in key places shows a serious attempt has been made to grapple with the more than 50 amendments which were demanded the last time the NSG met.

In paragraph 1(a), what was earlier a reiteration of the NSG's desire to contribute to the widest possible implementation of the objectives of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has become "objectives and provisions" of the NPT. This is a concession by India, since the "provisions" are what spell out the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, with the latter expected to have full-scope safeguards.

Paras 1 and 2 also remove references to the NPT as the "traditional" non-proliferation regime and drop the idea of Indian being a "contributing partner" in the non-proliferation regime. These changes essentially are meant to allay concerns of NSG members that the NPT itself is in some way old or obsolete.

Also Para 1 (b) now speaks of the NSG seeking to "avert" the further spread of nuclear weapons, rather than "limit" it. Though several NSG states wanted a formal review mechanism -- a red line for India which said this might jeopardize billions of dollars worth of investment -- the new draft provides for NSG members to notify each other of transfers to India and the details of their bilateral agreements with India. But consultation now shall be, inter alia, about matters connected with implementation of the "statement" rather than the "Guidelines" as it was in the earlier draft, thus more tightly highlighting the centrality of India's non-proliferation commitments.

There are two other changes in the waiver which are significant. First, the link between India's commitments and the NSG's decision has been tightened. Earlier, the link was simply "In view of the above", i.e. India's commitments, the NSG was deciding to waive it guidelines. Now, it says, "Based on the commitments and actions mentioned above", i.e. in the paragraph outlining India's obligations, the NSG was acting. Though the connection is more direct, this wording also falls short of the demand made by some to make the waiver decision explicitly conditional on India's implementation of its commitments.Second, the paragraph requiring consultation with India by the NSG prior to the adoption of any changes to its guidelines has been diluted somewhat to the country's detriment.

The issue is important because one of India's commitments is "adherence to NSG guidelines" despite not being a member of the group. This commitment could expose India to being compelled to adhere to policies it did not play a role in formulating and which it might even oppose. The earlier draft had spelt out a mechanism for consultation with India and said "participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India". The new draft drops the word "effective". It also drops the earlier requirement that the NSG consult with India "on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as may wish to make".

 

[nitesh]

Moneycontrol >> News >> Current Affairs >> NSG decision may get suspended: Brahma Chellaney

Round two of the crucial NSG (Nuclear Supplier’s Group) meet in Vienna begins today. The topic of discussion is the India-specific waiver on the nuclear trade. This comes after a bombshell was dropped in Washington, sending the Manmohan Singh government scurrying for cover. A confidential letter said the US would terminate the nuclear trade with India in the event of a nuclear test. The Washington post published the secret letter between the US state department and the US congress. The letter says that the deal could be called off, and all supplies would be stopped, if India conducts any nuclear tests.

Speaking on the deal, Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at The Centre For Policy Research feels the Indian government position stands contradicted by the Bush administration’s letter. He said the final outcome of the NSG might have to be in conformity with the Hyde Act and that India's leverage is low due to the absence of domestic consensus. He sees a possibility of the NSG decision getting suspended.

Excerpts from CNBC-TV18’s exclusive interview with Brahma Chellaney:

Q: What have you made of the letter from Mr. Howard Berman to Ms. Condoleezza Rice which is now in the public domain?

A: Actually it’s a letter from the State department stating the Bush administration's official stands on the 123 Agreement and the letter was sent to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs in January and released two days ago.

It contradicts the assurances made to the Prime Minister in the Indian parliament. So this a very embarrassing development for the Indian government that on the eve of the NSG meeting in Vienna, the Chairman of the Committee was forced to publicly reveal the contents of this 26-page letter; of course, he has his own motive. He wanted to put pressure on the NSG meeting because he is a critic of the deal. But the fact is that the Government of India’s publicly-stated position on various contentious issues stands contradicted by the Bush administration's letter to the US Congress Committee.

Q: Does it bring into question the US’s motives and stance and does it suggest that it is speaking in multiple voices and what bearing could it have on the final NSG waiver over the next two days?

A: If one sees the game that the US is playing at the NSG, it is playing a good cop-bad cop game versus India. It is a good cop but it has roped in some of its Western allies, six countries in particular to be the bad cops at the NSG. The whole idea is to mount pressure and to bring in some addition conditions into the NSG’s waiver and this is a way to ensure that the final outcome of the NSG process is an outcome that comes with some conditions; conditions that are sync with the Hyde Act because the Hyde Act itself specifies that the final NSG waiver for India ought to reflect the conditions that that legislation incorporates.

Q: If indeed the contents of the letter and the conditions as you pointed out will have to hold, what are the options ahead of India- will they have to walk away from this deal or will they have to accept it with the additional conditions being laid out?

A: We are reaching the moment of truth on this deal because this deal has divided India like no other issue since Independence. It has become a very divisive issue domestically. Unfortunately because it’s such a divisive issue and the way the deal has been mismanaged domestically, it has undercut India’s leverage internationally. Had India built domestic consensus, our negotiators would have had much more leverage vis-à-vis the Americans or vis-à-vis the internationally community that is represented in the NSG.

Now we are faced with a choice of either accepting the NSG waiver as it comes with all the conditions - it’s inevitable that the NSG waiver will come with conditions; they will not give us a clean unconditional waiver - so either we accept that waiver or we say thanks but no, thanks.

Q: What are the chances that there would be no clear outcome post this meet because now there are reports indicating that if indeed there is a dissatisfaction amongst a couple of the other member countries, the talks may just get suspended and perhaps go on the backburner for a bit longer?

A: I think that’s a real possibility because of the fact that once you play this game of bad cop and good cop and you try to use some of your allies to bring in additional conditions against India, then this game goes out of your hands.

It's quite possible that Americans might realise at the meeting today and tomorrow, at the latest meeting of the NSG that things are not actually under their control - that some of the smaller countries that are not nuclear exporters but are very staunch non-proliferation advocates - they have hijacked the agenda and ensured that there is no successful outcome in the NSG process.

If this meeting gets postponed then we are in for trouble because then we do not know when the next meeting will take place and there is also a Congressional calendar which is ticking away because the Bush administration wishes to clinch the deal while it remains in the office and if the meeting today is not going to progress satisfactorily, then it will become very difficult for Washington to ensure that this entire process of Congressional ratification is completed before Bush leaves office sometime in the third week of January.

Q: If it is not a clean waiver or even postponement, how do you think it will go down closer home - politically what could it mean for the Government- for the government which put its neck out and staked being in power on this issue?

A: There are two things - one, is that this deal has become linked with the Prime Minister; it has become a matter of prestige for him and if there is no successful outcome, he loses face domestically and that actually is his weak spot.

Secondly, it is clear already that this waiver by NSG is not going to be unconditional or clean; when the government of India now talks about the word clean, what it means is that the conditions should not be obtrusive. If the conditions are hidden, if they are cloaked in a way that the Government of India can save face in public, then such an outcome might be acceptable to the Government. But the fact is that as far as our opposition in the country is concerned, they have already rejected such a conditional outcome.

We already know from the letter that the Bush administration wrote to the Congressional Committee that the 123 Agreement comes with important conditions and infact the 123 Agreement is anchored in the Hyde Act and if the NSG waiver comes with hidden or explicit conditions, it will make the government's task at home much more difficult.