Rabiya_Khan
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The idea of appointing a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) was first initiated by British Government in 1959 after the Second World War to reflect the new concept of joint operations. In UK, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is not only the professional head of the British Armed Forces, but also the most senior uniformed military adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence and Head of the State.
After independence in 1947, India developed its independent services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), each headed by a Chief (Four-Star General). This model seemed flawless to the decision makers until the Kargil War in 1999, after which the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) floated the idea of developing a tri-services command headed by Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Later in 2000-2001, the Group of Ministers (GoM) report on National Security recommended the placement of tri-service chiefs under a unified commander representing common interests of the joint services. In pursuance Headquarter Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was established, headed by Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) in October 2001. A decade later in year 2011, Naresh Chandra Task Force and Shekatkar Committee proposed that either a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC CoSC) should be appointed in order to provide a single point interface between the tri-services chiefs and the civil government for effective utilisation of resources and synergised decision making at all levels [1].
However, the idea which seemed lucrative on paper is facing a lot of limitations during implementation. The biggest obstacle is lack of coordination between government of India and the Armed Forces. Each service is trying to safeguard its own requirements/needs instead of giving priority to combined interests. The Indian Armed forces are unable to prioritize their national security matters over their trivial operational challenges. While addressing the 14th Subroto Mukerjee seminar in October 2017, Vice Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal S.B. Deo said that India has a limited budget and cannot afford duplication of capabilities and resources. He stated: “We cannot have an Air Force with the Army, an Air Force with the Navy and another Air Force.” On the other hand while addressing a seminar carried out by Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in September 2017, Army Chief General Bipin Rawat clearly emphasized that there is a need to keep Army as a supreme force in the joint services environment. He said: “We may be dominating the seas or the air, but finally war will be to ensure territorial integrity of the nation and therefore the supremacy of the Army in a joint services environment becomes much more relevant” [2]. This tug of war among the armed forces for greater power in the tri-service command is the biggest dilemma due to which an idea that was initiated long ago is still in pipeline.
Second biggest hurdle in the way of this important appointment is bureaucracy that has deeply embedded roots in India. The concerned ministries are not practically carrying out measures to speed up the process of appointing a CDS or Permanent Chairman CoSC because they assume that provision of such a great power to one man is a threat to democracy. They believe that so much power to the CDS is not advisable, as the chance of staging a coup increases [3]. This fear prevents them from carrying out practical steps towards the proposed decision.
Reluctance of the Indian government to sanction additional manpower is another roadblock. The government is not ready to sanction more number of people for the forces which implies that in order to form a joint command, staff will be shifted from the existing forces. The individual armed forces show reluctance in formation of joint command because they fear a negative impact on their performance. Hence the issue of manpower provision needs to be resolved.
Lack of operational and functional clarity about the proposed decision is another reason that causes delay in the final decision making. Presently, the chief of each Armed Force is administrative as well as operational head. It is difficult for them to surrender the immense power to a newly appointed CDS or Permanent chairman especially if he is a four star general. Being on the same rank would imply that none of the chiefs would transfer any substantial power to the CDS/Permanent Chairman and his position will be a puppet position [4].
Indian government’s claims of coping with the pace of developed countries seems questionable keeping in view their failure to apply a model of joint command and appoint a CDS since last two decades. Most modern militaries, approximately 65 countries have already applied joint command model suited to their specific requirements. Even China and Pakistan have joined the league since quiet a long time now but world’s largest democracy; India is still stuck in the process [5]. Apart from HQ IDS, the only practical steps Indian government carried out in case of joint command include tri-service command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands, strategic forces command and some training institutions that are being placed under HQ IDS.
Although Indian government and armed forces have continuously emphasized on the need of developing a CDS/permanent chairman but none of the stakeholders took a substantial decision until now, not even the all knower: Modi Government. This is an alarming situation for India keeping in view the threatening national and international scenario faced by the country. India deteriorating relations with two of its neighbors; violations on the LoC and Chinese movements across the LAC including the recent Doklam standoff makes it extremely vulnerable to outside attacks.
India’s inability to appoint CDS can be utilized as a strategic advantage by Pakistan. India lacks an all-encompassing, coherent and stable perspective for close monitoring/assessment of emerging situations as it carries out three separate assessments for every prevailing situation leading to delays in decisions related to national security matters. It is high time that Pakistan Armed Forces and strategist exploit India’s weakness for their own benefit keeping in view the fact that without a CDS or Permanent Chairman the Indian Armed Forces are facing lack of tactical, administrative and financial benefit.
Bibliography
1. Chait, Lt Gen Anil. An overall Chief of Defence Staff will boost co-operation between India's forces. 25 March 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahom...nce-Staff-boost-operation-India-s-forces.html>. 29 Jan 2018.
2. Peri, Dinakar. Tri-service integration or consolidation? 6 Oct 2017. <http:www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/tri-service-integration-or-consolidation/article19803274.ece>. 23 Jan 2018.
3. Chatterji, SK. India desperately needs a chief of defence staff. 30 June 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/chief-of-defence-staff-army-navy-air-force-india/story/1/18095.html>. 23 Jan 2018.
4. TOI Editorials. Take the call: Appointment of Chief of Defence Staff can’t be delayed any longer. 26 December 2016. <https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatim...-of-defence-staff-cant-be-delayed-any-longer/>. 23 January 2018.
5. Chatterji, Brig SK. India desperately needs a chief of defence staff. 30 June 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/chief-of-defence-staff-army-navy-air-force-india/story/1/18095.html>. 23 Jan 2018.
After independence in 1947, India developed its independent services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), each headed by a Chief (Four-Star General). This model seemed flawless to the decision makers until the Kargil War in 1999, after which the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) floated the idea of developing a tri-services command headed by Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Later in 2000-2001, the Group of Ministers (GoM) report on National Security recommended the placement of tri-service chiefs under a unified commander representing common interests of the joint services. In pursuance Headquarter Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was established, headed by Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) in October 2001. A decade later in year 2011, Naresh Chandra Task Force and Shekatkar Committee proposed that either a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC CoSC) should be appointed in order to provide a single point interface between the tri-services chiefs and the civil government for effective utilisation of resources and synergised decision making at all levels [1].
However, the idea which seemed lucrative on paper is facing a lot of limitations during implementation. The biggest obstacle is lack of coordination between government of India and the Armed Forces. Each service is trying to safeguard its own requirements/needs instead of giving priority to combined interests. The Indian Armed forces are unable to prioritize their national security matters over their trivial operational challenges. While addressing the 14th Subroto Mukerjee seminar in October 2017, Vice Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal S.B. Deo said that India has a limited budget and cannot afford duplication of capabilities and resources. He stated: “We cannot have an Air Force with the Army, an Air Force with the Navy and another Air Force.” On the other hand while addressing a seminar carried out by Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in September 2017, Army Chief General Bipin Rawat clearly emphasized that there is a need to keep Army as a supreme force in the joint services environment. He said: “We may be dominating the seas or the air, but finally war will be to ensure territorial integrity of the nation and therefore the supremacy of the Army in a joint services environment becomes much more relevant” [2]. This tug of war among the armed forces for greater power in the tri-service command is the biggest dilemma due to which an idea that was initiated long ago is still in pipeline.
Second biggest hurdle in the way of this important appointment is bureaucracy that has deeply embedded roots in India. The concerned ministries are not practically carrying out measures to speed up the process of appointing a CDS or Permanent Chairman CoSC because they assume that provision of such a great power to one man is a threat to democracy. They believe that so much power to the CDS is not advisable, as the chance of staging a coup increases [3]. This fear prevents them from carrying out practical steps towards the proposed decision.
Reluctance of the Indian government to sanction additional manpower is another roadblock. The government is not ready to sanction more number of people for the forces which implies that in order to form a joint command, staff will be shifted from the existing forces. The individual armed forces show reluctance in formation of joint command because they fear a negative impact on their performance. Hence the issue of manpower provision needs to be resolved.
Lack of operational and functional clarity about the proposed decision is another reason that causes delay in the final decision making. Presently, the chief of each Armed Force is administrative as well as operational head. It is difficult for them to surrender the immense power to a newly appointed CDS or Permanent chairman especially if he is a four star general. Being on the same rank would imply that none of the chiefs would transfer any substantial power to the CDS/Permanent Chairman and his position will be a puppet position [4].
Indian government’s claims of coping with the pace of developed countries seems questionable keeping in view their failure to apply a model of joint command and appoint a CDS since last two decades. Most modern militaries, approximately 65 countries have already applied joint command model suited to their specific requirements. Even China and Pakistan have joined the league since quiet a long time now but world’s largest democracy; India is still stuck in the process [5]. Apart from HQ IDS, the only practical steps Indian government carried out in case of joint command include tri-service command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands, strategic forces command and some training institutions that are being placed under HQ IDS.
Although Indian government and armed forces have continuously emphasized on the need of developing a CDS/permanent chairman but none of the stakeholders took a substantial decision until now, not even the all knower: Modi Government. This is an alarming situation for India keeping in view the threatening national and international scenario faced by the country. India deteriorating relations with two of its neighbors; violations on the LoC and Chinese movements across the LAC including the recent Doklam standoff makes it extremely vulnerable to outside attacks.
India’s inability to appoint CDS can be utilized as a strategic advantage by Pakistan. India lacks an all-encompassing, coherent and stable perspective for close monitoring/assessment of emerging situations as it carries out three separate assessments for every prevailing situation leading to delays in decisions related to national security matters. It is high time that Pakistan Armed Forces and strategist exploit India’s weakness for their own benefit keeping in view the fact that without a CDS or Permanent Chairman the Indian Armed Forces are facing lack of tactical, administrative and financial benefit.
Bibliography
1. Chait, Lt Gen Anil. An overall Chief of Defence Staff will boost co-operation between India's forces. 25 March 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahom...nce-Staff-boost-operation-India-s-forces.html>. 29 Jan 2018.
2. Peri, Dinakar. Tri-service integration or consolidation? 6 Oct 2017. <http:www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/tri-service-integration-or-consolidation/article19803274.ece>. 23 Jan 2018.
3. Chatterji, SK. India desperately needs a chief of defence staff. 30 June 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/chief-of-defence-staff-army-navy-air-force-india/story/1/18095.html>. 23 Jan 2018.
4. TOI Editorials. Take the call: Appointment of Chief of Defence Staff can’t be delayed any longer. 26 December 2016. <https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatim...-of-defence-staff-cant-be-delayed-any-longer/>. 23 January 2018.
5. Chatterji, Brig SK. India desperately needs a chief of defence staff. 30 June 2017. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/chief-of-defence-staff-army-navy-air-force-india/story/1/18095.html>. 23 Jan 2018.
