gambit
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Nope...The interceptor platform has basically two major and physically distinct structures: the missile package and the radar system. The radar system would have its own major and minor distinct structures such as the antenna arrays and the cabin or some sort of a console for the operators. So it would be the radar system that should detect and track.Excuse me, but can you please explain this in layman's terms? I didnt get it exactly.
If I am not wrong, the interceptor missile computers/radar should detect and track the incoming warhead...
Correct...After the radar system detect and track the target, depending on its sophistication, it would either judge the target as hostile or flag it for the operators as ID unknown. It would up to the human operators to actually send the launch command. This is for safety reasons....and should calculate to try and intercept it by launching the interceptor.
For this test? No. Keep in mind that the testing regime is supposed to be as controlled as possible. You release variables only AFTER you have performed an assessment of the consequences of those variables.Now, if the BM veers offcourse, wouldn't it still be a threat if it potentially has a nuclear warhead? If so then, shouldn't the radars correctly re-calculate the interception point and launch a missile?
For example...
Assuming we have a functional target system, meaning we have a bunch of 'hostile' missiles readied for the interceptor system. Assume that we have no issues with them. The first test for the interceptor system would be to check for the scan capability of the radar system. For this we would launch nothing but uses simple aircrafts. Remember, we are checking only the detection capability.
Next...We would launch an actual 'hostile' missile to check if the radar acquisition portion is capable of detection and continuous track of a target that is faster than an aircraft. At this point we enter the 'destructive testing' regime, aka 'burning up a lot of money'. If we are technologically capable enough, we could incorporate missile data link as well, meaning we transmit target information to the missile launcher and see if it is capable of orienting itself to the appropriate general direction.
Next...We launch the interceptor itself. However, we also want to know if the interceptor missile itself is capable of taking over target acquisition from the main ground guidance radar system. To do this under the 'destructive testing' regime, we should control the 'hostile' missile's flight as much as possible. Everything, from 'hostile' launch time to when it reached apogee to when the warhead begins its descent, the interceptor should know in advance. This is not 'cheating' as some would like to call it. We are checking the integrity of the tracking portion to see how well it perform under very tight target flight pattern.
Next...We introduce more insidious variables such as weather when we schedule an interception when there is an overcast or even in heavy storm. We must because we cannot rely on when the enemy would launch his attack. Other variables are decoy warheads or ECM when we fly a jammer around the area in trying to confuse the radar system.
Next...We introduce a maneuvering warhead, which is quite problematic as may be we are not as technologically capable as our enemy. This point is applicable to your final question. Is this point the latest test? From the fact that the interceptor was not launched, answer is no. Ideally, yes the entire interceptor system should have been flexible enough and rapid response enough to recalculate a new interception point. But again, because the interceptor missile was not launched, looks like the system is not yet ready for more sophisticated attacks.
Under every major step listed, there would other minor steps that does not involve any missile launches at all. The more variables you release into each step, the greater the investigative complications should something goes wrong. The less variables you release into each step, the more resource intensive and longer it will take you to declare the system employable and deployable. Ultimately...The defense is only as capable as how creative and capable we are at simulating attacks. This is why most countries would rather purchase their defense than develop their own as each is uncertain of what his potential adversary is up to.