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Abstract: Kautilya was the key adviser to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya (c. 317-293 B.C.E.). Written about 300 B.C.E., Kautilya's Arthasastra was a science of politics intended to teach a wise king how to govern. In this work, Kautilya offers wide-ranging and truly fascinating discussions on war and diplomacy, including his wish to have his king become a world conqueror, his analysis of which kingdoms are natural allies and which are inevitable enemies, his willingness to make treaties he knew he would break, his doctrine of silent war or a war of assassination against an unsuspecting king, his approval of secret agents who killed enemy leaders and sowed discord among them, his view of women as weapons of war, his use of religion and superstition to bolster his troops and demoralize enemy soldiers, the spread of disinformation, and his humane treatment of conquered soldiers and subjects.
KAUTILYA's Arthasastra was one of the greatest political books of the ancient world. Max Weber recognized this. "Truly radical 'Machiavellianism,' in the popular sense of that word," Weber said in his famous lecture "Politics as a Vocation," "is classically expressed in Indian literature in the Arthasastra of Kautilya (written long before the birth of Christ, ostensibly in the time of Chandragupta [Maurya]): compared to it, Machiavelli's The Prince is harmless." (1)
Kautilya wanted the expansion of the empire with harsh measures. A number of authors have explored these domestic policies, but very few scholars have focused on Kautilya's discussions of war and diplomacy. And yet, his analyses are fascinating and far-reaching, such as his wish to have his king become a world conqueror, his evaluation of which kingdoms are natural allies and which are inevitable enemies, his willingness to make treaties that he knew he would break, his doctrine of silent war or a war of assassination and contrived revolt against an unsuspecting king, his approval of secret agents who killed enemy leaders and sowed discord among them, his view of women as weapons of war, his use of religion and superstition to bolster his troops and demoralize enemy soldiers, his employment of the spread of disinformation, and his humane treatment of conquered soldiers and subjects.
Historical Background:
Kautilya was the key adviser toand the genius of the strategy undertaken bythe Indian king Chandragupta Maurya (c. 317-293 B.C.E.). Kautilyasometimes called chancellor or prime minister to Chandragupta, something like a Bismarck (2) composed his Arthasastra, or "science of politics," to show a wise king how to defeat his enemies and rule on behalf of the general good. He was not modest in his claims as to how much he helped Chandragupta, noting "This science has been composed by him [Kautilya], who . . . quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and [conquered] the earth that was under control of the Nanda kings." (3)
Just after Alexander's death in 323 B.C.E., Chandragupta and Kautilya began their conquest of India by stopping the Greek invaders. In this effort they assassinated two Greek governors, Nicanor and Philip, a strategy to keep in mind when I later examine Kautilya's approval of assassination. "The assassinations of the Greek governors," wrote Radha Kumud Mookerji, "are not to be looked upon as mere accidents." (4) By taking much of western India (the Punjab and the Sindh) from the Greeks and concluding a treaty with Seleucus (Alexander the Great's Greek heir to western India), Chandragupta and Kautilya succeeded in bringing together almost all of the Indian subcontinent. As a result, Chandragupta was, and is now, considered the first unifier of India and the first genuine emperor or king of India. (5)
Many Indian historians are proud to embrace Kautilya's Arthasastra as a practical book of rugged political realisminstead of the impotent idealism of, say, Platothat actually shaped history. D. D. Kosambi notes, "The Greeks make excellent reading; the Indian treatise [Arthasastra] worked infinitely better in practice for its own time and place." (6) Ram Sharan Sharma maintains, "Kautilya furnishes us as full and complete [a] definition of the state as was possible in ancient times. The Greek thinkers hardly discuss the constituent elements of the state." (7)
Kautilya's Arthasastra is thus a book of political realism, a book analyzing how the political world does work and not very often stating how it ought to work, a book that frequently discloses to a king what calculating and sometimes brutal measures he must carry out to preserve the state and the common good. One important question lurks in discussions of Kautilya. Were the harsh actions he often recommended necessary for the common good of India? Did Chandragupta and Bindusara have to act in a violent and sometimes brutal fashion to defend India, bring order, and establish unity? (8) With the old order crumbling, with the Nanda kings having proved cruel and inept, with enemies on India's borders, and with the threat of anarchy within, were not Kautilya's harsh measures necessary and have not his critics failed "to note the nature of the times in which he lived"? (9) In defense of Chandragupta and Kautilya, Bhargava says, "all kinds of means might have been considered necessary to restore peace with honor." (10) Put more bluntly, did India need the harsh measures of Kautilya the realist in order to enjoy the luxury of Ashoka the idealist?
Kautilya and His "Science of Politics":
R. P. Kangle translates the word arthasastra as "science of politics," (11) a treatise to help a king in "the acquisition and protection of the earth." (12) Others translate arthasastra in slightly different ways: A. L. Basham says it is a "treatise on polity," (13) Kosambi emphasizes the economic importance of the word in calling it a "science of material gain," (14) and G. P. Singh labels it a "science of polity." (15) I happen to prefer to translate arthasastra as a "science of political economy," but however one translates the word, Kautilya claimed to be putting forth what Heinrich Zimmer rightly calls "timeless laws of politics, economy, diplomacy, and war." (16)
Because he was offering his readers a science with which they could master the world, Kautilya believed that having a passive stance toward the worldfor example, trusting in fate or relying on superstitionwas outlandish. "One trusting in fate," noted Kautilya, "being devoid of human endeavor, perishes."(17) His philosophy called for action, not resignation: "The object slips away from the foolish person, who continuously consults the stars; . . . what will the stars do?" (18) In urging the king to rely on science and not the precepts of religion, Kautilya separated political thought from religious speculation. (19)
Like Thomas Hobbes, Kautilya believed the goal of science was power. His statements "Power is (possession of) strength" and "strength changes the mind" (20) show that Kautilya sought the power to control not only outward behavior, but also the thoughts of one's subjects and enemies. Probably his science could not promise all of that, but the power offered by this science was extensive: "An arrow, discharged by an archer, may kill one person or may not kill (even one); but intellect operated by a wise man would kill even children in the womb." (21) Having as his first and primary goal to "destroy the enemies and protect his own people," (22) the king could certainly accomplish this with Kautilya's science; in fact, "he, who is well-versed in the science of politics . . . plays, as he pleases, with kings tied by the chain of his intellect." (23) Beyond protecting the kingdom, the king who uses Kautilya's science can bring to himself and his subjects the three goods of life"material gain, spiritual good and pleasures." (24) Wealth is the key to raising successful armies and having a peaceful and just kingdom, and Kautilya's political science brings wealth: "The source of the livelihood of men is wealth, in other words, the earth inhabited by men. The science which is the means of the attainment and protection of that earth is the Science of Politics." (25) Put another way, Kautilya's book is the greatest weapon a king can have, and political science is more important thanor at least brings aboutwealth, armies, and conquests.
In the world of international politics, it is only "natural" that nations interact with each other through "dissension and force." (26) A political realist typically argues that there will always be conflict in international relations and, in effect, rule by the strongest. Kautilya was writing about 300 B.C.E., a century after Thucydides composed his History of the Peloponnesian War and several decades after the Sophists Callicles and Thrasymachus said to Plato that rule by the stronger was "natural." Kautilya, in the boldest of his promises, claimed that one who knows his science of politics can conquer the world, that "one possessed of personal qualities, though ruling over a small territory . . . conversant with (the science of) politics, does conquer the entire earth, never loses." (27) There is no modesty here. Kautilya's science brings an abundance of wealth and details correct strategies in politics and war. With this science anyone can succeed: "And winning over and purchasing men of energy, those possessed of might, even women, children, lame and blind persons, have conquered the world." (28) Kautilya did not see this conquest as something unjust. A king who carries out his duties, rules according to law, metes out only just punishment, applies the law equally "to his son and his enemy," and protects his subjects not only goes "to heaven" but "would conquer the earth up to its four ends." (29) Whereas Kautilya did not talk of glory, I do believe he was thinking of something we might call "greatness," but this would come only with social justice and the morally correct ordering of the world. The king, "after conquering the world . . . should enjoy it divided into varnas [castes] and asramas [Hindu stages of life] in accordance with his own duty." (30)
What Kautilya apparently meant by the phrase "conquering the world" is something very crucial to understand. Surely Dikshitar is correct in saying that this ideal of a world conqueror in ancient India led to an "imperialism" that was "one of the causes of chronic warfare," (31) although the Mauryan dynasty did bring comparative peace for more than a century. As Narasingha Prosad Sil notes, "For Kautilya a world conquest is the true foundation for world peace." (32)
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy as Extensions of Warfare:
As a political realist, Kautilya assumed that every nation acts to maximize power and self-interest, and therefore moral principles or obligations have little or no force in actions among nations. While it is good to have an ally, the alliance will last only as long as it is in that ally's as well as one's own self-interest, because "an ally looks to the securing of his own interests in the event of simultaneity of calamities and in the event of the growth of the enemy's power." (33) Whether one goes to war or remains at peace depends entirely upon the self-interest of, or advantage to, one's kingdom: "War and peace are considered solely from the point of view of profit." (34) One keeps an ally not because of good will or moral obligation, but because one is strong and can advance one's own self-interest as well as the self-interest of the ally, for "when one has an army, one's ally remains friendly, or (even) the enemy becomes friendly." (35) Because nations always act in their political, economic, and military self-interest, even times of peace have the potential to turn abruptly into times of war, allies into enemies, and even enemies into allies. Burton Stein notes correctly that Kautilya was describing a foreign policy not of a great empire like that of the Mauryas, but of small warring states in incessant conflict, such as India experienced before the Mauryan Empire. (36) Kautilya probably assumed that peaceful empires cannot last forever, and that conflict among smaller states is more common in history. And thus India does not want peace as it follows the idealism of Kautilya.
Kautilya is most famous for outlining the so-called Mandala theory of foreign policy, in which immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighboring state is regarded as an ally, or, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Imagine a series of states to one's west, and then number them starting with oneself. States numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on will likely be friends, whereas states 2, 4, 6, 8, and so on will probably be enemies. (The same thing can be done with concentric circles, which would look more like a mandala, but it is difficult to envision these circles as states.) Kautilya put this basic principle in a number of different ways, but most simply as, "One with immediately proximate territory is the natural enemy." (37) Elsewhere he stated this Mandala theory of foreign policy in more detail: "With respect to the middle king [he himself], the third and the fifth constituents are friendly elements. The second, the fourth, and the sixth are unfriendly elements." (38)
Kautilya assumed that he lived in a world of foreign relations in which one either conquered or suffered conquest. He did not say to himself, "Prepare for war, but hope for peace," but instead, "Prepare for war, and plan to conquer." Diplomacy was just another weapon used in the prolonged warfare that was always either occurring or being planned for. After analyzing a king's unique configuration of potential enemies and allies, Kautilya then coldly calculated how that king must think and act. "The king, endowed with personal excellences and those of his material constituents, the seat of good policy, is the would-be conqueror. Encircling him on all sides, with territory immediately next to his is the constituent called the enemy. In the same manner, one with territory separated by one (other territory) is the constituent called the ally." (39) This much just repeats the principles of foreign policy discussed above, but then notice how Kautilya regarded neighboring states: "A neighboring prince possessed of the excellences of an enemy is the foe; one in calamity is vulnerable; one without support or with weak support isfit to be exterminated; in the reverse case, fit to be harassed or weakened. These are the different types of enemies." (40)
In his excellent discussion of Kautilya's Mandala theory of foreign policy, Singh continues by correctly stating that this is ancient India's most notable contribution to political theory. (41) Although Singh analyzes Kautilya's theory well, he makes a mistake in labeling the Mandala theory an argument based on the doctrine of the balance of power. Kautilya, in fact, was not offering a modern balance of power argument. In the twentieth century, international relations theorists have defended the doctrine of the balance of power, because equally armed nations will supposedly deter each other, and therefore no war will result. One does find this argument occasionally in Kautilya: "In case the gains [of two allies of equal strength] are equal, there should be peace; if unequal, fight," (42) or, "the conqueror should march if superior in strength, otherwise stay quiet." (43) Whereas these balance of power theorists suggest that a nation arm itself so that it can ensure peace, Kautilya wanted his king to arm the nation in order to find or create a weakness in the enemy and conquer, even to conquer the world.
In reading his Arthasastra, we find no moral considerations other than a king doing what is right for his own people. Rather, we discover merely what Kautilya regarded as the nature of power. The king, he wrote, "should march when by marching he would be able to weaken or exterminate the enemy." (44) And Kautilya assumed that every other state would act in a like manner because "even the equal who has achieved his object tends to be stronger, and when augmented in power, untrustworthy; prosperity tends to change the mind." (45) Just as did Thucydides, Kautilya regarded a request for negotiations as a sign of weakness, indeed a desperate act of a weak nation trying to survive: "A weaker king may bargain with a stronger king with the offer of a gain equal to his troops, when he is in a calamity or is addicted to what is harmful [that is, women, wine, or gambling] or is in trouble. He with whom the bargain is made should fight if capable of doing harm to him; else he should make the pact." (46)
Whereas Carl von Clausewitz said that war is just an extension of domestic politics, (47) Kautilya argued that diplomacy is really a subtle act of war, a series of actions taken to weaken an enemy and gain advantages for oneself, all with an eye toward eventual conquest. A nation's foreign policy should always consist of preliminary movements toward war: "In this way, the conqueror should establish in the rear and in front, a circle (of kings) in his own interest. . . . And in the entire circle, he should ever station envoys and secret agents, becoming a friend of the rivals, maintaining secrecy when striking again and again. The affairs of one, who cannot maintain secrecy . . . undoubtedly, perish, like a broken boat in the ocean." (48) In Kautilya's foreign policy, even during a time of diplomacy and negotiated peace, a king should still be "striking again and again" in secrecy.
Consider some of the measures Kautilya supported during times of peace. If opposed by an alliance of nations, a king should secretly "sow dissensions" within the alliance until one or more of the parties in the alliance becomes weak. (49) When he has weakened a neighbor, the king "should violate the treaty." (50) Or, in another example, "The wise (conqueror), making one neighboring king fight with another neighboring king, should seize the territory of another, cutting off his party on all sides." (51) In Kautilya's view, two kinds of kingdoms confront any kingthose weak kingdoms fit to be exterminated and those strong kingdoms that, over a long period of time, one can only secretly harass and hope to weaken. He advised, "As between an enemy fit to be harassed and an enemy fit to be exterminated, acquisition of land from an enemy fit to be exterminated is preferable. For, the king fit to be exterminated, being without support or with a weak support, is deserted by his subjects when, on being attacked, he wishes to flee taking with him the treasury and the army." (52) It is best to attack an enemy that is "disunited," rather than an enemy in which the subjects have organized themselves into "bands." (53) During times of peace and negotiations, Kautilya wanted spies and secret agents to exploit the divisions within a country. Most countries, he maintained, have four kinds of unhappy subjectsthe enraged, the frightened, the greedy, and the proud. Secret agents can widen and deepen these divisions by inciting these four types of people to act against their king. The opposing king "should win over the seducible in the enemy's territories by means of conciliation and gifts and those not seducible by means of dissension and force." (54)
Because a king abides by a treaty only for so long as it is advantageous, Kautilya regarded all allies as future conquests when the time is ripe. He wrote, for example, "That ally who remains common to the enemy (and himself), he should divide that rogue from the enemy (and) when divided, exterminate him, thereafter (exterminate) the enemy." (55) Kautilya also sought to take a nation trying to remain neutral or "indifferent" and secretly provoke war between that nation and a neighboring kingdom, until the neutral nation sought his help. Then Kautilya's king could "place him under (his) obligations." (56) Kautilya himself had no moral qualms about breaking obligations or trust: "That ally who might do harm or who, though capable, would not help in times of trouble, he should exterminate him, when trustingly, he comes within his reach." (57)
Because foreign policy is just an extension of a nation's wars, the goal of foreign policy is not to end wars, but rather to ward off defeats and to make sure one is successful in subsequent warfare. For Kautilya, all ambassadors were potential spies with diplomatic immunity. (58) Indeed, he wrote an entire section about how to "fight with the weapon of diplomacy." (59)
War:
Kautilya thought there was a "science" of warfare, presumably part of a larger science of politics. The Commandant of the Army, he suggested, should be "trained in the science of all (kinds of) fights and weapons, (and) renowned for riding on elephants, horses or in chariots." (60) Just as Machiavelli advised his prince to attend to matters of warfare constantly, so did Kautilya advise the king not to leave military matters entirely to others: "Infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants should carry out practice in the arts outside (the city) at sun-rise. . . . The king should constantly attend to that, and should frequently inspect their arts." (61) Just as the king's agents spied on officials in the state bureaucracy, so too must the king have spies to assess the loyalty of soldiers. What greater threat is there to a king than having a military coup remove him from power? Kautilya recommended that "secret agents, prostitutes, artisans and actors as well as elders of the army should ascertain with diligence, the loyalty or disloyalty of soldiers." (62)
In his section on foreign policy, Kautilya wrote a startling sentence: "Of war, there is open war, concealed war and silent war." (63) Open war is obvious, and concealed war is what we call guerrilla warfare, but silent war is a kind of fighting that no other thinker I know of has discussed. Silent war is a kind of warfare with another kingdom in which the king and his ministersand unknowingly, the peopleall act publicly as if they were at peace with the opposing kingdom, but all the while secret agents and spies are assassinating important leaders in the other kingdom, creating divisions among key ministers and classes, and spreading propaganda and disinformation. According to Kautilya, "Open war is fighting at the place and time indicated; creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is error or a calamity, giving way and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which concerns secret practices and instigations through secret agents is the mark of silent war." (64) In silent warfare, secrecy is paramount, and, from a passage quoted earlier, the king can prevail only by "maintaining secrecy when striking again and again." (65) This entire concept of secret war was apparently original with Kautilya. (66)
Open warfare, Kautilya declared, is "most righteous," (67) but he was willing to use any and all kinds of warfare to achieve consolidation and expansion of the kingdom. There is no question of morality hereother than the general good of one's kingdombut only of strategy. Kautilya advised the king that "When he is superior in troops, when secret instigations are made (in the enemy's camp), when precautions are taken about the season, (and) when he is on land suitable to himself, he should engage in an open fight. In the reverse case, (he should resort to) concealed fighting." (68) How different all this is from the image of war, certainly exaggerated, found in the Hindu epics, the Mahabharata, or the Ramayana, of the central figure being the great hero in the chariot who frightened all before him. (69)
In Book 12, Kautilya faced the situation in which one rules a weak kingdom and is about to be attacked by a stronger king. He maintained that "there are three kings who attack: the righteous conqueror, the greedy conqueror and the demoniacal conqueror." (70) Whereas one can satisfy a righteous conqueror simply by submitting to his rule, one must surrender "land and goods" as well as money in order to satisfy a greedy conqueror. The demoniacal conqueror, however, will stop only when he has seized "land, goods, sons, wives and life." (71) A weak king must give up everything if it is inevitable, but he must find a way to survive to fight another day, preserving "his body, not wealth; for, what regret can there be for wealth that is impermanent?" (72) However, Kautilya did not advocate giving in to a conqueror without countermeasures and recommended that the king use "diplomatic or concealed warfare"; attempt to conciliate his enemy with gifts; direct secret agents to wield "weapons, poison or fire" to destroy the enemy's fort or camp; instruct secret agents to promote a coup by a "pretender from his family or a prince in disfavor"; send the demoniacal king listless elephants, which had been poisoned; give to the enemy king treasonable or alien troops; surrender to an entirely different king and give him all but the capital city; have secret agents instigate a revolt among the subjects of the enemy king; "employ assassins and poison-givers"; use an astrologer to persuade a "high officer" of the enemy king to try a coup; command secret agents to declare that the Regent of the king is about to take power, while the agents kill leaders at night and blame the murders on the Regent of the enemy king; use secret agents in the countryside to protest oppression of the enemy king's bureaucracy and kill agents of the king hoping to start a revolt; or finally, set fire to palaces and stores of grain and blame this on the Regent of the enemy king. (73)
Kautilya often advocated using women as weapons of war. He certainly regarded women as a source of satisfaction for troops at war, writing that when setting up camp for the army, "courtesans (should be encamped) along the highways." (74) And Kautilya certainly saw women as an addictive source of pleasure, worse than wine or gambling, that a good king must enjoy only in moderation: "Deliverance is possible in gambling, without deliverance is addiction to women. Failure to show himself, aversion from work, absence of material good and loss of spiritual good by allowing the right time to pass, weakness in administration and addiction to drink (result from addiction to women)." (75) Precisely because women are such a powerful addiction, a king can use them against an enemy; for example, if a king is trying to undermine a ruling oligarchy, he "should make chiefs of the ruling council infatuated with women possessed of great beauty and youth. When passion is roused in them, they should start quarrels by creating belief (about their love) in one and by going to another." (76) A woman supposedly in love with one leader should go to another, profess her love for him, urge him to murder the first leader, and "then she should proclaim, 'My lover has been killed by so and so.'" (77) Obviously such tactics create mistrust among leaders of an oligarchy and also bring about the death of key enemies. In the chapters about how a weak king can stave off disastrous conquest by a stronger king, Kautilya again turned, as just one possible tactic among many, to women as weapons of war, stating that "keepers of prostitutes should make the (enemy's) army chiefs infatuated with women possessed of great beauty and youth. When many or two of the chiefs feel passion for one woman, assassins should create quarrels among them." (78) Secret agents can destroy high officers in the enemy army either with poison or with "love-winning medicines." (79)
Speaking of justice to an enemy about to conquer is the last tactic of the weak, just as Thucydides showed in his recreation of the debate about Melos. In Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, the Melians try to talk about justice and fair play when facing the prospect of conquest by the Athenians, who contend that such arguments are the last, desperate tactic of those facing defeat, which the Melians "know as well as we do." The Athenians tell the Melians "that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." (80) After that both the Melians and the Athenians debate only what is in the self-interest of Athens. Similarly, willing to try all tactics, even desperate ones, Kautilya made up a powerful speech to be given by a weak king to the king about to conquer, a speech offering a mixture of moral exhortation and arguments based on the self-interest of the conqueror. In this speech, Kautilya depicted an envoy saying to the conquering king that he should accept a treaty and "pay regard to [his] spiritual and material well-being"; that conquering a kingdom willing to surrender on reasonable terms is an "impious act"; that battle is not in the conquering king's self-interest, since "to fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash deed" and the conqueror will lose troops and "material good"; that such a conquest will only unite his enemies all the more; that the conquering king's enemies are only waiting for him to be weakened in order to attack; that he himself is risking death; that war itself in which men on each side die is "an impious act"; and that he should not listen to "enemies masquerading as friends" who are giving him false advice as to his real self-interest. (81) In much the same way as Thucydides, only more dramatically, Kautilya demonstrated the realities of diplomacy and war as well as the ineffectiveness of moral pleas when confronted by a superior power.
Machiavelli longed for the legions of ancient Rome; Kautilya wanted legions, but he wanted them preceded by elephants, which acted in the ancient world a bit like modern tanks. So valuable were they that Kautilya wrote, "destruction of an enemy's forces is principally dependent on elephants." (82) As shown earlier, Kautilya considered the treasury most valuable in raising an army, procuring equipment (including elephants), and preparing for war. After the treasury and the army, Kautilya focused on the importance of the fort, on which depends "the treasury, the army, silent war, restraint of one's own party, use of armed forces, receiving allied troops, and warding off enemy troops and forest tribes. And in the absence of a fort, the treasury will fall into the hands of enemies. . . . those with forts are not exterminated." (83) (A mountain fort is more valuable than a river fort, because it "is easy to protect, difficult to lay siege to, difficult to climb." (84) )
Kautilya was inconsistent in ranking the importance of the treasury, the army, and forts, but it seems that the people, or a popular army, are the most important of all. As he put it, "one should seek a fortress with men." (85) Well before Machiavelli defended a republican army, well before Mao Zedong defended a people's war as invincible, Kautilya urged the king to be popular with the people and rely on the countryside. "If weak in might, [a king] should endeavor to secure the welfare of his subjects. The countryside is the source of all undertakings; from them comes might." (86) The "undertakings" of forts, the treasury, and the army all depend ultimately on the people of the countryside, where are found "bravery, firmness, cleverness and large numbers." (87) Kautilya here was cautiously making a revolution in warfare, relying not quite as much on the warrior class of kshatriyas. India was divided into four castes (varnas): brahmins or priests; kshatriyas or warriors and rulers; vaishyas or farmers and traders; and sh-udras or laborers. TheDharmas-utras, or law codes, writtenbefore Kautilya, urged an army of kshatriyas and, in an emergency, also brahmins (priests) and vaishyas (farmers or merchants). Kautilya had no use for brahmin troops"by prostration, an enemy may win over Brahmana troops"but he liked the energy, numbers, and strength of sh-udras, agricultural laborers treated much like serfs. (88) Kautilya's praise of ordinary men from the lower two varnas was unusual in the ancient world. He wrote, "As between land with the support of a fort and one with the support of men, the one with the support of men is preferable. For, a kingdom is that which has men. Without men, like a barren cow, what could it yield?" (89) Says Sharma, "Kautilya alone holds that the army made up of vaishyas and sudras is important." (90) Kautilya apparently believed that an army of kshatriyas was best; warriors were supposed to find their "highest duty and pleasure" by dying in battle. (91) Megasthenes, a Greek ambassador to Chandragupta Maurya's court, suggested that as much as one-fifth of the population under Chandragupta's empire were warriors or kshatriyas. (92) In addition, Kautilya clearly argued that sections of the army should consist "mostly of persons from the same region, caste or profession." (93) Using a little common sense, we can see that he is suggesting that men of an army should know one another, that an army of friends fighting side by side is the most difficult to defeat. On the subject of the king's location during battle, for example, he wrote: "A bare army, without standards, consisting of warriors related as fathers, sons and brothers, should be the place for the king. An elephant or a chariot should be the vehicle for the king, guarded by cavalry." (94) (Kautilya wanted a man who looked like the king to lead the army into battle. (95) )
And thus, a king's power, for Kautilya, is in the end tied to the power and popular energy of the people, without which a king can be conquered, for "not being rooted among his subjects, [a king] becomes easy to uproot." (96) Although Kautilya wrote of using money to raise an army and even of "purchasing heroic men," (97) he was not advocating mercenaries who fought only for pay, but he was merely outlining the cost of paying, supplying, and feeding soldiers. He believed that "hereditary troops are better than hired troops" (98) ; in other words, troops made of men born in the kingdom and thus loyal to the king since birth are better than strangers fighting for money, as Machiavelli noted so often later. It is not at all clear, remarked Kautilya, that "inviting alien troops with money" (99) is an advantage or a disadvantage.
To be continued...
KAUTILYA's Arthasastra was one of the greatest political books of the ancient world. Max Weber recognized this. "Truly radical 'Machiavellianism,' in the popular sense of that word," Weber said in his famous lecture "Politics as a Vocation," "is classically expressed in Indian literature in the Arthasastra of Kautilya (written long before the birth of Christ, ostensibly in the time of Chandragupta [Maurya]): compared to it, Machiavelli's The Prince is harmless." (1)
Kautilya wanted the expansion of the empire with harsh measures. A number of authors have explored these domestic policies, but very few scholars have focused on Kautilya's discussions of war and diplomacy. And yet, his analyses are fascinating and far-reaching, such as his wish to have his king become a world conqueror, his evaluation of which kingdoms are natural allies and which are inevitable enemies, his willingness to make treaties that he knew he would break, his doctrine of silent war or a war of assassination and contrived revolt against an unsuspecting king, his approval of secret agents who killed enemy leaders and sowed discord among them, his view of women as weapons of war, his use of religion and superstition to bolster his troops and demoralize enemy soldiers, his employment of the spread of disinformation, and his humane treatment of conquered soldiers and subjects.
Historical Background:
Kautilya was the key adviser toand the genius of the strategy undertaken bythe Indian king Chandragupta Maurya (c. 317-293 B.C.E.). Kautilyasometimes called chancellor or prime minister to Chandragupta, something like a Bismarck (2) composed his Arthasastra, or "science of politics," to show a wise king how to defeat his enemies and rule on behalf of the general good. He was not modest in his claims as to how much he helped Chandragupta, noting "This science has been composed by him [Kautilya], who . . . quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and [conquered] the earth that was under control of the Nanda kings." (3)
Just after Alexander's death in 323 B.C.E., Chandragupta and Kautilya began their conquest of India by stopping the Greek invaders. In this effort they assassinated two Greek governors, Nicanor and Philip, a strategy to keep in mind when I later examine Kautilya's approval of assassination. "The assassinations of the Greek governors," wrote Radha Kumud Mookerji, "are not to be looked upon as mere accidents." (4) By taking much of western India (the Punjab and the Sindh) from the Greeks and concluding a treaty with Seleucus (Alexander the Great's Greek heir to western India), Chandragupta and Kautilya succeeded in bringing together almost all of the Indian subcontinent. As a result, Chandragupta was, and is now, considered the first unifier of India and the first genuine emperor or king of India. (5)
Many Indian historians are proud to embrace Kautilya's Arthasastra as a practical book of rugged political realisminstead of the impotent idealism of, say, Platothat actually shaped history. D. D. Kosambi notes, "The Greeks make excellent reading; the Indian treatise [Arthasastra] worked infinitely better in practice for its own time and place." (6) Ram Sharan Sharma maintains, "Kautilya furnishes us as full and complete [a] definition of the state as was possible in ancient times. The Greek thinkers hardly discuss the constituent elements of the state." (7)
Kautilya's Arthasastra is thus a book of political realism, a book analyzing how the political world does work and not very often stating how it ought to work, a book that frequently discloses to a king what calculating and sometimes brutal measures he must carry out to preserve the state and the common good. One important question lurks in discussions of Kautilya. Were the harsh actions he often recommended necessary for the common good of India? Did Chandragupta and Bindusara have to act in a violent and sometimes brutal fashion to defend India, bring order, and establish unity? (8) With the old order crumbling, with the Nanda kings having proved cruel and inept, with enemies on India's borders, and with the threat of anarchy within, were not Kautilya's harsh measures necessary and have not his critics failed "to note the nature of the times in which he lived"? (9) In defense of Chandragupta and Kautilya, Bhargava says, "all kinds of means might have been considered necessary to restore peace with honor." (10) Put more bluntly, did India need the harsh measures of Kautilya the realist in order to enjoy the luxury of Ashoka the idealist?
Kautilya and His "Science of Politics":
R. P. Kangle translates the word arthasastra as "science of politics," (11) a treatise to help a king in "the acquisition and protection of the earth." (12) Others translate arthasastra in slightly different ways: A. L. Basham says it is a "treatise on polity," (13) Kosambi emphasizes the economic importance of the word in calling it a "science of material gain," (14) and G. P. Singh labels it a "science of polity." (15) I happen to prefer to translate arthasastra as a "science of political economy," but however one translates the word, Kautilya claimed to be putting forth what Heinrich Zimmer rightly calls "timeless laws of politics, economy, diplomacy, and war." (16)
Because he was offering his readers a science with which they could master the world, Kautilya believed that having a passive stance toward the worldfor example, trusting in fate or relying on superstitionwas outlandish. "One trusting in fate," noted Kautilya, "being devoid of human endeavor, perishes."(17) His philosophy called for action, not resignation: "The object slips away from the foolish person, who continuously consults the stars; . . . what will the stars do?" (18) In urging the king to rely on science and not the precepts of religion, Kautilya separated political thought from religious speculation. (19)
Like Thomas Hobbes, Kautilya believed the goal of science was power. His statements "Power is (possession of) strength" and "strength changes the mind" (20) show that Kautilya sought the power to control not only outward behavior, but also the thoughts of one's subjects and enemies. Probably his science could not promise all of that, but the power offered by this science was extensive: "An arrow, discharged by an archer, may kill one person or may not kill (even one); but intellect operated by a wise man would kill even children in the womb." (21) Having as his first and primary goal to "destroy the enemies and protect his own people," (22) the king could certainly accomplish this with Kautilya's science; in fact, "he, who is well-versed in the science of politics . . . plays, as he pleases, with kings tied by the chain of his intellect." (23) Beyond protecting the kingdom, the king who uses Kautilya's science can bring to himself and his subjects the three goods of life"material gain, spiritual good and pleasures." (24) Wealth is the key to raising successful armies and having a peaceful and just kingdom, and Kautilya's political science brings wealth: "The source of the livelihood of men is wealth, in other words, the earth inhabited by men. The science which is the means of the attainment and protection of that earth is the Science of Politics." (25) Put another way, Kautilya's book is the greatest weapon a king can have, and political science is more important thanor at least brings aboutwealth, armies, and conquests.
In the world of international politics, it is only "natural" that nations interact with each other through "dissension and force." (26) A political realist typically argues that there will always be conflict in international relations and, in effect, rule by the strongest. Kautilya was writing about 300 B.C.E., a century after Thucydides composed his History of the Peloponnesian War and several decades after the Sophists Callicles and Thrasymachus said to Plato that rule by the stronger was "natural." Kautilya, in the boldest of his promises, claimed that one who knows his science of politics can conquer the world, that "one possessed of personal qualities, though ruling over a small territory . . . conversant with (the science of) politics, does conquer the entire earth, never loses." (27) There is no modesty here. Kautilya's science brings an abundance of wealth and details correct strategies in politics and war. With this science anyone can succeed: "And winning over and purchasing men of energy, those possessed of might, even women, children, lame and blind persons, have conquered the world." (28) Kautilya did not see this conquest as something unjust. A king who carries out his duties, rules according to law, metes out only just punishment, applies the law equally "to his son and his enemy," and protects his subjects not only goes "to heaven" but "would conquer the earth up to its four ends." (29) Whereas Kautilya did not talk of glory, I do believe he was thinking of something we might call "greatness," but this would come only with social justice and the morally correct ordering of the world. The king, "after conquering the world . . . should enjoy it divided into varnas [castes] and asramas [Hindu stages of life] in accordance with his own duty." (30)
What Kautilya apparently meant by the phrase "conquering the world" is something very crucial to understand. Surely Dikshitar is correct in saying that this ideal of a world conqueror in ancient India led to an "imperialism" that was "one of the causes of chronic warfare," (31) although the Mauryan dynasty did bring comparative peace for more than a century. As Narasingha Prosad Sil notes, "For Kautilya a world conquest is the true foundation for world peace." (32)
Diplomacy and Foreign Policy as Extensions of Warfare:
As a political realist, Kautilya assumed that every nation acts to maximize power and self-interest, and therefore moral principles or obligations have little or no force in actions among nations. While it is good to have an ally, the alliance will last only as long as it is in that ally's as well as one's own self-interest, because "an ally looks to the securing of his own interests in the event of simultaneity of calamities and in the event of the growth of the enemy's power." (33) Whether one goes to war or remains at peace depends entirely upon the self-interest of, or advantage to, one's kingdom: "War and peace are considered solely from the point of view of profit." (34) One keeps an ally not because of good will or moral obligation, but because one is strong and can advance one's own self-interest as well as the self-interest of the ally, for "when one has an army, one's ally remains friendly, or (even) the enemy becomes friendly." (35) Because nations always act in their political, economic, and military self-interest, even times of peace have the potential to turn abruptly into times of war, allies into enemies, and even enemies into allies. Burton Stein notes correctly that Kautilya was describing a foreign policy not of a great empire like that of the Mauryas, but of small warring states in incessant conflict, such as India experienced before the Mauryan Empire. (36) Kautilya probably assumed that peaceful empires cannot last forever, and that conflict among smaller states is more common in history. And thus India does not want peace as it follows the idealism of Kautilya.
Kautilya is most famous for outlining the so-called Mandala theory of foreign policy, in which immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighboring state is regarded as an ally, or, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Imagine a series of states to one's west, and then number them starting with oneself. States numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on will likely be friends, whereas states 2, 4, 6, 8, and so on will probably be enemies. (The same thing can be done with concentric circles, which would look more like a mandala, but it is difficult to envision these circles as states.) Kautilya put this basic principle in a number of different ways, but most simply as, "One with immediately proximate territory is the natural enemy." (37) Elsewhere he stated this Mandala theory of foreign policy in more detail: "With respect to the middle king [he himself], the third and the fifth constituents are friendly elements. The second, the fourth, and the sixth are unfriendly elements." (38)
Kautilya assumed that he lived in a world of foreign relations in which one either conquered or suffered conquest. He did not say to himself, "Prepare for war, but hope for peace," but instead, "Prepare for war, and plan to conquer." Diplomacy was just another weapon used in the prolonged warfare that was always either occurring or being planned for. After analyzing a king's unique configuration of potential enemies and allies, Kautilya then coldly calculated how that king must think and act. "The king, endowed with personal excellences and those of his material constituents, the seat of good policy, is the would-be conqueror. Encircling him on all sides, with territory immediately next to his is the constituent called the enemy. In the same manner, one with territory separated by one (other territory) is the constituent called the ally." (39) This much just repeats the principles of foreign policy discussed above, but then notice how Kautilya regarded neighboring states: "A neighboring prince possessed of the excellences of an enemy is the foe; one in calamity is vulnerable; one without support or with weak support isfit to be exterminated; in the reverse case, fit to be harassed or weakened. These are the different types of enemies." (40)
In his excellent discussion of Kautilya's Mandala theory of foreign policy, Singh continues by correctly stating that this is ancient India's most notable contribution to political theory. (41) Although Singh analyzes Kautilya's theory well, he makes a mistake in labeling the Mandala theory an argument based on the doctrine of the balance of power. Kautilya, in fact, was not offering a modern balance of power argument. In the twentieth century, international relations theorists have defended the doctrine of the balance of power, because equally armed nations will supposedly deter each other, and therefore no war will result. One does find this argument occasionally in Kautilya: "In case the gains [of two allies of equal strength] are equal, there should be peace; if unequal, fight," (42) or, "the conqueror should march if superior in strength, otherwise stay quiet." (43) Whereas these balance of power theorists suggest that a nation arm itself so that it can ensure peace, Kautilya wanted his king to arm the nation in order to find or create a weakness in the enemy and conquer, even to conquer the world.
In reading his Arthasastra, we find no moral considerations other than a king doing what is right for his own people. Rather, we discover merely what Kautilya regarded as the nature of power. The king, he wrote, "should march when by marching he would be able to weaken or exterminate the enemy." (44) And Kautilya assumed that every other state would act in a like manner because "even the equal who has achieved his object tends to be stronger, and when augmented in power, untrustworthy; prosperity tends to change the mind." (45) Just as did Thucydides, Kautilya regarded a request for negotiations as a sign of weakness, indeed a desperate act of a weak nation trying to survive: "A weaker king may bargain with a stronger king with the offer of a gain equal to his troops, when he is in a calamity or is addicted to what is harmful [that is, women, wine, or gambling] or is in trouble. He with whom the bargain is made should fight if capable of doing harm to him; else he should make the pact." (46)
Whereas Carl von Clausewitz said that war is just an extension of domestic politics, (47) Kautilya argued that diplomacy is really a subtle act of war, a series of actions taken to weaken an enemy and gain advantages for oneself, all with an eye toward eventual conquest. A nation's foreign policy should always consist of preliminary movements toward war: "In this way, the conqueror should establish in the rear and in front, a circle (of kings) in his own interest. . . . And in the entire circle, he should ever station envoys and secret agents, becoming a friend of the rivals, maintaining secrecy when striking again and again. The affairs of one, who cannot maintain secrecy . . . undoubtedly, perish, like a broken boat in the ocean." (48) In Kautilya's foreign policy, even during a time of diplomacy and negotiated peace, a king should still be "striking again and again" in secrecy.
Consider some of the measures Kautilya supported during times of peace. If opposed by an alliance of nations, a king should secretly "sow dissensions" within the alliance until one or more of the parties in the alliance becomes weak. (49) When he has weakened a neighbor, the king "should violate the treaty." (50) Or, in another example, "The wise (conqueror), making one neighboring king fight with another neighboring king, should seize the territory of another, cutting off his party on all sides." (51) In Kautilya's view, two kinds of kingdoms confront any kingthose weak kingdoms fit to be exterminated and those strong kingdoms that, over a long period of time, one can only secretly harass and hope to weaken. He advised, "As between an enemy fit to be harassed and an enemy fit to be exterminated, acquisition of land from an enemy fit to be exterminated is preferable. For, the king fit to be exterminated, being without support or with a weak support, is deserted by his subjects when, on being attacked, he wishes to flee taking with him the treasury and the army." (52) It is best to attack an enemy that is "disunited," rather than an enemy in which the subjects have organized themselves into "bands." (53) During times of peace and negotiations, Kautilya wanted spies and secret agents to exploit the divisions within a country. Most countries, he maintained, have four kinds of unhappy subjectsthe enraged, the frightened, the greedy, and the proud. Secret agents can widen and deepen these divisions by inciting these four types of people to act against their king. The opposing king "should win over the seducible in the enemy's territories by means of conciliation and gifts and those not seducible by means of dissension and force." (54)
Because a king abides by a treaty only for so long as it is advantageous, Kautilya regarded all allies as future conquests when the time is ripe. He wrote, for example, "That ally who remains common to the enemy (and himself), he should divide that rogue from the enemy (and) when divided, exterminate him, thereafter (exterminate) the enemy." (55) Kautilya also sought to take a nation trying to remain neutral or "indifferent" and secretly provoke war between that nation and a neighboring kingdom, until the neutral nation sought his help. Then Kautilya's king could "place him under (his) obligations." (56) Kautilya himself had no moral qualms about breaking obligations or trust: "That ally who might do harm or who, though capable, would not help in times of trouble, he should exterminate him, when trustingly, he comes within his reach." (57)
Because foreign policy is just an extension of a nation's wars, the goal of foreign policy is not to end wars, but rather to ward off defeats and to make sure one is successful in subsequent warfare. For Kautilya, all ambassadors were potential spies with diplomatic immunity. (58) Indeed, he wrote an entire section about how to "fight with the weapon of diplomacy." (59)
War:
Kautilya thought there was a "science" of warfare, presumably part of a larger science of politics. The Commandant of the Army, he suggested, should be "trained in the science of all (kinds of) fights and weapons, (and) renowned for riding on elephants, horses or in chariots." (60) Just as Machiavelli advised his prince to attend to matters of warfare constantly, so did Kautilya advise the king not to leave military matters entirely to others: "Infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants should carry out practice in the arts outside (the city) at sun-rise. . . . The king should constantly attend to that, and should frequently inspect their arts." (61) Just as the king's agents spied on officials in the state bureaucracy, so too must the king have spies to assess the loyalty of soldiers. What greater threat is there to a king than having a military coup remove him from power? Kautilya recommended that "secret agents, prostitutes, artisans and actors as well as elders of the army should ascertain with diligence, the loyalty or disloyalty of soldiers." (62)
In his section on foreign policy, Kautilya wrote a startling sentence: "Of war, there is open war, concealed war and silent war." (63) Open war is obvious, and concealed war is what we call guerrilla warfare, but silent war is a kind of fighting that no other thinker I know of has discussed. Silent war is a kind of warfare with another kingdom in which the king and his ministersand unknowingly, the peopleall act publicly as if they were at peace with the opposing kingdom, but all the while secret agents and spies are assassinating important leaders in the other kingdom, creating divisions among key ministers and classes, and spreading propaganda and disinformation. According to Kautilya, "Open war is fighting at the place and time indicated; creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is error or a calamity, giving way and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which concerns secret practices and instigations through secret agents is the mark of silent war." (64) In silent warfare, secrecy is paramount, and, from a passage quoted earlier, the king can prevail only by "maintaining secrecy when striking again and again." (65) This entire concept of secret war was apparently original with Kautilya. (66)
Open warfare, Kautilya declared, is "most righteous," (67) but he was willing to use any and all kinds of warfare to achieve consolidation and expansion of the kingdom. There is no question of morality hereother than the general good of one's kingdombut only of strategy. Kautilya advised the king that "When he is superior in troops, when secret instigations are made (in the enemy's camp), when precautions are taken about the season, (and) when he is on land suitable to himself, he should engage in an open fight. In the reverse case, (he should resort to) concealed fighting." (68) How different all this is from the image of war, certainly exaggerated, found in the Hindu epics, the Mahabharata, or the Ramayana, of the central figure being the great hero in the chariot who frightened all before him. (69)
In Book 12, Kautilya faced the situation in which one rules a weak kingdom and is about to be attacked by a stronger king. He maintained that "there are three kings who attack: the righteous conqueror, the greedy conqueror and the demoniacal conqueror." (70) Whereas one can satisfy a righteous conqueror simply by submitting to his rule, one must surrender "land and goods" as well as money in order to satisfy a greedy conqueror. The demoniacal conqueror, however, will stop only when he has seized "land, goods, sons, wives and life." (71) A weak king must give up everything if it is inevitable, but he must find a way to survive to fight another day, preserving "his body, not wealth; for, what regret can there be for wealth that is impermanent?" (72) However, Kautilya did not advocate giving in to a conqueror without countermeasures and recommended that the king use "diplomatic or concealed warfare"; attempt to conciliate his enemy with gifts; direct secret agents to wield "weapons, poison or fire" to destroy the enemy's fort or camp; instruct secret agents to promote a coup by a "pretender from his family or a prince in disfavor"; send the demoniacal king listless elephants, which had been poisoned; give to the enemy king treasonable or alien troops; surrender to an entirely different king and give him all but the capital city; have secret agents instigate a revolt among the subjects of the enemy king; "employ assassins and poison-givers"; use an astrologer to persuade a "high officer" of the enemy king to try a coup; command secret agents to declare that the Regent of the king is about to take power, while the agents kill leaders at night and blame the murders on the Regent of the enemy king; use secret agents in the countryside to protest oppression of the enemy king's bureaucracy and kill agents of the king hoping to start a revolt; or finally, set fire to palaces and stores of grain and blame this on the Regent of the enemy king. (73)
Kautilya often advocated using women as weapons of war. He certainly regarded women as a source of satisfaction for troops at war, writing that when setting up camp for the army, "courtesans (should be encamped) along the highways." (74) And Kautilya certainly saw women as an addictive source of pleasure, worse than wine or gambling, that a good king must enjoy only in moderation: "Deliverance is possible in gambling, without deliverance is addiction to women. Failure to show himself, aversion from work, absence of material good and loss of spiritual good by allowing the right time to pass, weakness in administration and addiction to drink (result from addiction to women)." (75) Precisely because women are such a powerful addiction, a king can use them against an enemy; for example, if a king is trying to undermine a ruling oligarchy, he "should make chiefs of the ruling council infatuated with women possessed of great beauty and youth. When passion is roused in them, they should start quarrels by creating belief (about their love) in one and by going to another." (76) A woman supposedly in love with one leader should go to another, profess her love for him, urge him to murder the first leader, and "then she should proclaim, 'My lover has been killed by so and so.'" (77) Obviously such tactics create mistrust among leaders of an oligarchy and also bring about the death of key enemies. In the chapters about how a weak king can stave off disastrous conquest by a stronger king, Kautilya again turned, as just one possible tactic among many, to women as weapons of war, stating that "keepers of prostitutes should make the (enemy's) army chiefs infatuated with women possessed of great beauty and youth. When many or two of the chiefs feel passion for one woman, assassins should create quarrels among them." (78) Secret agents can destroy high officers in the enemy army either with poison or with "love-winning medicines." (79)
Speaking of justice to an enemy about to conquer is the last tactic of the weak, just as Thucydides showed in his recreation of the debate about Melos. In Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, the Melians try to talk about justice and fair play when facing the prospect of conquest by the Athenians, who contend that such arguments are the last, desperate tactic of those facing defeat, which the Melians "know as well as we do." The Athenians tell the Melians "that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." (80) After that both the Melians and the Athenians debate only what is in the self-interest of Athens. Similarly, willing to try all tactics, even desperate ones, Kautilya made up a powerful speech to be given by a weak king to the king about to conquer, a speech offering a mixture of moral exhortation and arguments based on the self-interest of the conqueror. In this speech, Kautilya depicted an envoy saying to the conquering king that he should accept a treaty and "pay regard to [his] spiritual and material well-being"; that conquering a kingdom willing to surrender on reasonable terms is an "impious act"; that battle is not in the conquering king's self-interest, since "to fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash deed" and the conqueror will lose troops and "material good"; that such a conquest will only unite his enemies all the more; that the conquering king's enemies are only waiting for him to be weakened in order to attack; that he himself is risking death; that war itself in which men on each side die is "an impious act"; and that he should not listen to "enemies masquerading as friends" who are giving him false advice as to his real self-interest. (81) In much the same way as Thucydides, only more dramatically, Kautilya demonstrated the realities of diplomacy and war as well as the ineffectiveness of moral pleas when confronted by a superior power.
Machiavelli longed for the legions of ancient Rome; Kautilya wanted legions, but he wanted them preceded by elephants, which acted in the ancient world a bit like modern tanks. So valuable were they that Kautilya wrote, "destruction of an enemy's forces is principally dependent on elephants." (82) As shown earlier, Kautilya considered the treasury most valuable in raising an army, procuring equipment (including elephants), and preparing for war. After the treasury and the army, Kautilya focused on the importance of the fort, on which depends "the treasury, the army, silent war, restraint of one's own party, use of armed forces, receiving allied troops, and warding off enemy troops and forest tribes. And in the absence of a fort, the treasury will fall into the hands of enemies. . . . those with forts are not exterminated." (83) (A mountain fort is more valuable than a river fort, because it "is easy to protect, difficult to lay siege to, difficult to climb." (84) )
Kautilya was inconsistent in ranking the importance of the treasury, the army, and forts, but it seems that the people, or a popular army, are the most important of all. As he put it, "one should seek a fortress with men." (85) Well before Machiavelli defended a republican army, well before Mao Zedong defended a people's war as invincible, Kautilya urged the king to be popular with the people and rely on the countryside. "If weak in might, [a king] should endeavor to secure the welfare of his subjects. The countryside is the source of all undertakings; from them comes might." (86) The "undertakings" of forts, the treasury, and the army all depend ultimately on the people of the countryside, where are found "bravery, firmness, cleverness and large numbers." (87) Kautilya here was cautiously making a revolution in warfare, relying not quite as much on the warrior class of kshatriyas. India was divided into four castes (varnas): brahmins or priests; kshatriyas or warriors and rulers; vaishyas or farmers and traders; and sh-udras or laborers. TheDharmas-utras, or law codes, writtenbefore Kautilya, urged an army of kshatriyas and, in an emergency, also brahmins (priests) and vaishyas (farmers or merchants). Kautilya had no use for brahmin troops"by prostration, an enemy may win over Brahmana troops"but he liked the energy, numbers, and strength of sh-udras, agricultural laborers treated much like serfs. (88) Kautilya's praise of ordinary men from the lower two varnas was unusual in the ancient world. He wrote, "As between land with the support of a fort and one with the support of men, the one with the support of men is preferable. For, a kingdom is that which has men. Without men, like a barren cow, what could it yield?" (89) Says Sharma, "Kautilya alone holds that the army made up of vaishyas and sudras is important." (90) Kautilya apparently believed that an army of kshatriyas was best; warriors were supposed to find their "highest duty and pleasure" by dying in battle. (91) Megasthenes, a Greek ambassador to Chandragupta Maurya's court, suggested that as much as one-fifth of the population under Chandragupta's empire were warriors or kshatriyas. (92) In addition, Kautilya clearly argued that sections of the army should consist "mostly of persons from the same region, caste or profession." (93) Using a little common sense, we can see that he is suggesting that men of an army should know one another, that an army of friends fighting side by side is the most difficult to defeat. On the subject of the king's location during battle, for example, he wrote: "A bare army, without standards, consisting of warriors related as fathers, sons and brothers, should be the place for the king. An elephant or a chariot should be the vehicle for the king, guarded by cavalry." (94) (Kautilya wanted a man who looked like the king to lead the army into battle. (95) )
And thus, a king's power, for Kautilya, is in the end tied to the power and popular energy of the people, without which a king can be conquered, for "not being rooted among his subjects, [a king] becomes easy to uproot." (96) Although Kautilya wrote of using money to raise an army and even of "purchasing heroic men," (97) he was not advocating mercenaries who fought only for pay, but he was merely outlining the cost of paying, supplying, and feeding soldiers. He believed that "hereditary troops are better than hired troops" (98) ; in other words, troops made of men born in the kingdom and thus loyal to the king since birth are better than strangers fighting for money, as Machiavelli noted so often later. It is not at all clear, remarked Kautilya, that "inviting alien troops with money" (99) is an advantage or a disadvantage.
To be continued...
rinceton University Press, 1967), 36. 
