@locker bro,
a recent article states that a think tank based on US (2 authors) states that Pak in a decade would have 3rd largest N stockpile after Russia and USA.
Report: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could become the world’s third-biggest - The Washington Post
It notes India can produce more if it wants but is not doing that.. Also the TTs say its way beyond credible minimum deterrence... the continuous rhetoric of first use seems a bit annoying to even old friends and protector like USA.. Ur views on all this?
As such how many Nukes u estimate for both India and pak as of now?
Also why the world and countries who cries the most abt India's N program dont talk abt Pak;s N program?
BTW i read an article that Pak repsentative (elected parliament) in london said world powers should restrain India and Israel as they are the biggest threat to world peace.. ironic is nt it? read it here
India, Israel hellbent upon threatening world peace: Pakistani Senator | idrw.org
The original article
A Normal Nuclear Pakistan - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Full report
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pakistan has worked hard and successfully to build diverse nuclear capabilities. It will retain these capabilities for the foreseeable future as a necessary deterrent against perceived existential threats from India. At this juncture, Pakistan’s military leadership in Rawalpindi can choose to accept success in achieving a “strategic” deterrent against India — a nuclear force posture su!cient to prevent limited nuclear exchanges and a major conventional war. Alternatively, it can choose to continue to compete with India in the pursuit of “full spectrum” deterrence, which would entail open-ended nuclear requirements against targets both near and far from Pakistan. "these choices would lead Pakistan to two
starkly di#erent nuclear futures and places in the global nuclear order.
Pakistan is now competing successfully with — and in some respects is outcompeting — India. Pakistan operates four plutonium production reactors; India operates one. Pakistan has the capability to produce perhaps 20 nuclear warheads annually; India appears to be producing about five warheads annually.
But given its larger economy and sizable nuclear infrastructure, India is able to outcompete Pakistan in fssile material and warhead production if it chooses to do so. Pakistan has prepared for this eventuality by investing in a large nuclear weapons production complex. Whether New Delhi chooses to compete more intensely or not, it is a losing proposition for Pakistan to sustain, let alone expand, itscurrent infrastructure to produce greater numbers of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Justas the Soviet Union’s large nuclear arsenal was of no help whatsoever for its manifold economic and societal weaknesses, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons do not address its internal challenges.
Pakistan seeks to be viewed as a “normal” state possessing nuclear weapons, as exempli$ed by membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Its diplomats seek a civil-nuclear cooperation agreement similar to the one accorded to India. A commercial pathway to being mainstreamed into the global nuclear order is highly unlikely for Pakistan, which lacks the commercial leverage and support that resulted in a nuclear deal for India. A di#erent path toward mainstreaming is available to Pakistan, via nuclear-weapon-related initiatives. Having succeeded in achieving the requirements of “strategic” deterrence, Pakistan is in a position to consider nuclear initiatives that would clarify its commitment to strengthening nuclear norms, regimes, and practices, and would address widely held perceptions that
its nuclear deterrence practices are a major source of danger in South Asia.
We propose that Pakistan consider $ve nuclear weapon-related initiatives:
• Shift declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence.
• Commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons.
• Lift Pakistan’s veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material production.
• Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.
• Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.
None of these initiatives would impair Pakistan’s successful accomplishment of strategic deterrence against India. "ey would, however, require di!cult and fundamental adjustments to thinking about nuclear weapons and Pakistan’s deeply ingrained habits of transactional bargaining. Precisely because these initiatives would be so di!cult and unusual for Pakistan, they would change perceptions about Pakistan and its place in the global nuclear order. As such, they could facilitate Pakistan’s entrance into the nuclear mainstream, while strengthening nonproliferation norms, bolstering global disarmament hopes, and setting the bar higher for new entrants into the NSG
.
The global nuclear order will not be strengthened by trying to accommodate a Pakistan that is greatly increasing its nuclear capabilities while rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cuto# Treaty. Nor will Pakistan become a normal, nuclear state by competing with India or by harboring groups that could spark a war with India. "e international community is unlikely to accommodate Pakistan’s desire to enter the nuclear mainstream without corresponding steps by Pakistan to align aspects of its nuclear policy and practices closer with international norms. "e steps we propose lend themselves to mainstreaming. More importantly, these steps would advance Pakistan’s
national, social, and economic security interests.
The rport in other pages touch bases and details like
The Pakistani case for mainstreaming rests on three arguments. The first is basic fairness: Pakistan deserves the same treatment and status in the global nuclear order as India. the second is stability: the subcontinent will grow increasingly unstable if India and Pakistan are treated di#erently, with India accorded favored treatment and Pakistan remaining an outlier. Providing Pakistan with the same benefits and standing as India will, in this view, stabilize the nuclear competition on the subcontinent by promoting responsible nuclear stewardship in both states. "e third is normative: the global nuclear
order will remain abnormal as long as Pakistan is excluded.
Few non-Pakistani analysts have found these arguments compelling. Absent market-oriented rationales, the international community is unlikely to accommodate Pakistan’s desires for mainstreaming unless Pakistan is willing to take corresponding steps that more closely align its nuclear policy and practices with international norms. We argue that Pakistan would become more secure by taking such steps than by continuing to compete militarily with a country whose economy is nine times larger. Moreover, if Pakistan were to take steps to strengthen nonproliferation norms — either unilaterally, or in some instances reciprocally — its case for entry into the NSG would be strengthened, with India being obliged to follow Pakistan’s lead. Pakistan would thereby paradoxically gain more leverage over Indian nuclear choices than by continuing a resource-draining nuclear competition. On the other hand, mainstreaming Pakistan into the global nuclear order without compensatory steps to buttress nonproliferation norms could increase nuclear dangers and exacerbate tensions between nuclear haves and have-nots, compounding damages resulting from the civil-nuclear agreement accorded India.
One more excerpt
By staying the present course, Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders will face very hard budgetary decisions going forward. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal requires large mortgage payments within a baseline security budget ($7 billion) that o!cially consumes 2.8 percent of Pakistan’s GDP, but, as discussed above, is assuredly much higher. According to published government documents, expenditures for atomic energy programs this past year — which may include some, but probably not all, of the activities related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program — were roughly $650 million.92 With a growing population, major social and education requirements, severe energy shortfalls and rising needs, as well
as requirements to bolster law enforcement and a judiciary that can stabilize Pakistan’s internal security, Islamabad can ill-a#ord nuclear mortgage payments that will balloon in the decades ahead. "ese expenses will crowd out more pressing requirements to improve conventional armaments that military commanders are far more likely to use, whether in North Waziristan or elsewhere
About Nasr
Pakistan could seek reciprocal nondeployment restraints from India, which has not announced plans to induct short-range nuclear systems with ranges comparable to the Nasr. For instance, Pakistan could announce that it would not store Nasr missiles within 100 km of the border during peacetime, but would only agree to nondeployment within that zone on the condition that India reciprocates. "is initiative does not constitute unilateral nuclear disarmament in short-range systems. Pakistan already possesses some short-range, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles; by limiting further production of short-range systems, by accepting a recessed deterrence posture, and by not deploying them, Pakistan would acknowledge the realities that short-range, nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons raise extremely di!cult command and control problems, and pose a greater risk of the% or, worse, accidental, inadvertent,
or unauthorized use. Pakistan would still retain some deterrence value from the limited possession and 'ight tests of the Nasr. Pakistan’s willingness to develop these capabilities comprises what "omas C. Schelling has described as “a threat that leaves something to chance.”Even so, many Indian strategists dismiss Pakistan’s threat to use short-range nuclear-weapon delivery systems against advancing Indian tanks on Pakistani territory as lacking credibility. "e
US Army realized belatedly that the incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons into any planning and operations for ground combat posed insurmountable challenges.Unless Rawalpindi can figure out solutions that eluded the Pentagon, it, too, will face insurmountable challenges associated with operations involving tactical nuclear weapons.
