India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Joe Shearer]

I am always full of admiration for GOC WC, Gen Harbaksh, for the role he played in 65 War. As commander of almost all the IA troops who took part in 65 war, he proved his mettle. He was always found wherever IA was about to break. He made his personality felt and did not feel shy in visiting the critical sectors of his front whenever there was a need.

After reading his War Despatches, I began to understand your assessment more fully. It is as you said; where he was not present, the area of action of I Corps, for instance, things did not go well.

 

[PanzerKiel]

After reading his War Despatches, I began to understand your assessment more fully. It is as you said; where he was not present, the area of action of I Corps, for instance, things did not go well.

Its both positive and negative.

Positive in the sense that GOC WC, despite the long frontage of his Command, did not shy away from visiting his frontline commanders. A commander, irrespective of his level (platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, Corps and Army), can only influence a battle with his Command Reserves. You may have noted that there were NO COMMAND RESERVES at the disposal of GOC WC. This left little choice with him except to set personal example and be visible whenever the situation turned critical somewhere. And its amply clear that his personal example and presence worked wonders and saved Indian Army many a times.

Negative in the sense that.....what if GOC WC were of the same caliber as of Commander 1 Corps, XI Corps, 1 Armd Div or even 15 Div. You can well imagine what would have happened. Gen Chaudhri, COAS, was also hardly seen anywhere, especially during the war itself.

@Joe Shearer like one of your associates told you, and you quoted here as well....Indian Army, being bigger than PA, has also greater number of duds. Its all relative. Smaller country, smaller share...bigger country, bigger share.

 

[Joe Shearer]

You may have noted that there were NO COMMAND RESERVES at the disposal of GOC WC. This left little choice with him except to set personal example and be visible whenever the situation turned critical somewhere. And its amply clear that his personal example and presence worked wonders and saved Indian Army many a times.

On reading the accounts from different points of view by different authors, this was the most incredible fact that emerged. I can hardly believe that the Indian Army attacked with such paper thin resources, and spread out in such a way that there was no local superiority anywhere, EXCEPT for two or three days right at the outset of I Corps' abortive attack.

Thank Heavens for Harbaksh Singh.

I have been promised by a rather more well-endowed member that he will get me Major General Jogindar Singh's Behind the Scene; I am looking forward to reading it as the excerpts I have read so far show it to be the same as Jake's book on his military life and his war experiences; a Chief of Staff who despised his Commander. I could only think despairingly of von Gneisenau and of Ludendorff. When will we learn to work in teams with loyalty towards each other? Is it impossible?

Negative in the sense that.....what if GOC WC were of the same caliber as of Commander 1 Corps, XI Corps, 1 Armd Div or even 15 Div. You can well imagine what would have happened. Gen Chaudhri, COAS, was also hardly seen anywhere, especially during the war itself.

I worked with the General's son, and he was one of only three managers with whom I worked successfully in 35 years; like others in my family, I was found to be an excellent superior, a prickly equal and an impossible subordinate. So I was terribly sorry, very, very disappointed to read about his performance in this test.

It was only on reading excerpts from Jogindar Singh's book that I realised that Muchu had been GOC XV Corps in his time. What was he doing, allowing his troops to be strung out like so many picquets along the tortuous border? Why did he create I Corps and recall Dunn from leave preparatory to retirement? What was he doing attacking from what clearly, in retrospect, was the wrong spot and in the wrong line of advance? Why did such a key person keep having mood swings, that Chavan reports in his diary? (I have my major reservations about Chavan, but that is another story, based on my complete antagonism towards Gopal Bewoor). How could he panic and ask that Indian troops retire behind the Beas? Why was he so ill-informed about Indian reserves and materiel status? I get a headache thinking of these; they go to bear out my theory, that I have repeatedly advanced, that the divine power was with India, not with Pakistan; nothing else can explain our survival.

You talked of 15 Div.; we had discussed this before, when you pointed out that Biji Kaul had commented that Niranjan Prasad had proved cool under fire. My objection to that remains; where did Biji hear or see enemy fire? He never saw it in his entire career, most of which was in the ASC; where did he see Niranjan Prasad braving it? Considering the rapid steps that the good Major General took when danger threatened?

I Armoured Division did not do well; however, on reading Harbaksh Singh, and on reading excerpts from Jogindar's poisoned book, I realised that my own pet hate was here, too, doing his bit. Brigadier K. K. Singh messed up in these movements, and he not only survived his ham-handed handling of his Armoured Brigade, but was leading a Division in 71, and retired as a Lieutenant General replete with honours and a Wikipedia page to himself. Theograj, to the best of my knowledge, retired in the same rank in which he fought Asal Uttar, Brigadier.

I personally think XI Corps could have done little, given an old woman like Niranjan Prasad leading one Division, and given the unbelievable decision to put a Mountain division to attack the world's best tanks with nothing much to stave them off with. However, perhaps you would say that it isn't enough to dig out excuses, it needs the digging out of victory from the situation. I believe Gurbaksh Singh was the least harmful of the top generals.

As for Dunn, the poor man should have not been recalled from Leave preparatory to retirement.

It was difficult reading these books and reading your comments. Painful.

 

[PanzerKiel]

After reading several accounts, including the source I have been using so far, Major K. C. Praval’s Indian Army After Independence, it seemed that @meghdut ‘s summary of Cloughley is the most economical. So it is presented here to take our narrative forward. @meghdut has done a marvellous job condensing Cloughley, and I have only made minor grammatical or orthographic corrections in several places.

THE SIALKOT SECTOR

The Indian attack in the Sialkot sector began on the night of 7th September on two axes; the Jammu Sialkot road and a parallel route some 12 miles to the south east. I Corps consisted of following unit

(i) 26 Inf Division, advanced on the axis of Jammu Sialkot road via the border village of Suchtgarh. G Ahmed claims it consisted of 4 Inf. Bdes and 2 Armd. Regts.

(ii) 6 Mtn. Div on the southern axis , crossed border near the village of Charwa.

(iii) 1 Armd. Joined the advance on the first light of 8th September, crossing the border near Charwa moving SE towards Chawinda; consisting of 2 Armrd Bdes with two ARs each and a lorried Ind. Bde with 2 batts. But having exchanged one/two of it’s Centurion equipped Regts. With Sherman Regts. of 2 IAB was understrength.


In the opening stages of the battle Pak 1st Cops covered the Sialkot sector with 15 Inf.Div. consisting of 7 battalions in 4 Bdes. (24,101,104,115) with 25 Cav as Armd Regt and a good allocation of artillery. But there were problems, not the least of which was that 115 Bde was fighting in the Jassar area, where it was required to remain for the rest of the war. 101, Bde (19 Punjab, 13FF) was the only formation directly defending Sialkot, and was located astride the main road to Jammu where it faced the onslaught of the Indian 26 Div. 24 bde(2 punjab, 3 FF and 25 Cav) was between the border and Chawinda, which lies due east of an almost right-angled bend in the Sialkot-Lahore railway. 104 Bde, which consisted of a single battalion 9 Baluch, was in reserve in the area of Uggoke/Raipur, about four miles west of Sialkot. It seemed that in the Jammr/Sialkot sector the Indian army might be able to bring sufficient force to bear to carry the day and even win the war. India’s 1 Corps advanced with two Inf Divisions and an Armd. Division against a Pakistani Armd. Bde and a single Inf. Division that had fragmented and understrength fighting units, no cohesive defensive plan, and some leaders of dubious quality who were always under considerable pressure. India’s 1 Armd. Div was ready to exploit the advantage won by the infantry that preceded it. The way to west seemed open.


6 Armd division , consisting of the Guides Cav, 22nd Cav. 1st SP Regt. Of 25 pdr on tracked chassis, and 4 FF (in total a Bde of 80 tanks 12 guns and 700 infantry) was in leaguer around Kot daska, 15 miles SW of Sialkot and 30 miles west of border . Chawinda, where it was to win it’s spurs , was 20 miles away. The units moved quickly when it became apparent that the Indian invasion was taking place.

THE INDIAN THRUST ALONG THE MAIN SIALKOT ROAD

In the north 2 batts of India’s 26 ID crossed the border astride the Jammu-sialkot road at midnight on 7th September. They quickly overcame the outposts of the Sutlwj Rangers but were brought to a halt by 101 Bde and weight of PA artillery. According to Mankekar and Johri, the approaches to Sialkot ‘bristled with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun-emplacements’, the latter including ‘ three field and one medium artillery regts. one heavy battery and one heavy mortar regts’. A concentration of this number of guns and mortars would cover an area of 500/150 meters in which the weight of shells and mortar bombs from one round of fire from each equipment would be approximately two tons. It does indicate that PA artillery fire was substantial and effective.

26 div. managed to reach the village of Kalarawanda, about 3 miles west of the border, by the time of the cease fire . There was a massive effort on the part of the IA on the northern axis of the Sialkot front, but an advance of only 3 miles cannot be called satisfactory when one considers the numerical superiority of 26 div. the defence of Sialkot by 19 Punjab and 13 FF and their supporting gunners were effective.

CHAWINDA BATTLES

Also at about midnight of 7th , two bdes of India’s 6 mountain division crossed the border south of the 26 div. axis and occupied the villages of Maharajke and Charwa just inside Pakistan. The battalions in the assault were 4 Raj Rif, and 2/5 Gurkha rifles. They secured the firm base for the advance of 1 AD at first light. In fact although the armour came through as planned, the immediate border area was not secure for several days because PA stay behind parties wreaked havoc by sniping and ambushing. The division’s 1 AB reached the village of Phillora and the line of the Sialkot-Lahore railway by 0900, but it’s right flank was exposed by the failure of 43 inf bde to move quickly enough to keep up. Explanations vary regarding the reasons for this, Johri claims there was a downpour which bogged down the vehicles, Verghese states the armour simply outran the wheeled vehicles, but whatever happened, the Armd Bde had no flank protection. Then a hastily assembled ad-hoc force under direct command of HQ 1 Corps Gujranwala , moved east quickly and stuck on 8 September. It forced the IA back to border where it remained for two days before advancing again.

The PA had three Armd. Regts. and three Inf.battalions, a mixture of units from 1st Armd.(6th?) and 24 Inf. Bde. India had two Armd. bde with two Regts. and an Inf. Battalion. Forces about equal strength had met in battle and one had been made to retreat. Unfortunately for PA, it had insufficient armour immediately available to strike a quick blow that would have destroyed the Indian armour which was, naturally , in some disarray,. Even Verghese claims that “1st Armoured division was hit….hard in the rib, because it dashed forward somewhat rashly”.

Both sides used the lull to regroup. The Indians rapidly regained balance and probed forward, while the Pakistanis brought up as many reinforcements as they could to match the preponderance of Indian armour, which was also being augumented. It was a desperate time for PA. they well knew IA still had reserves while almost every unit of PA ORBAT was already committed to the fight. 11 Cav arrived from Chhamb along with 4 Inf. Bde(14 Punjab and 6FF) not a minute too early to join ain defending the area against the Indian assault which began at first light of 11 September.

The Indians advanced on two axes, Charwa-Chawind and Kaloi-Pagowal. The battalion group advancing on the latter route was repulsed and forced to fall back to the Kaloi area. On the Chawinda axis, the Indians reached Phillora after a series of head-on tank and infantry battles in which the two sides slugged it out until dusk when 5 Jat(100 killed), 5/9 GR, elements of the Poona Horse, and 4 Horse took and held the village. Battles raged over the area until cease-fire. The Indians knew it was essential for them to take Chawinda; the Pakistanis knew that if they did, the ground between Lahore and Sialkot would open up for their further advance as there were no forces available for defence further west. On 12 Spetember the PA tried without success to retake Phillora and next day Indians tried to outflank Chawinda from the east but, in an impressive display of flexibility, PA moved 19 and 20 Lancers and 1 FF (of 1 Ad) to tis defence and the Indian advance was halted after fierce fighting. Gulzar Ahmed acknowledged that “It must be said to the credit of the Indian AArmy that they fought with commendable courage and determination on this day”. An attack against Chawind was planned on 14th but, in classic employment of good intelligence and efficient artillery, the PA located the FUP of the Garhwali battalion that was to lead the assault and brought fire down on it. The battalion was forced to withdraw and the attack did not take place.

On the night of 15/16 September the Indians again tried to outflank the main PA force, this time by pressing west to Jassoran, three miles due west of Chawinda, across the railway line, then south to cut off Chawinda from the rear. Once the village was isolated, the Indians considered it would fall. At first the advance went well, with Jassoran being occupied at about 1100 on the 16 by 8 Garhwali rifles, supported by 1 Sqdn of 2 Poona Horse. The infantry than turned south and managed to take the village of Buttar Dograndi, but their armour was engaged so heavily by PA AT weapons that it could not advance further. The battalion held out until 17th then was forced to withdraw to Jassoran. It had been impossible to reinforce the unit in order to continue the advance, but neither could the Pakistanis bring in enough force to mount a counter attack. Furthermore the PA artillery was running short of ammunition. By mid September the daily allocation of 155mm ammo was five rounds per gun! The embargo on Pakistan was taking effect.

In spite of ammo shortage and tank casualities, the PA regrouped and managed to clear the area west of Chawinda around the railway line on 18/19 September; but did not manage to fully retake the station at Alhar, the north side of which remained in Indian hands until the cease-fire. The PA planned Operation Wind Up for 19/20 September with the aim of outflanking the Indians and penetrating west to cut them off. But it was cancelled for various reasons.

Some points from my side regarding the battle of Chawinda / Sialkot

Indian 1 Corps was raised in April - May 1965 as a spare HQ, with its Commander P O Dunn junior to Sparrow who was commanding 1 Armored Division under him. Initially there were no troops under command HQ 1 Corps.

The mandate given by GOC WC to GOC 1 Corps was..
Advance along axis Pathankot-Samba, EITHER towards Jammu or Daska to relieve Jammu...
OR establish bridgehead on Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak area, and then advance till MRLC.

Later 1 Armored, 6 Mountain, 14 and 26 Infantry Divisions were placed under command 1 Corps.

Overall final plan was for 6 Mountain and 14 Infantry Divisions to secure a lodgement from which 1 Armored Division will breakout. 26 and 14 Infantry Divisions were to protect the flanks of 1 Armored Division by pushing towards Sialkot and Zafarwal respectively.

PA 6 Armored division had its own problems due to its hasty raising. They included...
- Absence of Brigade HQs between Div HQ and units
- Absence of Div artillery HQ
-absence of Col Staff
-each armored regiment had one squadron of obsolete M36B2 tank busters.
-Armored Infantry units had no APCs, only trucks.
-15 RRs per unit instead of 27 RRs.
-Ineffective signal comm eqpt
-6 Armored Division was actually to undergo a test exercise in Oct 1965 to gel some cohesion due to the hasty raising, but the war came first.

Strangely, once IA 1 Armored Division was identified, PA 6 Armored Division was given a defensive task to hold ground, a task suited for infantry formations, not armor.

As usual , IAF again failed to play any role in furthering the operations of IA 1 Corps.

IA 14 Division also missed a golden opportunity to capture Zafarwal keeping in view of paucity of troops on PA side initially.

Overall, Op Nepal ended as a stalemate.
Root cause which was identified was lack of schwerpunkt....there was no real strength of IA forces on any given axis.

Op Nepal forces advanced on a wide front which resulted into dilution of forces. Hence, again, there were NO RESERVES with Corps / Div commanders.
14 Division was supposed to be the Corps reserve formation, but it was initially cannibalized, and subsequently scattered.

Moreover, there was strategic direction of IA 1 Corps...a specific direction in which the Corps could have focused all its efforts.

1 Armored Brigade of IA 1 Armored Division operated with only two armor regiments, there was lack of a third regiment which could have been used for exploitation.

GOC 1 Armored Division, instead of showing boldness and going deep or for outflanking maneuvers, settled for shallow jabs only.

IA feint at Jassar and diversionary effort could have better exploited if these actions could have been included in the overall planning.

1 Corps overall showed undue caution which was clear by its policy of detaching major forces for flank protection instead of in attack.

Weak command and control of GOC 1 Corps was also clearly evident.

It can also be said that overall, this battle was a competition between the ineptness of Indian commanders in applying operational strategy principles and inability of PA commanders to handle large formations in the field.

PA suffered due to incorrect assessment of IA strength and its intentions. PA in Sialkot had no reason to be surprised by IA 1 Corps offensive since it opened two days after 6 September.

Later, in a hurried fashion, PA pulled out 1 AD from Khem Karan and deployed it in Sialkot sector with no plans for its employment. This shows that there no peacetime contingency plans for employment of PA 1 AD in Sialkot sector.

Later, it was also found that IA was operating with outdated maps, with no new features or names. This shows their peacetime preparation and planning for an offensive in Sialkot sector.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Indian 1 Corps was raised in April - May 1965 as a spare HQ, with its Commander P O Dunn junior to Sparrow who was commanding 1 Armored Division under him. Initially there were no troops under command HQ 1 Corps.

He was actually recalled from leave preparatory to retirement! Why this formation was felt necessary, and why this Corps Commander was dragged out of seclusion, will remain a mystery.

The mandate given by GOC WC to GOC 1 Corps was..
Advance along axis Pathankot-Samba, EITHER towards Jammu or Daska to relieve Jammu...
OR establish bridgehead on Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak area, and then advance till MRLC.

It seems that the parallel (and most irregular) conversation between the COAS and the Corps Commander, eliminating the Army Commander (GOC-in-C Wn. C.) quite early on decided on one of these alternatives and went strong on it.

This unfortunate short-circuiting continued throughout the very brief prelude to hostilities. Fortunately so; it is uncomfortable to think of what might have happened given more time for these interpersonal dynamics to play out.

Overall final plan was for 6 Mountain and 14 Infantry Divisions to secure a lodgement from which 1 Armored Division will breakout. 26 and 14 Infantry Divisions were to protect the flanks of 1 Armored Division by pushing towards Sialkot and Zafarwal respectively.

I thought, after reading again, that establishing the bridgehead - securing a lodgement - was done quite efficiently. The next part didn't quite go off, and I'd like to know your assessment of why. One reason could be the September time-frame and the state of bad roads, but there must be other reasons, which is where I do not have the boldness to go.

- Absence of Brigade HQs between Div HQ and units
- Absence of Div artillery HQ
-absence of Col Staff
-each armored regiment had one squadron of obsolete M36B2 tank busters.
-Armored Infantry units had no APCs, only trucks.
-15 RRs per unit instead of 27 RRs.
-Ineffective signal comm eqpt
-6 Armored Division was actually to undergo a test exercise in Oct 1965 to gel some cohesion due to the hasty raising, but the war came first.

That is a bit stunning to read, but points to a conclusion that both sides were ill-prepared, that another six months would have done both armies a world of good.

MAYBE placing Dunn in charge of I Corps was a prelude to pushing up Rajinder Singh after Dunn's retirement very soon afterwards.

As usual , IAF again failed to play any role in furthering the operations of IA 1 Corps.

THIS needs a separate thread!

Chavan in his diary is so pleased with Arjan Singh. The government is pleased with Arjan Singh and gives him the 5 star rank (after retirement).

Why?

IA 14 Division also missed a golden opportunity to capture Zafarwal keeping in view of paucity of troops on PA side initially.

Again, to paraphrase, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. There was nothing (almost) facing 14 Division. What slowed them down?

 

[PanzerKiel]

I thought, after reading again, that establishing the bridgehead - securing a lodgement - was done quite efficiently. The next part didn't quite go off, and I'd like to know your assessment of why. One reason could be the September time-frame and the state of bad roads, but there must be other reasons, which is where I do not have the boldness to go.

Yes you are right. The lodgement operation went well.

For 1 AD, two routes were choosen.
43 Lorried Brigade was to advance along Green route towards Bhagowal. 1 Armored Brigade was to advance on Red route towards Phillaurah.

Problem here was that for 1 AD, there was no alternative apart from these two routes ONLY.

43 Lorried Brigade was the first to bog down due to single track limitation and mud due to rain.

Moreover, the left flank of 1 Armored Brigade was left unprotected since 62 Cav, which was supposed to protect it, was lacking aggressiveness and was facing broken ground as well. PA 13 FF, which was an R&S unit equipped with 106 RRs, duly exploited this gap and destroyed SP guns which were moving behind the lead armor regiments of 1 Armored Brigade. 1 AB, thinking of being attacked by PA armor from the rear, stopped and then withdrew towards Sabzpir.

After Philaurah, 1 AD was given two days break. This time, 1 Armored Division tried to outflank PA defences from the west, however, they bumped into the 4 Corps Artillery gun areas, where PA artillery engaged them with open sights. This, along with counter attacks by PA armor, repulsed 1 AD attack.
1 AD tried the same thing again on 16 Sep, again was engaged by artillery and tanks, but this time, it was pulled out for good, around 20 Sep.

Again, to paraphrase, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory

We have already discussed this aspect, we know both armies did this in 65 and 71.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yes you are right. The lodgement operation went well.

For 1 AD, two routes were choosen.
43 Lorried Brigade was to advance along Green route towards Bhagowal. 1 Armored Brigade was to advance on Red route towards Phillaurah.

Problem here was that for 1 AD, there was no alternative apart from these two routes ONLY.

43 Lorried Brigade was the first to bog down due to single track limitation and mud due to rain.

Moreover, the left flank of 1 Armored Brigade was left unprotected since 62 Cav, which was supposed to protect it, was lacking aggressiveness and was facing broken ground as well. PA 13 FF, which was an R&S unit equipped with 106 RRs, duly exploited this gap and destroyed SP guns which were moving behind the lead armor regiments of 1 Armored Brigade. 1 AB, thinking of being attacked by PA armor from the rear, stopped and then withdrew towards Sabzpir.

After Philaurah, 1 AD was given two days break. This time, 1 Armored Division tried to outflank PA defences from the west, however, they bumped into the 4 Corps Artillery gun areas, where PA artillery engaged them with open sights. This, along with counter attacks by PA armor, repulsed 1 AD attack.
1 AD tried the same thing again on 16 Sep, again was engaged by artillery and tanks, but this time, it was pulled out for good, around 20 Sep.



We have already discussed this aspect, we know both armies did this in 65 and 71.

I had hoped, but dared not expect, such an answer. The matter is so much clearer after your illuminating comments.

I keep reading about this legendary Pakistani cavalry regiment that threw itself across the path of the oncoming 1 Arm. Brigade, and frightened them into retreat. Where did this incident take place?

 

[PanzerKiel]

I had hoped, but dared not expect, such an answer. The matter is so much clearer after your illuminating comments.

I keep reading about this legendary Pakistani cavalry regiment that threw itself across the path of the oncoming 1 Arm. Brigade, and frightened them into retreat. Where did this incident take place?

25 Cavalry, Col Nisar, he also retired as a Brigadier. Must remind you of several who ended like him.

 

[Joe Shearer]

25 Cavalry, Col Nisar, he also retired as a Brigadier. Must remind you of several who ended like him.

Some of the best did, while the K. K. Singhs and the Gopal Bewoors soared.

Within this narrative, we have Brigadier Theograj retiring as Brigadier; he performed perhaps the best among the general officers in the conflict.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Some of the best did, while the K. K. Singhs and the Gopal Bewoors soared.

Within this narrative, we have Brigadier Theograj retiring as Brigadier; he performed perhaps the best among the general officers in the conflict.

On our side, apart from Brig Nisar (25 Cav), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 AD), Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div) and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Div at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

 

[Joe Shearer]

On our side, apart from Brig Nisar (25 Cav), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 AD), Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div) and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Div at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

I know General Malik was posted as Ambassador to Turkey and died mysteriously in a road accident. To hear that General Sarfraz, after that back to the wall defence, was sidelined, and Abrar, after making an ad hoc formation slapped together from what was essentially war wastage reserves fight for every inch against the chosen men of the Indian Army, causes mixed feelings.

It is sad that their services were not retained for their Army. The fighting spirit they showed, most of all, Nisar, would have helped Pakistan six years later.

It is a good thing for us in India that their country did not value them as it should have. To have had them fighting for Pakistan would have been troubling, knowing, as all do, what happened in Bewoor's beat, knowing Khambata's paralysis and frozen inactivity after Longewala, knowing that Manekshaw's personal urgings got nowhere close to breaking the timid and indecisive responses of several key commanders in this theatre. Eftekhar Janjua of Kutch fame, who survived, troubled us enough at Chhamb; nobody likes to talk about that, and nobody cares to remember that, against the backdrop of the campaign in the east.

I am gathering material for my note to you and @jaibi about the Indian perspective on counter-insurgency, and the experience behind Vairangte, covering police, para-military and military actions alike, but after that is done, it is a great desire of a large number of us that you should illuminate a narrative of the western front actions of 1971 as you have done this.

 

[PanzerKiel]

The fighting spirit they showed, most of all, Nisar, would have helped Pakistan six years later.

it is a great desire of a large number of us that you should illuminate a narrative of the western front actions of 1971 as you have done this.

Even then, despite being sidelined as commandant of Armor School , Brig Nisar was given command of the famous ad-hoc Chengez Force in Sialkot sector where he was supposed to fight a delay action for 72 hours but was able to delay IA for more than a week. God knows what would have happened if he would have been commanding 8 Armored Brigade at Barapind.

As far as 1971 is concerned, I would love to.

Am all for it, you decide.....

 

[PanzerKiel]

GENERAL AKHTER HUSSAIN MALIK LETTER TO GENERAL ABDUL ALI MALIK

My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:
a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.
b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.
c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.
d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.
e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!
f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.
g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik

 

[saiyan0321]

GENERAL AKHTER HUSSAIN MALIK LETTER TO GENERAL ABDUL ALI MALIK

My Dear brother,
I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:
a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.
b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.
c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.
d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.
e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!
f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.
g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.
I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.
Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik

Lets try to revive this old thread.

I remember reading this letter before and one of the first questions that came to my mind was did we succeed in bringing the Kashmir issue out of the freeze? i am guessing the international light to Kashmir issue was meant to be UN Resolutions and Super Power pressure for plebiscite. So did that materialize? If we look at the resolutions then it would seem that it did not materialize at all.

Some of the best UN resolutions that carried the favorable position for Pakistan were the resolutions in the 1950s and i would guess that the non-freezing of the issue was, the coming of such Resolutions. Let me add to that.

In 1950 the council Passed Resolution 80 which was a marked shift from Resolution 47 since contrary to 47, Resolution 80 called for mutual demilitarization of Kashmir and withdrawl of the armed forces by Pakistan and India, it called upon local authority to govern the three regions, Gilgit Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and the State of Kashmir which meant that the Resolution gave a form of defacto credence to the Azad government and ofcourse to the Azad forces which were equated with the State of Kashmir forces.

The all important Mcnaughton report and his solutions were made part of the Kashmir resolution. Then in 1952 we had Resolution 98 which again gave credence and recognition to the Azad forces since the number of troops by both Pakistani, Indian, Azad forces and State of Kashmir were decided. Post them the 1957 Resolutions called for restraint by both parties.

So an unfreezing would be the above and its implementation, disregarding any opposition. However the 1965 resolutions were Ceasefire resolutions in relation to Kashmir. Ofcourse discussions were held in the UN but starting a war and sending in military men and risking a war for a few words is not equitable exchange. Equitable exchange on the minimum would have been atleast a Resolution in line with the Resolution 80 or 98 or some form of absolute pressure.

The reason why i am saying this is because in war we study military objects and how those objects were achieved and how and why those objectives failed and while we study every aspect from Gibraltar, grandslam, Khem Karan, Lahore, sialkot, Haji pir Pass, Akhnur dagger, however we ignore this war objective and it was a war objective which was to bring the Kashmir issue in the scope of the world. Why and how did that objective fail and whether it failed or not? This question is ignored and i think the reason is that it is seen as a last saving grace where it is stated that " look atleast we got this objective." However lack of concrete resolution makes one wonder whether it was this objective where we witnessed our greatest failure or not. From 1965 November Resolution 126 was the last one and it spoke only of ceasefire and then the next resolution was in 1971 concerning December 1971.

From the political non-freezing front, what did we gain and if this was the central objective then what did we hope to gain and what did that gain look like? Initiating a conflict is such a big thing that the result should have been greater than the Resolution 80

 

[saiyan0321]

Adding to the Previous post, the political objective of internationalizing Kashmir didnt happen and along with that we witnessed that Pakistan's own stock in the International world plummeted since the US denied military exports to both countries and this embargo hit Pakistan the hardest since it was reliant on military equipment whereas we witnessed how in the Iran and Iraq war, the US helped Iraq everywhere it could.

So if we compare these two situations. The Resolution 80 and the non-existence of another of its kind post 1965 and the US support where for Pakistan it created an embargo but in Iraq Iran war, it supported Iran as much as it could which means that in terms of political goals of Internationalizing Kashmir and gaining International support, Pakistan failed in both objectives. So what was the reason for such a failure.

A major reason were the following.

1. Political objectives do become part of the war effort. That is natural like General Lee in the American Civil War where he counted on the political defeat of lincoln as a means for an end to the war effort of northern america. However this case was different because here Political objective was not becoming part of the war effort but war effort was becoming part of the political object. This meant that the political side of things was extremely effort and the entire skirmishes and battles would be centered around the political concept. The political objects werent just the internationalizing of Kashmir or the world support after but also internal political dynamics that were part of this as well. A victory would allow Ayub Khan more security and more power and would see the Democratic Restoration Movement die out which werent just happening in Pakistan but also in Azad Kashmir and coming to Azad Kashmir, by 1965 there were protests for the implementation of a proper governance system and a victory in concern of Kashmir would have given Ayub Khan a strong excuse when dealing with Ghulam Abbas, Sardar Ibrahim, Abdul Qayyum, Khurshid and amanullah. All of them especially the last name as Amanullah and his Plebiscite party was creating a very disturbing situation in Azad Kashmir. A victory in the Kashmir cause would allow Ayub Khan to not only stand as a titan infront of these politicians but would have also allowed him to garner more central power of Azad Kashmir as hero of Kashmir. Akhtar Malik may not know this but Ayub needed that victory to be his and his alone because All of those names had huge prestige behind them and they were all respected in Kashmir. Ayub needed something of the same stature to stand against them.
By focusing on political objectives, the war effort did not receive the necessary time and strategic planning that would have taken into account all the factors like the most important one that whether this action would lead to war and if it did, would India open another front? You are starting a major operation with the thought that this is done to internationalize Kashmir, then you are going to struggle when things get out of hand.

2. Whether Political or military, an objective of the war must be achieved and for its achievement, all planning and resources must be spent and all scenarios must be taken into account. Pakistan leadership did not take into account how far Is India willing to go which was quite odd considering that in 1962, India displayed that it was willing to enter into military solutions against military attacks. Yet even with that, we witness that the strategic thinking was simply not given its due share and the objectives were based on the best case scenario rather than the worst case scenario. The political objective of internationalization was also not given its due share of thinking like what happens when the world does not focus on the flashpoint but on those that are making it a flashpoint. Pakistan wanted to display initially that look, people are fighting the Indian army and are capturing areas and the situation is getting worse and when it would reach its apex either the UN would intervene or Pakistan would intervene militarily like it did in 1948. This was gibraltar however this was absolutely the best case scenario. Worst case scenario was that the infiltration effort would fail and the world would start to condemn Pakistan as aggressive and India would retaliate strongly. Basically that is what happened. Where was the solution for this. Why wasnt this analyzed? what was the counter plan in the UN? There was none and Bhutto played a very leading role in this.

3. The US support was dwindling by mid 1960s and was not at the level of 1950s which we saw with Pakistan trying to shift from the US influence when it condemned the Us actions in Vietnam and when Pakistan started to have greater relations with China which irked the US greatly especially the Sino-Pak Treaty 1963 and although they never condemned the treaty, they were not pleased that Pakistan had hatched out a dispute resolution. By 1965 the relations were sour between the two countries and here is the thing, In bhutto's book myth of independence, we see bhutto write on this topic on how the US wanted Pakistan to lend credence to the US war effort since it was getting no support and there was diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, so here we witness one of the worst case scenarios already taking place that the strategic ally was angry and i think because of that, US also canceled a state visit to Pakistan. So when this was happening, how could we count on the US support in our war effort. By the end of 1950s, we witness that the US was getting closer and closer to India since India offered a concrete ground to contain China. By mid 1960s it was abundantly cleat that the US relations with Pakistan and India were not like their Relations with both the nations in the 1950s. So expecting Us support as a political objective would be similar to having annexation of Calcutta and Delhi as the 1965 military objective. It was that impossible and the exact same thing happened. Pakistan, which had used alot of its ammunition and was not exactly home to huge reserves of equipment, found itself in a military embargo by its largest military importer. India on the other hand had the USSR


4. Now we come to resolutions. When the war effort began i.e gibraltar, did Pakistan file for any UN meeting or try to present any resolution or did anything beforehand to make sure the wheels would immediately turn the moment gibraltar began? No it had not. Pakistan had done little diplomatic homework in order to make sure the operation remained as much a secret as possible and due to this alot of the wheels that turned were left to their own devices for turning rather than being egged on by the prepared homework. Ideally the moment gibralter began, three days later the nations, under diplomatic influence should have presented resolutions and condemnations to India and the US making hostile statements and the UN floor echoing with Kashmir. There was no foreign policy homework. Military objectives require military preparation like if you annex to amritsar then the army would be creating corps and divisions for attacking and defending and holding, buying ammunition and equipment and vehicles for transport, paramilitary to be trained for hostile occupied regions. Military objective would see military preparation and just like that political objectives would see political preparation. The german empire happily allowed Lenin to send his papers and writing to Russia so that the Russian empire would become occupied with internal dissent. That is a semblance of political preparation. We seemed to have done nothing but the idle promises of Bhutto and the result was that the military objectives did not witness that much of a failure than the political ones did. They flat out failed and they were the ones that needed the most preparation.

and with that i hope @PanzerKiel and @Joe Shearer would start the 1971 war. Joe dont dilly dally