India Military Must Fill Gaps To Become Top Pacific Power: The Four P’s

[arp2041]

India has a long way to go before it becomes the security provider that Washington and the rest of Asia hope India will become. As most knowledgeable analysts and observers are aware, it takes much more than a large defense acquisition budget and occasional military presence to develop a credible and capable defense force. In the case of India, there are key lacunas in its defense modernization which point to a defense establishment that has a long way to go before it becomes a world class military force that can become, in the words of the U.S. Defense Department’s strategic guidance, “a provider of security.”

India’s recent push for defense modernization has received a considerable amount of attention for the magnitude of its defense spending on a variety of weapons systems. These weapons procurements, combined with episodic displays of Indian military presence through counter-piracy patrols, disaster response, high profile naval exercises, and port visits, have led many observers to opine that India will play a pivotal role in promoting security and stability throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

India’s defense modernization challenges can be best captured through four dimensions that either define the Indian defense environment or point to areas that require significant reform or change. Taken together, these four areas can be collectively called the Four P’s of Indian defense modernization.

Public Apathy. Indian politicians do not typically win or lose elections based on their knowledge (or lack thereof) about defense and foreign policy. An Indian electorate that is overwhelmingly focused on issues of access to paani (water), bijli (electricity), andsarak (roads) has little interest in what elected leaders have done for the promotion of the nation’s defense. Their electoral demands are highly personalized and focused on their immediate needs. Partly for that reason, there are few Indian parliamentarians that take a keen interest in Indian defense strategy and modernization.

Even among wealthier voters, the focus is usually on facilitating greater business and trade opportunities rather than a muscular defense policy. The notable exception to this is when defense acquisitions become tainted with corruption. Indian politicians are extremely sensitive to any hint of corruption in defense scandals and Defence Minister Antony, a Gandhi family loyalist, is always on guard against any hint of corruption that might taint the Congress Party and its future hold on power. For that reason, defense deals are slow to materialize as bureaucrats and politicians are both extremely cautious about being caught holding the bag if a defense deal becomes tainted with corruption charges. As India’s global influence grows, one would expect there to be an attendant public debate about India’s role in the world. Yet, beyond a relatively small group of strategic-minded thinkers, the Indian government has not engaged its public in a meaningful way about these issues.

Policy coherence. India is still unsure of the type of power it wants to become. That uncertainty translates to the lack of an effective and coordinated defense strategy that guides defense procurement, force structure, military deployments, and developing relationships. Aside from its doctrine of ‘strategic autonomy’ that allows India the luxury of ‘omni-engagement’ while resisting excessively close partnerships or entangling alliances, India has yet to officially articulate its core interests through a publicly available national security strategy or defense strategy.

The Indian leadership is reluctant to promulgate such a document partly because of the potential political controversy such a document might generate. Crafting a meaningful strategy would require India to make strategic choices and prioritize its interests and partnerships. Doing so would not only put New Delhi at odds with certain foreign capitals (such as Beijing), but also domestic elements such as India’s leftists that oppose closer U.S.-India ties.

Procurement reform. As India modernizes its defense forces, it realizes that it needs to reform its process of procuring defense equipment. Historically, India has had a history of sclerotic defense acquisition which stymies the military’s ability to obtain the needed hardware for its needs in a timely manner. The Ministry of Defence’s inability to more quickly procure defense equipment can be attributed to a number of factors including excessively bureaucratic procedures, insufficient bureaucratic capacity, and concerns about the perception of corruption that can scuttle defense deals if there are charges of irregularities. The slow pace of India’s acquisition process also stymies the MOD from spending all of is allocated budget. Due to India’s inability to produce its own defense equipment (a goal to which it aspires), it has been forced to rely on foreign acquisitions for its defense needs. India has attempted to streamline its procurement process and increase transparency through its Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP), which is regularly updated to reflect reforms in acquisition procedures.

One of the major problems with India’s procurement system is that it is geared towards acquiring equipment that meets established criteria rather than obtaining equipment that provides best value. Until India develops a system that is expeditious, fully transparent, and undergirded by a philosophy of procuring best value systems, it will continue to face challenges in getting the equipment it needs. India has started the road towards this ideal, but has a long way to go to reach it.

Personnel challenges. Any all-volunteer force will face a range of challenges and India is no exception. As India modernizes its armed forces, it will require men (and women) who are well educated and technically competent. That will be challenging given the poor state of India’s primary and secondary education system. Complicating the Indian military’s recruiting challenge is India’s growing economy, which provides young people a range of opportunities in the private sector that pay well, provide upward mobility, and avoid the privations of military life. This competition for talent has manifested itself through significant shortfalls in the numbers of officers for all the services.

By various accounts, the Army is short approximately 10,500 officers, the Air Force 1,100 officers, and the Navy 1,400 officers. The Indian military is also plagued by salaries that frequently do not measure up to their civil service counterparts, let alone the private sector. The high status traditionally associated with an officer’s lifestyle since India’s independence has eroded over the past decade as India’s growing wealth has brought alternative opportunities for generating wealth and acquiring status. The Indian Army has also been recently plagued by corruption scandals at the general officer level. Complicating the picture are instances of enlisted (other ranks) personnel mutinying against their officers at various units. The new Army Chief, General Bikram Singh has put an emphasis on restoring good order and discipline, integrity and morale to the nation’s largest armed service.

Anyone who views India as a key stabilizer in the Indo-Pacificshould be concerned about India’s ability to meet these challenges. New Delhi’s ability to effectively modernize its defense is not just an issue for curious policy study, but, instead, has high stakes for Asia’s bet that India will become a democratic force for stability and security in Asia’s coming century.

India Military Must Fill Gaps To Become Top Pacific Power: The Four P’s | idrw.org

 

[jiki]

India has a long way to go before it becomes the security provider that Washington and the rest of Asia hope India will become. As most knowledgeable analysts and observers are aware, it takes much more than a large defense acquisition budget and occasional military presence to develop a credible and capable defense force. In the case of India, there are key lacunas in its defense modernization which point to a defense establishment that has a long way to go before it becomes a world class military force that can become, in the words of the U.S. Defense Department’s strategic guidance, “a provider of security.”

India’s recent push for defense modernization has received a considerable amount of attention for the magnitude of its defense spending on a variety of weapons systems. These weapons procurements, combined with episodic displays of Indian military presence through counter-piracy patrols, disaster response, high profile naval exercises, and port visits, have led many observers to opine that India will play a pivotal role in promoting security and stability throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

India’s defense modernization challenges can be best captured through four dimensions that either define the Indian defense environment or point to areas that require significant reform or change. Taken together, these four areas can be collectively called the Four P’s of Indian defense modernization.

Public Apathy. Indian politicians do not typically win or lose elections based on their knowledge (or lack thereof) about defense and foreign policy. An Indian electorate that is overwhelmingly focused on issues of access to paani (water), bijli (electricity), andsarak (roads) has little interest in what elected leaders have done for the promotion of the nation’s defense. Their electoral demands are highly personalized and focused on their immediate needs. Partly for that reason, there are few Indian parliamentarians that take a keen interest in Indian defense strategy and modernization.

Even among wealthier voters, the focus is usually on facilitating greater business and trade opportunities rather than a muscular defense policy. The notable exception to this is when defense acquisitions become tainted with corruption. Indian politicians are extremely sensitive to any hint of corruption in defense scandals and Defence Minister Antony, a Gandhi family loyalist, is always on guard against any hint of corruption that might taint the Congress Party and its future hold on power. For that reason, defense deals are slow to materialize as bureaucrats and politicians are both extremely cautious about being caught holding the bag if a defense deal becomes tainted with corruption charges. As India’s global influence grows, one would expect there to be an attendant public debate about India’s role in the world. Yet, beyond a relatively small group of strategic-minded thinkers, the Indian government has not engaged its public in a meaningful way about these issues.

Policy coherence. India is still unsure of the type of power it wants to become. That uncertainty translates to the lack of an effective and coordinated defense strategy that guides defense procurement, force structure, military deployments, and developing relationships. Aside from its doctrine of ‘strategic autonomy’ that allows India the luxury of ‘omni-engagement’ while resisting excessively close partnerships or entangling alliances, India has yet to officially articulate its core interests through a publicly available national security strategy or defense strategy.

The Indian leadership is reluctant to promulgate such a document partly because of the potential political controversy such a document might generate. Crafting a meaningful strategy would require India to make strategic choices and prioritize its interests and partnerships. Doing so would not only put New Delhi at odds with certain foreign capitals (such as Beijing), but also domestic elements such as India’s leftists that oppose closer U.S.-India ties.

Procurement reform. As India modernizes its defense forces, it realizes that it needs to reform its process of procuring defense equipment. Historically, India has had a history of sclerotic defense acquisition which stymies the military’s ability to obtain the needed hardware for its needs in a timely manner. The Ministry of Defence’s inability to more quickly procure defense equipment can be attributed to a number of factors including excessively bureaucratic procedures, insufficient bureaucratic capacity, and concerns about the perception of corruption that can scuttle defense deals if there are charges of irregularities. The slow pace of India’s acquisition process also stymies the MOD from spending all of is allocated budget. Due to India’s inability to produce its own defense equipment (a goal to which it aspires), it has been forced to rely on foreign acquisitions for its defense needs. India has attempted to streamline its procurement process and increase transparency through its Defense Procurement Procedure (DPP), which is regularly updated to reflect reforms in acquisition procedures.

One of the major problems with India’s procurement system is that it is geared towards acquiring equipment that meets established criteria rather than obtaining equipment that provides best value. Until India develops a system that is expeditious, fully transparent, and undergirded by a philosophy of procuring best value systems, it will continue to face challenges in getting the equipment it needs. India has started the road towards this ideal, but has a long way to go to reach it.

Personnel challenges. Any all-volunteer force will face a range of challenges and India is no exception. As India modernizes its armed forces, it will require men (and women) who are well educated and technically competent. That will be challenging given the poor state of India’s primary and secondary education system. Complicating the Indian military’s recruiting challenge is India’s growing economy, which provides young people a range of opportunities in the private sector that pay well, provide upward mobility, and avoid the privations of military life. This competition for talent has manifested itself through significant shortfalls in the numbers of officers for all the services.

By various accounts, the Army is short approximately 10,500 officers, the Air Force 1,100 officers, and the Navy 1,400 officers. The Indian military is also plagued by salaries that frequently do not measure up to their civil service counterparts, let alone the private sector. The high status traditionally associated with an officer’s lifestyle since India’s independence has eroded over the past decade as India’s growing wealth has brought alternative opportunities for generating wealth and acquiring status. The Indian Army has also been recently plagued by corruption scandals at the general officer level. Complicating the picture are instances of enlisted (other ranks) personnel mutinying against their officers at various units. The new Army Chief, General Bikram Singh has put an emphasis on restoring good order and discipline, integrity and morale to the nation’s largest armed service.

Anyone who views India as a key stabilizer in the Indo-Pacificshould be concerned about India’s ability to meet these challenges. New Delhi’s ability to effectively modernize its defense is not just an issue for curious policy study, but, instead, has high stakes for Asia’s bet that India will become a democratic force for stability and security in Asia’s coming century.

India Military Must Fill Gaps To Become Top Pacific Power: The Four P’s | idrw.org

a must read article . Even if it ain't look good to our members but still i would say its one of the true non biased articles , it indentifys some of the valid lacuna in our milty posturing , don't pay much attention to the trolling frm our neighbourhood frnds
(as it is surely going to happen in this thread) but put som valid solutions and pnts .

But as a military enthusiast i would always like to see an indian goverment like US or russia for whom a foriegn policy and a military policy sud have most active ones but for a democracy like india i don't think it would wrk in near future.We r putting only top man in a cabinet in to this area but vastly lakng of a strng political will and ambition to materialize it. May be we r now much messed up with our domestic problems and involved in economic development......may be our consti is giving too much freedom to our ppl and media..... i dont know may be i am completely wrong or half wrong but this kind of thing pushed me always to introspect that
Can india truly be a superpower in coming decades ?????

i would like to invite all our members to put their thoughts in it its truly a nice thing to discuss but dont put any illogical pnts.

 

[Hellraiser007]

India is not yet a complete regional power, India will arrive at world stage as a strong power but it will take some time. Following US words will become disaster for the peaceful development of India.

 

[Rajaraja Chola]

India sould take its time. We cannot become a defence power even if we have a budget of 150billion dollars next year.
maybe around 2025 we can have a stable powerfull military cover with F INSAS programmme

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

We have no intention of becoming 'top pacific power'.Indian ocean is our priority.

 

[Shardul.....the lion]

No thanks...........

 

[Tshering22]

Why would we want to dominate the pacific when the most happening place right now is IOR?


Besides, our bureaucracy is so strong that it will take eons to become a power if the current system of governance continues.

The government agencies are still stuck in Kim Il Sung's socialist era... and to think of Kejriwal and his jokers like Bhushan talking about running India in a socialist fashion...

India sould take its time. We cannot become a defence power even if we have a budget of 150billion dollars next year.
maybe around 2025 we can have a stable powerfull military cover with F INSAS programmme

We need a government like that who can plan the agenda, define process, fix gaps and deliver end to end goals rather than fidgeting with defense contracts or half the time keep running around up and down trying to find out who's done scams. The problem is in the lack of indigenous development that is being outpaced by the kind of stature our government demands from the world.

While we are expecting that level of treatment, we have done little to be able to command that respect. Even South Korea which is nowhere a military power has more indigenous weapon systems than we have, with not even a tenth resources compared to ours. This is indeed a shame.

And I blame only one thing: Red tape.

 

[Killswitch]

Why should India provide security for other countries? India has Pakistan and China as neighbors. That's enough of a workload IMHO.

 

[Dandpatta]

China can keep pacifying the pacific
We Indians should keep developing the IOR for our own benefit & interests.

 

[sancho]

a must read article . Even if it ain't look good to our members but still i would say its one of the true non biased articles ,

Posted this yesterday in another forum to the same article:

India has a long way to go before it becomes the security provider that Washington and the rest of Asia hope India will become.

So the route of the article was clear right from the begining and that's not even surprising, since the US are searching for new allies to support them in their wars, like the European NATO countries did in the past. But with Europe in financial trouble and China catching up in the superpower race with the US, new partners are important to achieve the future goals and is there a better choice than a democratic nuclear power with the biggest force besides the US, Russia and China, that has land borders to China (possibility of a second front line if necessary), that has an important location between the sea lanes from the Gulf countries to the East?

The US pushing India to a "legal" nuclear power status, possibly even to a permanent UNC seat, convincing / pressering other countries to support India, offering nearly all high tech weapon systems of the US arsenal, even by disappointing Pakistan, their former ally in the region isn't just a nice gesture, but a clear sign for India what is possible if they follow US policies.
The problem is, India is non-aligned, balances it's foreign policies quiet well and has only the interest to deploy force in the Indian Ocean region, or to the Chinese east coasts, to complete it's nuclear deterrence against China in future. That are Indias area of interest and not to be a global military power, that deploys it's forces even to the Pacific and Atlantic.

 

[Kompromat]

As long as India is importing, weapons from small arms to high tech jets,engines,tanks and subs, the dream of India becoming a power in the pacific will remain a pipe dream.No country can claim to be a power without having a credible indigenous, military R&D base. India, has a long future ahead, the dream of becoming THE Power will not come true until India is self sufficient, and technologically competitive based on its own indigenous technology.

 

[Silverblaze]

India has generally done well. Her foreign policy has been good. Its stayed out of Afghanistan and Iraq. The only problem India has is internal mismanagement.

Whether I as a Pakistani like it or not, India' voice is regarded credible internationally.

India can become a mid sized power if she avoids confrontation for some time like China and concentrate on the economy.

Following the US line could be dangerous.

 

[Abingdonboy]

As long as India is importing, weapons from small arms to high tech jets,engines,tanks and subs, the dream of India becoming a power in the pacific will remain a pipe dream.No country can claim to be a power without having a credible indigenous, military R&D base. India, has a long future ahead, the dream of becoming THE Power will not come true until India is self sufficient, and technologically competitive based on its own indigenous technology.

I don't at all agree sir. I don't think anyone can say that having a force of 126-200+ imported Rafales, 200-250+ imported FGFAs (although with Indian tech and design influence), 1-2 imported SSNs, 1 imported ACC with state of the art (imported) MiG-29Ks, 6-8 imported LHD/LPD, 22-80+ Apache imported helos, 24-30 imported P-8Is etc etc within the next decade or so is irrelevant and that India is not a power to be reckoned with. Yes to be a Super Power or whatever one must be self-sufficent to an extent but in this globalised world India would be beyond stupid to be re-inventing the wheel and not taking advantage of the global arms market that is offering the most advanced equipment on the planet.


This is simply the same stick people use to beat India with again and again and it is wearing pretty thin.

An imported bullet is going to inflict the same damage as a "made in India" bullet, no? Same goes fighters, submarines etc. Wrt sanctions- no one is stupid enough to place sanctions on India these days and in the future the likelihood of sanctions will only decrease by year and India is being smart as it is- buying strategically important equipment from those with a history of supporting India and not imposing sanctions.

Indigenous efforts are ongoing but as you can imagine these things take time.

India has generally done well. Her foreign policy has been good. Its stayed out of Afghanistan and Iraq. The only problem India has is internal mismanagement.

Whether I as a Pakistani like it or not, India' voice is regarded credible internationally.

India can become a mid sized power if she avoids confrontation for some time like China and concentrate on the economy.

Following the US line could be dangerous.

Sir do you think that by 2055-60 when India has the largest or second largest economy on Earth it can only aspire to be a "mid-sized" power?

 

[Kompromat]

@Abingdonboy My case is that India is A Power with imported weapons but cannot be The power which it hopes to become without being self sufficient. Its not all about sanctions.

 

[Abingdonboy]

@Abingdonboy My case is that India is A Power with imported weapons but cannot be The power which it hopes to become without being self sufficient. Its not all about sanctions.

Sir, please explain to me exactly what it is about if not sanctions then? Prestige? Public opinion? And by the time India becomes "the " power it aims to be the indigenous content will be significantly higher as India is investing in more and more R&D efforts