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Extract from Paper "The Growing Power of the Indian Navy" published in Military and Strategic Affairs Volume 4 | No. 3 | December 2012 of The Institute for national security studies (INSS) Israel
Written by:
1- Admiral (ret.) Yuval Zur was assistant commander of the Israeli Navy. After his retirement from the IDF he served as assistant head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. He is currently the Principal Maritime Strategic Chair at the department of Maritime Civilizations at the University of Haifa.
2-Tamir Magal is a research assistant at INSS.
3- Nadav Kedem, a former Neubauer research fellow at INSS, is a doctoral student in political science at the University of Haifa.
http://cdn.www.inss.org.il.reblazecdn.net/upload/(FILE)1362315050.pdf
In a 2007 speech, former Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Defense Shekhar Dutt defined the sphere of influence that India aspires to:
Given the size of the country and its role in the comity of nations, our security concerns are not limited to our immediate neighborhood Indias area of security interest extends beyond the confines of the conventional geographical definition of South Asia Indias security environment extends from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, including the Central Asian region in the North West, China in the North East and South East Asia.
In addition to this agreed definition, there are Indian leaders who extend this region further to the west and south. For instance, according to former Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, extended neighborhood for India stretches from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea and includes within it West Asia, the Gulf, Central Asia, South East Asia, East Asia, the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.
Indias primary interests in these regions are to defend its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), to secure Indias access to SLOCs across the Arabian Sea, and to solidify its status in these regions vis-à-vis China. In this context it is important to note that the Arabian Sea serves as a junction for maritime routes that run through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, as well as the Persian Gulf
Indian Navy Power Projection Mission
Over the past decade the Indian Navy, despite its limited size, has worked persistently to project its power and capabilities to the furthest edges of its delineated expanded neighborhood. These efforts included activities from the South China Sea to the eastern Mediterranean, and specifically within the western part of the Indian Ocean.
India is already maintaining a permanent presence in two key areas in the Arabian Sea: since 2008 there has been a permanent combat vessel stationed in the Gulf of Aden.
In addition, reconnaissance planes and combat vessels are permanently stationed near the Seychelles, aimed at monitoring the islands economic zone, as well as maritime traffic along the East African coast.
A further increase in the size of Indian naval forces would likely lead to the permanent presence of an Indian battle group in the Gulf of Aden.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a flotilla of three or four Indian vessels has made annual visits to the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and on occasion the Mediterranean. With the introduction into service of a second aircraft carrier and further growth in the size of the navy, such visits are likely to develop into the continuous presence of an Indian battle group in the Gulf of Oman.
India-Israel Naval Relations and their Potential Development
Beyond their extensive trade relations, there are large scale Israeli arms sales to India, as well as enhanced intelligence collaboration. However, these mutual relationships have thus far been restricted, in part by Indias extensive relations with Iran and Arab nations and its large Muslim minority.
These limitations have resulted in relatively minor military cooperation between the two countries, with India preferring to maintain a very low public profile on these relationships (mainly in political and security contexts). Still, there is ongoing contact between the Indian and Israeli navies, including visits of Indian ships to Israeli ports.
Technological cooperation between Israel and India developed in the 1990s in response to the Israeli defense industrys need to find new markets, which coincided with Indias need for advanced military technology. The crisis in the Russian defense industry, combined with American unwillingness to sell arms, led India to seek alternative sources for modern technology. The Israeli defense industry identified correctly the potential of the Indian market, particularly Indias need for modern maritime technology.
This technological cooperation was based on mutual interests in both navies: the Indian Navy assured itself high quality projects, advanced technology, and system specifications suited to the modern naval arena. The Israeli Navy, through its defense industries, would spearhead development and equip itself with systems that barring Indian collaboration budget restrictions would otherwise not have permitted (in terms of investment in development and the scope of procurement).
Within the framework of this technological cooperation India equipped its vessels with Barak air defense missiles and on-board radar systems. Additionally, India procured UAVs for maritime patrol missions, as well as Aerostat-borne radar and surveillance systems for coastal defense. Without a doubt, from Israels point of view, its defense export policy is the key incentive for developing cooperation between the two navies. However, the potential in these relationships is far greater.
Future Directions of Israeli-Indian Maritime Cooperation
One of the challenges facing the Israeli Navy is the difficulty of sustaining operations at long distance from Israeli ports. The Indian Navy could grant Israeli vessels access to its ports, similar to the visits of Indian ships to Israeli ports. In such a way the Israeli Navy can replenish its vessels and extend its operational reach.
Sustained collaboration between the two navies could in the long term lay the foundations for Israeli participation in international maritime enforcement operations. Without taking a stand in this regard, Israeli participation in such operations may yield substantial political gains.
Moreover, higher cooperation between the navies could enable covert operational collaboration. For example, based on existing intelligence cooperation, Israeli vessels, and in the future perhaps Indian vessels too, might be able to intercept ships that are smuggling weapons to the region. At present, there is little likelihood that India would agree to halt Iranian ships. However, it could offer behind-the-scenes assistance, in terms of intelligence and logistics, which would enable Israeli vessels to intercept suspicious ships. Indeed, it would be ill advised for Israel to rely solely on the US Navy in this regard. Despite its sheer size, even the US Navy has its limitations. Moreover, it is wiser to diversify the sources of intelligence and expand the toolbox at Israels disposal.
Furthermore, sustained cooperation fosters personal ties between Indian and Israeli officers, which in turn tend to foster and generate new channels of communication. India maintains extensive ties with Persian Gulf states, including Iran and Afghanistan, and closely monitors threats of Islamic terrorism. These may generate a shared interest in an ongoing exchange of valuable information, with appropriate attention to precautionary measures.
It is impossible to ignore the fact that Indian political and geostrategic considerations are liable to restrict the development of such cooperation. Two aspects to bear in mind, among others, are Indias preference for maintaining a relatively low profile vis-à-vis the relationship with Israel, and the importance it ascribes to preserving its connection with Iran. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable for political changes in India and/or other developments to turn higher cooperation between the two nations into a political reality. Ultimately both need each other, and thus cooperation is natural. It is essential for Israel to take an overall view of its relations with India, rather than focusing primarily on the potential for arms export. Arms exports have indeed leveraged relations favorably for Israel. However, they alone are insufficient to realize the broader potential of relations between the countries, particularly between their navies. Accordingly, such cooperation should be viewed as a prime objective that Israel should aspire to realize, in accordance with the developments and opportunities it encounters along the way.
Written by:
1- Admiral (ret.) Yuval Zur was assistant commander of the Israeli Navy. After his retirement from the IDF he served as assistant head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission. He is currently the Principal Maritime Strategic Chair at the department of Maritime Civilizations at the University of Haifa.
2-Tamir Magal is a research assistant at INSS.
3- Nadav Kedem, a former Neubauer research fellow at INSS, is a doctoral student in political science at the University of Haifa.
http://cdn.www.inss.org.il.reblazecdn.net/upload/(FILE)1362315050.pdf
In a 2007 speech, former Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Defense Shekhar Dutt defined the sphere of influence that India aspires to:
Given the size of the country and its role in the comity of nations, our security concerns are not limited to our immediate neighborhood Indias area of security interest extends beyond the confines of the conventional geographical definition of South Asia Indias security environment extends from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, including the Central Asian region in the North West, China in the North East and South East Asia.
In addition to this agreed definition, there are Indian leaders who extend this region further to the west and south. For instance, according to former Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, extended neighborhood for India stretches from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea and includes within it West Asia, the Gulf, Central Asia, South East Asia, East Asia, the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.
Indias primary interests in these regions are to defend its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), to secure Indias access to SLOCs across the Arabian Sea, and to solidify its status in these regions vis-à-vis China. In this context it is important to note that the Arabian Sea serves as a junction for maritime routes that run through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, as well as the Persian Gulf
Indian Navy Power Projection Mission
Over the past decade the Indian Navy, despite its limited size, has worked persistently to project its power and capabilities to the furthest edges of its delineated expanded neighborhood. These efforts included activities from the South China Sea to the eastern Mediterranean, and specifically within the western part of the Indian Ocean.
India is already maintaining a permanent presence in two key areas in the Arabian Sea: since 2008 there has been a permanent combat vessel stationed in the Gulf of Aden.
In addition, reconnaissance planes and combat vessels are permanently stationed near the Seychelles, aimed at monitoring the islands economic zone, as well as maritime traffic along the East African coast.
A further increase in the size of Indian naval forces would likely lead to the permanent presence of an Indian battle group in the Gulf of Aden.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a flotilla of three or four Indian vessels has made annual visits to the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and on occasion the Mediterranean. With the introduction into service of a second aircraft carrier and further growth in the size of the navy, such visits are likely to develop into the continuous presence of an Indian battle group in the Gulf of Oman.
India-Israel Naval Relations and their Potential Development
Beyond their extensive trade relations, there are large scale Israeli arms sales to India, as well as enhanced intelligence collaboration. However, these mutual relationships have thus far been restricted, in part by Indias extensive relations with Iran and Arab nations and its large Muslim minority.
These limitations have resulted in relatively minor military cooperation between the two countries, with India preferring to maintain a very low public profile on these relationships (mainly in political and security contexts). Still, there is ongoing contact between the Indian and Israeli navies, including visits of Indian ships to Israeli ports.
Technological cooperation between Israel and India developed in the 1990s in response to the Israeli defense industrys need to find new markets, which coincided with Indias need for advanced military technology. The crisis in the Russian defense industry, combined with American unwillingness to sell arms, led India to seek alternative sources for modern technology. The Israeli defense industry identified correctly the potential of the Indian market, particularly Indias need for modern maritime technology.
This technological cooperation was based on mutual interests in both navies: the Indian Navy assured itself high quality projects, advanced technology, and system specifications suited to the modern naval arena. The Israeli Navy, through its defense industries, would spearhead development and equip itself with systems that barring Indian collaboration budget restrictions would otherwise not have permitted (in terms of investment in development and the scope of procurement).
Within the framework of this technological cooperation India equipped its vessels with Barak air defense missiles and on-board radar systems. Additionally, India procured UAVs for maritime patrol missions, as well as Aerostat-borne radar and surveillance systems for coastal defense. Without a doubt, from Israels point of view, its defense export policy is the key incentive for developing cooperation between the two navies. However, the potential in these relationships is far greater.
Future Directions of Israeli-Indian Maritime Cooperation
One of the challenges facing the Israeli Navy is the difficulty of sustaining operations at long distance from Israeli ports. The Indian Navy could grant Israeli vessels access to its ports, similar to the visits of Indian ships to Israeli ports. In such a way the Israeli Navy can replenish its vessels and extend its operational reach.
Sustained collaboration between the two navies could in the long term lay the foundations for Israeli participation in international maritime enforcement operations. Without taking a stand in this regard, Israeli participation in such operations may yield substantial political gains.
Moreover, higher cooperation between the navies could enable covert operational collaboration. For example, based on existing intelligence cooperation, Israeli vessels, and in the future perhaps Indian vessels too, might be able to intercept ships that are smuggling weapons to the region. At present, there is little likelihood that India would agree to halt Iranian ships. However, it could offer behind-the-scenes assistance, in terms of intelligence and logistics, which would enable Israeli vessels to intercept suspicious ships. Indeed, it would be ill advised for Israel to rely solely on the US Navy in this regard. Despite its sheer size, even the US Navy has its limitations. Moreover, it is wiser to diversify the sources of intelligence and expand the toolbox at Israels disposal.
Furthermore, sustained cooperation fosters personal ties between Indian and Israeli officers, which in turn tend to foster and generate new channels of communication. India maintains extensive ties with Persian Gulf states, including Iran and Afghanistan, and closely monitors threats of Islamic terrorism. These may generate a shared interest in an ongoing exchange of valuable information, with appropriate attention to precautionary measures.
It is impossible to ignore the fact that Indian political and geostrategic considerations are liable to restrict the development of such cooperation. Two aspects to bear in mind, among others, are Indias preference for maintaining a relatively low profile vis-à-vis the relationship with Israel, and the importance it ascribes to preserving its connection with Iran. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable for political changes in India and/or other developments to turn higher cooperation between the two nations into a political reality. Ultimately both need each other, and thus cooperation is natural. It is essential for Israel to take an overall view of its relations with India, rather than focusing primarily on the potential for arms export. Arms exports have indeed leveraged relations favorably for Israel. However, they alone are insufficient to realize the broader potential of relations between the countries, particularly between their navies. Accordingly, such cooperation should be viewed as a prime objective that Israel should aspire to realize, in accordance with the developments and opportunities it encounters along the way.
