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INDIA: Building a Modern Arsenal in India

Russia commissions delayed SSN before leasing it to India

30 December 2009


The Akula-class (Project 971) nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) Nerpa (K 152) was commissioned into the Russian Federation Navy's Pacific Fleet on 28 December.

Local media reported that the commissioning ceremony took place at the town of Bolshoy Kamen in Russia's Far East, near to Amur Shipyard, following the completion of sea trials. Nerpa was repaired there following a fatal incident in November 2008 that delayed its delivery to the navy.

A malfunction in the boat's fire-extinguishing system during sea trials resulted in the suffocation of 20 sailors and technicians. Following repairs costing RUR1.9 billion (USD60 million), Nerpa returned to sea in July 2009.

The 9,100-ton SSN will not fly the Russian flag for long as it is due to be leased to the Indian Navy (IN) for 10 years under an agreement worth a reported USD650 million.
 
INS Vikramaditya: Waiting for Gorshkov…


Right now, there are 2 major concerns in India. One is slipping timelines. INS Viraat was scheduled to retire in 2009. It’s only semi-operational, and nearing the limits of its mechanical life, even as shortages of flyable Sea Harrier fighters are creating issues of their own. Meanwhile, the delivery date for India’s locally-built 37,000t escort carrier project appears to be slipping to 2015 or so. This leaves India’s Navy with a serious scheduling problem, and no significant carrier force.
The other concern involves Vikramaditya’s 3-fold cost increase, including worries that Russia will raise it rates yet again once India is deeper into the commitment trap. The carrier purchase has now become the subject of high level diplomacy, involving a shipyard that can’t even execute on commercial contracts. An agreement in principle reportedly exists, but negotiations that began in 2007 have yet to lead to a revised contract. Recent Russian demands have continued to raise the price, even as advance work related to India’s new MiG-29K naval fighters continues.
Now, reports surface once again that India and Russia have reached an agreement on the Vikramaditya’s price. This time, they may even be true….


Waiting for Gorshkov – A History

On Jan 20/04 India and Russia signed a $947 million deal to refurbish and convert the 40,000t Soviet/Russian Admiral Gorshkov into a full carrier, to be re-named INS Vikramaditya. Initial reports of delays sparked controversy and denials in India, but subsequent events more than justified them. The INS Viraat’s retirement is now set for 2010-2012 – but it soon became clear that even that might not be late enough. Slow negotiations and steadily-lengthening delivery times quickly pushed delivery of the Gorshkov back to 2010, and then to 2012 or later, even as Russia’s asking price more than doubled. Unless the price dispute is resolved, the continued absence of a contract that Russia will honor is likely to create even more delays.

The Vikramaditya project demands extensive modifications to the original ship. The cruiser-carrier’s guns, anti-shipping and anti-air missile launchers on the front deck would be removed and replaced with a full runway and ski jump, the deck would be widened in numerous places, its boilers would be changed to diesel fuel, the rear aircraft elevator would be enlarged and strengthened, and other modifications would be put in place to make Gorshkov a fully modern ship. The announced delivery date for INS Vikramaditya was August 2008 – an ambitious schedule, but one that would allow the carrier to enter service in 2009, around the time as their 29,000t light carrier/LHA INS Viraat (formerly HMS Hermes, last of the Centaur class) was scheduled to retire. The new carrier would berth at the new Indian Navy facility in Karwar, on India’s west coast.
When reports first surfaced that this delivery date would not be met, India’s Ministry of Defence initially tried to deflect the issue with denials. Then, in May 2007, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta said the ships will be delivered:
”...by late 2008 or early 2009…. Our officials, who are stationed at the spot, have said that the work is going on as per schedule and we can have a month long delay once the work is completed as that part of Russia is frozen for a long time.”
Later comments on this issue included this May 1/07 quote:
“The work is only three to four months behind schedule and we can expect the aircraft carrier to be delivered by late 2008 or early 2009”
Subsequent updates, however, have proven the critics to be more than correct. Cost estimates and reports concerning the Gorshkov’s final total now hover in the $2.9 billion range, of which about $600 million has reportedly already been paid. As is customary with Indian defense procurement issues, that transparency eventually came after all other alternatives had been exhausted. After the delivery delays could no longer be denied, the initial approach was to minimize their length. February 2008 news reports, however, began to give figures of up to 3-4 years before refurbishment and testing could allow the ship to enter service. Subsequent reports by Indian and Russian sources stress 2012, or even later.

That risks a gap with no serving carriers in the fleet if further delays occur, or if INS Viraat cannot have its life or its aircraft extended for another 4 years of unanticipated service. An official Indian CAG report adds that even if inducted, the warship will have no aerial defenses until 2017, whereupon it is scheduled to be retrofitted with a last-ditch CIWS gun.

Meanwhile, China is working hard to refurbish the 58,000t ex-Russian carrier Varyag, and some analysts believe the ship could be operational in a testing capacity by 2010.

Those sunk construction costs, Russian possession of the Gorshkov, the difficulty in finding a substitute carrier to replace the Gorshkov sooner than 2013, and the Chinese push with the Varyag, have all combined to give the Russians substantial leverage in their negotiations. They have exploited that leverage to the fullest. The latest Russian offer would triple the originally-agreed contract price, and reports place the current negotiating gap as sitting between India’s proposed $2.2 billion final price and Russia’s $2.9 billion.
Gorshkov-Vikramaditya: Aerial Complement

Many of Gorshkov’s key modifications are aircraft-related, including the new arrester gear and ski jump. New boilers and wiring are the other major components. The timelines and cost figures for delivery of the ship do not include the aircraft, however, which are bought separately.

The original carrier’s complement was 12 Yak-38 Forger V/STOL fighters, 12 Ka-28 helicopters, and 2 Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters. The removal of the Gorshkov’s forward missiles, addition of the ski ramp, and other modifications will improve the ship’s air complement somewhat.

The nature of its original design, however, means that INS Vikramaditya will still fall short of comparably-sized western counterparts like the 43,000t FNS Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, with its 40-plane complement that leans heavily to fighter jets. For instance, the Gorshkov would be large enough to operate full naval AWACS aircraft, but it lacks a launch catapult. If rumors prove true and India does indeed buy E-2C+/E-2D Hawkeyes, they would be likely to operate from shore.

Carriage ranges given for the refitted Vikramaditya seem to average 12-16 fighters and 4-16 of the compact Ka-28/31 helicopters; diagrams seem to suggest total stowage space for a “footprint” of no more than 15-16 MiG-29Ks, with each Kamov helicopter sporting a comparative footprint of about 0.4, and about 5-6 open footprint spots on deck.

A related $740 million contract for 16 MiG-29K (12 MiG-29K, 4 two-seat MiG-29KUB) aircraft plus training and maintenance was confirmed on Dec 22/04, with an option for another 30 MiG-29Ks by 2015. They would be operated in STOBAR (Short Take-Off via the ski ramp, But Assisted Recovery via arresting wires) mode. The MiG-29K was reportedly selected over the larger and more-capable navalized SU-33, because India also hopes to operate them from smaller “Project-71” indigenous carriers.

In addition to its fighters, the Gorshkov-Vikramaditya’s complement will include Kamov Ka-31 AEW and/or Ka-28 multi-role helicopters, along with a complement of torpedo tubes, and a CIWS gatling gun for close in defense after 2017.

Contracts & Key Events

Dec 5/09: Reports surface once again that India and Russia have reached an agreement on the Vikramaditya’s price. This time, they may even be true. Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said that during summit-level talks between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev:

“Both the leaders discussed the [Vikramaditya] issue and noted excellent progress on negotiations on price and technical issues which have been brought to a successful conclusion.”

The actual price in question is not discussed, and that political rapprochement may not be shared by the Navy. Defence Minister AK Antony has publicly distanced the Government from Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta’s recent public hard line regarding the Gorshkov’s price, and suggestions that India reassess its defense ties with Russia owing to quality issues. Adm. Arum Prakash also issued a warning, saying that: “The long-term price that we pay for 25 years of mischief, of twisting our arm will be much more than what we pay now.”


Dec 4/09: Ending a year-long wait, the first batch of MiG-29K naval fighter jets, purchased from Russia for the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, arrive in Goa in a “knocked down condition” packed in containers on board an AN-124 cargo aircraft. Press Trust of India.
Nov 30/09: Defence Minister Shri AK Antony, in a written reply to the Lok Sabha (India’s Parliament):

“The Russian side had submitted a revised Master Schedule indicating delay and increase in prices for repair and re-equipping of aircraft carrier ex-Admiral Gorshkov. The Government has agreed to conduct negotiations for finalizing a revised Repair and Re-equipping contract. Negotiations are in progress with the Russian side. Details of final prices would be known only after completion of these negotiations.
An exhaustive list of equipment to be fitted on the ship was included in the original contract. The Aircraft Carrier is scheduled to be inducted in December, 2012.”

Nov 16/09: Amidst rumors of major British defense budget cuts, The Guardian reports that India has expressed formal interest in the 65,000t CVF/Queen Elizabeth class carrier program. The UK MoD is desperately looking for long-term budget savings, but canceling either of its full-size carriers at this point would be rival the cost of finishing them:
“According to senior defence sources, Whitehall officials are examining the feasibility of selling one of the carriers. It is understood they are planning to put forward the option as part of the government’s strategic defence review, which will start early next year…. “Selling a carrier is one very serious option,” a defence source said this weekend, although the government is a long way from committing to any sale. It could take between six and 12 months to reach a decision, he added.”
Each Queen Elizabeth carrier costs about $3.5 billion, and the negotiating difference around the Admiral Gorshkov is currently around $2.2+ billion. The question is whether India would be able to buy one of the CVF carriers for less than the UK paid, in order to offer the Treasury monies that it could not otherwise obtain from the CVF program. If a refund could be forthcoming from the Russians, and a deal done with the British, investing the Vikramaditya’s $3 billion could net India a comletely new ship rather than an old and refurbished one, with double the Gorshkov’s aerial complement. Key questions include whether those deals could be secured, and whether India is prepared to wait until 2016 for the British carrier, as opposed to 2013 (and sliding…) for Gorshkov.

Then again, $2.2 – $2.5 billion could also secure India an America class light carrier from Northrop Grumman, with a similar tonnage and aerial complement to the Gorshkov, but markedly better electronics and defensive systems. If India begins to look beyond Russia for options, Britain’s CVF program is not its sole alternative.
Nov 1/09: The Times of India reports that INS Viraat is now on the verge of completing its sea-acceptance trials and work-up phase, after an 18-month-long comprehensive refit and upgrade program in Mumbai and Kochi. This will give India an aircraft carrier again. The 28,000-tonne carrier will complete its 50th year as an operational warship in November 2009, having serves as both HMS Hermes and INS Viraat.

Oct 23/09: A British BBC report explains some of the hurdles on the road to Vikramaditya’s delivery:
“In this hurry [on both sides to sign a deal], fine points including the ones relating to what was expected of Russia were overlooked…. India agreed to buy and get a ship refurbished without Gorshkov’s design [presumably means a detail design blueprint].... When the ship was ripped open, it was found that the wiring was ageing and needed to be redone. A Japanese contractor awarded the rewiring contract found the job overwhelming – given the costs involved – and left. Now a new contractor has been found for the purpose. Gorshkov’s steel plates and machinery, too, needed to be pulled apart and new ones fitted…. With Gorshkov’s induction delayed, the government decided to refit its only aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, but it will not be operational till 2015. That leaves the Indian navy with no aircraft carrier for some time.”

Oct 15/09: Despite prior reports that an agreement on the Vikramaditya’s final cost would be reached during Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s 2-day visit to Moscow, India and Russia have failed to reach agreement. Negotiations will continue. India MoD | Indo-Asian News Service.

Sept 24/09: Russia’s Vedemosti newspaper reports that the Russian Navy may decide to replace its 19 larger and longer-range SU-33 fighters on its Admiral Kuznetsov carrier with 24 MiG-29Ks, when the SU-33’s must be retired in 2015. Caution is advised, since the article is based on a source who sees a contract as possible in 2 years; that’s not exactly a rock-solid basis for concluding that India will avoid the potential trap of being the MiG-29K’s only operator. Vedemosti [in Russian] | Barents Observer.

Sept 3/09: Indian media report that a deal to finish the Vikramaditya refit is expected by mid-Octiber 2009. Some caution is advised, as past reports and predictions in this area have later been proven false by events. India’s Business Standard | The Hindu | Hindustan Times.

Aug 16/09: Indian media report that the government has cleared a $122 million bridging payment for continued modification work on the Gorshkov, while negotiations continue. The payment was sanctioned in early August, following demands by Rosoboronexport. domain-b | Economic Times of India.

July 31/09: India’s Business Standard conducts an interview with Russia’s outgoing ambassador to India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov. Excerpts:
”[VT] Not changing [the Gorshkov order], but the Indian Navy was eager to get the best, the most modern equipment [to insert into the hull].
[IBS] So the Navy’s appetite kept increasing, they wanted more and more..
[VT] Yes.
[BS] Reports are that it will cost around $2.2 billion?
[VT] It would be irresponsible of me to comment. Price negotiations are now entering the final stage. What is important for India is also the time of delivery. But the point is that if India wants additional equipment, the carrier will cost even more. So if both sides stop and decide, okay no request from India and no increase in price from our side, then we can finalise price and delivery.”

July 29/09: The CAG report begins to generate political opposition to the Gorshkov deal, as well as media op/ed calls for a re-think. In the course of one such op-ed, The Hindustan Times offers a report on the negotiating spread:
“The Russians now want $2.9 billion (Rs 14,500 crore) for the warship, while the defence ministry is bargaining for $2.2 billion (Rs 11,000 crore). [Defence Minister Antony said that] “The Russians have demanded a substantially huge amount. We are still negotiating the deal. No final decision has been taken.”

July 25/09: India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) issues a scathing report, saying that:
“The objective of inducting an aircraft carrier in time to fill the gap in the Indian Navy has not been achieved. The cost of acquisition has more than doubled [from $875 million] to $1.82 billion (Rs. 7,207 crore) in four years. At best, the Indian Navy would be acquiring, belatedly, a second-hand ship with a limited life span, by paying significantly more than what it would have paid for a new ship…”
The largest cost escalation is in sea trials, which have risen from $27 million to $500 million, and the CAG report sharply criticizes the Navy for poor project supervision practices. The report adds that planning failures will leave the warship with no air defense upon delivery, and only a Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) when one is retrofitted in 2017. Risks are also cited with respect to the aircraft arresting gear, which has not been finalized due to development problems. India CAG – they do not archive reports | DNA India | The Hindu | Indian Express | Rediff | Times of India | Agence France Presse.

May 25/09: Indian media report that the government has decided to speed up renegotiation with Russia, after a recent Moscow trip undertaken by defence secretary Vijay Singh failed to break the long-standing deadlock. The government has reportedly scheduled 3 visits to Russia by Indian officials, in hopes of sealing the deal by the end of July 2009. During those visits, they will also discuss the larger subject of Indian-Russian defense relations.
Another senior official of the Controller of Warship Production and Acquisition will reportedly visit Russia in the middle of June 2009, to work out the warship’s hoped-for 2011 trials in Barents Sea. Assuming that a deal can in fact be reached this time. Times of India.

April 6/09: India inaugurates the first phase of the MiG-29K maintenance and and training facility at the INS Hansa naval base in Goa. Vice-Admiral J. J. Bedi, Commander-in-Chief of India’s Western Naval command, is quoted as saying that:
“This is the first time in my service career of 40 years that I witness construction and availability of major infrastructure project prior to the induction of hardware in the Indian Navy.”
He expects the first batch of 4 aircraft to be “with us by middle of this year.” The Hindu.

March 16/09: Still no agreement on the Gorshkov refit. Meanwhile, The Times of India reports a Russian decision to ground its MiG-29 fleet, following accidents caused by the disintegration of the planes’ tail fins. It quoted an unidentified “senior officer,” who said that:
“We continue to fly our MiG-29s…. Our checks are stringent since we operate our MiG-29s also from coastal airbases (Jamnagar) and Russian metallurgy is susceptible to salinity.”
That’s a somewhat worrying assertion, in light of the MiG-29K naval buy. India is scheduled to finish its MiG-29A upgrades to MiG-29SMT status in 2014, thanks to a contract signed in March 2008. That effort will not be delayed by the news from Russia, but the news will reportedly delay delivery of the new MiG-29Ks to the Indian Navy.

Feb 28/09: The keel for India’s first “Project-71” 37.5t-40t indigenous carrier project is laid at the Cochin Shipyard in Kerala. The new carrier will be named INS Vikrant, after the 20,000t World War 2 era carrier HMS Herculaeus that was sold to the Indian Navy, and served as the Vikrant (from Sanskrit vikranta, “courageous/ victorious”) from 1961-1997. Ptoject-71 currently has a budget of INR 32.6 billion (currently about $650 million), but few observers believe that the final cost will remain on budget.
Delivery is scheduled for 2014-2015, and these carriers are expected to carry their own complement of MiG-29K fighters. Plans exist for a naval variant of India’s LCA Tejas lightweight fighters, but India’s history of extremely late and failed weapons projects suggests caution. Even a successful project is unlikely to induct a naval Tejas before 2016-2018, leaving both of India’s future carrier classes strongly dependent on Russian goodwill. The Hindu | Indian Express | Sindh Today.

Feb 23/09: Indian media report that Russia has demanded another $700 million, on top of their demand for an additional $1.2 billion which had been approved by India’s cabinet, on top of the original $947 million contract. The shipyard is also demanding $190 million immediately, in order to continue work. Delivery is still scheduled for 2012, but this assumes the schedule promises are kept, and that there are no work stoppages or other production delays owning to contract negotiations.
Assuming that this is in fact Russia’s final demand, it would bring the asking price for the Gorshkov to $2.85 billion. That figure could buy a similar 45.7t new-build America Class LHA-R medium carrier with funds left over, and might even buy one of Britain’s new 65t CVF Class carriers. Hindustan Times | Indian Express | Forecast International report/op-ed | Indian Express op-ed.

Feb 22/09: The Hindu quotes UAC VP and RAC MiG Director-General Mikhail Aslanovich Pogosyan, who says that Indian naval pilots have been training in Russia since October 2008. The theory portion of the course is done, and:
“Indian pilots are already training to fly the MiG-29Ks from a shore-based facility. They have been doing even 15 sorties in a day during the winter. We expect the first four MiG-29Ks to arrive in India later this year, with the other 12 being delivered by 2010.”
So far, 4 certified MiG-29Ks have been transferred to the Indian project team in Russia, after Russian test pilots have conducted carrier landing check-outs. After the course is complete, India’s Navy hopes to continue their own pilots’ training by using a Shore-based Test Facility (SBTF), built with Russian help at INS Hansa in Goa.

Feb 12/08: RIA Novosti reports that Russia has delivered the first 4 MiG-29 naval fighters to India. Oddly, they use the designation “MiG-29 Fulcrum D,” which is the NATO reporting code and not Russian or RAC MiG nomenclature.

Dec 3/08: Indian Express reports that India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on Tuesday “gave in to Moscow’s demands,” and will renegotiate the Vikramaditya upgrade on terms acceptable to Moscow.

Nov 22/08: Australia’s the Age newspaper reports that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has cut back his December 2008 India visit to a single day, a signal usually associated with a strained geo-strategic relationship. The visit will now take place on Dec 5/08.

Nov 13/08: As negotiations regarding the Gorshkov continue to drag on, pressure for timely resolution is building on the Russian side, as well. Sevmash (Severodvinsk Machine Building Enterprise) shipyard Deputy General-Director Sergey Novoselov tells RIA Novosti new agency that:
“We are essentially constructing a new aircraft carrier at the open assembly berth of Sevmash. In the last two years, work has only proceeded thanks to internal loans….”
That cannot continue indefinitely – but Sevmash is not backlogged with projects, which means it needs to hang on to the Admiral Gorshkov refit. So, what if India proves unwilling to pay? Novoselov pointed out that even at $2 billion, a refitted Gorshkov costs only 50-67% of the $3-4 billion involved in building a medium sized carrier. Novoselov would not be pinned down to any firm figure, of course, but some Russian defense planners are either taking him seriously, or willing to help him put added pressure on India. RIA Novosti, via Forecast Interational:
“If India won’t pay the money [over the agreed $617 million], we will keep the aircraft carrier ourselves. It will be very useful to us, because the situation in the world is complicated. Vessels like that are needed to patrol the waters of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean,” noted a Russian defense industry official.”
If Russia did make that move, India would need compensation for costs incurred to date – reportedly about $400 million.

Nov 11/08: Russia now says that the delivery of Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier to the Indian Navy will be delayed till 2012. The shipyard also claims that New Delhi has not made any payments since last year, although extra work to the tune of $1.7 billion has been done by the shipyard. ITAR-TASS reportedly quoted a shipyard representative as saying that:
“At this juncture, the completion of work in 2010 would be realistic. Two more years would be required to complete the vessel’s sailing trials, including testing its aircraft in the severe conditions of Barents Sea.”
DID isn’t quite sure why arctic operations would matter to India. India Defence.
Nov 2/08: India’s finance ministry has for the second time rejected a proposal from the MoD to approve an additional $1.2 billion in funds, in order to complete the INS Vikramaditya retrofit project. The article reports that India has already paid Russia about 67% of the original program cost, but has made no further payments since January 2007. The India Defence report adds, cryptically:
“The finance ministry’s latest decision also stemmed from a request to allocate $60 million to perform sea trials of the refurbished vessel during 2011.”
Oct 18/08: The Hindu newspaper quotes Sevmash Shipyard’s deputy director for foreign defence contracts Sergei Novosyolov, who says that Gorshkov will be taken out of dry dock by the end of the month.
“The ship’s hull has been fully done and painted and scaffolding will be dismantled by the end of October…”
Sept 21/08: Still no firm deal on the Gorshkov refit, but India’s Defence Acquisition Committee (DAC) has given approval in principle to add another 29 MiG-29Ks to the original 16-plane, $1.5 billion deal.
No price negotiations have taken place, but the contract is expected to be worth close to $2 billion when it is signed. The Navy is reported to have set its sights on a 3-squadron goal for its MiG-29K/KUB force. Indian Express report.
Sept 19/08: Indian Express reports that after Indian officials expressed concern over the slow progress in overhauling Gorshkov at the Sevmash shipyard in North Sea, Russian asked South Block to immediately pay the cash-strapped shipyard $200 million, “without prejudice to the on-going price negotiations,” in order to speed up work.
The report adds that Russian Defence Minister A Serdyukov’s visit to Delhi later in September 2008 is expected to result in a revised price for the Gorshkov refit, which must then receive political approval in India.
June 3/08: Press Trust of India reports that Russia’s Sevmash shipyard has promised readiness by 2012 – maybe. RIA Novosti quotes Sevmash officials as saying that:
“The successful solution of all the financial issues will enable the shipbuilders to sail the aircraft carrier out into the Barents Sea for trials. In the winter of 2012, the ship is expected to be finally refitted and trials will continue in the summer of that year… At the end of 2012, the aircraft carrier is expected to be fully prepared for its transfer to the Indian navy in accordance with the schedule approved by the Russian Navy.”
Negotiations and maneuvering around the contract’s final details continue, and Sevmash’s history of delivery, detailed below, must also be considered when evaluating such statements.
June 2/08: Defense News reports that India’s MiG-29Ks will be based on land, because the country has no operational carriers. With INS Viraat unavailable due to upgrades and Vikramaditya badly behind schedule, the MiG-29Ks will go to the Naval Aviation Centre at INS Hansa in Goa instead. Hansa is the based used to train naval pilots. Deliveries of all 16 MiG-29Ks are expected to be complete by 2009.
May 30/08: Reuters reports that American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was asked about rumours that the USS Kitty Hawk might be sold to India at the at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum of regional analysts, defense and security officials. “I am aware of no such plans,” Gates replied.
May 9/08: News Post India’s “Indian Navy To Order Another Aircraft Carrier” claims that the Indian Navy will supplement the Vikramaditya with 2 of its 37,500t indigenous “Air Defence Ship” carriers, instead of just one. The article also includes additional information about the Vikramaditya’s schedule and the potential risks.
April 9/08: Despite an agreement that was supposed to be finalized in March, Indian Defence Secretary Vijay Singh describes the parties as still “locked in intense negotiations over the price details,” adding that “technical assessment of the work needed on the carrier is still on…” The expected responses re: the deal being on track, and having a final price proposal to bring to the Cabinet “soon,” were also voiced. Zee News.
March 18/08: During Chief of Naval Staff Sureesh Mehta’s visit to Russia, the first serially produced MiG-29KUB (tail number 113) performs its maiden flight at the RAC MiG test airfield in Lukhovitsy near Moscow. The MiG-29KUB is the 2-seat variant of the carrier-capable MiG-29K. RAC MiG release.
March 10/08: The Indian government’s DDI News reports that “India has reconciled to a price hike for procurement of Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov and the government has constituted an experts committee to work out the increase.”
Naval Chief Sureesh Mehta, who had opposed additional payments under the contract, said that: “There will be some price hike. We need to pay extra amount and whatever amount is due as per contracts we will pay.” This does not sound like an encouraging report from ongoing negotiations.
March 3/08: India opts to pay Russia more, in hopes of getting the Gorshkov ready in time. Figures given vary between $500 million and $1.2 billion; exactly how much more India will agree to pay will reportedly be decided later in March 2008, after 2 more rounds of negotiations. India’s Defence Secretary Vijay Singh is quoted as saying that:
“It should be completed by mid-2010. After that, it will undergo 18 months of extensive sea trials by the Russian navy to ensure all systems are working properly.”
Retired Admiral Arun Prakash was head of the Indian Navy in 2004 when the original deal was “laboriously and painstakingly negotiated for 11 months, and the contract sealed and signed.” He told BusinessWeek that he is disappointed by Russia “reneging on the deal” and says Russia “gifted” the Gorshkov to India in exchange for a $1.5 billion contract to buy planes and helicopters and “revive their terminally ill shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing industries.”
India will also reportedly send 500 shipyard workers, technicians and managers to Russia, to take direct charge of the work, cover Russia’s labor shortage, and keep an eye on quality control so that it’s caught immediately. Whether this will suffice, in the wake of Sevmash shipyard disasters like the Odfjell contract (q.v. Feb 21/08), remains to be seen.
What also remains to be seen at this point is whether India’s MiG-29K contract becomes the next bottleneck. India remains the only customer for this substantially different aircraft, and MiG will need to make production line changes that the existing contract may not adequately finance.
Meanwhile, BusinessWeek has its own speculation re: “Why India Talked Up A US Carrier Deal.” As an interesting second perspective on the larger Russia-India relationship, see also the Navhind Times March 4/08 article “India’s Defence: Looking Beyond Russia”.

March 3/08: India’s Defence Minister Shri A K Antony confesses that India’s Sea Harrier fleet has an availability problem, due to the rotation of aircraft through the current upgrade program.
“India’s Sea Harrier Shortage” looks at numbers and planned upgrades for India’s legacy naval aircraft, as the Navy prepares for future operations with MiG-29Ks.

Feb 27/08: India’s Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony, asked about this issue, says:
“The overall progress of repair and re-equipping of the ship, ex-Admiral Gorshkov, in Russia is behind schedule. Execution of contract for construction of three ships of Project 1135.6 (follow-on-ships of Talwar Class) is on schedule. Russia has indicated an increase in price for repair and re-equipping of ex-Admiral Gorshkov. There is no proposal under the active consideration of the Government to contact some other country in this regard. The need for contacting other country does not arise as the existing contract with Russia is still valid.”
A fine politician’s reply. If another country contacted India instead, his denial would still be “true” in the strict sense of the term…

Feb 23/08: Progress on Gorshkov? According to the India Times’ Economic Times, Indian Defence Secretary Vijay Singh’s 5-day delegation visit to Sevmash Shipyard, and talks with Russian Energy and Industries Minister Viktor Khristenko, may have made progress. Russian senior officials reportedly assured Singh that the Russian government was making strenuous efforts to improve the situation.
Feb 19-23/08: Crazy Sam’s Carrier Clearance Sale? As reports begin to suggest that Russia and India are too far apart to agree on the Gorshkov refit, speculation grows that the USA intends to solve India’s problem with a stunning offer during Defense Secretary Gates’ imminent visit to India. instead of retiring and decommissioning its last conventionally-powered carrier, the 81,800 ton/ 74,200t USS Kitty Hawk [CV-63, commissioned 1961], would be handed over to India when its current tour in Japan ends in 2008. The procedure would resemble the January 2007 “hot transfer” of the amphibious landing ship USS Trenton [LPD-14], which become INS Jalashva. The cost? This time, it would be free. As in, $0.
Naturally, there is a quid pro quo that accompanies these rumors. In return for an aircraft carrier that would be larger than its counterparts in every navy other than the US Navy, India would select at least 60 F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets in its MMRCA fighter competition, to serve as the carrier’s air wing. Unlike the Gorshkov, the Kitty Hawk is a purpose-built carrier whose full air complement is a whopping “75+” aircraft and helicopters. India has also expressed interest in the USA’s E-2 Hawkeye carrier AWACS aircraft, which would be a natural fit for its new ship.
As a number of sources point out, this is a multi-pronged move that would achieve several objectives at once. First, the offer removes all Russian negotiating leverage over India by removing the issues of sunk costs, foreign possession of the Vikramaditya, and any danger of being left without a carrier. The Indian Navy would be greatly strengthened, and its ability to police the Indian Ocean from the Straits of Malacca to South Africa would take a huge leap forward. Any additional work to upgrade or refurbish the carrier could be undertaken in India, providing jobs and expertise while maintaining full national control over the refit. The USA gains financial benefits of its own, as the Navy avoids the expensive task of steaming the Kitty Hawk home and decommissioning it. Americans would almost certainly receive maintenance contracts for the steam catapults, and possibly for some new electronics, but those economic benefits pale in comparison to the multi-billion dollar follow-on wins for Boeing (Super Hornet), Northrop Grumman (E-2 Hawkeye), and possibly even Lockheed Martin (F-16 E/F, F-35B). All of which works to cement a growing strategic alliance between the two countries, and creates deep defense industrial ties as well.
Then there’s the effect on Russia, whose relations with the USA currently border on outright hostility. With the MiG-29Ks no longer necessary for India, that contract would almost certainly be canceled. At which point, the commonality value of choosing the MiG-35 as a lower-cost secondary MMRCA buy drops sharply, opening the door for other MMRCA split-buy options that could include the Saab/BAE JAS-39 Gripen, or a complementary American offer of F-16E/Fs and/or F-35Bs. The combined effect of these blows would be a severe setback for Russia’s arms industry, though rising oil & gas revenues in Russia and other export opportunities may lead to less shrinkage and civilian re-purposing than publications like the Weekly Standard believe. The question now is: will this happen? Barents Observer |
Weekly Standard | Information Dissemination: Feb 20th/ 23rd.

Feb 21/08: “Galrahn” of the respected blog Information Dissemination passes a key tip along to DID. First, recall that the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk, Archangel Oblast is responsible for the Gorshkov refit. Until recently, they also had a $544 million contract to build up to 12 tankers for the Norwegian shipping form Odfjell. When it was signed in 2004, it was promoted as “a historic deal in Norwegian-Russian industrial relations.”
Now it has been canceled, and Odfjell CEO Terje Storeng has used terms like “no will to try to understand that this is a commercial project,” “deliberately sabotaged and delayed the project” et. al. to Dagens Næringsliv. He adds:
“Following serious delays in the construction process, combined with demands for further price increases from the Yard, continuous cooperation problems as well as protracted negotiations, Odfjell decided today to serve formal notice of cancellation to Sevmash. The instalments already paid are covered by standard refund guarantees from international banks. Odfjell will further claim full compensation for its costs and losses caused, on account of wilful misconduct and massive contract breaches by the Yard. Unless the matter is solved amicably between the parties, the issue will be solved by arbitration in Sweden, as provided for in the contract.”
Note the Russian official’s comments in the Feb 7/08 entry. Closure may once again become a very real possibility for Sevmash. Worse, Odfjell’s experience has to give India serious pause re: the reliability of Russia’s new refit cost estimates, and the likelihood of further extortion to ‘adjust’ the deal down the road. Barents Observer | Dagens Naeringsliv report [Norwegian] | Odjfell.NO release

Feb 7/08: Zeenews quotes an unnamed “Russian official” with interesting and somewhat unsettling arguments, in advance of a high-level delegation’s arrival led by Indian Defence Secretary Vijay Singh:
“Moscow feels that the agreement for supply of the 45,000 tonne warship was signed at a time when the Russian ship-building company was in bad shape and India “used” the situation to sign the contract at lower price. The ship-building company was facing closure and was ready to sign any kind of contract when the contract was signed.”
Defense Industry Daily needs to look up the exact definitions to be certain, but we believe this process is known as “shrewd negotiation,” followed by “a deal.” Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta appears to be using the same lexicon, and has publicly said that there should be no revision to the Goshkov contract. Still, India cannot receive the carrier she wants if the shipyard goes bankrupt, and Russia is holding the carrier. This gives the Russians considerable leverage in negotiations, unless India can find an alternate provider. There may be a way out, however:
“But Russia is willing to “compensate” for the cost of Gorshkov if it gets more military orders, which Moscow insists is not linked to 126 fighter planes that India is planning to buy but other defence purchases.”
Nov 19/07: India’s MoD confirms delays in the Gorshkov’s delivery and slow progress, without really answering any questions. It acknowledges that the Russian side has submitted a revised Master Schedule, attributing the delays to “Growth of Work.” In response, an apex level Indian committee under the Defence Secretary, and a Steering Committee under a Vice Admiral, have been set up. A team has also been stationed at the shipyard.
No word on the timelines or costs suggested; indeed, these are likely to remain under negotiation. Indian MoD release.

Nov 6/07: A top-level Indian Navy delegation is heading for Moscow to discuss the delay and price escalation in the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal. A detailed financial and technical plan outlining the specific justifications and amounts will be presented to the Indian side, who is there to listen rather than to negotiate.
The report pegs the original price quoted for refurbishing the carrier was just under $980 million, adding that the Russians are insisting on cost increases of at least $350 million. Indian officials reportedly fear that the final escalation may end up being much more once they are deep enough into the commitment trap of having paid for work. The report also adds that the Navy “had reconciled itself to the fact that the delivery of the ship would be delayed from the original deadline of August 2008 by a few years,” a surprising development given the limited service life of India’s remaining carrier. If the government is indeed prioritizing cost containment over delivery dates, reconciliation of the INS Viraat’s service life with Gorshkov’s entry may prove difficult. IDRW.
Oct 18/07: India’s MoD finally admits the obvious, as part of an announcement concerning an Indo-Russia fighter development deal. India MoD release:
“The Defence Minister described the Agreement on FGFA as a ‘major landmark’ and said that the Indo-Russian relationship is on a trajectory to reach new heights…. Mr. Antony expressed satisfaction at the outcome of discussions on other important projects e.g., supply and licensed production of T-90 tanks, SU-30 MKI aircraft and other strategic issues. He admitted that there has been a delay in the delivery of the repaired and refurbished aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov along with supply of deck-based fighter aircraft MiG-29-K and said it was decided that some more studies by technical groups would be done to go through the details. He appreciated the efforts made by the Russian side to resolve issues relating to life cycle support of equipment of Russian origin.”
June 16/07: India Defence: High Level Indian Delegation In Russia To Re-Negotiate Defense Deals Pricing:
“With differences over prices delaying the delivery of upgraded Sukhoi multi-role fighters and Gorshkov aircraft carrier, India today rushed a high-level defence team to Russia with fresh proposals to break the logjam…. The visit of the team assumes significance with Defence Minister AK Antony admitting that New Delhi was facing “problems” in acquisition of the carrier Gorshkov as well as in negotiating a new deal to buy 40 more upgraded Sukhoi-30 fighters for the Indian Air Force.”
May 17/07: India Defence: No Delays in INS Vikramaditya Acquisition from Russia: Defence Minister.

:cheers:
 
India Ordering, Modernizing SU-30MKIs?


India’s 105 existing SU-30MKI aircraft are the pride of its fleet, and up to 230 have already been ordered in 3 stages: 50 ordered directly in 1996, another 40 ordered direct in 2007, and a license-build deal with HAL that aims to produce up to 140 more planes from 203-2017. The aircraft and crews performed very well at an American Red Flag exercise in 2008, and the RAF’s respect for it in the 2007 Indra Dhanush exercise is equally instructive.
India is undertaking the Tejas LCA program to fill its low-end fighter needs, and the $10+ billion MMRCA competition will purchase an intermediate tier. But India isn’t neglecting its high end, either. Recent reports indicate that another purchase of SU-30MKIs may be in the works, along with an upgrade program for serving aircraft…

Contracts & Key Events

Dec 7/09: Defense minister Antony offers an update on the existing program to assemble SU-30MKIs in India:
“In addition to licensed manufacture of 140 SU-30 aircraft by M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), a contact for procurement of additional 40 SU-30 MKI was signed with M/s HAL in 2007. Out of these three aircraft have been delivered to the Indian Air Force and delivery of the remaining aircraft is expected to be completed by 2011-12”
Nov 30/09: A SU-30MKI crashes near the firing range at Pokharan, triggering a fleet-wide grounding and investigation. Both pilots eject safely, and initial suspicion focuses on the plane’s engine. MoD announcement | Indian Express re: Grounding | Indian Express.
An SU-30 had also crashed on April 30/09, reportedly due to the failure of its fly-by-wire system. These 2 accidents are the only SU-30 losses India has experienced.
Nov 12/09: India’s Business Standard reports that the SU-30MKI program is about to include Samtel Display Systems’ multi-function displays; their first delivery will equip 6 Su-30MKIs in lieu of Thales systems manufactured under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd in Nashik. Samtel has a joint venture with Thales, Samtel went forward on its own through the 5-year road to “airworthy” certification from DRDO’s CEMILAC. A public-private partnership with HAL has created Samtel HAL Display Systems (SHDS), which may create wider opportunities for Samtel’s lower-priced displays – if both delivery and quality are up to par on the initial SU-30MKI orders.
The article notes that Samtel has succeeded, in part, by embracing obsolete technology that others were abandoning (CRT displays), evan as it prepares to leapfrog LCD displays with Organic Light Emitting Diodes. The road to military certification isn’t an easy one, though:
“Starting with liquid crystal display (LCD) screens, commercially procured from Japan and Korea, Samtel has ruggedised them for use in military avionics. The display must be easily readable even in bright sunlight; it must be dim enough for the pilot to read at night without losing night vision; it must work at minus 40 degrees Centigrade when conventional LCD screens get frozen solid; and it must absorb the repeated violent impacts of landing on aircraft carriers.”
Oct 9/09: The Indian Ministry of Defence issues a release regarding the 9th meeting of the Russia-India Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation on Oct 14-15/09:
“The modernisation of the SU 30 MKI aircraft is also expected to come up for discussion in the Commission’s meeting. The aircraft, contracted in 1996, are due for overhaul shortly and the Russia side have offered an upgrade of the aircraft with incorporation of the latest technologies during the major overhaul.”
Obvious areas for modernization would include the aircraft’s N011M Bars radar, now that Russian AESA designs are beginning to appear. Engine improvements underway for Russia’s SU-35 program would also be a logical candidate for any SU-30MKI upgrades. The most important modification, however, might be an upgraded datalink that could reduce the level of coalition fratricide observed in exercises like Red Flag 2008. Indian MoD | RIA Novosti.
Oct 2/09: Jane’s reports that India is looking to buy another 50 SU-30MKIs, quoting Air Chief Marshal P V Naik who said that the IAF was “interested.” This comes hard on the heels of comments that the IAF’s fleet strength was 1/3 the size of China’s, coupled with comments that the IAF would eliminate its fighter squadron deficit by 2022.
Interest is not a purchase, but reported prices of $50-60 million for an aircraft that can can equal or best $110-120 million F-15 variants do make the the SU-30 an attractive buy, even relative to options like the foreign designs competing for the MMRCA contract. Forecast International offers an additional possibility, citing the context within which that interest was expressed, and wondering if the new SU-30KIs might be tasked with a nuclear delivery role. Their range and payload would certainly make them uniquely suited to such a role within the IAF.
If a purchase does ensue, it would be good news for a number of players, including Indian firms that have contributed technologies to the SU-30MKI design. Samtel Display Systems (SDS), who makes avionics for the SU-30MKI’s cockpit, would be one example of a growing slate of private Indian defense firms with niche capabilities. Construction firms may also benefit; The Deccan Herald reports that:
“The IAF is keeping one squadron of its most advanced Su-30 MKI fighters in Bareilly whose primary responsibility is the western and middle sector of the LAC. Similarly a Su-30 base is being created in Tezpur, Assam, for the eastern sector [near China].”
 
India’s Fighter Modernization: Add MiG-29s to the List


The Indian Air force is dealing with the same fighter modernization numbers crisis that affects a number of air forces around the world. Its MiG-21s are retiring fast, and so are the subsequent generation of MiG-23/27 and MiG-25 aircraft. At the same time, India’s locally-developed Light Combat Aircraft (Tejas) program has been beset by numerous problems and ongoing delays, raising questions concerning its readiness and ability to begin filling some of that void in time. India’s MMRCA light-medium fighter competition will fill other gaps with 126 imported fighters, but it has yet to produce a winner, let alone a delivery date.
As the timelines for replacements stretch, India’s defense planners are concluding that more upgrades will be necessary in order to keep their existing fleet viable. February 2006 reports discussed a decision to upgrade India’s existing fleet of MiG-29B, MiG-29S, and two-seat MiG-29UB “Baaz” (Falcon) aircraft as well, in order to give them multi-role capabilities and improve their ability to carry advanced weapons. December 2006 reports from MosNews et. al. indicated that a contract has been signed, but it wasn’t until March 2008 that a deal was finalized.
Despite reports that the IAF’s own failure to deliver key specifications may be about to create a serious delay, IAF officials are still predicting mid-2010 arrival – at the entire MiG-29 fleet’s air base in the Punjab region, overlooking Pakistan and Kashmir…
• The Numbers Problem
• Wanting a New Baaz: The Upgrades
• A Better Baaz: Program Updates [updated]
• Additional Readings

The Numbers Problem

By 2010, the IAF will have phased out most of its 300-or-so MiG-21s, the 16-18 aircraft in its only remaining swing-wing MiG-23 ground attack squadron, around 100-110 related swing-wing MiG-27M Bahadur ground attack fighters that are not being upgraded, and the MiG-25 Foxbat strategic reconnaissance jets (already phased out).
125 MiG-21 Bis interceptors and 40 upgraded MiG-27ML fighters will remain. India’s updated MiG-21 ‘Bisons’ caused a lot of trouble for American jets at COPE India 2004 & 2005, but are not expected to last beyond 2016.
India continues to field over 100 SU-30MKI aircraft, under a joint agreement with Sukhoi. These aircraft will be the high end of India’s air power, and are competitive with or superior to top-end European fighters and American F-15 variants.
At the lower end currently occupied by the MiG-21s, an initial order has been placed for 24 of HAL’s LCA Tejas light fighters. They are currently expected to arrive by the end of 2010, but that will not even begin to dent the fighter gap. Further orders are held up by the fact that key design choices for the full production “Tejas II” upgrade remain in limbo.
With MMRCA unlikely to even produce a contract by the end of 2010, India is forced to look to upgrades of her most modern legacy fighters, in order to maintain competitive strength. The IAF’s Mirage 2000 fleet has been the subject of numerous reports concerning upgrade agreements and supplementary buys, none of which have come to fruition yet.
That leaves India’s MiG-29 fleet of air superiority fighters. Under a proposed set of upgrades, these planes would see a set of improvements that would address their biggest deficiencies, insert important upgrades, and give them full multi-role capability. A total of 54 single-seat fighters and 8 trainers are being refurbished.
Wanting a New Baaz: The Upgrades
IANS reported in December 2006 that India was “finalizing” a proposal to have its fleet of MiG-29 lightweight fighters refurbished for $888 million by the Russian company RSK-MiG, which has a dedicated upgrade set designed to turn older MiG-29 air defense fighters into multi-role MiG-29SMT/UBTfighters. India’s focus on its domestic industries will ensure that its modifications will include their share of unique attributes and equipment, in addition to the standard set – an insistence that is now causing problems for the program.
The 62 upgraded MiG-29SMTs are expected to remain in service for 10-15 years, with their flight-hours lifetimes extended from 25 years/2,500 hours to 40 years/ 3,500 hours.
The planes will be fitted with upgraded weapons and a new avionics suite, including the Phazatron Zhuk-ME radar. The Zhuk-M/ME is a derivative of the baseline Zhuk radar, but its acquisition range has increased 1.5 times, with a wide scan and tracking area of + / – 85 deg. in azimuth and + / – 60 deg. in elevation. It also adds terrain following mode, and ground target acquisition including high-resolution modes.
Normally, these moves would accompany weapons upgrades. India’s MiG-29s are already believed to be capable of firing the R-77/AA-12 “AMRAAMski” medium range air-air missile, but photos consistently show the R-27/ AA-10. The new systems will offer certain R-77 compatibility, along with the ability to mount precision air-to-ground weapons. Upgraded electronic warfare systems round out the package, to improve survivability against modern threats.
In terms of aerodynamic performance, India’s MiG-29s will be upgraded with extra fuel tanks in a thickened center spine, but the MiG-29SMT upgrades will continue to suffer from “Soviet short-legs syndrome.” Adding mid-air refueling capability completes the upgrade, offering dramatic changes to the fighters’ deployment range. Unspecified engine modifications may also correct some of the problems experienced with the R-33 engine, such as the visible smoke trails that have already been addressed in the MiG-29M2. Local R-33 production will offer much improved turnaround time, which will hopefully improve the Indian MiG-29 fleet’s poor overall availability record.
This will not quite bring the older MiG-29s up to the status of the MiG-29M2 multi-role aircraft, let alone the thrust-vectoring MiG-29OVT/MiG-35 model that Russia is reportedly offering for India’s MMRCA competition. Nevertheless, India will be left with an aircraft that is comparable to the F-16C as a strike fighter, and air-to-air performance that is arguably superior to all but the F-16 Block 60s with their ultra-advanced AESA radar.
RSK-MiG will be the sole vendor to perform the upgrades and service life extension tasks, delivering the first 6 aircraft from Russia and then supplying upgrade kits. Other components would reportedly come from a range of Indian, Russian, French, Israeli (Elbit has its own MiG-29 ‘Sniper’ upgrade program), and possibly even American vendors, though that list has yet to be finalized. The Americans would represent a new source, but the others all contributed to the MiG-21 Bis upgrade, and the $130+ million MiG-27ML upgrade sources equipment from Russia, Israel, and Britain (Vinten optical pod), and may include other countries as well.
India Defense has more details re: the IAF’s overall upgrade programs, including timeline slippages on the upgrades. DID has noted before that this is not an unusual problem; India’s defense industry is heavily state-owned, and it also has unique systemic problems in its defense procurement apparatus.

A Better Baaz: Program Updates

Nov 23/09: India’s Ministry of Defence offers an update on the upgrades, which reiterates basic details but does not discuss the key issue of expected completion times:
“The government signed a contract for upgradation of MiG-29 aircraft with M/s Russian Aircraft Corporation (RAC MiG) on 7 March 2008. The MiG-29 aircraft upgrade is planned in two phases namely Design & Development (D&D) phase in Russia and series upgrade in India. Upgrade of six aircraft in D&D phase commenced from August 2008. The series upgrade for the remaining aircraft is expected to be carried out in India from June 2010 onwards. The cost of the upgrade of the MiG-29 aircraft is 964 Million US Dollars.”
Oct 6/09: Reports from India say that all of the upgraded MiG-29SMTs will be stationed at Adampur Air Force Base, located in the northwest Punjab region overlooking Pakistan and Kashmir. Adampur is also the home base for India’s Garud commandos, who performed superbly at an American Red Flag exercise in 2008. An unnamed IAF officer is quoted as saying that the 1st lot of 6 upgraded MiG 29s is expected to reach Adampur by mid-2010, with the remaining aircraft arriving by the end of 2013.
Time will tell if that schedule is met, especially given past reports of program delays.
Sept 18/09: Russia’s RIA Novosti quotes an unnamed “Russian defense industry source” who says that Russia will finish upgrading India’s MiG-29s in 2013.
Aug 2/09: The Hindu reports that India’s MiG-29 upgrade could be delayed by a year or more. The first upgraded MiG-29 was scheduled to fly into India in March 2010, but the entire project is reportedly being held up by IAF non-performance.
India typically insists on including an array of locally-developed electronics in military orders, and the MiG-29 upgrade is no exception. In order to accomplish that, the contract stipulates that the IAF must give RSK MiG the associated list of equipment, dimensions, and specifications. That list has yet to be finalized, leading officials at RSK MiG to tell The Hindu that they now expect a delay of at least 8 months.
Under the contract, RSK MiG is to upgrade the first 6 aircraft in Russia, then ship kits that will allow the IAF’s 11 Base Repair Depot (BRD) at Nasik to handle the other 56 planes. A total of 14 more refurbished MiG-29s were supposed to roll out of 11BRD between April 2010 – March 2011, but the delay at RSK-MiG is likely to translate into a delay of at least a year for Nasik.
March 16/09: The Times of India reports that Russian decision to ground its MiG-29 fleet after a couple of accidents caused by the disintegration of the plane’s tail fins, will not extend to the Indian fleet. It quoted an unidentified “senior officer,” who said that:
“We continue to fly our MiG-29s, which were inducted in the mid-1980s, from our airbases at Halwara and Jamnagar. We have our own method of regular maintenance and other technical checks, which are underway…. Our checks are stringent since we operate our MiG-29s also from coastal airbases (Jamnagar) and Russian metallurgy is susceptible to salinity.”
That was prescient, as Russia’s accident investigation eventually cited structural faults in the aircraft due to corrosion on the fin root ribs. The Times of India report adds that 6 Indian MiG-29s are already in Russia for upgrades. The rest will reportedly be run through the IAF base repair depot at Nasik, thanks to transfer of technology arrangements, with project completion scheduled for 2014.
The problems in Russia will, however, delay delivery of new MiG-29K naval variants to the Indian Navy.
March 7/08: India and Russia sign an INR 38.4 billion (about $952 million) contract to upgrade its MiG-29 fighter jets over the next 3 years. The plan is intended to help the Indian Air Force extend the service life of its 69 Mig-29 aircraft (5 squadrons) from the present 25 years/ 2,500 flight-hours to 40 years/ 3,500 flight-hours, while adding upgrades and ground attack capability.
The Times of India reports that the first 6 Mig-29s will be upgraded in Russia, while the rest be done at Ohjar AFS near the western city of Nasik, using equipment kits supplied by RAC-MiG. Ohjar is currently the overhaul center for MiG-21sw, 23s, 37s, and 29s, and an anonymous Indian official quoted by Agence France Presse was clear on the reasons for making it the program’s center:
“The pre-condition was a “precaution” against delays in the modernisation of the MiG-29s which are among the main combat planes in India’s inventory. “We learnt our lessons with the MiG-21 project,” he added, alluding to years of delay in the promised upgrade by Russia of the jets.”
The usual 30% foreign industrial offset rules also apply to this deal, and will be fulfilled by setting up setting-up simulator centers, spares depots and service centers for maintenance and repair of the aircraft and its Zhuk family radars. When these moves are added to the 2006 agreement to license-produce the R-33 series 3 engine in India (q.v. Sept 4/06 entry), it becomes clear that India has is also addressing its MiG-29 fleet’s history of long service delays, by removing its dependence on Russia.
Aug 29/07: India MoD release:
“There has been some delay in upgradation of MiG-21 Bison, NavWASS Jaguar and MiG-27 aircraft due to delays in design and developments phase. The projects are closely monitored to mitigate the delay.”
Dec 14/06: MosNews reports that this deal is signed for around $850 million, with work to be carried out exclusively by RSK-MiG. The deal reportedly covers 66 aircraft (down 1 due to a November 2006 crash), and will feature more powerful radars, advanced avionics and a new engine variant as well as air-to-air re-fueling capabilities.
Sept 4/06: Kommersant reports that a deal has been done to produce RD-33 Series III jet engines in India. These engines will be an improvement on the existing RD-33 Series I and II engines currently installed in India’s fleet. See DID coverage.
 
India to License-build MiG-29 Engines

Until the arrival of the SU-30MKs and SU-30MKIs, India’s MiG-29 fleet was its primary counter to Pakistan’s F-16s. That fleet had a number of problems, the most prominent of which was a low readiness rate given the Russians’ long turnaround time for spares, repairs, and other support. Engines were reported to be a particularly troublesome issue. Yet India is acquiring MiG-29K fighters for use from its new full-size INS Vikramaditya carrier, and the thrust-vectoring MiG-29OVT/MiG-35 variant is a contender for its MRCA medium fighter aircraft competition. Both use variants of the same basic RD-33 engine: the RD-33MK Sea Wasp, and the MK-derived RD-133 with full thrust vectoring nozzles.
In 2006 the MiG-35’s MRCA position was strengthened, and India’s maintenance issues made easier, by a $275 million arrangement to license produce an improved version of the basic RD-33 engine in India. That arrangement is moving ahead – slowly…

Contracts and Key Events

RD-33
Aug 21/09: RIA Novosti reports that Rosoboronexport and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) have signed a contract at the MAKS-2009 air show for 26 RD-33 series 3 engines. Price was not disclosed. The agreement is reportedly connected to the license-manufacturing deal, as they will “help HAL master the assembly of the RD-33 jet engines and use the experience in the assembly of next generation jet engines.” StrategyPage claims that this translates as:
”...so far, India has not been able to develop the technology to manufacture core components (that deal with very high pressures and temperatures).... India is trying to buy all the engine component manufacturing technologies from Russia but, so far, has had no success in getting the most valuable ones. China had the same problem, but was able to steal some of the technologies, and duplicate the rest. That said, the Chinese engines using these locally made components are not as durable or reliable as the Russian originals.”
March 8/07: A release from India’s DoD explains the current state of the program:
“There is no proposal for advancement of engine of MiG-29 aircraft which are powered with RD-33 Series – I and Series – II engines. These engines are no longer in production. To meet the future requirement of replacement engines for the MiG-29 fleet, an Inter Governmental Agreement (IGA) has been signed between the Government of India and the Government of Russian Federation for license manufacture of RD-33 Series – III engines at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). RD-33 Series – III engine is the latest version of RD-33 engine and has higher Total Technical Life (TTL) and Time Between Overhauls (TBO). HAL has signed a general contract with the Russian side for Transfer of Technology (TOT) for license manufacture of these engines at HAL.”
Dec 14/06: MosNews reports that a MiG-29 upgrade deal is signed for around $850 million, with work to be carried out exclusively by RSK-MiG. The deal reportedly covers 66 aircraft (down 1 due to a November 2006 crash), and will feature more powerful radars, advanced avionics and a new engine variant as well as air-to-air re-fueling capabilities.
The effort is still moving ahead, but has been delayed. Read “India’s Fighter Modernization: Add MiG-29s to the List” for ongoing coverage.
Sept 4/06: Kommersant reports that Moscow-based Chernyshev Machine-building plant will supply 20 of the new 18,000 lb/ 8300 kg thrust RD-33 jet engines for trials at a cost of about $25 million. Delivery will take place between December 2006 – January 2007. Under a deal with Rosoboronexport, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) will then manufacture 120 RD-33 series 3 extended life cycle jet engines under the $250 million license deal from St. Petersburg-based Klimov at its Koraput plant
The Times of India points out that this deal will also help India master the assembly of the related RD-33MK Sea Wasp engines for its MiG-29K naval fighters, as well as provide expertise that would strengthen maintenance capabilities for any MiG-35 fighters purchased (they use full-aspect thrust vectoring RD-133 engines).
Both Chernyshev and Klimow are part of RAC-MiG corporation, for those interested in Russia’s complex defense industry corporate structure
 
HAL and Irkut’s Joint Tactical Transport Project

In late December 2006, Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) announced a $700-million joint venture (JV) agreement with Irkut Corporation of Russia for manufacturing 60-tonne multi-role transport aircraft (MRTA). Under this 50/50 arrangement with HAL, Ilyushin Design Bureau of Russia will design the MRTA and Irkut corporation of Russia will develop the aircraft, while series production would be taken up by the transport aircraft division of HAL at Kanpur. Irkut is a major investor (40% of project expenses), and will be the coordinator of the Russian side. For HAL, the move is part of an effort to forge new partnerships with global aviation majors for military and civil projects, with an eye on trebling their annual turnover to $3 billion by 2011.
The MRTA has been described in news reports as a 60-ton, 100-seat aircraft aimed at the military freigter market, creating some confusion about its ultimate carrying capacity and competitive niche. Is it destined to replace the Ilyushin IL-76s India flies? Compete with the 120-troop capacity A400M? Further research with Irkut shows it to be a 60-ton total takeoff weight aircraft with a cargo capacity of around 18,500 kg/ 20 tons, giving it similar capacity and dimensions to the Russian An-12 or the USA’s C-130J Hercules. Illustrations show a jet aircraft whose requirements produce a design somewhat reminiscent of the canceled 1970s US AMST Program that eventually led to the much larger C-17.
Recent reports indicate that the formal contract is set for signing in September 2009 – but other competitors may have a jump of the critical time-window for introduction…
• MRTA and the Per-Ton Price Constant
• MRTA: Contracts and Key Events
• Additional Readings
MRTA and the Per-Ton Price Constant
Ultimately, however, the plane’s fate may well rest on whether it can break the per-ton price constant in the military market….
Consider:
The Alenia/CMAS C-27J Spartan has a 12-ton capacity and costs about $35-40 million per plane. Lockheed’s C-130J Hercules carries 20 tons and costs about $65 million. the Airbus A400M is projected to carry 35-37 tons and cost about $100-120 million. At the high end, the 80-85 ton capacity C-17 Globemaster III sells for about $200-240 million. That appears to give us something approaching a per-ton constant for Western fixed-wing military transports that can carry tactical vehicles: around $3 million per ton.
Beyond the 20-ton target market of AN-12 and C-130 owners, Irkut also envisions this new plane as an attractive option for customers of the much smaller An-26. If they wish to realize that ambition, and some of their broader goals as well, the question boils down to this:
Can Irkut and HAL offer an ICAO-certifiable military transport with modern avionics near a C-27J’s price range, with a C-130J’s performance and some short field ability?
If so, they may have a winner with good global prospects. If not, India and Russia will have a new transport, and both countries’ aviation industries will still derive some benefits from the program. Irkut claims that the Indian Air Force plans to acquire 45 of these aircraft, and they also see market demand in Russia’s military and civil sectors for another 100 transport aircraft within 12 years of introduction. Subsequent Indian reports are already adjusting the number down slightly to 40, while Russia’s interest remains firm.
Introduction is expected between 2015-2020.
MRTA: Contracts and Key Events

Oct 9/09: The Indian Ministry of Defence issues a release regarding the 9th meeting of the Russia-India Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation on Oct 14-15/09:
“Both sides will also review the progress on the MTA, on which the Inter-Governmental Agreement had been signed during the visit of Dr Manmohan Singh’s to Moscow in November 2007. Both sides have been discussing the formation of the Joint Venture company which would execute the project involving design, development and production of the Medium Transport Aircraft in the 15-20 tonne class to meet the requirements of the Russian and Indian Armed Forces. Both sides are likely to conclude the Agreement to form the JVC shortly. “
Aug 21/09: The Indian government’s DDI News reports that India and Russia are expected to sign the MRTA contract deal during Defence Minister A K Antony’s September 2009 Moscow visit [DID: later moved to October]. HAL General Manager V. Balakrishnan told DDI that the Russian government has cleared the formalities for the creation of 50-50 JV, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has allocated funds for financing Russia’s share.
Balakrishnan is also quoted as saying that the IAF is interested in buying about 40 aircraft, while the Russian air force has confirmed its readiness to buy 100 planes.
Aug 3/09: In an official reply to a Parliamentary question, India’s Ministry of Defense states:
“An Inter Government Agreement (IGA) between Government of India and Government of Russian Federation was signed for formation of Joint Venture (JV) in November 2007 to develop a new Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) for Defence Sector with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as the Indian Partner. A preliminary project report prepared in 2006 envisaging a development cost of USD 600 million for a transport aircraft of weight class 20 tons. It is expected that commencement of production of the aircraft will take seven to eight years from ‘Go Ahead’ sanction.”
While the government agreement exists, the formal contract and go ahead have yet to be announced. If 7-8 years is the timeline thereafter, the program launch date is already past 2015. Meanwhile, Brazil’s Embraer intends to have its KC-390 competitor available by 2015, and Lockheed Martin is gaining traction with its C-130J around the world – including India.
Feb 12/09: The Times of India quotes Russian UAC President and Chairman Alexey I. Fedorov during his Aero India 2009 visit. Federov says that that India and Russia will establish the MRTA joint venture “in the next few months.”
The cost is now listed at $600 million, and Russia will reportedly identify its participants in the next few weeks. Consolidation has brought most of Russia’s aerospace firms under the United Aircraft Corporation banner.
April 23/08: In an official release, India’s Ministry of Defence says:
“Government proposes to relax the Foreign Direct Investment cap of 26 per cent in defence sector to facilitate co-development of multi-role transport aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics. The matter is under process to get approval of the competent authority.”
It is unclear whether this foreign investment ceiling is being relaxed more generally, or just for this specific project; the latter interpretation appears to be more likely.
December 2006: Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) announces a $700-million joint venture (JV) agreement with Irkut Corporation of Russia for manufacturing 60-tonne multi-role transport aircraft (MRTA). Under this 50/50 arrangement with HAL, Ilyushin Design Bureau of Russia will design the MRTA and Irkut corporation of Russia will develop the aircraft, while series production would be taken up by the transport aircraft division of HAL at Kanpur.
Irkut is a major investor (40% of project expenses), and will be the coordinator of the Russian side. For HAL, the move is part of an effort to forge new partnerships with global aviation majors for military and civil projects, with an eye on trebling their annual turnover to $3 billion by 2011.
 
India Buys Israeli “SPYDER” Mobile Air Defense System

Israel’s SPYDER air defense system follows a recent trend of using advanced air-air missiles designed for fighter jets as ground-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM). This truck-mounted system mixes radar and optical tracking with any combination of short to medium-range Derby 4 and ultra-agile short-range 5th generation Python 5 air to air missiles, in order to create a versatile system adapted for a wider range of threats. Hence its inclusion in in our AMRAAM FOCUS article’s “international competitors” section.
India has become the system’s inaugural export customer. SPYDER will reportedly replace India’s Russian-made OSA-AKM/SA-8 Gecko and ZRK-BD Strela-10M/ SA-13 Gopher SAM systems, and the purchase has decisively shelved the Indian DRDO’s failed Trishul project.
More success may be on the way. As India’s Air Force gears up, the Army is reportedly about to follow suit with an even bigger contract…
• The SPYDER System
• Contracts and Key Events: India
• Additional Readings

The SPYDER System

Each SPYDER ADS-SR Mobile Firing Unit can slant-launch up to 4 missiles in either lock on after launch (LOAL) mode, or lock on before launch (LOBL). This short-range version offers 360 degree quick engagement capability and 60-target tracking via IAI’s Elta EL/M 2106 ATAR 3D surveillance radar and TOPLITE optical sensor, a kill range of over 15 km, and openly advertised effectiveness from 20 – 9,000 meters (65 – 30,000 feet).
A new SPYDER ADS-MR 6×6 truck version was unveiled at Eurosatory 2006. It’s restricted to LOAL but offers 8 vertical-launch missiles in any mix, adds a dedicated radar vehicle with a more powerful radar, and puts boosters on all missiles, in order to improve advertised range to 50 km/ 30 miles, and performance to 16 km/ 52,000 feet.
A typical SPYDER squadron consists of 1 Mobile Command and Control Unit, plus 4 Mobile Firing Units with with their own built-in power supplies and missile sets of 4-8 missiles.
Contracts and Key Events: India
Aug 18/09: Indian Army’s QR-SAM. The Times of India reports that India’s Ministry of Defence has finally given the go-ahead for the army’s INR 40 billion (about $820 million) Quick-Reaction SAM program. These mobile missiles would protect Indian maneuver elements like armored columns and troop concentrations, as well as important areas and installations. The Army seeks to equip 3 regiments with this contract, which is over twice the size of the IAF’s 18 squadron purchase. The Times of India:
“With the indigenous Akash and Trishul air defence projects not meeting its “user-requirements”... The Defence Acquisitions Council, chaired by defence minister A K Antony, discussed the entire matter on Monday. Though there was no official word, sources said the Israeli SpyDer QR-SAM systems had been selected for the project.
....The projects were in a limbo for quite some time now, with one of the main reasons being the naming of Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Rafael in the Rs 1,160-crore Barak-I deal kickbacks case by the CBI. The government, however, was reluctant to blacklist these Israeli armament firms because it held that it would prove “counter-productive” since there were several “crucial” defence projects underway with them.”

Jan 20/09: SR-SAM – Revenge of DRDO? India Defence reports that neither MBDA nor India’s state-run DRDO have given up on their “SR-SAM” short range air defense proposal. Rumors peg it as a combination of DRDO’s Trishul and MBDA’s VL-MICA system, though Trishul’s failure and VL-MICA’s techologies mean that claims regarding Trishul technology are likely to be about saving face as much as anything else.

The “Maitri” LLQRM proposal’s positioning would be directly competitive with RAFAEL’s SPYDER, and VL-MICA is deployable as a mobile system. That could affect SPYDER’s future expansion within the Indian military, and might even affect its prospects if program problems crop up. MICA’s capabilities mean that SR-SAM/Maitri would also be directly competitive with India’s indigenous Akash, and might even impinge on the proposed medium range MR-SAM deal involving a longer-range Barak missile.

Dec 11/08: The Indian Ministry of Defence confirms that it has signed the Spyder contract – and canceled Trishul. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony, in a written reply to Shri Tarini Kanta Roy in Rajya Sabha:
“Ministry of Defence has signed a contract with M/s Rafael, Israel to procure Spyder Low Level Quick Reaction Missile System (LLQRM) for the Indian Air Force.
The proposal for Trishul system was foreclosed due to its inability to meet certain critical operational requirements. However, it served as a technology demonstrator and the expertise acquired with the technologies developed during design and development phase of Trishul Missile System are being utilized for developing state-of-the-art Short Range Surface to Air Missile System.”
Costs were not disclosed, though some reports place the deal at $260 million; previous reports of R 18,000 crore would be about $362 million at current exchange rates. Nor was the future composition of India’s Spyder force; Spyder systems now come in the 8-pack, booster-enabled SPYDER ADS-MR, and the 4-pack SPYDER ADS-SR. Indian MoD | domain-b.

Oct 13/08: DNA India reports that a new order from the Union government downgraded both IAI and RAFAEL’s position as weapon suppliers to India, and may place the Spyder contract in jeopardy. The issue is not expected to sort itself out until after the 2009 Parliamentary elections.

Sept 1/08: The Spyder contract was delayed for almost 2 years by political accusations, but those have apparently been put to rest. Defense News reports that a $260 million contract has now been signed with Rafael. The Indian Air Force will receive 18 Spyder systems, with deliveries beginning in early 2011 and finishing by August 2012. Unusually, the contract will not include any mandatory industrial offsets.

March 19/07: Reports indicate that MBDA is working on a deal with the DRDO, whose Trishul short range anti-aorcraft missile project continues to flounder. DRDO’s Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) would team with MBDA to develop a “new-generation low-level, quick-reaction missile (LLQRM) system” known as ‘Maitri’, for the Indian Navy and Air Force.
The project is said to be worth $500 million and is to be signed in May between the Hyderabad-based DRDL and MBDA. It is retry to revive the work done under the unsuccessful Trishul LLQRM project,
October 2006: India Defence quoted Air Chief SP Tyagi as saying India is close to wrapping up a deal to purchase quick reaction surface-to-air missiles from Israel as a mobile air defense system. Under the deal, India proposed to buy 18 SPYDER (Surface-to-air PYthon and DERby) missile systems and accompanying missiles in a deal worth more than Rs 1,800 crores (18 billion Indian rupees, or about $395.4 million at the time). RAFAEL would be the prime contractor, and Israel Aircraft Industries the major subcontractor.

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This was something that puzzled me.
What will the implication of the SPYDER purchase over the AKASH SAM, which has satisfied both Army and Airforce.
 
This was something that puzzled me.
What will the implication of the SPYDER purchase over the AKASH SAM, which has satisfied both Army and Airforce.

spyder has a range of 1-15 km where as akash can be fired between 25-30 km range
 
India Adding Ka-31 AEW Helicopters


Indian media report that India and Russia will sign a contract for 5 more Russian Kamov-31 airborne early warning helicopters, after India’s Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) cleared the purchase on Aug 4/09. The rumored cost is INR 9.5 billion (about $195-200 million), but that remains to be finalized in negotiations. Note that transparency is often low with Russian contracts, and India has often found that the final price differs from any negotiated deal with Russian firms.

The Indian Navy currently operates 9 Ka-31s, deploying them on its remaining aircraft carrier INS Viraat, its 3 Talwar class guided missile frigates, and key shore facilities. The aircraft’s belly-mounted NIIRT E-801M Oko (Eye) radar folds down and begins rotating once deployed, and can track 30-40 targets over a much larger horizon that ships’ radars – about 200 km for ships, and 100-200 km for fighter aircraft sized targets. This makes it an important complement for naval task forces whose ships are too small to operate a full fixed-wing AEW aircraft like America’s E-2 Hawkeyes; Britain’s Sea King ASaC Mk7 helicopters serve a similar role. domain-b | The Hindu | Indian Express | The Times of India loks at India’s broad helicopter plans.
 
India’s Project 17-A Stealth Frigates

In July 2006, “India Orders 3 More Krivak III/Talwar Class Frigates” noted that the Talwar/Krivak Class were better described as modern multi-role designs, given the presence of contemporary classes with far better stealth features.

The follow-on Project 17/ Shivalik class program offered improvements in that area, with 3 ships ordered and the possibility of more too follow. In December 2006, India Defence reported that India was looking to acquire up to 7 more frigates with stealth improvements, plus some level of joint development and technology transfer. The Request for Information (RFI) was reportedly issued to about 12 international firms, mostly in Europe and Russia.

These “Project 17A” ships could be worth up to 45,000 crore (INR 450 billion, about $9.23 billion as of June 2009), according to a recently-approved budget. Further reports appear to be confirming 100% construction in India, however, even as they clarify an extended timeline for design and delivery…

• Project 17-A [updated]
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings

Project 17-A

Though Project 17 was approved in 1997, delivery of the first Shivalik class ship is only expected in 2009, thanks to construction delays and other hold-ups. The overall program envisages a total of 12 ships, and the 7 Project 17-A ships would be part of that plan.
India Defense characterizes this P-17A project as the next generation ships beyond the ongoing Project 17 Shivalik class multi-role stealth frigates. Ship “signature reduction” levels are expected to rise to fully modern standards, similar to Singapore’s new Formidable Class frigates from France (a Lafayette Class derivative). Beyond that, political battles, India’s culture of semi-transparency, and the nature of this procurement process have left 3 key areas of uncertainty.
One is dollars. The proposed P-17A acquisition has had different figures floated. Early figures mentioned Rs 30,000 crore (300 billion Indian rupees, then about $6.7 billion), with expected costs of Rs 4,000 crore (then about $892 million) per ship. March 2009 reports give figures of Rs 17,000 crore, or about $3.3 billion at that time. By June 2009, however, reports of DAC approval mentioned Rs 45,000 crore, or about $9.23 billion total and $1.3 billion per ship. As a basis of comparison, India’s July 2006 order for 3 more Talwar Class frigates amounted to Rs 5,114 crore, or between $400-550 million per ship.
The second area of uncertainty involves ship design. By soliciting tenders from so many foreign firms, and insisting on improved stealth requirements, India is implicitly creating the option of having Project 17-A ships use a very different base design than the Project 17 Shivalik class frigates. That question will not be resolved until a foreign shipbuilding partner is chosen and ratified, and possibly not even then.
The 3rd area of uncertainty revolves around the program’s industrial arrangements, though current reports indicate that a resolution is close. Typical Indian contracts involve some number of ships built by the manufacturer, and others built at Indian shipyards like Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) in Mumbai, or Garden Reach Shipyard Engineers (GRSE) in Kolkata. On the other hand, in 2006 Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta specifically referred to force modernization problems stemming from both constraints on defense budgets, and Indian shipyards’ record of slow delivery. He added that:
“It is not necessary that we will take this route [of using MDL or Garden Reach], adding that the other Indian shipyards may step up warship production to meet the projected force levels.”
That multi-shipyard option would disappear, and new complications are introduced, if these ships use modular construction. That approach would involve a series of 300-tonne ship “blocks” that are fully equipped, and must fit together so precisely that pipes, wiring, and other components all align exactly when they’re joined. MDL and GRSE are the only shipyards with the depth of experience to pull that off – but neither has ever used modular construction.
Which leads to India’s final option: build some of these ships at foreign shipyards, as the government is doing with its July 2006 “Improved Krivak class” frigate order. The Navy would prefer to have MDL and/or GRSE workers learn by working at a foreign shipyard with experience in modular construction, then bring those important skills back to India to build additional ships. The alternative would involve trying to learn a completely new shipbuilding method, while trying to build important Navy ships, and having the Navy foot the bill for any mistakes.
Based on past history, and the experience of other countries, India’s Director of Naval Design Rear Adm. Badhwar is clever to be cautious. Mistakes using the new modular method would be extremely expensive to fix. The level of rework required could easily turn the Indian shipyards’ purported 100% cost advantage into a deficit, while creating project delays that would extend for months – and might even be measured in years.
Despite these risks, it appears that India’s government intends to move forward with a dual-build strategy at MDL at GRSE, using modular construction, without any work or co-build efforts performed in foreign shipyards.

Contracts and Key Events

July 27/09: India’s Business Standard reports that shipbuilders MDL and GRSE have prevailed over the Indian Navy’s objections, and will divide Project 17A between them with no foreign construction. GRSE Chairman and Managing Director Rear Admiral KC Sekhar promises that GRSE will have a fully equipped modular yard with a 250-ton Goliath crane by mid-2011. The report adds:
“Each Shivalik class frigate of Project 17 was priced at Rs 2,600 crore, and the navy plans to insist on the same price for Project 17A…. But Defence Minister AK Antony stepped in to order entirely indigenous production…. Explaining the time-line, Admiral Sekhar said, “The MoD has informally told us that MDL and GRSE will build Project 17A; we are awaiting [formal sanction]. Once the navy finalises the size and design of the new frigate, we will decide our build strategy and costing. Then, hopefully, by the end of 2009, the MoD will issue a Request for Proposals (RfP); GRSE and MDL will submit separate quotes; and then the MoD will place a formal order on the shipyards. Construction should start by end-2011.”

June 19/09: India’s political Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) clears India’s largest ever indigenous defense contract: about Rs 45,000 crore (currently $9.29 billion) to manufacture 7 Project 17A frigates. The DAC reportedly made one major change, however, insisting that all 7 warships must be manufactured in India by the Mazagon Dock Ltd. in Mumbai (MDL), and by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) in Kolkata. Work will be divided between the 2 shipyards, making P17A India’s first dual-shipyard contract.
The DAC has essentially placed a bet that the modular construction approach will be successful without foreign shipyard training during construction of the first 2 ships of class, or that the budget increase to Rs 45,000 crore will cover any unpleasant contingencies. Time will tell whether that proves to be an expensive decision.

March 27/09: French shipbuilder DCNS’ board approves a 3-party design consultancy with Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) of Kolkata, and the I.T. engineers of Infotech Enterprises. The consultancy will design ships for global clients, including back office work for DCNS itself. As India’s Business Standard reports:
“But the first design job that the JV is shooting for is Project 17-A, [which] needs a design partner…. because all seven frigates will be built using an advanced manufacturing process – modular shipbuilding…. Each 300-ton block is built separately, complete with all the piping, electrical wiring and fitments that would be a part of the ship. These must precisely connect…. This is the expertise that DCNS is hoping to sell as the foreign design partner for Project 17-A.”
indian shipbuilders GRSE and MDL are lobbying to have the frigates built entirely in India, and have joined forces to that end. The result may be India’s first dual-shipyard naval contract. Meanwhile, the firms are investing in the equipment required for modular construction, including large covered workshops with sliding roofs for module lift-out, and a 300-tonne, 138m span Goliath crane from Italy’s Fagioli and McNally Bharat Engineering.
March 27/09: India’s Business Standard reports that the crore 17,000 ($ equivalent) Project 17-A contract is stalled due a dispute between India’s Navy, and its 2 major shipyards. The Navy is insisting that the first 2 ships be built in a European shipyard, even if it doubles those ships’ bid cost.
Why? Because these ships will use modular construction based on 300-tonne “blocks” that are fully equipped, and must fit together so precisely that pipes, wiring, and other components all align. Neither Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) in Mumbai, nor Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) in Kolkata, has ever used this method. The Navy would prefer to have their workers learn by working at a shipyard with experience in this approach, before bringing the skills back to India. Rear Admiral MK Badhwar, India’s Director of Naval Design:
“This will also make the vendor demonstrate ‘buildability.’ He must demonstrate that his design can be actually built into a warship, using modular construction, in four years. That will create a demonstrated benchmark for GRSE and MDL; otherwise, if there are delays later, our shipyards could argue that the foreign yard too would have taken a long period to build each frigate.”
March 6/09: India’s Business Times reports that an overzealous US State Department bureaucrat appears to have created a serious delay in the related Project 17 program, after ordering GE to stop work on the program. Unlike the Krivak III Class, Shivalik Class ships use 2 American LM2500 turbines in place of Russian designs.
If India is lucky, the delay will be only 2 months. If the State Department’s actions cause India to miss sea trials due to the monsoon season, the delay could be many months longer. In the end, all the State Department may succeed in doing is jeopardizing the chances of other American companies under consideration for Indian defense buys.
Dec 24/07: India Defence relays a story which suggests that state-run arms export agency Rosoboronexport may be negotiating with Indian authorities for the construction of a fresh lot of 3 “stealth frigates.”
From the reports, it would appear that negotiations are for an order over and above the follow-on order for 3 Talwar Class frigates – either more Project 17 Shivalik Class ships, or the initial Project 17A contract. As with all such reports concerning India, however, a wait-and-see attitude is advised.
December 2006: India issues an RFI for “stealth frigates.” They are looking to acquire up to 7 ships under “Project 17A”, along with some level of joint development and technology transfer.
These ships could be modified “Project 17” Shivalik Class frigates, which are an enlarged and enhanced design derived from the Kirvak IIIs. On the other hand, the RFI was issued to a number of foreign shipbuilders, raising the possibility that Project 17A ships could use an entirely different base platform.
 
India Refurbishing its AN-32 Transport Fleet

The Antonov AN-32 “Cline” builds on the general design of the widely-used AN-26 light transport plane, but high placement of the engine nacelles above the wing allow bigger propellers, driven by 5,100 hp AI-20 turboprops that almost double the output of the AN-26’s engines. As a result, the AN-32’s 14,750 pound/ 6900 kg load capacity is almost 50% better than its AN-26 cousin’s, and it can take off with much better load fractions in hot and/or high-altitude conditions, whose thin air could be a problem for other aircraft. AN-32s serve with a number of countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, and the type was purchased in 2008 by Afghanistan.
India was the plane’s launch customer in the 1980s, and its fleet of up to 105 aircraft are used by the IAF’s Parachute Training School, by its military and humanitarian personnel and supply airdrops, and as an important link in the transport chain to the disputed Siachen glacier area in northern Jammu and Kashmir. That length of service has taken a toll, hence India’s decision to modernize and refurbish its fleet.
A program that appears to have winners now, and a contract…
As an IAF official put it to the Press Trust of India:
“The avionics of the aircraft were up-to-date when it was inducted during the 1980s, but is quite crude compared with today’s requirements…. With the upgrades on-board, we will have better flight management system, glass cockpit display, landing system and other equipment to improve accuracy and lend a multi-role operational edge to the aircraft.”
The aircraft’s airframe will also undergo some changes to improve its landing capabilities, and to extend its service life for another 15-20 years.
The process began with a Parliamentary Committee suggestion in 2000-01. The intent to upgrade the AN-32 fleet was restated in 2006, and India has now performed pre-upgrade surveys of its fleet. Anotnov and Israel’s Elbit Systems are said to be the likely contractors.
The AN-32 upgrade appears to have survived India’s contract to purchase 6-12 C-130J Hercules aircraft configured for special forces operations, and may even be complementary to it. On Oct 14/08, Zee News quoted Agra Air Station’s Air Officer Commanding Air Commodore Shouvik Roy:
“With special operations being the focus of the Air Force in the days to come, the upgraded aircraft will be used increasingly for operations involving tactical transport. The improved on-board avionics will facilitate night operations and even search and rescue.”

Contracts and Key Events

June 13/09: Reports say that India’s Ministry of Defence Ministry signed a $400 million deal with Ukrainian firms to refurbish “close to 100” AN-32s under a life extension contract. Reports are apparently slightly conflicting, due to lack of transparency on both sides.
Word of the deal leaked after a June 9/09 AN-32 crash, shortly after it took off from the Mechuka landing base, near the Chinese border. Investigators are still looking for the aircraft’s “black box” as of June 18/09. Indian Express.
March 3/09: Jane’s adds that the upgrade will involve about 70 aircraft, adding that around 50 of the 100 remaining AN-32s will require structural refurbishment, as well as systems modernization. It will apparently be performed in cooperation with Elbit Systems, whose avionics are popular with the Indian military.
Feb 16/09: According to the Ukraine’s official news agency UKRINFORM, Ukraine’s Aviant Aircraft Building Plant in Kiev appears to have won the upgrade contract for India’s AN-32s. Ukraine’s national news agency reports that:
“At the meeting with India’s Defense Minister it was noted that in the context of a recent victory of the Ukrainian party in a tender on modernization of the fleet of 105 An-23 planes of the Indian Air Force, the relevant bilateral military-technical cooperation has prospects of achieving a qualitatively new level. The work on the contract is being completed now.”
Contract amounts were not mentioned. In India, however, it’s wise not to count on any contract until it’s actually signed.
 
India Launches $200M TECSAR Spy Satellite


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TECSAR


The April 20/09 launch of the RISAT-2 satellite gives India the ability to monitor cross-border movements of suspected terrorists, as well as troop movements in Pakistan and other neighboring countries, at night and under all weather conditions. The satellite was reportedly a modified TECSAR satellite, purchased from Israel Aerospace Industries for $200 million. Indian sources state that the satellite launch was accelerated after the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai.
The 300 kg/ 660 pound TECSAR’s military X-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR) provides up to 1 meter radar resolution was carried into low earth orbit aboard a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV-C-12) from the Satish Dhawan Space Center located on the barrier island of Sriharikota in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The PSLV-C-12 also carried the 40 kg/ 88 pound experimental communication ANUSAT satellite built by Chennai-based Anna University.
The satellite purchase marks a growing military relationship between India and Israel…
In January of 2008, India reportedly launched a TECSAR satellite for Israel aboard a PSLV-C-12 rocket from the Satish Dhawan Space Center. Israel has used its own “Shavit” rocket for other launches, but working with India widens Israel’s placement and payload options by avoiding the necessity of launching westwards, against the rotation of the earth. By turning to India, Israel is able to launch a satellite into polar orbit; a defense analyst told AFP news agency that this orbit that provides Israel with the ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear progra.
On India’s side of the fence, its government has been building a number of satellites with dual-use capabilities, but reported problems with Cartosat-2, and expanding coverage needs, apparently made existing options unsatisfactory. India’s response was to delay the civilian RISAT-1 satellite, in order to make way for RISAT-2.
The PSLV-C-12 rocket experienced launch postponements, and the April 20/09 launch had its own drama. Despite that, the rocket lifted off into orbit from Sriharikota spaceport as scheduled. RISAT-2 will fly in a sun-synchronous orbit, at 550 km altitude, for use in a number of roles including civilian disaster and recovery monitoring. It is expected to last for 3 years.
The Indian-developed RISAT-1, which also uses SAR technology, will follow in a subsequent launch. It is designed for agricultural monitoring in the civilian C-band, flying at 608 km above the earth. Its dedicated missions will include time-lapse coverage of the Kharif crop, the important autumn harvest in India and Pakistan.
 
Ukraine, India Headed for Defense Cooperation Agreement


India’s domain-b business magazine reports that India and the Ukraine have agreed to frame an inter-governmental commission on military technical cooperation, after talks at AeroIndia 2009 in Bangalore. The result would be a broad set of umbrella agreements that would define key requirements like security, technology transfer, and support, opening the way to defense projects with Ukrainian firms. India already has a framework of this type in place with Russia, is reportedly negotiating one with France, and arguably needs one with the United States.

The Ukraine has a substantial defense industry left as a legacy from the Soviet Union, and some products like the BTR-3E1/3U have become export successes. India is certainly aware of the T-80UD “Al-Khalid” tank developed for Pakistan, whose rapid and successful fielding resulted in a rush effort to add T-90S tanks to the Indian Army’s fleet. The Ukraine needs more of those orders in order to modernize and maintain its defense industrial base, which is vital to the country’s continued security.

India has a different problem, which it shares with the Ukraine: sets of Soviet/Russian-made equipment that must be maintained and upgraded, despite poor cooperation from Russian firms. Reports indicate that Ukrainian expertise will be sought for programs aimed at modernizing Indian armor, MiG, Antonov, Tupolev and Ilyushin aircraft; and Mil and Kamov helicopters. Missiles, radars, and weapons cooperation are also reportedly under discussion.

It’s worthy of note that all of these potential areas are also areas of Israeli expertise, and Israeli cooperation with India has grown apace on that basis. What Israel lacks, and the Ukraine offers, is original manufacturing capabilities for Russian equipment designs, and for many of the associated parts that would be used as spares.
 
Free? No Thanks! India Chooses Datalink Development Partner


Datalinks are an under-rated but critical technology set for any modern military. In simple terms, a datalink provides virtual circuit and datagram services that guarantee reliable, simultaneous, multi- channel transmissions. They can include voice, data, imagery, and video, and are generally encrypted for obvious reasons. These services may allow a soldier with a V-RAMBO wrist device to get streaming video from a UAV, or a strike aircraft to receive target information directly from troops on the ground via the ROVER system. Weapons with 2-way datalinks can be re-targeted in flight. Advanced uses of datalinks even include implementations like NATO’s Link 16 standard, which allow targets identified by one radar or aircraft to appear on others’ displays.

The Indian Air Force recently put out a contract for datalink development. In the ODL pilot project, the Air Force plans to network selected aircraft and ground stations by 2012, as a first step and training opportunity. Over the next 10 years, they plan to equip their fighter fleets, transport aircraft, helicopters, AWACS and maritime surveillance aircraft, UAVs, and key radars…

The long-term potential for this contract is significant, though technology transfer requirements shrink the total effort’s long term value to any foreign partners. Even so, this could become a very significant contract for any weapons manufacturer. Deep knowledge of India’s datalink structure could give that manufacturer’s weapons an advantage in future competitions, especially if compatibility becomes a built-in, zero-cost feature of their upgrades and future weapons.

RAFAEL already builds airborne datalinks, and is a globally competitive designer and producer of weapons. India already uses their Python, Derby, and Barak missiles, among others. Thinking quickly, RAFAEL made India an offer: they would do it for free. Other bids reportedly included Israel’s IAI at $4.2 million, and Lockheed Martin at $8 million.

Defense News reports that some bureaucrats favored the Rafael offer in this lowest-bidder competition, but in the end, India refused. RAFAEL’s offer was disqualified because there was no value consideration, which meant that IAI’s bid became the lowest. A bid of even $1 might have stepped around that technical rule, but there was also some uneasiness concerning the ethical appearance of a free or nearly-free offer.

The offer certainly made sense from RAFAEL’s point of view, but an offer that’s too good creates problems of its own. Perhaps, in retrospect, the best option would have been a $1 million bid, or a bundling deal with an existing weapon purchase.

It doesn’t matter now, because India’s decision is made, leaving these events as an interesting lesson for industry vendors.
 
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