It looks more like propaganda rather than a decent analysis. The main gist of the article is a non-argument, just a play on average readers. Whenever you are going to introduce a new weapon system you can posture it as increasing risk but the actual purpose may be deterrence. These western authors rarely, very rarely portray an introduction by Pakistan as an effort at deterring and balancing India-Pakistan nuclear equation which it usually is. All developments by us have actually been in a reaction to introductions by India rather than in reverse. Whether development of nukes or the development of delivery systems over the years. But they portray our introductions as if these are escalatory and increase risk of an exchange.
It was India which introduced nukes in South Asia not us, ours was a reaction. In the grave situation we were than we had no choice but to pursue that capability ourselves as well. But once we had these, west started worrying about a 'nuclear exchange'.
It was not us which introduced ballistic missile based delivery systems, it was Indians who introduced Prithvi which were short ranged and deployed near to our borders. They than introduced Agnis, forcing us to again respond to maintain credible deterrence. You study history of nuclear development without bias and can see that it was always India which moved one leg up on nuclear ladder when we had matched them up to maintain deterrence.
The another play these authors make is to parrot again and again India's purported 'No First Use' nuclear doctrine as if to persuade a reader that it is Pakistan which is more inclined toward striking first rather than India. Here I remember a Chinese saying that actions are weightier than words. Let me reiterate history of nuclear 'escalation' in South Asia to point out this fallacy.
With all their talk of 'no first use' it were Indians who converted soviet SA-2s with their help in Prithvis and started deploying them giving them the ability to quickly launch a first strike on our main bases. This was which prompted us to start working on earlier Hatfs, which were purposely short ranged and designed to only reach areas where they could deploy Prithvi so as to deter India from deploying them too close for a surprise launch.
Than they started testing longer ranged Agnis to take them out of range of our missiles and not only deployed them but deployed them in fixed or rail based silos, an operational choice certified and stamped as a first launch operational option. Indian just played on average user's ignorance of nuclear strategy and tactics to portray it as if they were just placing their nukes out of our range so as to exercise 'no first use'. But this now put us facing a grave scenario, they can now refuel their liquid propellant based Agnis well outside range of our missiles as well as do it undetected as we had no way of even detecting them re-fueling their rockets. Again a grave and even a more seriously dangerous scenario of a surprise first strike against our assets than Prithivis, and worse now they covered every inch of our soil with their rail mobile capability as well.
This than again forced us to come with a solution and this time because of their ability to strike anywhere in Pakistan we have to make choices of making them more survivable. By making them fully mobile and gradually shifting away from liquid based to solid fuelled delivery systems. By making them mobile we were trying to ensure that we had a survivable force with enough potency left in case of a surprise Indian strike so as to deter India from such a strike. This force was gradually shifted to solid fuel based systems to enhance operational mobility and also finely calibrated with the up-gradations they made to their force.
They kept on shifting their operational posture to the east of their territory and retaining silo based operational profile so as to outrange us and also to have the option of a surprise first strike. Here I'll again remind our forum members that this 'perception' that road mobile strike elements are geared to first launch is entirely wrong. your force elements which are silo deployed are the one best geared for a surprise launch rather than road based mobile elements, which are geared more toward survivability. It was only when they started running out of territory than they started looking more seriously at making some of their force road mobile as well. Although its mobility is a bit questionable. Again our aim was to maintain a credible deterrence rather than escalate it up the nuclear ladder, it was India which did this again and again.
Now lets look at one of the insinuations that author made i.e. "another unsettling first in the annals of nuclear deterrence" about our tactical nukes. Completely false and actually an outright lie if author has even an inkling of an idea of nuclear history.
It was USA and NATO which first developed and operationalised this strategy against Soviets which was than later replicated by soviets as well. In case of USA it was actually escalatory as they were trying to reduce soviets assumed superiority in conventional forces even when USA at that time enjoyed a significant advantage in strategic force posture and this assumption of soviets conventional superiority was not even worth a pinch of salt in such a scenario. US had IRBMs deployed in Europe, any soviet conventional forces breakthrough and advance in western Europe would have resulted in a debilitating strike. And records and writings by soviet authors after breakup of Soviet Union proves that they feared these IRBMs much more than western authors acknowledge.
In our case, introduction of tactical nukes is again a response to conventional force posture and doctrine which Indian Army has been operationalising from 2000. Actually I do not even remember a single credible western analyst or author pointing out the incredulity of what Indians are trying to achieve and its seriously escalatory and nuclear risk related connotations. Rather than trying to maintain deterrence or enhance it they are actually trying to remove it and doing it in the worst of ways possible, by a conventional war, presumably a blitzkrieg!! to heavily dent our conventional forces and rapidly occupy a significant portion of our heavily populated territories. what an idiots.. that is the best I can say.
Now spicing up such a propaganda article with a few mentions of terrorism do not change the ground facts. Also I'll point out, for the benefit of our readers, that there is strong evidence of Indian meddling in Afghanistan for supporting terrorism against us in Baluchistan and FATA via TTP. TTP had no operational useful benefits out of striking our AWACS or P3C Orions, both of which were India specific platforms. I just hope that extra deployments which we ended up making in FATA to fight this off do not end up getting over the head of that gurkha idiot now sitting in Indian Army HQ. He is making too many foolish noises these days.
It was India which introduced nukes in South Asia not us, ours was a reaction. In the grave situation we were than we had no choice but to pursue that capability ourselves as well. But once we had these, west started worrying about a 'nuclear exchange'.
It was not us which introduced ballistic missile based delivery systems, it was Indians who introduced Prithvi which were short ranged and deployed near to our borders. They than introduced Agnis, forcing us to again respond to maintain credible deterrence. You study history of nuclear development without bias and can see that it was always India which moved one leg up on nuclear ladder when we had matched them up to maintain deterrence.
The another play these authors make is to parrot again and again India's purported 'No First Use' nuclear doctrine as if to persuade a reader that it is Pakistan which is more inclined toward striking first rather than India. Here I remember a Chinese saying that actions are weightier than words. Let me reiterate history of nuclear 'escalation' in South Asia to point out this fallacy.
With all their talk of 'no first use' it were Indians who converted soviet SA-2s with their help in Prithvis and started deploying them giving them the ability to quickly launch a first strike on our main bases. This was which prompted us to start working on earlier Hatfs, which were purposely short ranged and designed to only reach areas where they could deploy Prithvi so as to deter India from deploying them too close for a surprise launch.
Than they started testing longer ranged Agnis to take them out of range of our missiles and not only deployed them but deployed them in fixed or rail based silos, an operational choice certified and stamped as a first launch operational option. Indian just played on average user's ignorance of nuclear strategy and tactics to portray it as if they were just placing their nukes out of our range so as to exercise 'no first use'. But this now put us facing a grave scenario, they can now refuel their liquid propellant based Agnis well outside range of our missiles as well as do it undetected as we had no way of even detecting them re-fueling their rockets. Again a grave and even a more seriously dangerous scenario of a surprise first strike against our assets than Prithivis, and worse now they covered every inch of our soil with their rail mobile capability as well.
This than again forced us to come with a solution and this time because of their ability to strike anywhere in Pakistan we have to make choices of making them more survivable. By making them fully mobile and gradually shifting away from liquid based to solid fuelled delivery systems. By making them mobile we were trying to ensure that we had a survivable force with enough potency left in case of a surprise Indian strike so as to deter India from such a strike. This force was gradually shifted to solid fuel based systems to enhance operational mobility and also finely calibrated with the up-gradations they made to their force.
They kept on shifting their operational posture to the east of their territory and retaining silo based operational profile so as to outrange us and also to have the option of a surprise first strike. Here I'll again remind our forum members that this 'perception' that road mobile strike elements are geared to first launch is entirely wrong. your force elements which are silo deployed are the one best geared for a surprise launch rather than road based mobile elements, which are geared more toward survivability. It was only when they started running out of territory than they started looking more seriously at making some of their force road mobile as well. Although its mobility is a bit questionable. Again our aim was to maintain a credible deterrence rather than escalate it up the nuclear ladder, it was India which did this again and again.
Now lets look at one of the insinuations that author made i.e. "another unsettling first in the annals of nuclear deterrence" about our tactical nukes. Completely false and actually an outright lie if author has even an inkling of an idea of nuclear history.
It was USA and NATO which first developed and operationalised this strategy against Soviets which was than later replicated by soviets as well. In case of USA it was actually escalatory as they were trying to reduce soviets assumed superiority in conventional forces even when USA at that time enjoyed a significant advantage in strategic force posture and this assumption of soviets conventional superiority was not even worth a pinch of salt in such a scenario. US had IRBMs deployed in Europe, any soviet conventional forces breakthrough and advance in western Europe would have resulted in a debilitating strike. And records and writings by soviet authors after breakup of Soviet Union proves that they feared these IRBMs much more than western authors acknowledge.
In our case, introduction of tactical nukes is again a response to conventional force posture and doctrine which Indian Army has been operationalising from 2000. Actually I do not even remember a single credible western analyst or author pointing out the incredulity of what Indians are trying to achieve and its seriously escalatory and nuclear risk related connotations. Rather than trying to maintain deterrence or enhance it they are actually trying to remove it and doing it in the worst of ways possible, by a conventional war, presumably a blitzkrieg!! to heavily dent our conventional forces and rapidly occupy a significant portion of our heavily populated territories. what an idiots.. that is the best I can say.
Now spicing up such a propaganda article with a few mentions of terrorism do not change the ground facts. Also I'll point out, for the benefit of our readers, that there is strong evidence of Indian meddling in Afghanistan for supporting terrorism against us in Baluchistan and FATA via TTP. TTP had no operational useful benefits out of striking our AWACS or P3C Orions, both of which were India specific platforms. I just hope that extra deployments which we ended up making in FATA to fight this off do not end up getting over the head of that gurkha idiot now sitting in Indian Army HQ. He is making too many foolish noises these days.
