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India almost lost Amritsar in ’65 war:Indian Army Captain Amarinder

You started the war and got hell of a beating in return
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Dear.. engilsh comprehesation .. and understaind ..
what present is saying is exaclty opposite what you siad

At a ratio of 3:1 PA stood firm. Be proud. This is the essence of what Pakistanis are capable of.
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then you strategic obejctive was always show ratio.. and loose war..?
and essnce showing pak establsihemnt cpable of maing bg blunder agian and agian and again
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if you won war.. why you sign sihmala agremt making kashmir bilateral and now stuck in it since then
wow what a vicoty ..and kashmir .. amristar still in india . and will remain so till next apocalyspe
listen this video its crytal clear.. who won who lost.. who made history tweak...
 
You started the war and got hell of a beating in return
Before accusing us of starting war, At least hear it from your own Pakistani people in the videos they talk about, who started it and who got a beating in return
I posted the videos atleast check them.
Asghar Khan - former Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Chairman of the Tehrik-e-Istaqlaal political party, and a man renowned for his integrity and clarity - argues against the official anti-India ideology of Pakistan.

He explains how: (a) India does not constitute a national threat and has no interest in swallowing Pakistan; (b) all wars between the two countries were started by Pakistan; (c) the Maharaja of Kashmir may not have acceded to India had Pakistan negotiated with him seriously; (d) the 1971 war was sheer lunacy in military terms on account of the long lines of communication; (e) unlike India, Pakistan does not need nuclear weapons; (f) nuclear program represents a grave danger to the national security of Pakistan; and (g) the country is paying a heavy economic price for its atomic program. This interview was recorded in 2009 by Dawn.
 
When push came to shove, you almost lost Lahore in 1965

Sure... reality is a tag bit different though:

1965 War, the Inside Story by R.D. Pradhan:

In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic", the author describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Lahore sector. When the general was fired upon by Pakistani forces, he "ran away". "On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."

Pradhan's book contains many different entries by Indian Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan. A Sept 9, 1965 entry reads:Had a very hard day on all fronts. Very fierce counter-attacks mounted and we are required to withdraw in Kasur area. COAS was somewhat uncertain of himself. I suggested to him that he should go in forward areas so that he will be in touch of realities. He said he would go next day.

In Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh reveals that not only did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation.

According to Shekhar Gupta, the editor of Indian Express, Harbkhash Singh recounts that a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumor – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle.
 
Amarinder: India almost lost Amritsar in ’65 war
15-t-5-pakistani-tank.jpg

Written by Man Aman Singh Chhina | Chandigarh | Posted: January 30, 2015 1:15 am
Fifty years after the 1965 Indo-Pak war, deputy leader of Congress in the Lok Sabha, Captain Amarinder Singh, has shed new light on an order allegedly given by the then Army Chief to withdraw Indian Army troops in Punjab, which could have led to the surrender of Amritsar.
Speaking to The Indian Express, Amarinder revealed he is writing a book on the 1965 war to mark its 50th anniversary. The book will trace battles fought in various theatres during the war, and give detailed information about several contentious issues.
One of these is an order allegedly given by then Chief of Army Staff Gen J N Chaudhari to the then General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Western Command, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, to withdraw Indian troops in Punjab. The order, had it been carried out, would have meant the surrender of Amritsar to the Pakistan Army, besides causing panic among Indian troops.
In September 1965, the Pakistan Army surprised Indian defenders in the Khemkaran Sector in Punjab when their armoured division made a dash towards the town of Khemkaran and captured it. The Indian Army had to pull back towards the village of Asal Uttar to consolidate their defence. The Pakistani division was believed to be in a three-pronged attack in which one column was heading towards south of Amritsar, one towards the town of Jandiala and another towards Beas. After the initial surprise, the Indian Army reinforced its presence in the area and the Pakistani advance was defeated in the Battle of Asal Uttar. The village is now known as the graveyard of Patton tanks.
Amarinder, who was the aide-de-camp of the GOC-in-C during the war, said he was a witness to the fact that Lt Gen Harbaksh received a call from Gen Chaudhuri late at night while the Pakistani armoured offensive in Khemkaran was under way. Gen Chaudhuri wanted the Indian troops to withdraw to river Beas, which would serve as a natural barrier to stop the advance of Pakistan’s armoured division.
“We had returned from Khemkaran very late and the general had gone to sleep when I received the call from the chief and put it through to the army commander. The general was heard telling the chief that he would not carry out those orders, and if he wanted this to be done, he should put it down in writing,” said Amarinder.
According to the former Punjab CM, the army chief went to Ambala the next day and met the GOC-in-C but did not mention his order of the previous night, because by then the battle in Asal Uttar had stabilised and the situation was under control.
Had it been anyone other than Lt Gen Harbaksh, he would not have been able to resist the orders of the army chief. And had those orders been carried out, we would have had to surrender Amritsar, and the road from Beas onwards to Delhi would have been open because there would have been general panic. It would have been a repeat of 1962,” said Amarinder.
The book, expected continued…


Amarinder: India almost lost Amritsar in ’65 war | The Indian Express

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Its only logical in what he is saying, no rocket science. PA by its design and constraints,neither has the resources, nor the strength to go on all out assault. More likely strategy of PA would be to somehow make a concentrated thrust from Indian Punjab and march on Dehli rather than pursuing IA deep inside Indian territory which would not only create supply line security risks but also increased costs of supplying the advancing troops. Resultantly Indian troops stationed at these sections would face increased pressure from PA. PA would like to stay as closer to border as possible. The strategy has been pretty much the same in 1965,71 and probably would also prevail in future wars.
 
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These pics are a proof of what happend in 1965.. this is the reality and has to be lived with...


Hari Singh of the India's 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District.
Brig.Hari_Singh_at_Barkee_Capture.jpg


Indian soldeirs before pak PS in lahore dist.
0273.jpg


inpak6.jpg
 
These pics are a proof of what happend in 1965.. this is the reality and has to be lived with...


Hari Singh of the India's 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District.
Brig.Hari_Singh_at_Barkee_Capture.jpg


Indian soldeirs before pak PS in lahore dist.
0273.jpg


inpak6.jpg


The first border village across wahga..

and than this happened:

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1965 War, the Inside Story by R.D. Pradhan:

In Chapter 8 titled "Of Cowardice and Panic", the author describes the cowardice of Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the Indian general commanding officer in Lahore sector. When the general was fired upon by Pakistani forces, he "ran away". "On learning that, Lt. Gen. Harbakash Singh and the corps commander drove in a Jonga to the battlefront. Army commander found that the enemy (PAF) air attack had created a havoc on G.T. Road. (Indian) Vehicles were burning and several vehicles of 15 Division abandoned on the road, the drivers having run away, leaving some of the engines still running. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad was hiding in a recently irrigated sugar cane field. As described by Harabakash Singh: "He (Prasad) came out to receive us, with his boots covered with wet mud. He had no head cover, nor was he wearing any badges of his rank. He had stubble on his face, not having shaved." Seeing him in such a stage, Harbakhash Singh asked him: "Whether he was the General Officer commanding a division or a coolie? Why had he removed badges of rank and not shaved? Niranjan Prasad had no answer."



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