In Okinawa, Talk of Independence From Japan Turns Serious

[Wholegrain]

In Okinawa, Talk of Break From Japan Turns Serious

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/w...k-of-break-from-japan-turns-serious.html?_r=0

In Okinawa, Talk of Break From Japan Turns Serious

Ko Sasaki for The New York Times
Chosuke Yara, the head of the Ryukyu Independence Party, last month. “Independence is an idea whose time has come,” he said.
By MARTIN FACKLER
Published: July 5, 2013

NAHA, Japan — In a windowless room in a corner of a bustling market where stalls displayed severed pigs’ heads and bolts of kimono silk, Okinawans gathered to learn about a political idea that until recently few had dared to take seriously: declaring their island chain’s political independence from Japan.

About two dozen people of all ages listened as speakers challenged the official view of Okinawa as inherently part of homogeneous Japan, arguing instead that Okinawans are a different ethnic group whose once-independent tropical islands were forcibly seized by Japan in 1879. Then, to lighten the mood, the organizers showed “Sayonara, Japan!”, a comedy about a fictional Okinawan island that becomes its own little republic.

“Until now, you were mocked if you spoke of independence,” said one speaker, Kobun Higa, 71, a retired journalist whose book on the history of the tiny independence movement has become a hot seller online. “But independence may be the only real way to free ourselves from the American bases.”

Mr. Higa and other advocates admit that few islanders would actually seek independence for Okinawa, the southernmost Japanese island chain, which is home to 1.4 million residents and more than half of the 50,000 American troops and sailors based in Japan. But discontent with the heavy American presence and a growing perception that the central government is ignoring Okinawans’ pleas to reduce it have made an increasing number of islanders willing to at least flirt publicly with the idea of breaking apart in a way that local politicians and scholars say they have not seen in decades.

In May, a newly formed group led by Okinawan university professors held a symposium on independence that drew 250 people. A tiny political party that advocates separation from Japan through peaceful means has been revived after decades of dormancy, though its candidates have fared poorly in recent elections. And on his blog, a member of Parliament from Okinawa recently went so far as to post an entry titled “Okinawa, It’s Finally Time for Independence From Yamato,” using the Okinawan word for the rest of Japan.

“Before, independence was just something we philosophized about over drinks,” said Masahide Ota, a former governor of Okinawa, who is not a member of the movement.

“Now, it is being taken much more seriously.”

The independence movement remains nascent, with a few hundred active adherents at most. But Mr. Ota and others say it still has the potential to complicate Japan’s unfolding contest with China for influence in the region.

That struggle expanded recently to include what appears to be a semiofficial campaign in China to question Japanese rule of Okinawa. Some analysts see the campaign as a ploy to strengthen China’s hand in a dispute over a smaller group of islands that has captured international headlines in recent months. Some Chinese scholars have called for exploiting the independence movement to say there are splits even in Japan over the legitimate ownership of islands annexed during Japan’s imperial expansion in the late 19th century, as Okinawa and the smaller island group were.

Okinawa has long looked and felt different from the rest of Japan, with the islands’ tropical climate, vibrant musical culture and lower average incomes setting it apart. Strategically situated in the center of East Asia, the islands, once known as the Kingdom of the Ryukyus, have had a tortured history with Japan since the takeover, including the forced suicides of Okinawan civilians by Japanese troops during World War II and the imposition of American bases after the war.

For years, Okinawans directed much of their ire over the bases at the United States. But that changed four years ago when the Japanese prime minister at the time, Yukio Hatoyama, reneged on campaign pledges to move the bustling Marine air base at Futenma off Okinawa, rather than to a less populated site on the island as previous governments had approved. After that, many Okinawans shifted much of their anger toward the rest of Japan, which wants the United States military presence to offset China’s growing power, but is unwilling to shoulder more of the burden of bases for fear of crime, noise and accidents.

Local leaders and scholars say the last time Okinawans spoke so openly of independence was during a period of sometimes violent unrest against American control before the United States ended its postwar occupation of the islands in 1972.

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“There is a growing feeling that Okinawans just exchanged one colonial master in Washington for another one in Tokyo,” said Shinako Oyakawa, 32, a doctoral student at the University of the Ryukyus and a co-founder of Okinawan Studies 107, a group promoting research into Ryukyuan ethnic identity.

Such discontent has helped nurture groups like hers, which seek to promote the idea that the islanders form a distinct ethnic group. It has also led to the creation of places like Ryukyu Hall, a privately run school that opened last year and offers classes on Okinawan language and culture.

On a recent weekend, about 30 people gathered at the school, a small, sparsely furnished two-story building, to hear accounts in the Ryukyuan language by survivors of the American invasion of Okinawa in 1945.

“Regaining our identity is the first step toward regaining independence,” said Midori Teruya, 41, a co-founder of the school in Ginowan, the site of the Futenma air base.

The talk of independence has grown enough that it is being heard in Tokyo, where some conservative newspapers have begun calling the Okinawan independence activists “pawns” of China.

Whether or not the activists are pawns, there is certainly some discussion in China about using the independence movement. Recently, an editorial in The Global Times, a state-run Chinese newspaper, said China could pressure Japan by “fostering forces in Okinawa that seek the restoration of the independence of the Ryukyu chain.”

Few believe China is about to pursue ownership of Okinawa. But Japanese analysts see the informal campaign as the latest gambit in China’s attempts to take over the smaller group of islands, known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, by essentially warning that China could expand its claims beyond those islands if Japan ignores its arguments.

“It will create problems for us if the Chinese government tries to use this issue,” said Masaki Tomochi, a professor at Okinawa International University who helped organize the symposium on independence in May.

Mr. Tomochi and other activists said that in the remote event that Okinawa became independent, they felt little fear of a Chinese takeover because the Ryukyus had held friendly ties with China for centuries before the Japanese takeover.

Mr. Tomochi’s group is planning a second symposium to present research on how Pacific island nations like Palau could serve as a model for a future Ryukyu republic. The idea is to try to overcome what he sees as the main challenge his movement faces: winning over Okinawans who seem content with their Japanese-style living standards.

“People are talking independence now, but how realistic is it?” asked Yoshinao Hiyane, 22, an economics major at Okinawa International University. “My generation has grown up Japanese.”

At the movie screening in the market, independence supporters tried to bolster the notion that their idea is more than a fantasy by handing out color-copied “currency” of a Ryukyu republic. They stood before a blue banner with three stars that the organizer, Chosuke Yara, called its flag.

“Recently, the interests of the Japanese people and the Ryukyu people have clearly diverged,” said Mr. Yara, 61, the head of the tiny Ryukyu Independence Party. “Independence is an idea whose time has come.”

A version of this article appeared in print on July 6, 2013, on page A4 of the New York edition with the headline: In Okinawa, Talk of Break From Japan Turns Serious.

@ChinaToday @ChineseTiger1986 @ChinaToday @shuttler @HongWu

 

[shuttler]

The People of Okinawa need to tell the world aloud about these:

the forced suicides of Okinawan civilians by Japanese troops during World War II and the imposition of American bases after the war.

People of Okinawa against the american and japanese imperialists!

 

[Wholegrain]

@shuttler

WikiLeaks: Okinawa’s Pro-China, Anti-U.S. Bent - Japan Real Time - WSJ

WikiLeaks: Okinawa’s Pro-China, Anti-U.S. Bent - China Real Time Report - WSJ

July 4, 2011, 9:23 PM
WikiLeaks: Okinawa’s Pro-China, Anti-U.S. Bent

By Yoree Koh

There have been plenty of reasons given explaining why Okinawan residents hold reservations about the continued U.S. military presence on the tropical island: noise pollution and the unruly behavior of some U.S. servicemen, to name a couple. But here’s another: Okinawans don’t view China’s growing military might as a security threat, a diverging perspective from attitudes held in Tokyo and Washington, according to a U.S. embassy cable released by Wikileaks.


Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
People shout slogans as they hold banners reading “Withdraw the plan” during the arrival of Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the Okinawa government offices in Naha, Okinawa prefecture on December 17, 2010.
More In WikiLeaks


“Despite China’s rapidly expanding economic and military activities, including in waters near Okinawa, Okinawans claim they do not share America’s or Japan’s sense of threat from China…..and which is a factor in local attitudes toward U.S. military bases in Okinawa,” states an April 26, 2006 cable sent from the U.S. Consulate in Naha, located in Okinawa.

The U.S. cable, signed by Thomas Reich, the consul general of the U.S. consulate in Naha, says that this lack of fear coincides with Okinawa’s historical ties with China and how the two share a mutual connection because both have been treated poorly by Japan. It refers to incidents that occurred during World War II, specifically the Battle of Okinawa – the full frontal assault from both sides that resulted in mass military and civilian casualties. It also gives a short historical brief on the amicable ties between China and the island chain when they were still recognized as the independent Ryukyu kingdom prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.

The cable details multiple conversations with local Okinawan authorities that show the southern island largely viewed the Chinese threat as nil, despite increasing incursions into Japanese maritime and air territory.

“We asked why a look at a map of the region surrounding Okinawa and current stories regarding China’s expansion didn’t provide Okinawans enough information for them to judge for themselves. Tomon replied the GOJ (government of Japan) and USG (U.S. government) were like the boy who cried wolf, pointing to China and claiming that something awful might happen, but nothing ever did. Okinawans were undisturbed, Tomon claimed, by Chinese incursions,” states the cable in reference to a March 2006 discussion with Mitsuko Tomon, a former Socialist Party lawmaker and who was at the time a mayoral candidate for Okinawa City. Ms. Tomon added, according to the cable, that historically, “Japan and the United States had been more harmful to Okinawa than China had ever been.”

The cable notes a number of friendly exchanges that had cropped up between Okinawa and China in recent years, and contrasts China’s tone towards the southern island with that extended towards the mainland based on local media reports. But the U.S. doubts whether it’s all about historical ties with China that have formed Okinawa’s attitude.

“Okinawa’s exceptionalism is not based entirely on history and feeling; it is used to practical effect. Okinawans claiming to feel no threat from China often use this to bolster arguments that bases should be eliminated from Okinawa. For example, when asked specifically about Chinese military activities near Okinawa, such as the November 2004 submarine incursion, former Diet member Tomon grudgingly admitted that the incident was regrettable. She hastened to add, however, that it alone did not justify the concentration of U.S. forces and facilities in Okinawa.”

Okinawans explore secession option

Okinawans explore secession option | The Japan Times

Okinawans explore secession option
Academics see need for people to regain pride, identity, culture
BY MIZUHO AOKI
STAFF WRITER
JUL 11, 2013

NAHA, OKINAWA PREF. – Okinawans are losing patience with Tokyo’s repeated vows to reduce the prefecture’s burden of hosting U.S. military installations and other hollow pledges, and some are seriously looking into the possibility of having the territory secede from Japan.

On May 15, the 41st anniversary of Okinawa’s belated 1972 reversion to Japan from U.S. control, five Okinawans established an academic society to study potential paths to regaining Ryukyu independence.

Before Japan took control of the territory in 1879 and incorporated it as Okinawa, the islands were known as the Ryukyu Kingdom, which had a thriving sea trade with China and Southeast Asia, as well as links with Japan.

The academic society — the Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans (local-language pronunciation of Ryukyuans) — made headlines and drew popular backing from many Okinawans, including Social Democratic Party lawmaker Kantoku Teruya, who praised the group in his blog, headlined “Okinawa, from Yamato to independence at last,” on April 1.

After a local newspaper reported the group’s plan, they said their membership grew to nearly 150 people in less than three months.

“Japan made Okinawa its colony, and discrimination and colonial rule continues to this day. If nothing is done, the future will be the same, and (secession may be) one of the answers to resolve that,” said Masaki Tomochi, 40, an associate professor of economics at Okinawa International University and a founding member of the academic group.

The group will study how other nations gained independence and explore ways for Okinawa to attain and justify it from different angles, including politics, culture, linguistics and economics. In the process, it also plans to collaborate with Guam and Taiwan, which have also sought independence, and hold two membership meetings a year. The first will be held in October.

“Our ultimate goal is to re-establish the right to self-determination, to gain independence and decide (policies) on our own,” Tomochi said. “We are not here to discuss whether we can or can’t realize independence. We will discuss how to achieve independence under the premise that we can.”

Independence isn’t a new concept in Okinawa. The topic has been batted about since the Meiji government seized the islands in 1879 and tried to eradicate the Ryukyu culture, language and identity.

Shinako Oyakawa, 32, a sociolinguistics graduate student at Ryukyu University and founding member of the academic group, said she used to hear adults talking about Ryukyu independence when she was a child. She always thought it was a pipe dream.

But after living under the heavy U.S. military presence and digging deep into Okinawa’s linguistic history, she concluded the islands must once again be independent.

“Being a colony is not a healthy status. It’s natural to return to the original state as an independent nation,” Oyakawa said.

When the Meiji government took over the kingdom, it attempted to eradicate its culture by, for instance, prohibiting children from speaking Okinawan at school. When they did, they were forced to wear “dialect cards” as punishment.

According to a November 2011 poll of 1,137 adult residents conducted by the daily Ryukyu Shimpo, about 45 percent can still speak Okinawan, down 11.1 points from 2001. The rate among those in their 20s and 30s, however, reveals that assimilation is gaining ground: About 90 percent can’t speak the Ryukyuan languages, also known as the Okinawan dialects.

Recovering the language and regaining self-esteem are part of the process of regaining independence, members of the academic group said.

“Some think everything can be translated. But there are so many things that cannot be translated. (Okinawan languages) embody a sense of value that Okinawans hold,” Oyakawa said. “It’s about retrieving the view of the world the language had.”

In the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, 1 out of every 4 Okinawans died. Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, the U.S. military took over the prefecture and didn’t cede control of it until 1972 — long after the rest of Japan had become independent again. That delayed return has cast a cloud over Japan’s independence celebrations.

Since 1972, Okinawa has essentially remained a U.S. military outpost, hosting some 74 percent of all American installations in Japan. Noise pollution and the specter of aircraft accidents remain part of everyday life on the islands, which also have Self-Defense Forces elements present.

“(Okinawa) was sacrificed in World War II to protect the mainland. When we look back in history, we realize this was due to discriminatory colonial rule,” Tomochi said.

Many Okinawans say they understand the sentiment behind the Ryukyu independence movement but have reservations when asked if they are really willing to part with Japan.

According to the Ryukyu Shimpo poll, 4.7 percent said they want Okinawa to become independent again and 61.8 percent said they want it to remain part of Japan.

Although the figures may be low, the founding members of the academic group believe that deep down, most Okinawans desire independence.

“We’ve been a colony for a long time. We need a process to regain” our identity, Tomochi said.

“This is a new movement to think about Ryukyu by Ryukyuans. Up until today, we have done things jointly with Japan, but it didn’t work,” he said. “We have a responsibility to the next generation (to stop being a colony).”

 

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Viewing cable 06NAHA103, OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF

Cable Viewer

Reference ID Created Classification Origin
06NAHA103 2006-04-26 01:20 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Naha
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INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
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RHMFISS/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RHMFISS/CG II MEF
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RHMFISS/CG III MEF
RUHBANB/CG MCB CAMP BUTLER JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RHHMDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0137
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHMBRA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0517
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVFO FAREAST YOKOSUKA JA
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0209
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0174
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0472
RHMFISS/USARPAC G5 FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/USPACOM REP GUAM ISLAND GU
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NAHA 000103

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/26/2031
TAGS: MARR PINS JA CH TW
SUBJECT: OKINAWAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE CHINA THREAT OR LACK THEREOF

REF: A. A. TOKYO 1301
¶B. B. TOKYO 1153
¶C. C. EMBASSY TOKYO TRANSLATION OF FEBRUARY 24 SANKEI SHIMBUN ARTICLE.
¶D. D. FUKUOKA 17
¶E. E. NAGOYA 11
¶F. F. TOKYO 822

NAHA 00000103 001.2 OF 008


CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas G. Reich, Consul General, Consulate
General Naha, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Despite China's rapidly expanding economic
and military activities, including in waters near Okinawa,
Okinawans claim they do not share America's or Japan's sense of
threat from China. While many mainland Japanese officials and
influentials say they recognize China as a potential threat to
regional security and stability, even most conservative
Okinawans do not believe a Chinese threat to Japan (or
elsewhere) necessarily means a threat to Okinawa. Many
Okinawans identify with China culturally and believe China sees
them as a separate people from the Japanese. Some also say
Okinawa, over the centuries, has received better treatment from
China than from Japan or the United States. These attitudes
combine to produce an Okinawan perspective that is markedly
different from that of mainland Japan, and which is a factor in
local attitudes toward U.S. military bases in Okinawa. End
summary.

------------------
China Rising
------------------

¶2. (SBU) In recent years, China's economic expansion and growing
military capabilities have attracted a great deal of attention
in Japan, although somewhat less in Okinawa. The two leading
Okinawan newspapers generally appear reluctant to feature
articles about the potential negative impacts on regional
security associated with China's rise, mostly because the
newspapers fear this line of thought will serve as an implicit
justification for the continued existence of U.S. military bases
on the island.

¶3. (SBU) Nevertheless, Okinawans who make the effort to read
mainland Japanese newspapers can find ample coverage of Japan's
concerns. Some widely reported Chinese activities have a very
direct connection to Okinawa. For example, Japan, China and
Taiwan have competing claims to an island chain 250 miles west
of Okinawa, known as the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China.
The governments of Japan and China have disputed the islands'
sovereignty for years and more recently have both made moves to
develop undersea resources near them (see, e.g., refs. A, B).
The media have reported China has erected drilling platforms in

NAHA 00000103 002.2 OF 008


the disputed territory.

¶4. (SBU) China has also stepped up military air and sea
activities in the area, prompting Japanese Self Defense Forces
to respond. According to national broadcaster NHK, Japan Air
Self Defense Forces scrambled to intercept Chinese military
aircraft above or near the East China Sea 30 times between April
and September 2005, more than twice as often as they did in all
of 2004. Chinese maritime activity also occasionally makes the
news. The November 2004 Chinese submarine incursion into
Japanese waters within Okinawa Prefecture drew a rare Chinese
apology for a "technical error." The mainland Japanese media
have suggested this was not the only Chinese submarine intrusion
near Okinawa.

--------------------------------------------- --------------
------------------------------
Different Perspectives of "Mainland" Japanese and Okinawans
--------------------------------------------- --------------
------------------------------

¶5. (C) In mainland Japan, concern over China's military buildup
is frequently aired. For example, in January the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) General Affairs Chairman Akio Kuma noted
that if China chose to swallow up Taiwan, it would be easy
enough for it to swallow up Okinawa, too, in the absence of U.S.
forces. In February the opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) issued a statement that it was "inevitable that China's
military buildup and its moves to line up marine interests from
the viewpoint of the Japanese people are recognized as an actual
threat to Japan" (ref. C).

¶6. (U) Typical of many Japanese academics' views was a February
9 article by (Japan's) National Defense University Professor
Tomohide Murai stating that the most efficient way for the
United States to project power throughout the world was to link
with regional partners, and that Japan, by its very location,
was a key partner in the Pacific. Murai noted the Chinese
recognized the strategic importance of Okinawa, calling it (as
does the United States) the "keystone of the Pacific."

¶7. (SBU) In Okinawa, however, many - probably most -residents
have a substantially different assessment of China. In general,
Okinawans perceive little potential threat from China; many
people here note China and the Ryukyu Kingdom had peaceful
relations for centuries prior to the 19th Century Meiji
Restoration in Japan. To be sure, there are Okinawans who are
as concerned about China's destabilizing possibilities as are
many mainlanders, but this is not the prevailing view on the
island.


NAHA 00000103 003.2 OF 008


¶8. (C) As vignettes of Okinawa's relaxed attitude toward China,
we note the following conversations. During a September 2005
office call, reformist Ginowan City Mayor Yoichi Iha told us he
believed China posed no threat to Okinawa. In October 2005 Kin
Town Mayor Gibu underscored his support for the U.S.-Japan
alliance but complained the GOJ had never explained what threat,
exactly, the alliance deterred. In March, former Socialist
Party Diet Member and candidate for Okinawa City mayor Mitsuko
Tomon made the same complaint.

¶9. (C) We asked why a look at a map of the region surrounding
Okinawa and current stories regarding China's expansion didn't
provide Okinawans enough information for them to judge for
themselves. Tomon replied the GOJ and USG were like the boy who
cried wolf, pointing to China and claiming that something awful
might happen, but nothing ever did. Okinawans were undisturbed,
Tomon claimed, by Chinese incursions. Chinese fishing boats
crossing the sea boundary did not affect Okinawan fisheries as
Okinawans worked only in its inner seas. In a separate
conversation, he Okinawan Federation of Fisheries echoed Tomon's
claim, but added that their members avoided the Senkakus because
they were "politically difficult." The Chinese might be
drilling near the Senkakus, and claim the Senkakus for
themselves, Tomon noted, but these were essentially peaceful
activities for the GOJ to settle. Because of Okinawa's history
as the Ryukyu Kingdom, it had a very different view of China
than did the Japanese mainland. Historically speaking, Tomon
commented, Japan and the United States had been more harmful to
Okinawa than China had ever been.

----------------------------------------
A Ryukyuan History Primer
----------------------------------------

¶10. (U) By entering into close trading relationships with both
China and Japan in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ryukyu
Kingdom enjoyed a lengthy period of prosperity in the years
before 1609. As George Kerr notes in his book Okinawa: The
History of an Island People, "the islands were independent.
They were in constant communication and at peace with
neighboring states. Okinawans were in the happy position of
freedom to adopt what they wanted, and to remain indifferent -
or at best mildly curious - about foreign artifacts and
institutions for which they felt no pressing need. China loomed
as the neighbor of unquestioned superiority, and Okinawans were
in close and constant communication with Japan, but were
overwhelmed by neither." Many Okinawans today regard this
period as the Golden Age of their history, and view it as a
basis for their belief that China sees Okinawa a place entirely
separate from Japan.


NAHA 00000103 004.2 OF 008


¶11. (U) The Golden Age ended in 1609, when the southernmost clan
in mainland Japan (the Satsumas of southern Kyushu) sent an army
to assert control over Okinawa and extracted increasingly
burdensome tributes. The Satsumas then took over the lucrative
trade with China through Okinawa, continuing it despite the
Tokugawa Shogunate's closed country (sakoku) policy.

¶12. (U) After Commodore Perry and his black ships helped trigger
the Meiji Restoration, Japan began vigorously securing and
expanding its borders. In 1872 Japan formally abolished the
Ryukyu Kingdom and annexed Okinawa, over Chinese protests.
Okinawa pleaded with China and the United States to intervene.
Four-party discussions dragged on for decades until the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which settled the issue in Japan's
favor as far as the western powers were concerned.

¶13. (U) Japan instituted a top-down assimilation program for
Okinawa that gained momentum when met by a bottom-up
assimilation movement following Japan's success in the
Sino-Japanese War. Practical-minded Okinawans became convinced
they would benefit from closer identification with Japan. Early
editorials of the Ryukyu Shimpo, dating as far back as 1893,
asserted that Okinawa could develop only by fully assimilating
with Japan.

¶14. (U) Over the following 50 years, many Okinawans saw military
service, including during the battle for Okinawa, as a chance to
prove they were true Japanese. However, the battle, which
killed perhaps a third of the Okinawan population, came as a
shock to most of the survivors, who experienced or heard stories
of atrocities against Okinawans by Japanese troops. In the
years after the war, a home-grown historical interpretation of
the battle took solid root in Okinawa, which holds that Tokyo
had always intended to sacrifice Okinawa in a battle designed to
consume as many U.S. forces as possible, to stall and weaken an
eventual attack on the mainland.

¶15. (U) The United States directly governed Okinawa through a
military high commissioner from 1945 to 1972, 20 years longer
than the rest of Japan. During this period, U.S. forces
forcibly seized land for bases. By the early 1960s, a movement
advocating reversion to Japan began among Okinawans, leading to
large-scale demonstrations against the U.S. administration in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Okinawa reverted to Japan May
15, 1972.

¶16. (SBU) The reunion was a victory for all Okinawans (though
many were dismayed at the remaining numbers of U.S. facilities
and forces), and anti-U.S. protests were dramatically reduced
following reversion. With reversion, the GOJ sharply increased
infrastructure development, and the general standard of living

NAHA 00000103 005.2 OF 008


greatly improved. However, in the years since 1972, many
Okinawans have called for lessening the island's economic
dependence on GOJ transfer payments. Okinawa remains the
poorest prefecture in Japan, with the highest unemployment rate
in Japan, and many argue that Okinawa needs to become more
economically independent.

--------------------------------------------- --------------
-----------------
Okinawan Analysis: Split Identity, Affinity with China
--------------------------------------------- --------------
-----------------

¶17. (SBU) The above history still shapes Okinawans' world views,
including their sense of identity. In December 2005 the
University of the Ryukyus announced the results of a telephone
survey of Okinawans, in which 40% of respondents, when asked how
they identified themselves, said they were Okinawan. A smaller
percentage said they were both Okinawan and Japanese (36%), and
just over one in five identified themselves as Japanese (21%).

¶18. (SBU) This history also shapes how Okinawans view the GOJ
and actions that are presented in the world press as
provocations to China, most notably visits by the Prime Minister
to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine. While many mainland Japanese are
reportedly uncomfortable with the visits, if push comes to shove
between China and Japan, opinion polls show that most side with
Japan's right to do as it pleases. We believe most Okinawans
side with China. Typical of this attitude is Masaru Yamada,
treasurer of Okinawa City, who recently criticized Koizumi's
visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He told us he doubted China would
ever accept Koizumi's explanations of the visits, any more than
he himself did. Okinawans and Chinese held similar views of the
visits, he explained, because they shared the experience of
having been "prisoners of war" of the Japanese.

¶19. (U) Local newspaper editorials have also pointed to the
Yasukuni visits as unnecessary barriers to bilateral and
regional cooperation that the GOJ could, and should, remove.
Although an exaggeration, a recent Ryukyu Shimpo article
reporting on the study of Okinawan identity concluded with a
warning that GOJ policies, particularly as they related to bases
and transformation, could influence Okinawans' opinions on
whether to remain part of Japan.

¶20. (SBU) Many Okinawans believe that China sees them
differently, and more warmly, than it sees the rest of Japan.
They point out that Taipei International Airport, when posting
place names in Chinese characters, lists flights to/from
"Ryukyu," not Okinawa. A May 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo report claimed
that, because of Okinawa's history, it could become an

NAHA 00000103 006.2 OF 008


intermediary peacefully linking China and Taiwan. By offering
an independent, international contribution, Okinawa could
renounce its title of "(strategic) keystone of the Pacific" and
become a "keystone of goodwill." A June 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo
opinion piece contrasted the hospitality the Chinese granted
Okinawa Governor Inamine and his party when they visited Beijing
with Beijing's snubbing of PM Koizumi. "The extreme attention
provided Okinawa, with its deep historical connection to China,
was conspicuous in its contrast. To look at it the other way
around, it was an intense dig at the GOJ," commented the Shimpo.

¶21. (SBU) Chinese Ambassador to Japan Ki Ou (phonetic from
Japanese pronunciation) visited Okinawa April 24, on a trip
sponsored by the OPG, Okinawa Economic Association, and Okinawa
Visitors and Convention Bureau. Ou masterfully played to
Okinawans' sense of exceptionalism and desire for a new golden
era of lucrative Sino-Okinawan relations. Ou cited the
historical and cultural links between China and the Ryukyus and
said he immediately felt comfortable on this first visit to
Okinawa. Over the past 25 years China's economic expansion had
far outpaced its military expansion, Ou claimed, and its defense
capabilities were reasonable for a country of China's area and
population. China alone, of the five original nuclear powers,
had offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons if the others would
only agree to do the same. Okinawa and China should again
travel together the path of peaceful development, Ou stressed,
and tens of thousands of Chinese tourists annually were sure to
follow.

-----------
Caveats
-----------

¶22. (SBU) Okinawa's exceptionalism is not based entirely on
history and feeling; it is used to practical effect. Okinawans
claiming to feel no threat from China often use this to bolster
arguments that bases should be eliminated from Okinawa. For
example, when asked specifically about Chinese military
activities near Okinawa, such as the November 2004 submarine
incursion, former Diet member Tomon grudgingly admitted that the
incident was regrettable. She hastened to add, however, that it
alone did not justify the concentration of U.S. forces and
facilities in Okinawa.

¶23. (SBU) The claim of exceptionalism is useful even for
conservatives who support the alliance and those who profit from
our base presence. Conservative Okinawans could be seen as
playing good cop to reformists' bad cop, in order to squeeze the
maximum concessions from the GOJ and USG. A number of Okinawan
leaders probably assert this exceptionalism because they believe
it useful in leveraging concessions from the USG and GOJ in

NAHA 00000103 007.2 OF 008


return for Okinawan shouldering the burden of U.S. military
bases.

¶24. (SBU) Economic self-interest also helps explain Okinawa's
keenness to engage China. In this, Okinawan governments and
businesses have motives similar to those of other provinces now
scrambling to find new sources of income as Koizumi's reforms
reduce the outward flow of GOJ largess. The former Secretary
General of the LDP in Okinawa, Kenjiro Nishida, told us his main
motivation for founding the Okinawa-China Friendship Exchange
Association was to boost the number of Chinese tourists to
Okinawa. He noted his Chinese counterparts met him more than
halfway, being well funded by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
ConGen Fukuoka and Consulate Nagoya have identified identical
local motives to engage China, as well as signs of China's
welcoming this engagement (Refs. F, G). The Chinese leadership
may remember Sun Tzu's maxim, "when he is united, divide him."
Regardless of how cool relations are between Tokyo and Beijing,
there is no evidence this has had an effect on Okinawa's ties
with China.

¶25. (SBU) That being said, Okinawan businesspeople whose
interests directly conflict with China are not as relaxed about
Chinese expansion. Local developer Tadashi Zayasu told us he
owned part of an interest in a drilling application in the East
China Sea near the Senkaku Islands. Zayasu said the GOJ had
approved a drilling application filed by the partnership, d.b.a.
Teikoku Oil. The application was filed in 1970, but the GOJ did
not approve it until July 2005. Zayasu mused that the GOJ
seemed bent on helping the Chinese at the expense of Okinawans.
Why else, he asked, would the GOJ have funded a Chinese pipeline
to support their exploitation of the fields while sitting on a
Japanese company's application for over thirty years?

-------------------------------
Comment/Conclusion
-------------------------------

¶26. (SBU) The above caveats notwithstanding, Okinawa's sense of
affinity with China and feeling of distance from Japanese
interests give this place a unique perspective on Sino-Japanese
relations, and it shapes the local environment for U.S. military
bases. Due in part to this, many Okinawans are unconvinced that
our bases in Okinawa are needed to defend Japan -- or at least
not to defend Okinawa. Some in the GOJ leadership may value the
domestic political benefits of appealing to Japanese nationalism
over the benefits of improved Sino-Japanese relations (ref. F).
The Yasukuni visits, and Chinese reactions to them, are having
the opposite effect on attitudes in Okinawa. Such acts
strengthen the sense in Okinawa that the LDP leadership, and the
GOJ more broadly, ignore the victims of militarism. Okinawans'

NAHA 00000103 008.2 OF 008


cultural identification with China, combined with a sense of
serial betrayal by the GOJ, fuels local suspicion of GOJ motives
on current political-military issues.
REICH

 

[cirr]

Liuqiu will be an independent country。

It will be when China is strong even to molest Japan the way the US does today。

It is only a matter of time。

 

[Wholegrain]

If Ryukyu becomes independent would we give up claims to Diaoyu as a gift to the Ryukyuan people? The gas field even with Diaoyu in Japan's control would still be under China's EEZ according to Japan's own boundaries. Japan's complaints over the gas field (manufactured by the Japanese government to increase tension) center around accusations that China would siphon off gas as in slant drilling.

@Lux de Veritas

In Okinawa during the days of the Ryukyu Kingdom the Ming dynasty sent 36 Chinese families from Fujian in 1392 to Okinawa to assist the Ryukyuans in building their kingdom. They came to dominate the cultural and political life of the court and introduced Confucianism and Chinese culture to the Ryukyuans. Their community in Kumemura was a hotbed of anti Japanese sentiment during their invasion and annexation of the islands.

The Ryukyu Kingdom was one of the Ming dynasty's strongest allies and it always had positive relations with China and viewed China and Chinese culture favorable. The Japanese Satsuma domain forced them into vassalage with an invasion and Japan annexed them in 1879. Japan enacted policies which nearly eradicated the Okinawan language by replacing it the Japanese among their younger generations and effectively "Japanized" their culture. They did this forcedmcultural and linguistic assimilation with both the Ainu and Ryukyuans and did not recognize their status as natives for decades and continue not to recognize their languages or work to preserve them and not a single condemnation came from outside powers.

琉球國萬歲!

The 36 families from Fujian.

Perpetual Happiness: The Ming Emperor Yongle - Shih-shan Henry Tsai - Google Books

The East Asian Maritime World 1400-1800: Its Fabrics of Power and Dynamics ... - Google Books

Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power of Premodern China - Gang Deng - Google Books

The Origins of Banana-Fibre Cloth in the Ryukyus, Japan - Katrien Hendrickx - Google Books

Papers of Ulysses S. Grant: October 1, 1878-sepember 20, 1880 - Ulysses Simpson Grant (Politiker), Cheryl R. Ragar - Google Books

The Premodern Chinese Economy: Structural Equilibrium and Capitalist Sterility - Gang Deng - Google Books

Flowers, Dragons and Pine Trees: Asian Textiles in the Collection of the ... - Mary M. Dusenberry - Google Books

East Asian lacquer: the Florence and Herbert Irving Collection ; [this book ... - Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York, N.Y.), Barbara Brennan Ford - Google Books

The East Asian Mediterranean: Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce and ... - Google Books

Trading Networks in Early Modern East Asia - Google Books

The Eunuchs in the Ming Dynasty - Shih-Shan Henry Tsai - Google Books

久米村

Kumemura - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Okinawa: The History of an Island People - George Kerr - Google Books

Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics - Gregory Smits - Google Books

The Origins of Banana-Fibre Cloth in the Ryukyus, Japan - Katrien Hendrickx - Google Books

Race, Ethnicity and Migration in Modern Japan: Imagined and imaginary minorities - Google Books

The Asian Mediterranean: Port Cities and Trading Networks in China, Japan ... - Google Books

Japanese Sports: A History - Allen Guttmann, Lee (Lee Austin) Thompson - Google Books

Becoming Okinawan: Japanese Capitalism and Changing Representations of Okinawa - Wendy Matsumura - Google Books

History Without Borders: The Making of an Asian World Region, 1000-1800 - Geoffrey C. Gunn - Google Books

The Ryukyuans had good relations with China but were affected by American and Japanese imperialism until their annexation and colonization by Japan.

Early History of The Ryukyu Kingdom and its Relationship with China and Japan

Ryukyu Ming relations

Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 93
Ryukyu in the Ming Reign Annals 1380s-1580s Geoff Wade
Asia Research Institute National University of Singapore
arigpw@nus.edu.sg
July 2007

http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps07_093.pdf

Ryukyu Kingdom - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Wholegrain]

Early History of The Ryukyu Kingdom and its Relationship with China and Japan

Early History of The Ryukyu Kingdom and its Relationship with China and Japan

In many ways, the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom previous to the Meiji Restoration provides a depiction of an island kingdom that maintained a high degree of national sovereignty that was eventually shattered by colonial domination by the Satsuma-han in the 17th century. From the earliest times, the Ryukyu Kingdom occupied a privileged position to the south of Japan due largely to its trade and cultural links with China. Despite the fact that Japan had exercised brief contacts with the kingdom from the 7th to the 9th century, it's attempts to interfere with Ryukyuan domestic affairs virtually disappeared from Ryukyuan history until the 17th century. Until that time, the Ryukyu Kingdom maintained it's strongest economic and cultural ties with China, and remained in somewhat constant contact with the Asian continent, through China. From the 14th century on, the Ryukyu Kingdom developed a tributary relationship with China, which while symbolically signifying the Ryukyu Kingdom's status under China (as demonstrated in a pledge of loyalty made by the Ryukyuan King to the Chinese Emperor) basically maintained the Ryukyu Kingdom's independent status as a nation. In no way did China seek to interfere in Ryukyuan domestic affairs, but merely sought to maintain cordial relations with the kingdom (which by the 16th century had consolidated all of the islands in the archipelago under centralized monarchical rule, with it's capitol at Shuri castle on the island of Okinawa). China's preeminent status had several key implications for the Ryukyuan people. It provided legitimacy to the Ryukyuan Monarchy, and also established the manner in which Chinese ethics and cultural customs were able to enter into the Ryukyus. Most importantly, however, it's status as a tributary allowed the Ryukyu Kingdom access to trade with China, which would serve to boost the Ryukyus status in terms of mercantile affairs.

The most significant change in status for this time period came in 1609 with the invasion of the Ryukyus by the Satsuma-han of Japan. In this time period, Satsuma took control of the Ryukyus from the Ryukyuan monarchy, and placed the northern islands of Amami under direct Satsuma rule, while allowing the rest of the kingdom to remain under a sort of semi-colonial jurisdiction. In many ways, the experiences of the Amami islands differed vastly from the rest of the kingdom. The Amami islands (part of present-day Kagoshima Prefecture) quickly became integral to the growth of Satsuma's economy and consequently to it's growth in military strength. With the rapid introduction of the sugar cane industry into the islands and the increasing harshness of Satsuma domain's leadership in extracting labor from the residents there, islanders underwent a period that they refer to as "Sato jigoku," or "Sugar Hell." Through this period of time, they were quickly integrated into Satsuma-han, as a part of Japan.

The rest of the Ryukyu Kingdom, however, was able to maintain some appearances of sovereignty despite the nature of their domination by the Satsuma domain. For the most part, the Sho dynasty, which had previously ruled the Ryukyu Kingdom, was able to remain intact along with its administrative structures. This occurred largely because it was in Satsuma's political and economic trade interests to keep up the pretense that the Ryukyu Kingdom was still an independent nation. Since the Ryukyu Kingdom had been able to maintain economic trade relations with China, and Japan had broken off those same relations, Satsuma had a vested interest in keeping up Ryukyuan trade activities with China in order to economically prosper. To that end, the Ryukyus proved indispensable, since by practicing the deception that the Ryukyus were still an independent nation free from Japanese control, Satsuma was able to use the Ryukyus as a means in which to trade Japanese goods with China. Thus, the situation for the Ryukyus proved especially interesting, since it remained in Satsuma's best interests to keep the Ryukyus as an independent nation (at least on the surface), while in the Amami islands, Satsuma favored complete integration of the islands into it's territory.

This relationship, however, changed with the arrival of the western colonial powers, as personified in the arrival of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry's "Black Fleet" in 1854. Stopping first in Okinawa before heading to Tokyo Bay, the Americans that Perry represented became the first colonial threat that Japan was forced to deal with after hundreds of years of isolationism. Faced with this threat, Japan felt the need to take several steps in order to protect itself from colonial encroachments, as had been seen in places like China, "Indochina," and any of the other colonized Asian nations. Japan quickly embarked on an ambitious program to develop internally on the model of the modern western nation-state. Towards those ends, Japan began a rapid process of industrialization, heightened its sense of national unity, and solidified its borders. In order to learn how to engage in this process of modernization, Japan sent a number of delegations to various western nations to learn from their models, but sadly enough, they learned these lessons at the tail end of the main period of outright western imperialism, and quickly latched onto the model of colonialist expansion and empire building.

Ironically enough, Perry's initial contact with Okinawa was not only the first moment of contact between the United States and Okinawa, but also the first time that U.S. military forces committed crimes against the Okinawan people. Shortly after docking, an American sailor broke into the house of an Okinawan woman and raped her. Upon hearing the woman's screams, several villagers gave pursuit, and Board either fell into the port or was drowned. Following this incident the villagers involved in this incident were punished for their role in the sailor's death, and Perry presented the woman who was raped with a few yards of cloth as compensation for the assault. This incident of violence against Okinawan women represented a theme that would return again later when Okinawa was placed under United States occupation.

After Perry's visit, and after being introduced to western models of colonialist expansion, Japanese leaders felt the need to legitimize Japan's nation-state status, and this provided the rationale for the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which signaled the end of Ryukyuan sovereignty, with the push for the full integration of the Ryukyu Kingdom into Japan as Okinawa Prefecture. There were several reasons for this at that time. First of all, the Satsuma domain and the Choshu domain (called the Sat-Cho clique) played a very central role in creating the circumstances for the Restoration, since they were battling the Tokugawa bakufu for control of Japan. The full integration of the Ryukyu Kingdom into the Satsuma domain represented a move to legitimize the Satsuma domain since the increased land and resources of the Ryukyus would give more power to the Satsuma domain in national affairs. More importantly, however, in looking at the Meiji Restoration as the means in which Japan sought to protect itself from western imperialism, Japan found it increasingly important to develop a strong sense of itself as a nation with clearly delineated borders. The Ryukyu islands presented an intolerable gray area in Japan's national boundaries due to it's place of "dual subordination" to Japan as well as China, and Japanese leaders felt it necessary to legitimize it's borders in the light of western international law. Even further than this, Japan felt the intense need to develop some form of geo-political buffer zone to protect itself from possible military encroachments by western powers. The Ryukyu Islands presented the perfect candidate for such protection, by providing some form of security on Japan's southern front, and this need for military security took precedence over the need to maintain trade relations with China. In order to fully protect it's interests in the region, Japan forced the annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879, thus establishing full control of the Ryukyus in Japan's hands and ending the ruse of Ryukyuan sovereignty. In all of these manners, the newly formed Okinawa prefecture would prove invaluable for Japan's military security.

Liuqiu will be an independent country。

It will be when China is strong even to molest Japan the way the US does today。

It is only a matter of time。

Japan does not need to be molsted but it needs to be taught a lesson for daring to interfere in Chinese affairs in both Taiwan and mainland China with its support for separatist movements and countries opposing China and Taiwan on the Spratly and Paracel islands.

The Ainu should be granted independence in Hokkaido since they were also annexed in the 19th century, demographically swamped by the Japanese and had their culture, identity and language nearly wiped out by Japan which is doing little to preserve their status or protect their rights today.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/china-far-east/262095-history-ainu-resistance-against-japan.html

アイヌ北海道共和國

阿伊努北海道共和國

アィヌ・モシリ共和國

蝦夷共和國

Ryukyu independence movement - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[darkhero]

Is there any descendant of liuqiu king still alive or they were all killed by japanese?