In 1971, America almost fought the Soviets (Russia) over Bangladesh

[Nilgiri]

Read the excerpts below and for the source of BSF early involvement you have to read other accounts, specially, by General Manekshaw, I think. I have lost the links because I am not like fanning Indians who keep on filing pages of links to use them afterwards to annihilate their internet adversaries.

"By the end of April 1971, Indira Gandhi asked Indian Army Chief Sam Manekshaw if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan. Manekshaw refused on the basis of some difficulties (including climatic conditions of the monsoon in East Pakistan) and he also offered to resign, an offer which Indira Gandhi declined. He then said he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it. Indira Gandhi accepted his conditions."

Read to know, it was only the end of April when the brilliant PM of India wanted to attack not knowing time was not ripe. Do not hide from reality and seek the remaining information by yourself.

Did you even read what Joe wrote? Gosh you are thick.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Read the excerpts below and for the source of BSF early involvement you have to read other accounts, specially, by General Manekshaw, I think. I have lost the links because I am not like fanning Indians who keep on filing pages of links to use them afterwards to annihilate their internet adversaries.

"By the end of April 1971, Indira Gandhi asked Indian Army Chief Sam Manekshaw if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan. Manekshaw refused on the basis of some difficulties (including climatic conditions of the monsoon in East Pakistan) and he also offered to resign, an offer which Indira Gandhi declined. He then said he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it. Indira Gandhi accepted his conditions."

Read to know, it was only the end of April when the brilliant PM of India wanted to attack not knowing time was not ripe. Do not hide from reality and seek the remaining information by yourself.

Nobody attacked. Ask those who were there. Manekshaw had nothing to say about BSF involvement as far as I know. The brilliant PM of India asked a professional a question; he answered it professionally, and she accepted his answer. Unlike the idiot Yahya Khan.

Did you even read what Joe wrote? Gosh you are thick.

He is thick as a plank.

Oh, @hellfire , if you don't mind the sharing of laurels, there's a chap rather like you (except that he's an azaadi wala), just as thorough and meticulous in his research. He is Junaid Qureshi, the son of the notorious Hashem Qureshi. We disagree violently but have a very close personal relationship.

I will come to his really amusing post in an hour or two.

 

[extra terrestrial]

You know why I showed you that photo of Colonel Osmani, as he then was, posing with 'Indians'? Because of the identities of the Indians.

From left to right, standing, my mother, Prem Nath Luthra, who managed the refugee camps, Mrs. Luthra, Mrs. Arora, Buchi Das, the son's daughter of C. R. Das, Lt. General Jagjit Singh Arora, Col. (later Gen.) M. A. G. Osmani, my father's personal friend from 1944 onwards, Siddhartha Ray, the daughter's son of C. R. Das, Maj. General J. F. R. Jacob, my father.

At that dinner, there was nothing about,'We could have done it without you.' At the best of times, Osmani was laconic; here what he had to say was limited, but it was profusely thankful. So when I read those fanciful stories of what he said about managing alone, I wonder.

There will always be individuals with whom you could get along well... Why do you think he would be bursting his grudges in informal meetings?

You may or may not be aware of the state of the Mukti Bahini by December 1971. Far from being able to conquer the PA, they were fighting with their backs to the wall. Don't kid yourself.

Joe, it does seem that you are pretty much confined by literature only from Indian POV on this issue, which is very unusual from a knowledgeable historian...

The war strategy of Mukti Bahini, famously known as the "Teliapara Document", was formulated by the the sector commanders forum headed by General Osmani and included defected Bengali officers from PA i.e Khaled Mosharraf, Ziaur Rahman, KM Shafiullah among others. The strategy proposed that the war was to be fought in three phases,

1. Defensive - Mukti Bahini will hold as much territory as possible with the highest possible duration
2. Guerrilla warfare
3. Conventional warfare - involving the regular forces as well as better trained guerrillas (who will also gain significant experience by that time)

In September, the guerrilla warfare intensified as the number of better trained forces increased and The Mukti Bahini began to launch number of successful offensives. By November, several districts already came under Mukti Bahini control, significantly demoralizing the Pakistani troops.

India was only supposed to provide logistical support i.e. the Arms and ammunition (supplied by the Soviet Union) and the training bases. Indian direct military intervention was never supported by the Bengali military officers, however, the government in exile asked for it. General Osmani also threatened to resign when the joint forces came under Aurora.

Of course. After feeding the refugees for months, we needed to get the food back from the huge stores piled up by the PA.

Now you are sounding like a true troll...

Didn't thousands of refugees die out of cholera epidemic and malnutrition in the refugee camps in Salt Lake and other parts of India because of the corruption and mismanagement by the officials?

Were you there? Just asking. Your breezy familiarity makes me ask

Where? At the dinner?

Read the excerpts below and for the source of BSF early involvement you have to read other accounts, specially, by General Manekshaw, I think. I have lost the links because I am not like fanning Indians who keep on filing pages of links to use them afterwards to annihilate their internet adversaries.

"By the end of April 1971, Indira Gandhi asked Indian Army Chief Sam Manekshaw if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan. Manekshaw refused on the basis of some difficulties (including climatic conditions of the monsoon in East Pakistan) and he also offered to resign, an offer which Indira Gandhi declined. He then said he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it. Indira Gandhi accepted his conditions."

Read to know, it was only the end of April when the brilliant PM of India wanted to attack not knowing time was not ripe. Do not hide from reality and seek the remaining information by yourself.

Indian strategy was to wait till winter i.e. late November/early December since that will neutralize the Chinese as it will be hard to cross the Himalayan pass at that time. This was the equation that was miscalculated by the Pakistanis. They thought launching preemptive strikes on the Western front will put significant pressure on India and will further allure the Chinese to override the Indians on the eastern front.

At the same time, India wanted to keep the conflict boiling till their intervention i.e. neither Mukti Bahini nor the Pakistani forces achieves decisive victory. To this regard, they deliberately kept the supplies for Mukti Bahini insufficient despite repeated requests...

 

[Joe Shearer]

There will always be individuals with whom you could get along well... Why do you think he would be bursting his grudges in informal meetings?

You think that he would be bursting his grudges at formal meetings? Can you hear yourself? When do you open up, in private or in public?

Joe, it does seem that you are pretty much confined by literature only from Indian POV on this issue, which is very unusual from a knowledgeable historian...

Not really.

What you are referring to is the vast aftermarket of war, a strategic outpouring of pretentious and totally baseless documents which were great on promise and absent in prosecution.

The war strategy of Mukti Bahini, famously known as the "Teliapara Document", was formulated by the the sector commanders forum headed by General Osmani and included defected Bengali officers from PA i.e Khaled Mosharraf, Ziaur Rahman, KM Shafiullah among others. The strategy proposed that the war was to be fought in three phases,

1. Defensive - Mukti Bahini will hold as much territory as possible with the highest possible duration
2. Guerrilla warfare
3. Conventional warfare - involving the regular forces as well as better trained guerrillas (who will also gain significant experience by that time)

In September, the guerrilla warfare intensified as the number of better trained forces increased and The Mukti Bahini began to launch number of successful offensives. By November, several districts already came under Mukti Bahini control, significantly demoralizing the Pakistani troops.

You talk too much and know bugger all.

This is what I mean by the aftermarket of war. If you want to know the truth, read on. Be careful, it will hurt.

By September the guerrila offensive was running out of steam.

General Osmani had been retired as a Colonel because of his intrigues and conspiracies in the Bengal Regiment, where his public and private policy was to push the Bengali cause, irrespective of merit. Pakistani officers of the time confirmed that he had nothing much to show other than this wholly parochial feeling.

Ziaur Rahman was the kind of CO (we have a lot of them in all armies, and they stand out from their peer groups) with elaborately embellished jeeps or command vehicles and a lot of parade ground flair and panache, and little battlefield contribution. His cold feet in front of the Chittagong wireless station has passed into unspoken history, especially in view of the political implications - the emperor had beautiful robes, and all reports to the contrary are not wanted. The other ex-PA officers were mediocre officers, who had the advantage of a military background, which was in fact the biggest disadvantage that they had; they were total misfits in guerrilla actions. Those were not the days when the Pakistan Army had even a foggy notion of counter-insurgency warfare, and had an even foggier notion of guerrilla warfare. The only well-trained troops in guerrilla warfare at that time were in Chittagong, a contingent of Mizos who were battle hardened and had fought the Indian Army, equally stiff-necked as the Pakistan Army, and survived, and even thrived.

Unfortunately, the Mizos looked to the conventional Pakistan Army for support and sustenance, and were not going to work with the resistance.

That left only the defiant non-military characters to hold the flag. The regular officers had failed, and Osmani refused to believe it, or to give in to the pleas of his civilian government to ask for help before it was too late. He stormed out of the provisional headquarters in Theatre Road (appropriate place) more than once, the last time after he had been cornered and asked pointed questions about the actual position on the ground, which the civilians were found to know better than he did.

The only other part, other than the home-bred guerrillas, who did well were, in fact, more home-bred guerrillas. What piss-proud Bangladeshis discount, stupidly, is the outstanding contribution of their marine commandos, not called that, but effectively that, who sank more Pakistani and foreign shipping than the whole Indian Navy. They paid a very heavy price for it, and the casualty rate was extremely high. Unfortunately, none of the forming officers of the later Bangladesh Navy were part of this valiant effort, so few of the Bangladeshi decorations went to these bravest of the brave.

India was only supposed to provide logistical support i.e. the Arms and ammunition (supplied by the Soviet Union) and the training bases. Indian direct military intervention was never supported by the Bengali military officers, however, the government in exile asked for it.

This is perfectly correct.

General Osmani also threatened to resign when the joint forces came under Aurora.

This is also perfectly correct. It was an absurd situation. Osmani had never served at more than field level; neither had any other of his sector commanders. They had absolutely no clue about strategic issues, or about how to bear up under the increasing pressure of Pakistani Army attacks. They had no idea about what to do with the PA. None.

The PA had by then cleared the towns, and had fanned out into the districts. They had enormous difficulty at night, but were completely in control during the day. Their encampments and fortified positions were also rarely, if ever, attacked. Post-liberation stories are bunkum.

The entire strategy of holding firm in the west, where the Pakistanis were expecting the attack to come from, and where they put up a desperate and valiant resistance in Hijli, and attacking from Tripura was entirely 'Jake' Jacob's; nobody in the Mukti Bahini had a contribution to make there. By then, they were trying to hold on to pockets, not successfully.

What is of interest in military terms is two things: the supposed intrigues between Jake and Norman Gill, behind Manekshaw's back, and the very interesting heli-hopping strategy used by the Indian Army.

Now you are sounding like a true troll...

Yes.

You were, and are being very irritating. I thought this sarcasm was needed.

Didn't thousands of refugees die out of cholera epidemic in the refugee camps in Salt Lake because of the corruption and mismanagement by the officials?

Shame on you. If you want to know the truth, ask politely. Don't say silly and wholly untrue things. You can start by taking on board that the camps were all on the border, not in Salt Lake. You can go on to check the miraculous effect of the massive intervention of overseas help, especially in the mass inoculation machines which we saw for the first time. But shame on you. This was such a cheap thing to say, when the saving of the refugees (after the first two months or so) was such a major feature of the whole ghastly episode.

I was personally there, and got thrown out repeatedly. I know.

You fool.

Where? At the dinner?

If you want to convert your so-apparent lack of knowledge and lack of personal experience into a smart-arse quip, feel free. I know what I mean, you know what I mean, and by sliding around, you may impress a captive audience, it doesn't impress me.

Indian strategy was to wait till winter i.e. late November/early December since that will neutralize the Chinese as it will be hard to cross the Himalayan pass at that time. This was the equation that was miscalculated by the Pakistanis. They thought launching preemptive strikes on the Western front will put significant pressure on India and will further allure the Chinese to override the Indians on the eastern front.

At the same time, India wanted to keep the conflict boiling till their intervention i.e. neither Mukti Bahini nor the Pakistani forces achieves decisive victory. To this regard, they deliberately kept the supplies for Mukti Bahini insufficient despite repeated requests...

The Mukti Bahini were awash with supplies and equipment. Again, an aftermarket product. Don't kid yourself. There was more arms, ammunition and food to run a campaign for a year. The only real resistance was from a man called Siddique, out in Sylhet, if I remember correctly, who, according to a Sikh officer who was attached to him and later joined Bhindranwale and got killed in Blue Star, was a natural-born leader and commanded with great authority.

I just remembered: the Sikh officer was Shabeg Singh.

I really dislike your shallow, jingoistic posts, and it send up my blood pressure to read them, or to post replies.

 

[Delnavaz B]

@Joe Shearer
you told me that you was in chadi during 1965 war and it is safe to asume that during 1971 war you was still young then you me and all other are same means you read listen like me and others about these wars OK so don't force other members to take your words as gospel of truth since we are same you did't fought the war just read about like we did you just have ratting power to impose your views so don't be coward reason with us instead of ratting our posts negative.

 

[Nilgiri]

and it send up my blood pressure to read them, or to post replies.

Sirjee, don't bother with it if so...although I hope it helps for you to know I (and others) treasure your posts immensely (even when you are in a heated exchange like this one here) and learn a great deal from them. I especially appreciate the efforts you make in mentioning particular details pertinent to a point. It is these examples that really add your personal touch, so understand that you do enlighten many others even if the person you are arguing may not necessarily be (and you really shouldn't worry too much about it....I stopped feeling that long time back).

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sirjee, don't bother with it if so...although I hope it helps for you to know I (and others) treasure your posts immensely (even when you are in a heated exchange like this one here) and learn a great deal from them. I especially appreciate the efforts you make in mentioning particular details pertinent to a point. It is these examples that really add your personal touch, so understand that you do enlighten many others even if the person you are arguing may not necessarily be (and you really shouldn't worry too much about it....I stopped feeling that long time back).

She is not only a fool but a particularly unintelligent one - if one can have gradations among fools.

 

[Nilgiri]

She is not only a fool but a particularly unintelligent one - if one can have gradations among fools.

Who is the "she" we are talking about?

 

[extra terrestrial]

You think that he would be bursting his grudges at formal meetings? Can you hear yourself? When do you open up, in private or in public?

Public and formal events are the most suitable occasions to express your grudges especially when it's related to politics, there will be media and all those important persons who can make an effect...

Not really.

What you are referring to is the vast aftermarket of war, a strategic outpouring of pretentious and totally baseless documents which were great on promise and absent in prosecution.

Who got to decide what's "pretentious and totally baseless"? That's where the biased POV comes into the scene which is very much visible in your posts....

This is also perfectly correct. It was an absurd situation. Osmani had never served at more than field level; neither had any other of his sector commanders. They had absolutely no clue about strategic issues, or about how to bear up under the increasing pressure of Pakistani Army attacks. They had no idea about what to do with the PA. None.

The PA had by then cleared the towns, and had fanned out into the districts. They had enormous difficulty at night, but were completely in control during the day. Their encampments and fortified positions were also rarely, if ever, attacked. Post-liberation stories are bunkum.

The entire strategy of holding firm in the west, where the Pakistanis were expecting the attack to come from, and where they put up a desperate and valiant resistance in Hijli, and attacking from Tripura was entirely 'Jake' Jacob's; nobody in the Mukti Bahini had a contribution to make there. By then, they were trying to hold on to pockets, not successfully.

What is of interest in military terms is two things: the supposed intrigues between Jake and Norman Gill, behind Manekshaw's back, and the very interesting heli-hopping strategy used by the Indian Army.

This is what I mean by the aftermarket of war. If you want to know the truth, read on. Be careful, it will hurt.

By September the guerrila offensive was running out of steam.

General Osmani had been retired as a Colonel because of his intrigues and conspiracies in the Bengal Regiment, where his public and private policy was to push the Bengali cause, irrespective of merit. Pakistani officers of the time confirmed that he had nothing much to show other than this wholly parochial feeling.

Ziaur Rahman was the kind of CO (we have a lot of them in all armies, and they stand out from their peer groups) with elaborately embellished jeeps or command vehicles and a lot of parade ground flair and panache, and little battlefield contribution. His cold feet in front of the Chittagong wireless station has passed into unspoken history, especially in view of the political implications - the emperor had beautiful robes, and all reports to the contrary are not wanted. The other ex-PA officers were mediocre officers, who had the advantage of a military background, which was in fact the biggest disadvantage that they had; they were total misfits in guerrilla actions. Those were not the days when the Pakistan Army had even a foggy notion of counter-insurgency warfare, and had an even foggier notion of guerrilla warfare. The only well-trained troops in guerrilla warfare at that time were in Chittagong, a contingent of Mizos who were battle hardened and had fought the Indian Army, equally stiff-necked as the Pakistan Army, and survived, and even thrived.

Unfortunately, the Mizos looked to the conventional Pakistan Army for support and sustenance, and were not going to work with the resistance.

That left only the defiant non-military characters to hold the flag. The regular officers had failed, and Osmani refused to believe it, or to give in to the pleas of his civilian government to ask for help before it was too late. He stormed out of the provisional headquarters in Theatre Road (appropriate place) more than once, the last time after he had been cornered and asked pointed questions about the actual position on the ground, which the civilians were found to know better than he did.

The only other part, other than the home-bred guerrillas, who did well were, in fact, more home-bred guerrillas. What piss-proud Bangladeshis discount, stupidly, is the outstanding contribution of their marine commandos, not called that, but effectively that, who sank more Pakistani and foreign shipping than the whole Indian Navy. They paid a very heavy price for it, and the casualty rate was extremely high. Unfortunately, none of the forming officers of the later Bangladesh Navy were part of this valiant effort, so few of the Bangladeshi decorations went to these bravest of the brave.

Your prejudice against the Bengali military officers and General Osmani is understandable. The fact is, they just had an experience of a full fledged war just 6 years back in 1965, many of them were even awarded bravery awards by the Pakistan government. There is no simply no reasons to think that they were inexperienced or lacked the necessary skills.

I wasn't talking about the Monsoon offensive which came in June-July and were largely a failure due to the insufficient logistical support by India. Rather I referred to the offensives in October and November which made the pretext for the final victory.

This is an excerpt of a telegram moved between American diplomats,

1. Reuters' November 22 report from New Delhi citing PTI states that Mukti Bahini forces have launched major offensive in Kushtia, Khulna and Jessore districts. According these reports Mukti Bahini have captured Chougacha in Jessore district and Maheshpur in same district. Debhata, border town in Khulna district, also said to have been taken with Mukti Bahini forces advancing to Satkhira, northeast of Debhata. In Kushtia district Mukti Bahini also reported as moving toward towns of Jibannagar and Damurhuda under cover their own artillery, having established "liberated areas" near border towns of Banpur and Gede.

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 396 - 397

Shame on you. If you want to know the truth, ask politely. Don't say silly and wholly untrue things. You can start by taking on board that the camps were all on the border, not in Salt Lake. You can go on to check the miraculous effect of the massive intervention of overseas help, especially in the mass inoculation machines which we saw for the first time. But shame on you. This was such a cheap thing to say, when the saving of the refugees (after the first two months or so) was such a major feature of the whole ghastly episode.

I was personally there, and got thrown out repeatedly. I know.

I did go rude in that remark but that's what happens when you try to cover up your lack of knowledge by idiotic trolling... If you have some emotional attachments to that thing, then apologies from my side...

However, despite the rudeness, there was nothing false in my comment...

"During the cholera epidemic, I remember that in one refugee camp of 15,000 people, over 750 died in one month - about 5 percent... By September 1971, hundreds of children were dying every day from malnutrition and doctors, who had also earlier worked in Biafra, were of the opinion that the malnutrition in the Indian refugee camps was worse than that of Biafra. Many more children died as a result of the severe winter. In mid-November, an accepted figure of the number of children dying was 4,300 per day in the refugee camps alone. I remember attending a coordination meeting at that time where it was estimated that by the end of December 1971 up to 500,000 children would have died largely from malnutrition."

Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/it-important-remember-1971-187654

Also, Salt Lake, Calcutta was indeed a site of the refugee camps. Here are some pictures...

This is perfectly correct.

You have finally agreed that the Bengali military officers were against the Indian military intervention which you previously tried to discard as mere "guff"... Since that's what our primary reason of argument, I don't think I have anything to say further...

You talk too much and know bugger all.

You fool.

Your rants prove who is being reasonable and rational here... I rest my case there...

 

[Joe Shearer]

Public and formal events are the most suitable occasions to express your grudges especially when it's related to politics, there will be media and all those important persons who can make an effect...

Let me put it bluntly: there was no such speech, there was no such mention.

[quote[Who got to decide what's "pretentious and totally baseless"? That's where the biased POV comes into the scene which is very much visible in your posts....[/quote]

Nothing but newspaper articles. If you are basing your information on published and accepted memoirs of senior officers, let's have them. Leave out magazine and newspaper articles, please.

Your prejudice against the Bengali military officers and General Osmani is understandable. The fact is, they just had an experience of a full fledged war just 6 years back in 1965, many of them were even awarded bravery awards by the Pakistan government. There is no simply no reasons to think that they were inexperienced or lacked the necessary skills.

That may be because you have no clue about who does what. Majors and colonels lead detachments to orders which detail where the detachment will start, when and to what ends. They do not determine strategy. When they prove themselves, they are taken out, given formal training, and inducted into higher levels: they do not levitate to those levels. The officers mentioned had experience, and had skills at battalion level operations, not even brigade level. Do you think, seriously, that they conducted an operation, or could conduct an operation at the level of several divisions on either side?

I wasn't talking about the Monsoon offensive which came in June-July and were largely a failure due to the insufficient logistical support by India. Rather I referred to the offensives in October and November which made the pretext for the final victory.

And that was when they were on the verge of being wiped out.

This is an excerpt of a telegram moved between American diplomats,

1. Reuters' November 22 report from New Delhi citing PTI states that Mukti Bahini forces have launched major offensive in Kushtia, Khulna and Jessore districts. According these reports Mukti Bahini have captured Chougacha in Jessore district and Maheshpur in same district. Debhata, border town in Khulna district, also said to have been taken with Mukti Bahini forces advancing to Satkhira, northeast of Debhata. In Kushtia district Mukti Bahini also reported as moving toward towns of Jibannagar and Damurhuda under cover their own artillery, having established "liberated areas" near border towns of Banpur and Gede.

Source: Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon House 1971, Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim, Pustaka Dhaka, p – 396 - 397

Are you aware, or are these journalists you have quoted even aware that the Mukti Bahini had no artillery of its own? Are you aware that other camps, except in this narrow arc, and except in Sylhet, had fallen, and these were the only active ones? Do you even understand what it means that the effort was confined to Kushtia, Khulna and Jessore?

Now make a further effort, and map them against the refugee camp belt from Bongaon to Basirhat (there was nothing but a few tents in Salt Lake; the entire camp settlement was in this Bongaon-Basirhat stretch). Does it ring a bell? Or two? Or ten?

I did go rude in that remark but that's what happens when you try to cover up your lack of knowledge by idiotic trolling... If you have some emotional attachments to that thing, then apologies from my side...

However, despite the rudeness, there was nothing false in my comment...

"During the cholera epidemic, I remember that in one refugee camp of 15,000 people, over 750 died in one month - about 5 percent... By September 1971, hundreds of children were dying every day from malnutrition and doctors, who had also earlier worked in Biafra, were of the opinion that the malnutrition in the Indian refugee camps was worse than that of Biafra. Many more children died as a result of the severe winter. In mid-November, an accepted figure of the number of children dying was 4,300 per day in the refugee camps alone. I remember attending a coordination meeting at that time where it was estimated that by the end of December 1971 up to 500,000 children would have died largely from malnutrition."

Source: http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/it-important-remember-1971-187654

Also, Salt Lake, Calcutta was indeed a site of the refugee camps. Here are some pictures...

Lack of knowledge? This is getting irritating. I was there, in the camps, on three separate occasions, without permission, before I was caught and thrown out; you weren't. These are pictures of refugees and refugee camps, NOT of Salt Lake.

Salt Lake is a heavily populated part of Calcutta. Take a look at it and you will figure out for yourself that your idiotic sources, which seem to be newspaper articles in the main, are hopelessly inaccurate.

The belt was from Bongaon in the north to Basirhat in the south. The training took place about 3 to 5 kms behind the camps, where the women and children were kept for intensive care. They came in starving, many of the women suffering post-rape trauma; the children were on the verge of death from malnutrition when they came in, not due to the camps. There was enough in the camps, but no way to preserve those who had come in dying.

You have finally agreed that the Bengali military officers were against the Indian military intervention which you previously tried to discard as mere "guff"... Since that's what our primary reason of argument, I don't think I have anything to say further...

No, that was NOT our primary reason of argument. I scoffed at your claims that the MB could have handled it alone, and at the claim of Col. Osmani that he could have done it on his own. Left to him and his parade-ground soldiers, they would not have survived another 90 days.

Your rants prove who is being reasonable and rational here... I rest my case there...

Please rest them permanently.

 

[Nilgiri]

I scoffed at your claims that the MB could have handled it alone, and at the claim of Col. Osmani that he could have done it on his own. Left to him and his parade-ground soldiers, they would not have survived another 90 days.

Its a pretty omnipresent opinion among many Bangladeshi defence board types. More than 90% of them I would say. It helps in their eyes to give more credibility to their sovereignty and defence capability today.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Its a pretty omnipresent opinion among many Bangladeshi defence board types. More than 90% of them I would say. It helps in their eyes to give more credibility to their sovereignty and defence capability today.

I have met three out of the four mentioned. Stiff as sticks and totally clueless.

 

[extra terrestrial]

Let me put it bluntly: there was no such speech, there was no such mention.


Nothing but newspaper articles. If you are basing your information on published and accepted memoirs of senior officers, let's have them. Leave out magazine and newspaper articles, please.



That may be because you have no clue about who does what. Majors and colonels lead detachments to orders which detail where the detachment will start, when and to what ends. They do not determine strategy. When they prove themselves, they are taken out, given formal training, and inducted into higher levels: they do not levitate to those levels. The officers mentioned had experience, and had skills at battalion level operations, not even brigade level. Do you think, seriously, that they conducted an operation, or could conduct an operation at the level of several divisions on either side?



And that was when they were on the verge of being wiped out.



Are you aware, or are these journalists you have quoted even aware that the Mukti Bahini had no artillery of its own? Are you aware that other camps, except in this narrow arc, and except in Sylhet, had fallen, and these were the only active ones? Do you even understand what it means that the effort was confined to Kushtia, Khulna and Jessore?

Now make a further effort, and map them against the refugee camp belt from Bongaon to Basirhat (there was nothing but a few tents in Salt Lake; the entire camp settlement was in this Bongaon-Basirhat stretch). Does it ring a bell? Or two? Or ten?



Lack of knowledge? This is getting irritating. I was there, in the camps, on three separate occasions, without permission, before I was caught and thrown out; you weren't. These are pictures of refugees and refugee camps, NOT of Salt Lake.

Salt Lake is a heavily populated part of Calcutta. Take a look at it and you will figure out for yourself that your idiotic sources, which seem to be newspaper articles in the main, are hopelessly inaccurate.

The belt was from Bongaon in the north to Basirhat in the south. The training took place about 3 to 5 kms behind the camps, where the women and children were kept for intensive care. They came in starving, many of the women suffering post-rape trauma; the children were on the verge of death from malnutrition when they came in, not due to the camps. There was enough in the camps, but no way to preserve those who had come in dying.



No, that was NOT our primary reason of argument. I scoffed at your claims that the MB could have handled it alone, and at the claim of Col. Osmani that he could have done it on his own. Left to him and his parade-ground soldiers, they would not have survived another 90 days.



Please rest them permanently.

There's simply nothing to say when somebody remains reluctant to accept their fallacies despite being shown credible neutral sources. It is even more annoying when the said person fails to show a single source to support his arguments...

The telegram about the Mukti Bahini offensives were sent by Christopher Van Hollen, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to the US ambassadors resident in New Delhi and Islamabad. I guess these diplomats are sane enough to judge the credibility of the report...

The article in Daily Star on the conditions of the refugees in India was written by Julian Francis, Coordinator of OXFAM's relief programme for the refugees from Bangladesh who received the Friends of Liberation War Honour from the Government of Bangladesh in 2012.

The images of the Salt Lake refugee camp was taken from these links:
http://www.gettyimages.com/pictures...fugee-in-salt-lake-camp-in-news-photo-3434524
http://www.gettyimages.com/pictures...alt-lake-camp-near-calcutta-picture-id3435585

And I thought I was discussing with a "Professional"...

What a waste of time!

 

[Joe Shearer]

There's simply nothing to say when somebody remains reluctant to accept their fallacies despite being shown credible neutral sources. It is even more annoying when the said person fails to show a single source to support his arguments...

All your sources are newspaper articles and made-easy populist accounts, except the American telegrams, and you have the impertinence to call them credible natural sources?

Regarding my narration, read Jacob, and read other contemporary accounts of the fightin

The telegram about the Mukti Bahini offensives were sent by Christopher Van Hollen, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to the US ambassadors resident in New Delhi and Islamabad. I guess these diplomats are sane enough to judge the credibility of the report...

Don't distort things. I pointed out that this was the last flicker of the candle and that all the actions took place in three small districts in the south-west, just outside the training camps.

The article in Daily Star on the conditions of the refugees in India was written by Julian Francis, Coordinator of OXFAM's relief programme for the refugees from Bangladesh who received the Friends of Liberation War Honour from the Government of Bangladesh in 2012.

You have taken his comments about the prognosis for the women and children arriving at the camps, in a continuous stream, and projected it as the condition of refugees already in the camps. A cheap subterfuge if there was any.

The images of the Salt Lake refugee camp was taken from these links:
http://www.gettyimages.com/pictures...fugee-in-salt-lake-camp-in-news-photo-3434524
http://www.gettyimages.com/pictures...alt-lake-camp-near-calcutta-picture-id3435585

I repeat, as one who was physically present, there were no camps other than in the Bongaon-Basirhat belt.

PS: For those who are not familiar with the geography, Salt Lake, a suburb of Calcutta, is 60 to 70 kms from Basirhat, and 75 to 90 kms from Bongaon. All the refugee camps were set up on the border, as the refugees crossed over. Those of us who wanted to work there had to travel half a day by rural bus to get to the nearest camp.

The entire area was carefully cordoned off, because with the situation worsening up to May for the Pakistan Army, there was a great deal of discomfort: there was even a plan going the rounds (confirmed later by a Pakistani military source) of a plan to mount a commando raid on the Theatre Road HQ of the civil administration of the Mukti Bahini. This is confirmed in Brig. Khan's book.

Under these circumstances, to be informed by an armchair warrior that the camps were in the middle of the poshest part of the city, where the IAS and the IPS had their houses is the flipping limit.

And I thought I was discussing with a "Professional"...

You were. And the professional was discussing with a half-baked consumer of newspaper articles, made-easy books and unnamed sources for details that you could not possibly have known.

What a waste of time!

In Spades. Redoubled.

 

[bluesky]

Indian strategy was to wait till winter i.e. late November/early December since that will neutralize the Chinese as it will be hard to cross the Himalayan pass at that time.

I know very very well that India wanted to attack in December because winter will set then and the PLA would not be able to cross the Himalayas. I was only telling the Indians who believe the military brain superiority of their sweet girl Indira Gandhi, when in reality, she, being a naive in military affairs, asked her military Chief to invade in May, 1971.