I think you raise some good points.
Taliban will adapt the right attitude once revolutionary fervor burns out. We have seen in China that Chinese policymakers become pragmatic after old guard started to go in the background. I believe we will see something similar in Afghanistan.
Taliban leadership has roots in the society and will work for for the benefit of the country when militarist elements recede into the background. War fighting and running a country require different mindset and skillset. Ultimately, Taliban leadership will realize that it is to the benefit of both countries if they cooperate.
But while I agree with your analysis, Pakistan cannot be explicit in its support for Taliban. Statecraft and diplomacy is not conducted in glare of publicity. Best course for Pak is to run with the hare and hunt with the hound. This is the strategy Pak has used to great effect when Pak participated in Afgan Jehad and after Americans invaded Afghanistan when Pak acted against Al Qaeda while protecting Taliban leadership.
IK however wanted to be a revolutionary leader by trying to conduct in public, what should be private and therefore is paying a price for his foolishness.
I compare the Taliban to the Vietnamese communists at the end of the war with America. When their policies saw rice production drop, they had to accept the reality of allowing more freedom to the individuals to grow the rice and sell it to have their own incentivizes to grow as much as possible, this coupled with the collapse of their Soviet patrons in the early 90s saw a huge shift, and then opening up 15 years after the Americans left.
The Afghans have no foreign patrons, so I suspect their shift to a more pragmatic set of policies is I’ll come once Pakistan gets its act together and makes it worth their while. This is here I see IK can be of most utility to the Pakistani state. Using his cache with the Afghans to speed up the economic corridors and development of the mining sector, which can absorbs excess Afghan labor.
With a stronger Pakistani and Afghan economy, and better integration, we will be able to handle the movement of afghans back and forth across the border, and the Afghans will begrudgingly defacto accept the border of its is packaged as the border between Afghanistan and KPK.
Now that the rulers of Afghanistan are who they are, the Pakistani state just had to say it supports the “Afghan People” but is committed to dealing with threat of terrorism. Pakistan needs a strategy that doesn’t alienate our neighbors nor our international partners. So working with our international partners and the Afghans as an intermediary and integral partner to create corridors to Central Asia can be common cause and help bring the Afghans “in from the cold” (getting them international recognition) in exchange for them upholding the Doha agreement and implementing pragmatic policies towards work and education. This is also why Pakistan needs to get it economy right, so it can fully fund education and set the regional precedent, having all boys and girls in school, such as in KPK, and show it is not in conflict with Pashtun culture.
IK had to be a revolutionary leader because the system needs reform. He is a visionary leader; a big picture guy, but not well suited to day to day execution. That’s what his ministers and beaurocrats are suppose to be for. In political science, there is a role for “visionary” leaders and “maintainers”.
The inefficiencies (unproductive nepotism and corruption) in the system are holding the state back from achieving what a country its size should easily be possible to achieve. Pakistan should be in the economic league of Indonesia by population and proximity to natural resources.
I agree IK said things that should have either been said more diplomatically or not said at all. Everyone knew the score by September 2021, so it was the time to pivot a constructive future for Pakistan and all partners.
So the state needs IK at this junction, and IK needs the state, to achieve it other mutual goal. After one term, IK can oversee a transition to new leader that allows the PTI to outlive him, and the state shifts from a revolutionary leader to a PTI leader that can be a maintained and shrewd economist first.