MirBadshah
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DAMMED DEVELOPMENT
How many bullets maketh a dam?
http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/jan/eco-bullets.htm
Developments in Manipur seem to indicate that our infrastructure planners are proposing security costs to construction of large dams on the back of strategic risks analysis. This, even though they may not have embraced a sensitivity to undertake geological/ecological risk analysis itself, finds Himanshu Upadhyaya.
In the past, there was a time when planners used to estimate how many bricks or concrete blocks would make a dam. Then there used to be those who tabulated costs and benefits emanating from a dam, attempting to strike a favourable ratio by calculating submergence land in hectares and the land that can be brought under irrigation in hectares.
Recently, we witness that planners have started counting how many bullets it may take to raise a dam.
They might not have embraced a new sensitivity to undertake geological/ecological risk analysis, but they are proposing security costs backed by strategic risks analysis. However, there are no agreements on who shall bear these costs: project proponents or state/central government.
Take for example, the case of the Loktak Downstream hydro project, proposed to be built over the Barak tributary of the Irang river, near Thanga Karang in Bishenpur district, Manipur. For past one year the project has experienced stalemate with the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation and the state government asking each other to bear the costs for providing security cover. NHPC is a government of India enterprise which reported sales turnover of Rs 1668.27 crores for the financial year 2004-'05. While, there might be a point in arguing why the security costs must be paid and accounted for by the project authorities, gleaning through audit reports of dams built and under construction in Manipur brings up a question: How much does the state/project authority spend to compensate the people whose lands are sunk under the reservoir water, as compared to how much does it spend to amass bullets for raising a dam? (1 crore = 10 million.)
Delivering judgement on a petition by affected persons from Loktak hydroelectric project, the Guwahati High Court had recently asked authorities to compensate the farmers for the lands that they had lost 21 years ago.
⢠The dams balance sheet
⢠Dams rehabilitation scam exposed
⢠The infrastructure of trust
On December 14, people being displaced by the construction of Khuga dam, at Lamka near Churchandpur district in Manipur, staged a sit in at the dam site demanding compensation. When a group of protestors marched to dam site under a moonlit sky that reverberated their slogans demanding compensation, para-military forces guarding the construction work responded by opening fire.
Going by information local sources, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Police) of Churchandpur was present when firing took place and could be held responsible for what happened. The site is guarded by the Border Security Force and the Indian Reserve Battalion. Police forces from Churchandpur rushed to the dam site when those protecting the construction work relayed the message to them.
On 16 November 2005, delivering judgement on the petition by affected persons from the Loktak hydroelectric project, the Guwahati High Court had asked authorities to compensate the farmers for the lands that they had lost 21 years ago. While the court directive on compensation came about 21 years late, oustees had to spend an entire decade arguing before the court of law that they were indeed the landholders having legal entitlements for the land in question. At the close of the year 2005, writing this article in the backdrop of the death of three oustees provides me a chance to thumb though an Advance Report of CAG of India for the year ending March 31, 1977; that had devoted 32 pages to discuss Loktak Hydroelectric project.
It has all the details on why did the costs rise, how the construction got started in October 1970 without adequate detailed geological investigations, how the firm 'P' to which the work on tunnel was awarded couldnât cope with the problems on tunneling. It is an audit scrutiny that meticulously examines the statement of accounts, but nowhere in those 32 pages do you get any information whatsoever on how much was allocated (let alone, spent) for compensating the oustees. (Firm 'P': the CAG had during 1977 adopted the convention to refer to a contracted firm this way, and not by its full name.)
However, the costs did skyrocket by almost six-fold within a matter of 10 years: from the initial assumption of Rs 10.90 crore in 1967 to Rs 60.11 crores in 1976. At the time of the publication of the said audit report, costs were proposed to be revised to Rs 76.31 crores. The reasons for the rise in costs were attributed to an increase of Rs 12.12 crore due to alteration in methods of tunneling and an increase of Rs 10.26 crores due to substitution of a part of power channel by cut and cover conduit. A number of geological problems were encountered during execution of various works, and firm 'P' could not cope with the problems in tunneling. The scope of it work was therefore, reduced to about 45 percent of the work, with balance â more difficult portion â being assigned to the department. Even then, the value of the modified contract was Rs 6.4 crores compared to the tendered value of Rs 5.71 crores for the entire work.
So this was in seventies, when Manipur neglected geological risks while embarking on dam construction. But, did the state learn from past blunders?
No, not at all; an audit report for the year ending March 31, 1999 which undertook a performance review of Khuga multi purpose project in Manipur pointed out, "Since 1984, the Irrigation and Flood Control Department of Manipur had carried out construction work on 25.37 km of canal over an area of 40.27 hectares of forestland in the Dampi Reserve Forest without obtaining the required clearance for diversion of forestland."
Yet another audit report for the year ending March 31, 2004 that undertook a performance review of Thoubal multi purpose project (near Phayeng in Senapati district) stated that although the project would submerge 595 hectares of forest land, the state government started construction without obtaining forest and environmental clearance from the Ministry. So if it was a tale of undermining geological risks in seventies, in eighties it was a tale of undermining ecological risks.
How many bullets maketh a dam?
http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/jan/eco-bullets.htm
Developments in Manipur seem to indicate that our infrastructure planners are proposing security costs to construction of large dams on the back of strategic risks analysis. This, even though they may not have embraced a sensitivity to undertake geological/ecological risk analysis itself, finds Himanshu Upadhyaya.
In the past, there was a time when planners used to estimate how many bricks or concrete blocks would make a dam. Then there used to be those who tabulated costs and benefits emanating from a dam, attempting to strike a favourable ratio by calculating submergence land in hectares and the land that can be brought under irrigation in hectares.
Recently, we witness that planners have started counting how many bullets it may take to raise a dam.
They might not have embraced a new sensitivity to undertake geological/ecological risk analysis, but they are proposing security costs backed by strategic risks analysis. However, there are no agreements on who shall bear these costs: project proponents or state/central government.
Take for example, the case of the Loktak Downstream hydro project, proposed to be built over the Barak tributary of the Irang river, near Thanga Karang in Bishenpur district, Manipur. For past one year the project has experienced stalemate with the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation and the state government asking each other to bear the costs for providing security cover. NHPC is a government of India enterprise which reported sales turnover of Rs 1668.27 crores for the financial year 2004-'05. While, there might be a point in arguing why the security costs must be paid and accounted for by the project authorities, gleaning through audit reports of dams built and under construction in Manipur brings up a question: How much does the state/project authority spend to compensate the people whose lands are sunk under the reservoir water, as compared to how much does it spend to amass bullets for raising a dam? (1 crore = 10 million.)
Delivering judgement on a petition by affected persons from Loktak hydroelectric project, the Guwahati High Court had recently asked authorities to compensate the farmers for the lands that they had lost 21 years ago.
⢠The dams balance sheet
⢠Dams rehabilitation scam exposed
⢠The infrastructure of trust
On December 14, people being displaced by the construction of Khuga dam, at Lamka near Churchandpur district in Manipur, staged a sit in at the dam site demanding compensation. When a group of protestors marched to dam site under a moonlit sky that reverberated their slogans demanding compensation, para-military forces guarding the construction work responded by opening fire.
Going by information local sources, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Police) of Churchandpur was present when firing took place and could be held responsible for what happened. The site is guarded by the Border Security Force and the Indian Reserve Battalion. Police forces from Churchandpur rushed to the dam site when those protecting the construction work relayed the message to them.
On 16 November 2005, delivering judgement on the petition by affected persons from the Loktak hydroelectric project, the Guwahati High Court had asked authorities to compensate the farmers for the lands that they had lost 21 years ago. While the court directive on compensation came about 21 years late, oustees had to spend an entire decade arguing before the court of law that they were indeed the landholders having legal entitlements for the land in question. At the close of the year 2005, writing this article in the backdrop of the death of three oustees provides me a chance to thumb though an Advance Report of CAG of India for the year ending March 31, 1977; that had devoted 32 pages to discuss Loktak Hydroelectric project.
It has all the details on why did the costs rise, how the construction got started in October 1970 without adequate detailed geological investigations, how the firm 'P' to which the work on tunnel was awarded couldnât cope with the problems on tunneling. It is an audit scrutiny that meticulously examines the statement of accounts, but nowhere in those 32 pages do you get any information whatsoever on how much was allocated (let alone, spent) for compensating the oustees. (Firm 'P': the CAG had during 1977 adopted the convention to refer to a contracted firm this way, and not by its full name.)
However, the costs did skyrocket by almost six-fold within a matter of 10 years: from the initial assumption of Rs 10.90 crore in 1967 to Rs 60.11 crores in 1976. At the time of the publication of the said audit report, costs were proposed to be revised to Rs 76.31 crores. The reasons for the rise in costs were attributed to an increase of Rs 12.12 crore due to alteration in methods of tunneling and an increase of Rs 10.26 crores due to substitution of a part of power channel by cut and cover conduit. A number of geological problems were encountered during execution of various works, and firm 'P' could not cope with the problems in tunneling. The scope of it work was therefore, reduced to about 45 percent of the work, with balance â more difficult portion â being assigned to the department. Even then, the value of the modified contract was Rs 6.4 crores compared to the tendered value of Rs 5.71 crores for the entire work.
So this was in seventies, when Manipur neglected geological risks while embarking on dam construction. But, did the state learn from past blunders?
No, not at all; an audit report for the year ending March 31, 1999 which undertook a performance review of Khuga multi purpose project in Manipur pointed out, "Since 1984, the Irrigation and Flood Control Department of Manipur had carried out construction work on 25.37 km of canal over an area of 40.27 hectares of forestland in the Dampi Reserve Forest without obtaining the required clearance for diversion of forestland."
Yet another audit report for the year ending March 31, 2004 that undertook a performance review of Thoubal multi purpose project (near Phayeng in Senapati district) stated that although the project would submerge 595 hectares of forest land, the state government started construction without obtaining forest and environmental clearance from the Ministry. So if it was a tale of undermining geological risks in seventies, in eighties it was a tale of undermining ecological risks.
