How Kashmir was stolen from Pakistan by Mountbatten

[toxic_pus]

I will quote your post .........

UNCIP’s 3rd Report, clarifies the positions of the two countries on this issue of demilitarization and the process of negotiations.

''...the Pakistan delegation held (a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces. (para 229)

India, on the other hand, has (a) never accepted the claim of Pakistan to equality of rights in a military or any other sphere, but considers that the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir constitutes an act of aggression and a violation of international law; and (b) has refused to discuss with Pakistan any feature of the withdrawal of Indian forces, maintaining that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State were matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India. The Government of India at this time also made it clear that the fulfillment by the Government of Pakistan of the conditions of withdrawal was a condition precedent to the implementation by the Government of India of any arrangement regarding the withdrawal of its own forces." (para 230)

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...en-pakistan-mountbatten-45.html#ixzz23A3CNRON


To say that Pakistan did not want to withdraw its forces stands denied from your own post. Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces and wanted to discuss the withdrawal plan with India. Indians did not agree. Period.

The reason they did not agree becomes secondary.

So basically when you can't provide an argument you just stick your fingers in your ears, shut your eyes tight and sing 'La-la-la-I-can't-hear-you-la-la-la'.

What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.” (para 243)

The Indians were not ready to provide such an assurance to the UN commission also. Because they did not want the plebiscite to be held, they refused to provide this assurance to the commission and therefore, the Indians refused to withdraw their forces.

Selective cut-pasting of points which go in Indian favour will not take you away from the reality.

I am quoting one of my earlier posts with minor adaptations.

'Assurance' was never a problem. The Commission was there precisely to see that the demilitarization wasn't being carried on in a manner that might create an 'opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities'. That was its job. For instance, in the words of Mr Robert van de Karchove, the UN rapporteur (UNCIP's 3rd Interim Report):

"It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)​

Further,

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)​

Besides, India had given plenty of 'assurance' that there would be no unilateral reopening of hostilities on its part, unless provoked.

In spite of all that Pakistan deliberately maintained an absurd stance,

"...(a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces" (para 230)​

Regarding 'synchronization' Mr Karchove observed:

"The Commission was not able to share the view of the Government of Pakistan that the only method of assuring this form of synchronization was by the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans." (para 242)​

Hence,

"The Pakistan Government could not in reason expect, nor could the Commission have granted, a "synchronization" which would have been incompatible with the terms of the Resolution of 13 August." (para 243)​

Clearly Pakistan was just looking for ways to shrug off its own responsibilities in a way that would enable it to blame India for all the failures.

'Assurance' was never a problem. Pakistan had plenty of it. From the Commission itself, no less.

Now try a little harder.

 

[karan.1970]

As already pointed out, the commission never agreed to extend such an assurance. The report contains no mention of such an intention. The report contains no mention of any binding on India prior to Pakistani withdrawal. On the contrary, it was clear that such issues were bilateral. Such an explicit written mention must surely supersede any surmise 64 years after the fact. In fact, to assume that Pakistan's views had any impact on the Commission's proceedings also ignores the commission's written view that it was free to hear the views of the Pakistani side on the matter. Not use it to guide its proceedings but to give it a hearing.

The mistake made again and again is to assume that since these views were given a hearing, they and their ramifications were in any way binding on the commission. This mistake compounds the other mistake, assuming that the commission, unreported anywhere but visualized by current surmise and creative reconstruction, then went on to realize these binding demands by making corresponding demands on the Indian side.

The written record could not be clearer.

Neither did the commission agree to provide any assurance to Pakistan, it also did not seek such assurance from India, nor was there any rejection of such a request by India for the simple reason that such a request was never made.

Why should all this have happened, when the record clearly shows that the commission clearly understood and stated that Pakistan's role was confined to withdrawal of troops, and that any arrangements for withdrawal of Indian troops were internal to its discussions and arrangements with India?

Those whose whole ideology (about Kashmir) is based on a lie have no option but to keep repeating that lie in a hope that the proverb about people believing a lie if its repeated enough number of times is correct..

 

[Jinx1]

You are right that everyone has a different point of view, since India went to the UN first on this dispute India obviously was favored in the wording and as such had to be accepted.. If Pakistan wants assurances despite what the resolution says then they should have completely rejected the resolution.. then there would have been no question of plebiscite

What irks is that many in Pakistan blame India, that it did not follow the UN resolution which is completely incorrect.. keeping in mind the wording of the resolution, India has been correct in this matter..

I am sorry, It does not happen this way. Yes Indian diplomats and the staff at the UN, would have had to work hard to get the desired wordings in their favour. Pakistan being a new country, would have certainly found it difficult, without the support of UK, whose representative was retained as Viceroy in India and UK's influence with other UNSC members. This fact incidentally has been amplified in historical records. Still, after the resolutions had been agreed to and signed, the implementation phase would have need definite clarifications to avoid differing understandings of various elements of resolutions. I wish it could all be clear cut for implementation, but in certain cases it is not. The US and UK even in recent cases have deciphered certain elements of resolution differently than other countries and the generally perceived or accepted understandings within the ambit of international law.

Such things happen all the time and therefore need to be understood in the manner.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Regarding #692, that is correct, what is stated is the equivalent of the assurances being sought, the commission being willing to arrange things that the final effect sought by Pakistan would be achieved. Pakistan, however, stuck to demanding direct discussions with the Indian side.

This position, incidentally, points to outstanding hypocrisy on Pakistan's side. Until 1971,she insisted on multilateral discussions. On the UN Resolutions, in fact, refusing any bilateral discussion. Yet on this occasion, to illustrate, once the multilateral implementation began, it was torpedoed by insisting on bilateral discussions.

In summary, it was shocking that the UN Resolution was not being implemented. It was even more shocking when Pakistan's clear and forthright right to determine how it was to be interpreted and executed was not acknowledged!

I am sorry, It does not happen this way. Yes Indian diplomats and the staff at the UN, would have had to work hard to get the desired wordings in their favour. Pakistan being a new country, would have certainly found it difficult, without the support of UK, whose representative was retained as Viceroy in India and UK's influence with other UNSC members. This fact incidentally has been amplified in historical records. Still, after the resolutions had been agreed to and signed, the implementation phase would have need definite clarifications to avoid differing understandings of various elements of resolutions. I wish it could all be clear cut for implementation, but in certain cases it is not. The US and UK even in recent cases have deciphered certain elements of resolution differently than other countries and the generally perceived or accepted understandings within the ambit of international law.

Such things happen all the time and therefore need to be understood in the manner.

The clarifications were there. The Commission explained what was to happen, and how. Pakistan did not accept that, and wanted direct discussions with India. This was violently against the wording of the resolution, not a varying interpretation.

Those whose whole ideology (about Kashmir) is based on a lie have no option but to keep repeating that lie in a hope that the proverb about people believing a lie if its repeated enough number of times is correct..

I do not agree that it was a lie, in the normal sense of the term.

Instead, I see it as a manifestation of the basic premise of the Pakistani position: that Indian Muslims were superior to all other Indians; that as a concession, they would accept absolute and mathematically defined parity, nothing less; and the world owed it to Pakistan to compensate her for not achieving parity in various fields, a sort of country affirmative action programme.

This thinking pervades everything. Everything.

 

[Nassr]

As already pointed out, the commission never agreed to extend such an assurance. The report contains no mention of such an intention. The report contains no mention of any binding on India prior to Pakistani withdrawal. On the contrary, it was clear that such issues were bilateral. Such an explicit written mention must surely supersede any surmise 64 years after the fact. In fact, to assume that Pakistan's views had any impact on the Commission's proceedings also ignores the commission's written view that it was free to hear the views of the Pakistani side on the matter. Not use it to guide its proceedings but to give it a hearing.

The mistake made again and again is to assume that since these views were given a hearing, they and their ramifications were in any way binding on the commission. This mistake compounds the other mistake, assuming that the commission, unreported anywhere but visualized by current surmise and creative reconstruction, then went on to realize these binding demands by making corresponding demands on the Indian side.

The written record could not be clearer.

Neither did the commission agree to provide any assurance to Pakistan, it also did not seek such assurance from India, nor was there any rejection of such a request by India for the simple reason that such a request was never made.

Why should all this have happened, when the record clearly shows that the commission clearly understood and stated that Pakistan's role was confined to withdrawal of troops, and that any arrangements for withdrawal of Indian troops were internal to its discussions and arrangements with India?

Sir,

I agree with @Jinx1’s comments that there is so much more that needs to be done between signing of an agreement and its implementation. We can continue giving our viewpoint and counter arguments and we will continue almost forever, without agreeing with each other. I am convinced that before implementation of the withdrawal plan of forces, necessary coordination was needed for its implementation. The Indian accusation that because Pakistan did not withdraw its forces, Plebiscite could not be held in Kashmir is completely and utterly unfounded, and can not stand the rigors of arguments.

Lets agree to disagree and move on.

When the UN appointed Commission was unable to establish a cooperative arrangement between India and Pakistan it returned without any agreement. Before returning, it suggested appointment of Admiral Chester Nimitz, who had confidence of both India and Pakistan to administer the plebiscite. Pakistan agreed to his appointment, however India did not agree. The commission returned without getting an agreement between the two countries.

The situation was again presented to UNSC. On 14 March 1950, UNSC ratified the resolution it passed on 13 August 1948. According to this resolution, immediate demilitarization was recommended.

Instead of UNCIP, Owen Dixon was made the UN representative. He arrived in India and held a conference with Indian and Pakistani PM on 20 Jul, which lasted for five days. It finished without an agreement.

Own Dixon then made his own recommendations and suggested that forces of both countries should vacate Kashmir before the plebiscite. Pakistan agreed, India did not agree.

He then presented what is now known as Owen Dixon Plan. It was rejected by both countries.

He then made further recommendations; the area be given under complete UN control; and no force from any country should remain in Kashmir for a plebiscite to be held under UN auspices. Pakistan agreed, India did not.

India wanted that her army should stay, her administrative echelons should stay, the plebiscite, though organized by the UN, should be administered by her own civil administration. Pakistan obviously could not accept all this and rejected Indian suggestions.

He failed in his objective and left.

Frank P. Graham came next.

In order to seek Indian acceptance, he suggested to increase the number of Indian Army presence from earlier suggested 18000 to 21000, as compared to local Kashmiri Force of 6000 in AJ&K. India did not agree.

The matter rested there.

When Sheikh Abdullah was arrested, in order to placate the Kashmiri population, Nehru met with Pakistan Prime Minister and a joint statement was issued at the end of the meeting. It indicated an agreement between India and Pakistan to announce the date of plebiscite before April 1954.

Nehru later refused citing US – Pakistan agreement and stated that this agreement has disturbed the regional balance of power and therefore, plebiscite in Kashmir cannot be held. He though had made his mind in 1948, to not to hold the plebiscite and only announced it at this moment.

India later announced through the newly created Kashmir Constituent Assembly that Kashmir has now become part of India.

After deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Kashmir still remain unresolved.

 

[bronxbull]

Pakistan is concerned about the safety of its people. There are over 140 armed secessionist groups operating in India, the largest in the world. That is why these people may not be allowed in a country which is infested with such groups, have massive law and order problems, Assam riots are a recent example and lot of people are getting killed. That's the reason.

If they want to go,then how does it matter?

You can laugh yourself to death if you wish. Just check if euthanasia is legal in India.

I heard Euthanasia is free on the streets of KPK.

 

[Nassr]

If they want to go,then how does it matter?

They have already left and are in India. They should have been allowed in the first place and should never have been stopped.

I heard Euthanasia is free on the streets of KPK.

ha ha ha ha ...... good one indeed. But it still is not legal. ha ha ha

 

[ajtr]

 

[Samlee]

Self Deleted

Rubbish.

Pakistan was was demanding something that they were not entitled to. I am quoting one of my earlier posts with minor adaptation.

Part II/B(1) of Cease Fire Agreement (13th August, 1948) reads:

“When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission”
​

Nehru, while seeking clarifications on the resolution of 13th Aug, 1948, had sought to identify the parties to the negotiation concerning demilitarization. He wrote to Joseph Korbel, the Chairman of the Commission, on 20th Aug, 1948 (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“...the paramount need for security is recognized by the Commission, and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.” (para 4)​

Joseph Korbel, wrote back, on 25th Aug, 1948, confirming Nehru’s interpretation (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the Resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation...”​

Pakistan, too, had sought clarification on this very issue. Joseph Korbel, in his letter to Zafarulla Khan, dated 3rd Sept, 1948, stated (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“As regards paragraphs B 1 and 2 of Part II, the Commission, while recognizing the paramount need for security of the State of Jammu ad Kashmir, confirms that the minimum strength required for the purpose of assisting the local authorities in the observance of law and order, would be determined by the Commission and the Government of India. The Commission considers that it is free to hear the views of the Government of Pakistan on the subject.”​

In other words, India was neither obliged to negotiate with Pakistan nor to share information about demilitarization with anyone other than UN Commission. Neither did Pakistan have any right to dictate terms and conditions for its own withdrawal or seek information from India, about India’s withdrawal. Pakistan’s role was relegated to that of someone who Commission may ‘hear’, and not that of a party to the negotiation. As far as India was concerned, UN was ‘free to hear views’ of whoever UN decided.

UNCIP’s 3rd Report, clarifies the positions of the two countries on this issue of demilitarization and the process of negotiations.

''...the Pakistan delegation held (a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces. (para 229)

India, on the other hand, has (a) never accepted the claim of Pakistan to equality of rights in a military or any other sphere, but considers that the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir constitutes an act of aggression and a violation of international law; and (b) has refused to discuss with Pakistan any feature of the withdrawal of Indian forces, maintaining that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State were matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India. The Government of India at this time also made it clear that the fulfillment by the Government of Pakistan of the conditions of withdrawal was a condition precedent to the implementation by the Government of India of any arrangement regarding the withdrawal of its own forces." (para 230)​

The Truce Agreement is clear that Pakistan would have to evacuate the territories captured by it and the local authority will be looking after the administration of the evacuated territory under the direct supervision of the UN Commission.

“Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.” [Part II/A(3)]​

By no stretch of imagination can this be construed that ‘the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side’. This deliberately flawed position of (a) led to (b). From Pakistan’s point of view, if it could be established that the withdrawal was about bringing in a ‘military balance’, it would then naturally mean that Pakistan got to decide what, for them, was an acceptable ‘military balance’. This in turn would mean that Pakistan’s withdrawal was contingent upon its agreement with Indian plan of withdrawal. It would then be very easy for Pakistan to weasel out of its own obligation by simply citing its disagreement with Indian plan of demilitarization. That’s exactly what they did eventually.

The Commission had on several occasions, clarified, that Pakistan had to ‘completely’ withdraw from the occupied part. The evacuated land was then to become UN’s concern and Pakistan had absolutely no role to play in it (not even in the subsequent plebiscite). Pakistan’s argument, based on its flawed premise, deliberate in any case, was in complete contradiction with the Commission’s clarifications. For example, UNCIP’s 3rd Report states:

“...the Resolution […], as has been pointed out, draws a distinction between the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces. Pakistan troops are to begin to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal is not conditioned on Pakistan's agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal.” (para 242)

“That Resolution does not suggest that Pakistan should be entitled to make her withdrawals conditional upon the consultations envisaged between the Commission and the Government of India having led to an agreed schedule of withdrawal of Indian troops. What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.” (para 243)​

To summarise, (a) negotiations regarding demilitarization was very much a bipartite affair, where Pakistan had limited role to play, if at all it had any role to play, and (b) Pakistan’s withdrawal was ‘unconditional’ and ‘unilateral’, in the sense that it didn’t depend on India’s plan for demilitarization.

Toxic Jee,
First of All It Is Nice To Know That Instead Of Trolling like The Other Indian Members You Have Put Up Sound Technical Argueme
nts.This Is What We Should Have.Unfortunately The Kashmir Topic By It's Very Nature Inflames Passions On Both Sides.People Forget Logic and Jump To Trolling.It Is My Misfortune That I Have To Sometimes Stoop To Their Level.Am A Patriotic Pakistani Just Can't Help It.Let Us Have A Civilised Discussion Based Upon Merit and and Agree To Disagree Kya Khyal Hai


I Would Like To Give You A Glimpse of Pakistan's Side Of The Story



Here Is The Dispassionate Pakistani Viewpoint




1.INDIAN OFFICIAL STANCE:India Claims That It's Claim Upon The State of Jammu and Kashmir Is Based Upon The Article Of Accession Of Maharaja Hari Singh.

India holds that the Instrument of Accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India, signed by Maharaja Hari Singh (erstwhile ruler of the State) on 25 October 1947 & executed on 27 October 1947 between the ruler of Kashmir and the Governor General of India was a legal act, was completely valid in terms of the Government of India Act (1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and international law and was total and irrevocable. There is no evidence of any deceit practiced by India on Kashmir. The Government of India had no right to question the right of the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession, as he alone had the right and power to take a decision for his state. To have asked the ruler to establish his right to sign the Instrument of Accession would have meant that the Government of India was going to meddle with the internal policies of the state. Law does not permit any such intervention in the affairs of another state.


Q1.Then Who Gave India To Question The Right Of The Nawab of Junagarh to Accede to Pakistan?Why Meddle In The Internal Policy of Junagarh?


September, 17, 1947, V.P. Menon, the then Secretary of States rushed to Junagarh with a special message from the Government of India that advised the Nawab to withdraw his accession to Pakistan. However, Menon could not meet the Nawab as he was indisposed, but construed this ruse to avoid him and expressed his displeasure to the Dewan of the State of Junagarh, Shah Nawaz Bhutto.

Bhitto explained to Menon that since the Instrument of Accession was duly signed, and the accession was complete and cannot be withdrawn, the proper course could be to talk to the Government of Pakistan on this issue.

Menon left Junagarh fuming and warned the Dewan of dire consequences. He went to Bombay from there and called for a press conference to announce the formation of Provisional Government of Junagarh that was formally formed on September, 25 1947 with Saamar Das Gandhi, a relative of Mahathma Gandhi, as its president.

Meanwhile, the Government of India made preparations for the annexation of Junagarh asking the army of the States in Kathaiwar to be suitably dispersed around Junagarh. On the 4th of October, the Chiefs of Staff were directed to instruct the Commander of the Kathiawar Defence Forces to prepare a plan for the occupation of Babariawad and Mangrol, the two pockets inside Junagarh state but outside its suzerainty and had acceded to the Indian Union.(The Princely State of Junagarh Dead or Alive. SM Pasha)

(BTW This Man Is An Indian Historian Do Not Go For His Name He Is Not Pakistani)



BUT THE BIGGEST QUESTIONID THE MAHARAJA SIGN THIS INSTRUMENT??????????????????


The formal overt Indian intervention in the internal affairs of the State of Jammu and Kashmir began on about 9.00 a.m. on 27 October 1947, when Indian troops started landing at Srinagar airfield. India has officially dated the commencement of its claim that the State was part of Indian sovereign territory to a few hours earlier, at some point in the afternoon or evening of 26 October.


India maintains that this period of independence, the existence of which it has never challenged effectively, came to an end on 26/27 October as the result of two pairs of closely related transactions, which we must now examine. They are:

(a) an Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India which the Maharajah is alleged to have signed on 26 October 1947, and;

(b) the acceptance of this Instrument by the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, on 27 October 1947; plus

(c) a letter from the Maharajah to Lord Mountbatten, dated 26 October 1947, in which Indian military aid is sought in return for accession to India (on terms stated in an allegedly enclosed Instrument) and the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah to head an Interim Government of the State; and

(d) a letter from Lord Mountbatten to the Maharajah, dated 27 October 1947, acknowledging the above and noting that, once the affairs of the State have been settled and law and order is restored, “the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people."


In both pairs of documents it will be noted that the date of the communication from the Maharajah, be it the alleged Instrument of Accession or the letter to Lord Mountbatten, is given as 26 October 1947, that is to say before the Indian troops actually began overtly to intervene in the State’s affairs on the morning of 27 October 1947. It has been said that Lord Mountbatten insisted on the Maharajah’s signature as a precondition for his approval of Indian intervention in the affairs of what would otherwise be an independent State.



It is now absolutely clear that the two documents (a) the Instrument of Accession, and (c) the letter to Lord Mountbatten, could not possibly have been signed by the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir on 26 October 1947. The earliest possible time and date for their signature would have to be the afternoon of 27 October 1947. During 26 October 1947 the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir was travelling by road from Srinagar to Jammu. His Prime Minister, M.C. Mahajan, who was negotiating with the Government of India, and the senior Indian official concerned in State matters, V.P. Menon, were still in New Delhi where they remained overnight, and where their presence was noted by many observers. There was no communication of any sort between New Delhi and the traveling Maharajah. Menon and Mahajan set out by air from New Delhi to Jammu at about 10.00 a.m. on 27 October, and the Maharajah learned from them for the first time the result of his Prime Minister’s negotiations in New Delhi in the early afternoon of that day. (Excerpts from 'The Myth of Indian Claim to JAMMU AND KASHMIR ––A REAPPRAISAL by Alistair Lamb)



a research from British sources quoted by Victoria Schofield, author of Kashmir in Conflict has indicated that Hari Singh did not reach Jammu until the evening of October 26 and that due to poor flying conditions, V P Menon was unable to get to Jammu until the morning of October 27, by which time Indian troops were already arriving in Srinagar....(Victoria Schofield Kashmir In Conflict)

Here is an excerpt from Alastair Lamb’s book Kashmir… A Disputed Legacy. (Capitalization emphasis is mine)

MAHAJAN’S NARRATIVE ALSO CONTAINS THE FASCINATING SUGGESTION THAT THE FIRST INDIAN TROOPS WERE LANDING AT SRINAGAR AIRFIELD BEFORE THE PROCESS OF ACCESSION HAD BEEN COMPLETED.

If so, then the intervention of the Indian Army in the Kashmir dispute could well be another of those episodes, of which Pearl Harbour is the supreme example, where the military course of events resulted in the opening act of war taking place before the politicians and diplomats were able to organize its formal legitimisation.

Even more intriguing, in this context, is the fact that Indian troops arriving at Srinagar airport on 27 Oct. 1947 found other Indian troops, in the shape of Patiala men, already established there and elsewhere in the State.

The Patiala forces had arrived, it seems, on about 17 Oct. 1947, that is to say before the tribal crossing of the bridge at Domel on 22 Oct.

These two questions, the timing of the precise moment of accession and the date of the arrival of the Patiala men, have for some reason not been touched upon by the Pakistani side in the Kashmir debate over all these years; and, not surprisingly, the Indian side has not gone out of its way to draw attention to the matter.

The chronology and interpretation of the events leading up to accession which have been set out in Chapter 7 above lead to a number of conclusions which certainly differ from the received opinion, at least as interpreted by Indian diplomats. We will confine ourselves here to two issues, the status of Azad Kashmir and the question of who were the “aggressors” in those crucial days from 21 to 27 Oct. 1947.

On 15 Aug. 1947 the State of Jammu and Kashmir became to all intents and purposes an independent state.

There is no other possible interpretation of the lapse of Paramountcy. On 24 Oct. 1947 the independence of the State of Azad Kashmir was declared, relating to the territory mainly in the old Poonch jagir in which the control of the Maharaja, apart from Poonch city itself, had completely disappeared. Azad Kashmir’s first president, Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, as an elected member of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly for a constituency in Poonch, could certainly be said to enjoy some measure of popular mandate, as least as much as the later claimed for Sheikh Abdullah.

On 26 or 27 Oct. 1947 the Maharaja formally acceded to India. Did he bring, even in theory, Azad Kashmir with him? This is certainly an interesting question which ought to occupy the minds of international lawyers.


Wolpert writes that Menon returned from Srinagar on 26 October ‘with no Instrument of Accession’ to report on the perilous condition in Kashmir to the Defence Committee. Only after Mountbatten had allowed the airlift of Indian troops on 27 October, did Menon and Mahajan set out for Jammu ‘to get the Instrument of Accession’. The Maharaja signed the Instrument after the Indian troops had assumed control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir’s summer capital, Srinagar.(Nehru:A Tryst With Destiny Stanley Wolpert)


The Above Facts Are Seconded By Andrew Whitehead:A Mission in Kashmir and Victoria Schofield:Kashmir in Conflict

Conclusion:As There Was No Accession When The Indian Airlift Of Soldiers Began Thus Rendering A Big Question Mark Over The Legal and Moral Pretext Of The Indian Invasion


Now We Come To The UN Resolutions

Q1.India Claims That Pakistan Has Delayed The Plebiscite It Demands By Not Withdrawing Troops From Jammu and Kashmir.Fair Enough.But The Words Are Not Backed By Actions.India Should Have Kept Status Quo.In This Way She Could Have Told The World That Look "We Are Prepared But Pakistan Is Not Cooperating By Removing Her Troops".On The Other Hand She Started The Process of Integration of Jammu and Kashmir

Mr. Josef Karbel India’s nominee on UNCIP made very sincere efforts solution of Kashmir problem. His study was through and unbiased. His studied views on the dispute including responsibility of UNO, portents, and his prophetic judgment – is a verdict indeed o the whole perspective. He surveyed the situation and concluded:
“In 1956 Nehru proceeded to negate the United Nations Resolutions, first by integrating Kashmir step by step with India and finally by openly rejecting the idea of a plebiscite.(Danger In Kashmir Joseph Karbel)


Q2.According To UN RESOLUTION 47 2b(i)

That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of
intimidation to the inhabitants of the State;

Then Why Do We Receive These Kinds Of Reports



A top-ranking police official permitted ConGen officer to see a highly classified intelligence report from sources supposedly in Indian-occupied Kashmir. The report detailed atrocities perpetrated by Indian troops on Kashmiri Muslims and participation of Indian troops in suppression of pro-Abdullah and pro-Pakistan demonstrations in Srinagar. The report also contained statements alleging an increase in communist infiltration from India into Kashmir and a growth of communist influence supposedly sponsored by the present Kashmir government. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Oct. 22-28, 1953, Oct. 29, 1953(U.S. National Archives)


Prem Nath Bazaz, a Kashmiri Pandit disillusioned with Sheikh Abdullah and still opposed to the autocracy of the maharaja, believed the motives of the tribesmen should be considered. 'They wanted to liberate Kashmir from the tyranny of the Maharaja and nationalist renegades. And we should not forget that some members of the Indian army did no less of looting and molesting.'[Prem Nath Bazaz, Azad Kashmir, Lahore, p.33.]


Q3.Putting Aside UN Resolutions In One Place,What About The Commitments Of Pundit Nehru To Pakistan and The People Of Kashmir

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 4, New Delhi 1986, p.288a

Cable to C.R. Attlee from Nehru : New Delhi, 28 October 1947.

12. We are always ready to discuss any issue in dispute with representatives of Pakistan. We have laid down the principle that accession of every State, whether Junagadh or Kashmir or Hyderabad, should depend on ascertained wishes of the people concerned.


and



We have fought the good fight about Kashmir on the field of battle... (and) ...in many a chancellery of the world and in the United Nations, but, above all, we have fought this fight in the hearts and minds of men and women of that State of Jammu and Kashmir. Because, ultimately - I say this with all deference to this Parliament - the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men and women of Kashmir;neither in this Parliament, nor in the United Nations nor by anybody else," Jawaharlal Nehru in the Lok Sabha on August 7, 1952.
- Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 19 pp. 295-

I Highly Doubt This Promise Is Ever Going To Be Fulfild Because You Guys May Not Like The Consequences


http://www.pakistantoday.com....dian-ministry/

These Are Just Two Of Many Of Nehru's Statements Regarding The Kashmir Dispute



P.S Some Of My Previous Posts Give The Impression That I Am Some Anti India Bigot or A Follower Of Zaid Hamid.In Actual Fact I Am Not.Many A Times I Have Had Discussions and Debates With Indians On Many Topics In The Friendliest and Candid Of Environments.I Also Find India's Socio-Economic Growth To Be Very Admirable.It Is Just When Certain Fellow Country Men Of Yours Make Sweeping Statements Like "Pakistan's Illegal Occupation" and Kashmir Is "Integral Part" of India Without Giving A Proper Meritocratic Justification.Such Arrogance Just Doesn't Sit Down Well With Me.

Granted There May Be Some Weight In Your Arguments.There May Be Some Weight In Mine.Personal Experience Indicates That The Truth Lies Somewhere In The Middle.

Personally I Think That The Chenab Formula Couples With Certain Non Kashmir Concessions On Pakistan's Part or The KSG Formula of a Smaller Independent Kashmir Are The Best Steps To Moderation and A Permanent and Durable Peace

 

[Vitamin_C]

I find it extremely disturbing that India got no part of sindh . The 4 million sindhis of India lost their native state . Each state that was partitioned - Punjab , Bengal , Jammu & Kashmir has been divided between both Pakistan and india but India got no part of Sindh . India should have got atleast a small part of Sindh .

Sindh was a princely state when it was invaded by the British somewhere around 1842 just like Kashmir and Kalat. It was not possible to cut it, it had to go whole either to India or Pakistan and unlike Punjab it had the option to stay independent.
Sindh joined Pakistan not because of religion as Sindhi culture binds Sindhis stronger than religion. Hinduism also originated in Sindh, Sindhi culture is still influenced by Hindu culture. At time of partition Sindh was Muslim majority but the urban areas were Hindu majority.
Today Sindh is 15% population of Pakistan and 70% of revenue of Pakistan comes from Sindh. But the Punjabi dominated army is obsessed with Kashmir and are wasting our resources.
Just imagine if Sindh was independent state Pakistans Military budget would have been $1.9billion instead of $6.5billion that also without a navy. =)

 

[toxic_pus]

These two questions, the timing of the precise moment of accession and the date of the arrival of the Patiala men, have for some reason not been touched upon by the Pakistani side in the Kashmir debate over all these years; and, not surprisingly, the Indian side has not gone out of its way to draw attention to the matter.

This should have been your first clue. If someone like Sir Zafarullah Khan, whose legal acumen matched that of Jinnah, didn't touch upon these two 'questions', then these are probably not relevant. Indeed, these are inconsequential.

What you are trying to say is that since the Instrument was probably signed after the arrival of Indian troops, then (a) the entry of Indian troops into the sovereign territory of J & K is itself illegal and (b) the accession was acquired at gun point. Both are false.

Following the tribal invasion on 22 Oct, the Maharaja had formally asked for Military aide from India. The request was received on 24th Oct. Entry of Indian troops, on 27th Oct, can be legally validated by this request alone, even if you consider the Instrument to be invalid. Meher Chand Mahajan, the Prime Minisiter of the Maharaja, who was present in Delhi from 25th Oct, with full authority to negotiate accession, in his autobiography, 'Looking Back' writes,

"I was, however, adamant in my submission; the Prime Minister also was sticking to his own view. As a last resort I said, Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give whatever power you desire to the popular party" [pg-151]
​

Point (a), therefore is legally not tenable.

Since you have quoted Victoria Schofield, let me quote her as well.

"Whether or not the Instrument of Accession was signed before or after Indian troops landed, the Maharaja had agreed to accession in principle upon the terms outlined by Mountbatten'' [pg-58, Kashmir in Conflict by Victoria Schofield]​

As with the presence of Patiala Force, it was still a militia and was not yet absorbed into Indian Army. Their presence was of no consequence.

Conclusion:As There Was No Accession When The Indian Airlift Of Soldiers Began Thus Rendering A Big Question Mark Over The Legal and Moral Pretext Of The Indian Invasion

It is irrelevant if the accession was incomplete when the Indian airlift of soldiers began or when they landed. What is relevant is the question, if GoI had legally valid authority to do so, even without the Instrument. As you can see, argument can be made successfully that India was merely responding to the Maharaja's formal request for military help.

[...to be continued]

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sindh was a princely state when it was invaded by the British somewhere around 1842 just like Kashmir and Kalat. It was not possible to cut it, it had to go whole either to India or Pakistan and unlike Punjab it had the option to stay independent.
Sindh joined Pakistan not because of religion as Sindhi culture binds Sindhis stronger than religion. Hinduism also originated in Sindh, Sindhi culture is still influenced by Hindu culture. At time of partition Sindh was Muslim majority but the urban areas were Hindu majority.
Today Sindh is 15% population of Pakistan and 70% of revenue of Pakistan comes from Sindh. But the Punjabi dominated army is obsessed with Kashmir and are wasting our resources.
Just imagine if Sindh was independent state Pakistans Military budget would have been $1.9billion instead of $6.5billion that also without a navy. =)

I liked your comment, but was troubled at the ignorance displayed in assuming that the Hindu religion originated in Sindh.

Not a capital offence, but troubling in its implications.

 

[kumarkumar1867]

OH REALLY NOW Iran,Pakistan,China and OIC are All Losers and India Half Which Is Under A Maoist Rebellion Are Winners Real Funny Lol

From when did you get hallucination that Pakistan can join in any league with countries like Iran & China??? Placing looser in league of winners doesnt make him look different.

The right of freedom, even an armed struggle for freedom is enshrined in the UN charter. Subash Chander Bhose was a freedom fighter for India - The Brits called him a traitor and some called him a terrorist.

One man's freedom fighter is other man's terrorist.

Yes like always, a man who was behind freedom of British India & probably behind freedom of today's Pakistan can be a terrorist to you by someone's definition.
In India such remarks about great person who did good for my country are called BS.

Moral and diplomatic support will continue. UN resolutions will also stay.

With no options left, if you dont support / pretend to support them they will beat back their master's a$$

Peace in Kashmir will cost Pakistan: Hizbul Mujahideen chief | Deccan Chronicle

Bas ab yahii zillat baaki reh gayi thi !!

 

[toxic_pus]

Q1.India Claims That Pakistan Has Delayed The Plebiscite It Demands By Not Withdrawing Troops From Jammu and Kashmir.Fair Enough.But The Words Are Not Backed By Actions.India Should Have Kept Status Quo.In This Way She Could Have Told The World That Look "We Are Prepared But Pakistan Is Not Cooperating By Removing Her Troops".On The Other Hand She Started The Process of Integration of Jammu and Kashmir

Mr. Josef Karbel India’s nominee on UNCIP made very sincere efforts solution of Kashmir problem. His study was through and unbiased. His studied views on the dispute including responsibility of UNO, portents, and his prophetic judgment – is a verdict indeed o the whole perspective. He surveyed the situation and concluded:
“In 1956 Nehru proceeded to negate the United Nations Resolutions, first by integrating Kashmir step by step with India and finally by openly rejecting the idea of a plebiscite.(Danger In Kashmir Joseph Karbel)

By the end of 1950 it was clear to all and sundry that Pakistan was using literally childish excuses to ensure that they wouldn't have to withdraw and it was clear that as a consequence, the plebiscite couldn't be organised almost indefinitely. What could India do? Keep Kashmir in a perpetual administrative limbo or extend the rights and privileges of the Constitution, while adequately safeguarding Kashmir's interest via Article 370?

Nevertheless, India's integration of Kashmir was inconsequential to the UN resolutions, and had absolutely no bearing on Pakistan's obligation to vacate the occupied land.

So, what stopped Pakistan from living upto it's own responsibilities till 1956?

Q2.According To UN RESOLUTION 47 2b(i)

That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of
intimidation to the inhabitants of the State;

Then Why Do We Receive These Kinds Of Reports



A top-ranking police official permitted ConGen officer to see a highly classified intelligence report from sources supposedly in Indian-occupied Kashmir. The report detailed atrocities perpetrated by Indian troops on Kashmiri Muslims and participation of Indian troops in suppression of pro-Abdullah and pro-Pakistan demonstrations in Srinagar. The report also contained statements alleging an increase in communist infiltration from India into Kashmir and a growth of communist influence supposedly sponsored by the present Kashmir government. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Oct. 22-28, 1953, Oct. 29, 1953(U.S. National Archives)


Prem Nath Bazaz, a Kashmiri Pandit disillusioned with Sheikh Abdullah and still opposed to the autocracy of the maharaja, believed the motives of the tribesmen should be considered. 'They wanted to liberate Kashmir from the tyranny of the Maharaja and nationalist renegades. And we should not forget that some members of the Indian army did no less of looting and molesting.'[Prem Nath Bazaz, Azad Kashmir, Lahore, p.33.]

Two reports, one from anonymous source and the other from a disillusioned individual. Not enough.

Q3.Putting Aside UN Resolutions In One Place,What About The Commitments Of Pundit Nehru To Pakistan and The People Of Kashmir

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 4, New Delhi 1986, p.288a

Cable to C.R. Attlee from Nehru : New Delhi, 28 October 1947.

12. We are always ready to discuss any issue in dispute with representatives of Pakistan. We have laid down the principle that accession of every State, whether Junagadh or Kashmir or Hyderabad, should depend on ascertained wishes of the people concerned.


and



We have fought the good fight about Kashmir on the field of battle... (and) ...in many a chancellery of the world and in the United Nations, but, above all, we have fought this fight in the hearts and minds of men and women of that State of Jammu and Kashmir. Because, ultimately - I say this with all deference to this Parliament - the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men and women of Kashmir;neither in this Parliament, nor in the United Nations nor by anybody else," Jawaharlal Nehru in the Lok Sabha on August 7, 1952.
- Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 19 pp. 295-

I Highly Doubt This Promise Is Ever Going To Be Fulfild Because You Guys May Not Like The Consequences


http://www.pakistantoday.com....dian-ministry/

All these commitments came with one simple condition - withdrawal of Pakistan. How do you suppose India would hold plebiscite in 'Northern Areas'?

[...concluded]

 

[Ticker]

Oh here comes the cut-paste horde with their one liners.