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How China and Pakistan Are Beating India in the New Great Game

800px-Prime_Minister_Narendra_Modi_with_Afghan_President_Ashraf_Ghani.jpg


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh this week to bolster ties with his eastern neighbor’s pro-India government. In Dhaka, Modi and his Bangladeshi counterpart Sheikh Hasina signed a number of accords, including agreements to resolve long-standing border issues, expand trade, and enhance land and sea connectivity.

Modi’s Bangladesh outreach is part of a broader strategy of “SAARC-minus-one,” aimed at integrating members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), except for Pakistan. Similarly, as part of its “Look East” policy, New Delhi plans a more assertive Asia-Pacific strategy, aimed at countering China by strengthening relationships with countries such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, which fear Chinese hegemony.

But as India looks east, it is losing influence to its west to China and Pakistan. India’s inability to consolidate space in South Asia should induce greater caution in assessments of its rise as a global power given its inability to establish dominance in its periphery.

India has experienced a flurry of setbacks to its west as of late.
One, New Delhi has lost influence in Afghanistan, where President Ashraf Ghani has tilted his government toward Pakistan and China, as part of a bid to secure peace in his country. After coming into office last fall, Ghani’s first foreign visits were to Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. His first presidential trip to India took place this April, after he suspended an arms deal with New Delhi.

Ghani has made a concerted effort to ease the shadow war between his country’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The NDS has backed away from its support for Pakistani Taliban (TTP) factions that engage in terrorism in Pakistan. A reduced footprint for Indian intelligence in Afghanistan could be on the cards as well. An ISI-NDS agreement, reported either as in the draft or final stages, has been the source of controversy in Afghanistan, but Kabul and Islamabad are likely to weather the storm and continue nurturing their bilateral relationship.

Ghani has also expanded outreach to the Afghan Taliban, through the facilitation of not just Pakistan, but also China. In recent months, the Kabul government has engaged in talks with the Afghan Taliban or elements connected to it; and Beijing has either played the role of observer or host in these parlays.
In the midst of the U.S. surge in Afghanistan, Indian and pro-India commentators called for the soft partition of Afghanistan and revival of the Northern Alliance it had backed in the1990s. Those plans have fallen flat, despite India’s development assistance to Afghanistan. India is a non-entity in the Taliban talks and its influence in Afghanistan—achieved through riding on the coattails of a now modest US and NATO military presence—is on the wane. This reduction is translating even on the economic side; an Indian consortium has essentially backed out of a $10 billion mining deal in Afghanistan.

Two, India has been unable to leverage uncertainty in the region to secure Iranian partnership against Pakistan. In the 1990s, New Delhi and Tehran supported the Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-backed Taliban in Afghanistan. But both Tehran and the Afghan Taliban view one another in more pragmatic terms these days. The Iranian government has hosted the Afghan Taliban on multiple occasions, including last month.

And despite regional sectarian turmoil, Iran-Pakistan relations are surprisingly stable, if not improving. Pakistan wisely chose not to join the Saudi-led Yemen war. And Islamabad and Tehran continue talks over energy, trade, and security cooperation despite periodic insurgent violence along their shared border.

The current government in Islamabad, generally seen as pro-Saudi, has moved away from its initial coolness toward a gas pipeline with Tehran. China willconstructmuch of the Pakistani portion of the pipeline. Tehran has even expressed interest inexpandingthe pipeline to China. Meanwhile, India—which was originally a member of the pipeline project, but backed out in part to deny Pakistan transit royalties—has dropped plans for an undersea pipeline bringing in Iranian gas from Oman. The expensive undersea pipeline was conceived to circumvent Pakistan, but a UN decision to expand Pakistan’s seabed territory has made the pipeline impossible without Islamabad’s involvement.

Three, China is pushing forward with a $46 billion economic corridor linking its underdeveloped and landlocked western frontier with the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf shipping lanes through Pakistan. The Chinese-built Arabian Sea port of Gwadar is already operational, but lacks dedicated road connectivity to central Pakistan. But by 2017, Gwadar will be connected to China with the completion of the M-8 motorway and rehabilitation and upgrading of the Karakoram Highway. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) promises to change the economic geography of the region, driving the next generation of growth in Pakistan and western China. CPEC, especially the Gwadar port, will also contribute to the strategic maritime depth of both China and Pakistan. Meanwhile, the nearby Iranian port of Chabahar, developed by India as a competitor to Gwadar, is at least a year from being operational and has only one crane to move containers.

Successful elections in Gilgit-Baltistan this week indicate that Pakistan is moving forward with normalizing the region, which lacks provincial status. Pakistani officials have pointed toward an Indian hand in terrorism along the planned CPEC route; but on the whole, Indian-backed militancy in Pakistan is on the wane, thanks in part to Pakistani military operations in Karachi and Balochistan, and a change in leadership and the foreign presence in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, protests grow in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, not just by Muslim separatists, but also by Sikhs, indicating that locals will resist the hardline policies planned by Hindu nationalists in the new coalition government there.

For most of the past decade, Pakistan has been hammered by political instability, terrorism, and economic decline. In India, Pakistan’s troubles have resulted in a distorted perception of New Delhi’s capacity to project power in the region.

But Pakistan is now taking a turn for the better. Deaths from terrorism are at their lowest rate since 2007 and continue to drop. The Pakistani economy has been stabilized and is primed for a take off. The civilian and military leadership are largely on the same page on major issues, resulting in political stability that shows signs of endurance. A second consecutive transition of power from one democratically elected government to another in 2018 looks reasonably likely. And while the Pakistani military remains committed to long-term counterinsurgency operations in the border regions with Afghanistan, it is now inching toward a resumption of its military modernization program.

Alongside its internal reform, Pakistan, aided by China, is engaging in a smarter, more effective approach toward the region, reflected in the aforementioned gains. But India’s evolving, more strident, strategic culture has resulted in a false sense of confidence among its strategic planners. If this does not reverse, they will be in for a big surprise. In South Asia, Islamabad and Beijing are going to give New Delhi a run for its money.
share the source or dont bother to share.
 
I took the example of declining British interest in SCS because its the only major active flash point. UK is absent in Iraq and Syria as well where fight against ISIS is going on. As far as i can recall French and USA have provided air support not sure about UK though

Britain has close to 1000 troops in Iraq, of course for training they claim.
 
Awesome close relations between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, they must work together for better and bright futures.

:china::pakistan:

800px-Prime_Minister_Narendra_Modi_with_Afghan_President_Ashraf_Ghani.jpg


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh this week to bolster ties with his eastern neighbor’s pro-India government. In Dhaka, Modi and his Bangladeshi counterpart Sheikh Hasina signed a number of accords, including agreements to resolve long-standing border issues, expand trade, and enhance land and sea connectivity.

Modi’s Bangladesh outreach is part of a broader strategy of “SAARC-minus-one,” aimed at integrating members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), except for Pakistan. Similarly, as part of its “Look East” policy, New Delhi plans a more assertive Asia-Pacific strategy, aimed at countering China by strengthening relationships with countries such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, which fear Chinese hegemony.

But as India looks east, it is losing influence to its west to China and Pakistan. India’s inability to consolidate space in South Asia should induce greater caution in assessments of its rise as a global power given its inability to establish dominance in its periphery.

India has experienced a flurry of setbacks to its west as of late.
One, New Delhi has lost influence in Afghanistan, where President Ashraf Ghani has tilted his government toward Pakistan and China, as part of a bid to secure peace in his country. After coming into office last fall, Ghani’s first foreign visits were to Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan. His first presidential trip to India took place this April, after he suspended an arms deal with New Delhi.

Ghani has made a concerted effort to ease the shadow war between his country’s intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The NDS has backed away from its support for Pakistani Taliban (TTP) factions that engage in terrorism in Pakistan. A reduced footprint for Indian intelligence in Afghanistan could be on the cards as well. An ISI-NDS agreement, reported either as in the draft or final stages, has been the source of controversy in Afghanistan, but Kabul and Islamabad are likely to weather the storm and continue nurturing their bilateral relationship.

Ghani has also expanded outreach to the Afghan Taliban, through the facilitation of not just Pakistan, but also China. In recent months, the Kabul government has engaged in talks with the Afghan Taliban or elements connected to it; and Beijing has either played the role of observer or host in these parlays.
In the midst of the U.S. surge in Afghanistan, Indian and pro-India commentators called for the soft partition of Afghanistan and revival of the Northern Alliance it had backed in the1990s. Those plans have fallen flat, despite India’s development assistance to Afghanistan. India is a non-entity in the Taliban talks and its influence in Afghanistan—achieved through riding on the coattails of a now modest US and NATO military presence—is on the wane. This reduction is translating even on the economic side; an Indian consortium has essentially backed out of a $10 billion mining deal in Afghanistan.

Two, India has been unable to leverage uncertainty in the region to secure Iranian partnership against Pakistan. In the 1990s, New Delhi and Tehran supported the Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-backed Taliban in Afghanistan. But both Tehran and the Afghan Taliban view one another in more pragmatic terms these days. The Iranian government has hosted the Afghan Taliban on multiple occasions, including last month.

And despite regional sectarian turmoil, Iran-Pakistan relations are surprisingly stable, if not improving. Pakistan wisely chose not to join the Saudi-led Yemen war. And Islamabad and Tehran continue talks over energy, trade, and security cooperation despite periodic insurgent violence along their shared border.

The current government in Islamabad, generally seen as pro-Saudi, has moved away from its initial coolness toward a gas pipeline with Tehran. China willconstructmuch of the Pakistani portion of the pipeline. Tehran has even expressed interest inexpandingthe pipeline to China. Meanwhile, India—which was originally a member of the pipeline project, but backed out in part to deny Pakistan transit royalties—has dropped plans for an undersea pipeline bringing in Iranian gas from Oman. The expensive undersea pipeline was conceived to circumvent Pakistan, but a UN decision to expand Pakistan’s seabed territory has made the pipeline impossible without Islamabad’s involvement.

Three, China is pushing forward with a $46 billion economic corridor linking its underdeveloped and landlocked western frontier with the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf shipping lanes through Pakistan. The Chinese-built Arabian Sea port of Gwadar is already operational, but lacks dedicated road connectivity to central Pakistan. But by 2017, Gwadar will be connected to China with the completion of the M-8 motorway and rehabilitation and upgrading of the Karakoram Highway. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) promises to change the economic geography of the region, driving the next generation of growth in Pakistan and western China. CPEC, especially the Gwadar port, will also contribute to the strategic maritime depth of both China and Pakistan. Meanwhile, the nearby Iranian port of Chabahar, developed by India as a competitor to Gwadar, is at least a year from being operational and has only one crane to move containers.

Successful elections in Gilgit-Baltistan this week indicate that Pakistan is moving forward with normalizing the region, which lacks provincial status. Pakistani officials have pointed toward an Indian hand in terrorism along the planned CPEC route; but on the whole, Indian-backed militancy in Pakistan is on the wane, thanks in part to Pakistani military operations in Karachi and Balochistan, and a change in leadership and the foreign presence in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, protests grow in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, not just by Muslim separatists, but also by Sikhs, indicating that locals will resist the hardline policies planned by Hindu nationalists in the new coalition government there.

For most of the past decade, Pakistan has been hammered by political instability, terrorism, and economic decline. In India, Pakistan’s troubles have resulted in a distorted perception of New Delhi’s capacity to project power in the region.

But Pakistan is now taking a turn for the better. Deaths from terrorism are at their lowest rate since 2007 and continue to drop. The Pakistani economy has been stabilized and is primed for a take off. The civilian and military leadership are largely on the same page on major issues, resulting in political stability that shows signs of endurance. A second consecutive transition of power from one democratically elected government to another in 2018 looks reasonably likely. And while the Pakistani military remains committed to long-term counterinsurgency operations in the border regions with Afghanistan, it is now inching toward a resumption of its military modernization program.

Alongside its internal reform, Pakistan, aided by China, is engaging in a smarter, more effective approach toward the region, reflected in the aforementioned gains. But India’s evolving, more strident, strategic culture has resulted in a false sense of confidence among its strategic planners. If this does not reverse, they will be in for a big surprise. In South Asia, Islamabad and Beijing are going to give New Delhi a run for its money.
 
Awesome close relations between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, they must work together for better and bright futures.

:china::pakistan:

Yes, as US is pulling out from Afghanistan, it's time for the country to rebuild itself together with PK-CN.

On socio-political stability, experienced PK agencies like ISI will be instrumental (PA, PAF if needed), CN will backup on required assistance/resources e.g. training and equipment provisions to Afghan security forces, mine-clearing teams. I don't think PLA will be involved, but I suppose if ISI/PA feel necessary then CPAP may offer backup (they do have some limited experience in Afghanistan).

On economic development, CN will lead the efforts, PK will backup (with Tajikistan or other SCO states in say railway links). Employment opportunities for the Afghans has already received a boost with the Chinese investment projects by virtue of electricity-generation projects for mining and extractions and a freight railroad passing from western China through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan (connected with future CPEC). On mining and extraction projects:
  • Touted to be the largest undeveloped copper field in the world, the Aynak copper field situated in the Logar province in central-east Afghanistan became the largest foreign direct investment ($3.5 billion) in the history of Afghanistan.
  • The Hajigak project, a two billion-tonne deposit of high-grade iron ore in the central province of Bamiyan. Afghanistan is home to large iron ore deposits stretching across Herat and the Panjsher Valley
  • Oil basin in Mazar-e-Sharif. Unexplored Afghan oil reserves now standing at 1,596 million barrels, and natural gas reserves placed at 15,687 trillion cubic feet.
  • Gold reserves in the northern provinces of Badakshan, Takhar and Ghazni.
Look forward to a better future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan!

:pakistan::china:

P.S.: Look forward to the coming SCO meeting, I suppose CPEC, AFPAK and Iran (depends on progress of sanction, a delicate issue) will be all high priority agenda.
 
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Pakistan needs to open up Khalistan issue once again for these Indians to deal with !!! we need to completely destabilized this country so it breaks up in 12 small ones !!
 
I blame India. It had the opportunity to join IPI, Gwadar, TAPI, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey train transit, access to Afghanistan and CPEC. Instead it chose SAARC minus one. The Hindutva govt is so blinded by its hatred for Pakistan that even for a Baniya they are failing to see and seek self interest.

SAARC minus one is a failure. Indian plans to team up with Australia etc to contain China are silly. The day Chinese pulled out their investment from Australia, the Aussie mates are going to I'll afford even their beers.

India has the opportunity to make up with Pakistan and China, instead of running a useless mock like a wild Turkey, it should behave like a mature state so we can share regional interests.

If Indians take farangis for their friends, I feel sorry for them.


A statement of public consumption and no strategic consequences .
 
Very good news indeed , long live Pakistan & China friendship .
 
This is the bottom line. This "great game" that will occur, India and Pakistan will be small and irrelevant players in it. India is by no means a centerfold in that.

So be happy you'll have that role.

SAARC minus one is a failure. Indian plans to team up with Australia etc to contain China are silly. The day Chinese pulled out their investment from Australia, the Aussie mates are going to I'll afford even their beers.

.

So, so wrong. India could give two shits about SAARC. Only it's own self interest.
 
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Yes, as US is pulling out from Afghanistan, it's time for the country to rebuild itself together with PK-CN.

On socio-political stability, experienced PK agencies like ISI will be instrumental (PA, PAF if needed), CN will backup on required assistance/resources e.g. training and equipment provisions to Afghan security forces, mine-clearing teams. I don't think PLA will be involved, but I suppose if ISI/PA feel necessary then CPAP may offer backup (they do have some limited experience in Afghanistan).

On economic development, CN will lead the efforts, PK will backup (with Tajikistan or other SCO states in say railway links). Employment opportunities for the Afghans has already received a boost with the Chinese investment projects by virtue of electricity-generation projects for mining and extractions and a freight railroad passing from western China through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan (connected with future CPEC). On mining and extraction projects:
  • Touted to be the largest undeveloped copper field in the world, the Aynak copper field situated in the Logar province in central-east Afghanistan became the largest foreign direct investment ($3.5 billion) in the history of Afghanistan.
  • The Hajigak project, a two billion-tonne deposit of high-grade iron ore in the central province of Bamiyan. Afghanistan is home to large iron ore deposits stretching across Herat and the Panjsher Valley
  • Oil basin in Mazar-e-Sharif. Unexplored Afghan oil reserves now standing at 1,596 million barrels, and natural gas reserves placed at 15,687 trillion cubic feet.
  • Gold reserves in the northern provinces of Badakshan, Takhar and Ghazni.
Look forward to a better future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan!

:pakistan::china:

P.S.: Look forward to the coming SCO meeting, I suppose CPEC, AFPAK and Iran (depends on progress of sanction, a delicate issue) will be all high priority agenda.

That's amazing process, we love it. Keep our hope high daily.

:cheers:
 
Ayyoo.... Article is one sided.. Yes recently our relation with Af not good as was earlier.. the same goes for China we're gaining more influence in Sri lanka , BD, Nepal, Myanmar, and island nations.. not to mention Vietnam and Japan..

And Don't worry... oNce the Port in Iran gets completed and more trade takes back the influence aould come back... also Pakistanis should be remembered.. you've not achieved anything big in Afganistan... remember what President of Af said this week about Pakistan


The more I read about Indian members' comments on here and elsewhere, a picture comes to my mind, a big and tall guy, starts to wear a suit 4 times his current size. He's started going to gym to build muscles, he doesn't take into consideration that it takes a LOT of time to build that sized muscles to match his clothes. So he remains in denial and acts big. Well, in reality, the suits look like a tarp on a person on him. That's India. Everything is projected so colorful in terms of the culture, and "mighty" when it comes to military and "rich" when it comes to the economy. But in reality, there is a LONG way to go, India has 1.2 billion people and 50% of which, are still around or below the basic poverty level. So acting mighty or "big" like this guy's suit, won't help.

The reality is, wherever China goes, she'd take over the existing Indian relationships, outside of the US, some West, Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines (and may be a few mote country who hate the Chinese). But outside of it, the Asean countries not developed enough, can't resists the billion worth of investments that they never had. So its a money, infrastructure and labor issue that they have mastered. India needs about 10 years to get to where China is today. But China won't stop growing so the gap will always remain. Just like no matter how big China becomes, she's still about a decade or so behind the US in terms of businesses and technology.
 
The more I read about Indian members' comments on here and elsewhere, a picture comes to my mind, a big and tall guy, starts to wear a suit 4 times his current size. He's started going to gym to build muscles, he doesn't take into consideration that it takes a LOT of time to build that sized muscles to match his clothes. So he remains in denial and acts big. Well, in reality, the suits look like a tarp on a person on him. That's India. Everything is projected so colorful in terms of the culture, and "mighty" when it comes to military and "rich" when it comes to the economy. But in reality, there is a LONG way to go, India has 1.2 billion people and 50% of which, are still around or below the basic poverty level. So acting mighty or "big" like this guy's suit, won't help.

The reality is, wherever China goes, she'd take over the existing Indian relationships, outside of the US, some West, Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines (and may be a few mote country who hate the Chinese). But outside of it, the Asean countries not developed enough, can't resists the billion worth of investments that they never had. So its a money, infrastructure and labor issue that they have mastered. India needs about 10 years to get to where China is today. But China won't stop growing so the gap will always remain. Just like no matter how big China becomes, she's still about a decade or so behind the US in terms of businesses and technology.
Lol bro.
India needs atleast 3 decades to even be a serious contender for China.The focus is on 'atleast'.
That too,when everything goes super ideal for India.
Under normal circumstances,it is not possibly in less than half a century.
 
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