What's new

How a democratic govt handled the problem in swat!

dabong1

<b>PDF VETERAN</b>
Joined
Nov 28, 2006
Messages
4,417
Reaction score
1
By Rahimullah Yusufzai

Thirteen years ago in 1994, Swat was in flames as it is nowadays. The movement for enforcement of Shariah had spread like wildfire in the whole of the then Malakand division but it was strongest in the scenic Swat valley and also the most violent. Though an operation against the militants was launched with the paramilitary Frontier Corps in the lead, the conflict was eventually resolved through political means.

There are many similarities in the two violent uprisings in Swat. Both were spearheaded by the Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM), an Islamic organization that was legal in 1994 and is now banned. As was the case 13 years ago, the loosely-organized TNSM and its offshoots are still strong in the Matta tehsil of Swat and in villages on the banks of river Swat such as Kabal, Kanju, Mamdheray, Bara Banday, Kuza Banday, Sangota, Charbagh, Manglawar, Khwazakhela, etc. The TNSM founder Maulana Sufi Mohammad led the campaign for enforcement of Shariah in 1994 and now his 32-year old son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah is in command.

In a way, the armed struggle for enforcement of Shariah made more gains in a short period of time than the one now underway in Swat. The militants managed to occupy the Saidu Sharif airport and took command of the Ayub Bridge near Mingora to cut off the entire stretch of territory up to Matta. They set up roadside checkpoints and the road beyond Mingora to Khwazakhela was also in their control. Matta town fell to the militants and 33 government employees including judges and civil and police officers were made hostages. In addition, the militants had abducted 165 personnel of the security forces including three army captains.

It was a desperate situation for the government as its writ no longer ran in parts of Swat. Violence had also occurred in the adjoining Dir district, native place of Maulana Sufi Mohammad now divided into Upper Dir and Lower Dir districts. Government installations had also come under attack in Bajaur, one of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) which at that time was part of Malakand division and even now is partially under the influence of the remnants of TNSM led pro-Taliban military commander Maulana Faqir Mohammad. Acts of violence following pro-Shariah demonstrations were also reported from Buner, Shangla and Chitral in Malakand division and from the adjacent Kohistan district of Hazara. As has been their practice, the Kohistanis had blocked the Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan with China across Gilgit and Khunjerab Pass in Northern Areas at places like Bisham, Pattan, Dassu and Chilas to show solidarity with Maulana Sufi Mohammad and demand enforcement of Shariah in their area as well. In adjoining Battagram, the famed Silk Route, or the Karakoram Highway, was blocked by armed protestors at a bridge over river Indus at Thakot.

Major General Fazal Ghafoor, the Inspector General of Frontier Corps (IGFC), soon realized that military operation to dislodge the armed militants from hilltops all along the main road to the twin towns of Mingora and Saidu Sharif and beyond would be long and costly. His helicopter had been fired at and his troops were facing stiff resistance as they began action at Batkhela in Malakand Agency and moved to Odigram in Swat. He was required to reassert the government’s writ and to retake the Saidu Sharif airport and Matta from the control of the TNSM activists. Pakistan Army was willing to join the fight but it was wisely restrained to allow the two FC’s — Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary —, along with the Frontier Police to accomplish the job.

A few men holding important government positions now were also principal actors in the 1994 conflict. Interior minister Aftab Sherpao was then the chief minister of NWFP and was still part of the mainstream PPP. Senior bureaucrat Ejaz Rahim was chief secretay of the province. Mohammad Sharif Virk, presently Inspector General of Police, NWFP, was DIG Police for Malakand Range and was based in Swat. Major General (Retd) Naseerullah Babar, now estranged from the PPP over its controversial ‘deal’ with President General Pervez Musharraf, was interior minister in then prime minister Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet.

Major General Ghafoor, who became a diplomat after retirement and served as ambassador, felt the best way to defuse the situation was to get hold of Maulana Sufi Mohammad and prevail upon him to advise his followers to end occupation of government installations and release hostages. The General was lucky to find the Maulana just as he was climbing a hill somewhere near Kanju to enter a bunker built by TNSM militants. The Maulana, along with some of his lieutenants and another son-in-law named Naseeb Bacha, were taken into custody and flown in helicopter to Saidu Sharif for talks with government functionaries. Initially, the Maulana refused to eat by arguing that it was “haram” (sinful) for him to partake of anything provided by the government. Gradually, he was convinced that this wasn’t so and he began eating and drinking at government guesthouses officers’ mess. Eventually, the Maulana agreed to fly to all those places along with Major General Ghafoor where the TNSM activists had occupied hilltops, blocked roads and seized government offices. With a mike in his hand, he would urge his followers to give up the blockade and return to their homes. Initially, the “torpatki,” or black-turbaned TNSM members, would not believe their eyes that their revered leader was flying in a helicopter in the company of a General but soon they would realize that it was none other than Maulana Sufi Mohammad in his usual gear and familiar voice. Obeying the “Ameer” or leader was the basic part of the training that the disciplined TNSM cadres had received and disobeying him amounted to a sin. They obeyed the Maulana’s orders, removed the roadblocks, descended from the hills and went home.

By sunset, the Maulana flew to Khwazakhela where around 15,000 men were waiting for him. He led the Maghrib prayers in an open ground but only the seven army officers, civil servants and his close TNSM aides joined him. Climbing an armoured personnel carrier (APC), he used the hand-mike to first reprimand his followers for not offering prayers after him and then remind him that he had never ordered them to pick up the gun and fight their own troops. The simple and pious cleric with the forceful personality could afford to criticize his men because they believed in him. By night, the hostages had been freed, roads were open and fighters had demobilized. The next day, the Maulana was flown to Kohistan where he prevailed upon his supporters to end the blockade of Karakoram Highway.

The Sherpao-led PPP government in NWFP agreed to the Maulana’s demand to enforce Shariah in Malakand division by promulgating the Nizam-i-Adl ordinance and setting up Qazi courts. However, the Maulana wasn’t satisfied as the package of Shariah reforms didn’t come up to his expectations. But he couldn’t organize another uprising after having convinced his TNSM followers that peaceful means rather than the military option would help them reach their goal of complete Shariah in Malakand. Events overtook him and TNSM subsequently and he landed in prison in Dera Ismail Khan in late 2001 after leading up to 10,000 of his poorly armed followers on a disastrous campaign to fight on the side of the Taliban against US-led forces in Afghanistan. He has refused to apply for bail and seek release, although all others in jail with him including son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah won their freedom long ago.

The government should consider releasing the Maulana and using his influence as it did in 1994 to defuse the volatile situation in Swat. He may be useful in neutralizing son-in-law Fazlullah. Though he has expelled Fazlullah from TNSM after objecting to his violent ways, it is possible that the elderly Sufi Mohammad would still have enough influence on the TNSM cadres to convince them to disarm. It is true that Swat of 2007 is different than the one in 1994 with all those suicide bombings and beheadings carried out by the militants and the use of gunship helicopters and artillery guns by the paramilitary forces, one should have faith in the good-natured Swatis who overwhelmingly seek peace in their heavenly valley. Besides, the government should agree to the demand of people of Swat and other districts of the erstwhile Malakand division for enforcement of Shariah. In 1994, the government accepted this demand and half-heartedly enforced a diluted form of Shariah. It could bring improvements in that ordinance keeping in view the aspirations of majority of Swatis because dissatisfied people would continue to challenge the writ of the state every few years if their demands are not met.

The writer is an executive editor of The News International based in Peshawar. Email: [email protected]ats. net.pk

http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_news.asp?id=9
 
By Rahimullah Yusufzai

Besides, the government should agree to the demand of people of Swat and other districts of the erstwhile Malakand division for enforcement of Shariah. In 1994, the government accepted this demand and half-heartedly enforced a diluted form of Shariah. It could bring improvements in that ordinance keeping in view the aspirations of majority of Swatis because dissatisfied people would continue to challenge the writ of the state every few years if their demands are not met.

The writer is an executive editor of The News International based in Peshawar. Email: [email protected]ats. net.pk

http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_news.asp?id=9

Dear dabong

Good to see all is well with you. I am confused now. If you say that Shariah is the best way for SWAT (thru a negotiated settlement without bloodshed) the what about the rest of Pakistan which is secular in nature. Can two systems co-exist in the same country ? Secondly what about the US factor across the border ?

Regards
 
i am not a religious expert but certain conditions need to be fulfilled before shariah can be imposed.
 
Thanks for the article. I wasn't aware that there was an uprising in 1994 in Swat as well.


Thunder you have any connection with Dawn News channel ????? :)
Your sig shows so i wana know


i am not a religious expert but certain conditions need to be fulfilled before shariah can be imposed.

Yes fatman i agree with you but i wont eleborate as my article is in the process on the same issue will be submitting in two days so i dont wana comment more on this point.

May be some of you if do so will also resmebles my points in the article
 
Dear dabong

Good to see all is well with you. I am confused now. If you say that Shariah is the best way for SWAT (thru a negotiated settlement without bloodshed) the what about the rest of Pakistan which is secular in nature. Can two systems co-exist in the same country ? Secondly what about the US factor across the border ?

Regards


Dear Always Neutral,
The tribal areas have been living under seperate laws to the rest of pakistan for decades,it was never a problem.
The radio FM mullah is the same person who would not allow polio vaccination and girls school.
After negoations the govt allowed him to carry using the radio station and he allowed the girls schools and the polio vaccination to take place.
My point being that the govt has always negioated there way in the NWFP and got a peaceful solution.
The neo con pakistanis who have the same mindset as that of the american/israelis neocons are leading us to disaster.
We all all know about the corruption of the civilian govt,but what about military corruption,something that has never been investigated.

We have lost more soldiers in this "war on terror" then NATO has in afghanistan.
 
Isn't the fact that we have to keep going back to negotiate with more Mullah's over more issues an indicator that talks have failed? Shariah in 1994, no Polio shots today, armed vigilantes on the streets becasue some Mullah or Mullah's organization wants things to change. How many times will we have to keep returning to "negotiate"? The demands will keep growing and growing, and it keeps encouraging the next generation of extremists, that if they pick up guns, blow up a few shops and chase away NGO's the Government will listen to them and implement whatever ridiculous demands they have.
 
Isn't the fact that we have to keep going back to negotiate with more Mullah's over more issues an indicator that talks have failed? Shariah in 1994, no Polio shots today, armed vigilantes on the streets becasue some Mullah or Mullah's organization wants things to change. How many times will we have to keep returning to "negotiate"? The demands will keep growing and growing, and it keeps encouraging the next generation of extremists, that if they pick up guns, blow up a few shops and chase away NGO's the Government will listen to them and implement whatever ridiculous demands they have.

While the world's attention focused on the troubles of President General Pervez Musharraf following his declaration of a state of emergency in Pakistan at the weekend, the Taliban have launched a coup of their own in Afghanistan and the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.

Pakistani troops had prevented the Taliban from launching their planned post-Ramadan (Muslim holy month) offensive into Afghanistan by invading the Pakistani North Waziristan and South Waziristan tribal areas on October 7.

The Taliban managed to set up a counter engagement by stirring their network in the Swat Valley in North-West Frontier Province, which took the pressure off the Waziristans. The November 4 declaration of an emergency and the preparations before it was enforced distracted the military. As a result, several villages and towns in the Swat Valley, only a drive of four hours from Islamabad, have fallen to the Taliban without a single bullet being fired - Pakistani security forces simply surrendered their weapons.

The Taliban have secured similar successes in the northwestern Afghan province of Farah and the southwestern provinces of Uruzgan and Kandahar, where districts have fallen without much resistance.
 
Back
Top Bottom