For those indicating that India did not have a cold start doctrine, the following article is of interest - hence Pakistan's NASR Missile has provided a further blow to this wrong cold start doctrine. Please note, DETTERRENCE IS THE KEY in a nuclear region. Lack of communication, misunderstanding and 'crazy' elements in both governments could escalate and result in an inadvertant risk of a nuclear exchange - note there are no winners in a real nuclear conflict:
ref:
INDIAN ARMY VALIDATES ITS COLD START WAR DOCTRINE
INDIAN ARMY VALIDATES ITS COLD START WAR DOCTRINE
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Background:
The Indian Army unveiled its new war doctrine, a year ago, on 28 April 2004, and naming it as the “Cold Start War Doctrine”. Thereafter, in ensuing twelve months, the new war doctrine was circulated to all the Army Commands for discussion and comments at formation levels. In tandem, the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) and the Army War College were tasked to fine-tune the operational concepts of the doctrine.
Before moving further, it needs to be stressed that neither the Congress Government of the day nor the Indian Army should get lulled into complacency by the so called “peace-process” offensive launched by General Musharraf. While the politicians and the media may term this “peace-process” as “irreversible”, India ’s military history and military logic does not suggest so. Hence the Indian Army’s formulation of new war doctrines and validating the operational concepts through exercises is a timely step.
While the Indian Army understandably, did not release the finer text of this new war doctrine, except for some salient characteristics, this author with his exposures at the Royal British Army Staff College Camberly, NATO Armies and US Army in Germany, Japan and South Korea could analyse in great detail the Cold Start War Doctrine with special reference to Indian conditions. Readers may refer to the following SAAG Papers of this author:
“India's New “Cold Start” War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed.” (SAAG Paper No. 991 dated 04.05.2004)
“Indian Army’s New “Cold Start” War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed-Part II: Additional Imperatives (SAAG Paper No.1013 dated 01.06.2004).
Following the publication of the above two papers of this author, other websites in India and Pakistan reproduced these papers and generated an exciting debate on the pros and cons. In fact on one website, the debate still continues, even after a year.
“Cold Start War Doctrine”- The Military Significance in the South Asian Context:
The military significance of the “Cold Start War Doctrine” in the South Asian contest is being highlighted for the benefit of new readers, who may not have gone through the earlier papers referred above.
The major points of military significance in the South Asian context can be analysed as under:
The Indian Army after 50 years or so of defensive mindsets has finally put itself in an offensive operations mode. The defensive mind-set was imposed on the Indian Army by the political leadership of India who shied away and did not have the political will to use military power to secure the country’s national security interests.
Indian Army has indicated that it now has plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan , or any other South Asian actor indulging in proxy war and terrorism against India .
Indian Army will now be prepared to undertake offensive military operations at the very outset of hostilities breaking out. This is to deny Pakistan , or any other hostile South Asian state from counting on external intervention by their external patrons.
India has in declaratory terms enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of nuclear war
Though not in declaratory terms, but implicit in its intentions to bring the switch to offensive operations mode as a key element of strategy, India may also be conveying that military intervention or pre-emptive military strikes could be also a military option in South Asia .
Extending this analysis into the nuclear warfare domain, one could say that the addition to India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine that India would retaliate with nuclear weapons if Indian Armed Forces are subjected to nuclear, biological or chemical strikes, would provide a nuclear umbrella to Cold Start War Doctrine offensive strikes into Pakistan.
The Indian Army and the Indian Air Force has commenced the process of validation of the operational concepts of the new war doctrine. The first major exercise in this process, Exercise VAJRA SHAKTI took place in early May 2005 in the Punjab sector.
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI would be followed by a series of other exercises in the Rajasthan Sector in winter.
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI- The Salient Features:
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI was a 10 day exercise which took place in early May 2005. Ex VAJRA SHAKTI involved exercising an infantry division and an independent mechanized brigade of 11 Corps. along with associated armoured elements, integral to the Corps, to carry put offensive strikes at the outbreak of hostilities.
The significance of Ex. VAJRA SHAKTI lies in the fact that for the first time the Indian Army exercised an erstwhile defensive operations holding Corps in the Western Sector in offensive operations. Such defensive Corps would now be termed as “Pivot Corps”. These Pivot Corps while defensively preventing any Pakistani military adventurism into Indian territory , will concurrently launch offensive operations into enemy territory which could then be exploited by other strike formations.
The salient features of Ex. VAJRA SHAKTI, as collated from open sources, were as under:
Offensive strike operations were carried out by a Pivot Corps employing from its own resources an infantry division, armoured regiments and an independent mechanized brigade.
The above offensive operations were exercised against the backdrop of a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare threat from the enemy.
Special Forces were employed in pre-emptive strikes for furtherance of the offensive operations.
Since Cold Start War Doctrine envisages swift, day and night operations, the offensive strikes were supported by advanced C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) network and systems.
The above included the establishment of a Force Multiplication Command Post for integration and flow of real-time information of the enemy to combat units, collected by satellites, UAVs, aerial reconnaissance, radar networks, communication intercepts etc. Digital photographs of the enemy areas were transmitted real time to forward combat units, facilitating speedy decision-making by Commanders.
Exercising of all of the above could be termed as the commencement of network-centric warfare in the Indian Army.
Information-dominance of the battlefield was practiced by use of electronic warfare systems.
The Indian Air Force provided 130 sorties for this exercise in a variety of roles from reconnaissance, fighter aircraft strikes, attack helicopter operations and Special Forces operations.
It can be assumed that based on the lessons learnt in Ex VAJRA SHAKTI and their review, the other PIVOT CORPS of the Indian Army would similarly be exercised.
Some Points for Consideration by Indian Army Commanders:
The Indian Army has never lacked in military competence, drive and determination in the conduct of military operations with the exception of the 1962 debacle, which squarely in terms of responsibility lay on Prime Minister Nehru, India’s diplomats in China, Nehru’s close advisors and the Intelligence Bureau chief. Taking-off from this, Indian Army Commanders in relation to Cold Start War Doctrine need to ponder on the following points.
Political decision-making and directions by the Government of the day; what systems need to be put into place for speedy political decision-making and the ensuing crisis management, so that military operations are not ham-strung and surprise, the most essential ingredient of this doctrine, is not lost.
Offensive operations of this doctrine would necessarily rest on effective collection, collation and assessment of enemy information, in the pre-ceding peace-time period. Intelligence has been India ’s bane, and the Indian Army needs to be persistent on this score with the Government.
Offensive operations require an “offensive mind-set” in both officers and men. In the last 50 years or so, the Indian Army stood be-numbed with defensive mind-sets imposed by the political leadership. Indian Army Commanders need to set a peronal example in terms of boldness and professional audacity themselves and further motivate and imbue their commands by sustained motivation drives. Military audacity should be the hall-mark of Indian Army professionalism at all levels.
War preparedness of a high-order at all times in terms of strategic reserves of weapons, equipment, ammunition, accessories and petroleum, diesel and aviation funl is required. Cold Start War Doctrine offensive operations cannot be launched on incomplete inventories.
Similarly, strategic assets should not be worn out in peacetime disaster management. It was shocking to read in the media that the Indian Air Force aircraft meant for air-refueling in long range strikes, being used for carrying fuel to Kashmir Valley in the last winter; similar use of transport aircraft and helicopters is inexcusable. The Government should create separate assets for disaster management and not use Armed Forces assets earmarked for military operations, which as it is are difficult to replace due to inordinate delays generated by politicizing defence acquisitions, with change of governments.
Concluding Observations:
Military exercises are an invaluable component of a nation’s war-preparedness. War preparedness has to be an ongoing, vigilant and persistent effort. It cannot be based on the reading of intentions of nation’s adversary by the political leadership of the day. We went wrong in 1962 because of this fatal flaw. While peace proces can be perused, so also war preparedness with greater intensity and vigour.
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI has therefore been a welcome development. It needs to be followed up by similar exercises by the PIVOT CORPS and more importantly by the combat commands which will provide the cutting edge of Cold Start War Doctrine offensive strikes. The operational concepts need to be validated and fine-tuned by repeated exercises of this type. Then only victory will be ensured in war.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email drsubhashkapila )
