What's new

Hatf-IX - Tactical Multi-Tube Ballistic Missile

Sending shivers down somebody's spine???? ...... well not the case at all..... but definitely an aggressive design.... which should be watched out for.... those who think otherwise..... must be living in fools paradise... and we don't want being there.... we as usual would take the safe side.... prepare ourselves for the eventualities..... Thats what the logic says too..... you don't wanna get caught sleeping.....

Doesn't matter if it exists or not... or some one excepts it or not..... but what is important to us ....that now a definite counter exists..... Precaution is better then cure!!


Adios!

I still dont agree with you.

You have made this system alright.

But usage of a nucleared Nasr on Indian troops even on ur soil will require lot of guts.

You have to keep in mind of the response that may come if u guys ever plan to go through "that" road.
 
lolzz.......the very mention of cold start sends down the shivers in somebody's spine.

Nobody wants to consider the fact that Indian govt has itself stated that no such thing as cold start exists with the Indian miliatry.

Why keep harping abt something when it does not exist at all?

I think the Indian government will try to distance it self from the cold start doctrine as it becomes more and more aware of its futility.
extract from http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1769/Ladwig, Cold Start NPS Paper.pdf

In April 2004, the Indian Army announced a new limited war doctrine that would allow it
to mobilize quickly and undertake retaliatory attacks in response to specific challenges
posed by Pakistan’s “proxy war” in Kashmir. This Cold Start doctrine marked a break
from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military has employed since
independence. Cold Start represents a significant undertaking for the Indian military as it
requires combined arms to operate jointly with airpower from the Indian Air Force.


Cold Start and India’s Grand StrategyIndia’s national security establishment faces significant difficulty in linking its grand
strategy to the development of its military doctrines and plans. As a result of the grand
bargain struck at independence, Indian civil-military relations appear to conform to the
Huntingtonian model of separate political and military spheres: Indian service chiefs
have been granted operational autonomy in return for extremely limited input into
national security policy-making at the highest levels.63 Barry Posen has argued that the
intervention of civilian leadership is necessary to ensure that a state’s military doctrine is
well integrated with its grand strategy, a situation that does not appear to be the case with
Cold Start.64
Within India, few politicians are well versed in military affairs, and the actual
expertise in defense matters possessed by civil servants in the Ministry of Defense is
“patchy” at best.65 Moreover, following Nehru’s blundering political interference in the
1962 war, Indian politicians have been wary of intervening in the details of military
matters.66 As a result, the armed services are often left to develop their strategies and
plans without significant civilian direction, a practice that is unlikely to result in the
fusion of strategic and military goals.
While this structural-bureaucratic problem is unlikely to be resolved in the near term,
the Indian Army can take steps to address many of the issues raised in this paper by
adopting a more transparent stance on Cold Start. The available evidence indicates that
the Indian army developed Cold Start with minimal guidance from the country’s political
leadership. Refusal to engage in broader-based discussions of the Cold Start concept on
the grounds that it is a warfighting strategy is myopic. If Cold Start is indeed a real
concept for limited war rather than just a bureaucratic justification for army
modernization programs, its strategic and policy implications deserve to be assessed by
both India’s political establishment and its strategic community. In particular, there
needs to be a rigorous examination of the impact the development of an organizational
Cold Start capability would have on India’s strategic goals vis-à-vis Pakistan. Active
pursuit of a limited war strategy runs the risk of upsetting favorable trends within
Pakistan, most notably improved bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and the
Pakistan Army’s fight against domestic militancy.


concluding...

It is a well-worn military axiom that no plan survives contact with the enemy. Cold
Start is an example of creative military problem-solving in response to Pakistan’s support
for terrorism and stated rejection of a no-first-use nuclear doctrine. By moving away
from the Sundarji doctrine, the Indian Army believes that it is developing the ability to
respond to a Pakistani proxy war with conventional force, while remaining below the
nuclear threshold. While Cold Start represents a significant advance in India’s
conventional capabilities, it is a concept that is poorly aligned with India’s broader
strategic goals. In the near term, active pursuit of Cold Start could have a pernicious
impact on India’s burgeoning relations with Pakistan. In the longer-term, if Cold Start
were operationalized, it could risk provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent
that could breach the nuclear threshold.
 
I suggest Pakistan use all its nuclear arsenals while going along with the strike this Tactical nuclear weapon carrying missile as there'll be full fledge indian nuclear response for Half-9,leaving no chance for Pakistan to strike back.
 
I think the Indian government will try to distance it self from the cold start doctrine as it becomes more and more aware of its futility.
extract from http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1769/Ladwig, Cold Start NPS Paper.pdf

In April 2004, the Indian Army announced a new limited war doctrine that would allow it
to mobilize quickly and undertake retaliatory attacks in response to specific challenges
posed by Pakistan’s “proxy war” in Kashmir. This Cold Start doctrine marked a break
from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military has employed since
independence. Cold Start represents a significant undertaking for the Indian military as it
requires combined arms to operate jointly with airpower from the Indian Air Force.


Cold Start and India’s Grand StrategyIndia’s national security establishment faces significant difficulty in linking its grand
strategy to the development of its military doctrines and plans. As a result of the grand
bargain struck at independence, Indian civil-military relations appear to conform to the
Huntingtonian model of separate political and military spheres: Indian service chiefs
have been granted operational autonomy in return for extremely limited input into
national security policy-making at the highest levels.63 Barry Posen has argued that the
intervention of civilian leadership is necessary to ensure that a state’s military doctrine is
well integrated with its grand strategy, a situation that does not appear to be the case with
Cold Start.64
Within India, few politicians are well versed in military affairs, and the actual
expertise in defense matters possessed by civil servants in the Ministry of Defense is
“patchy” at best.65 Moreover, following Nehru’s blundering political interference in the
1962 war, Indian politicians have been wary of intervening in the details of military
matters.66 As a result, the armed services are often left to develop their strategies and
plans without significant civilian direction, a practice that is unlikely to result in the
fusion of strategic and military goals.
While this structural-bureaucratic problem is unlikely to be resolved in the near term,
the Indian Army can take steps to address many of the issues raised in this paper by
adopting a more transparent stance on Cold Start. The available evidence indicates that
the Indian army developed Cold Start with minimal guidance from the country’s political
leadership. Refusal to engage in broader-based discussions of the Cold Start concept on
the grounds that it is a warfighting strategy is myopic. If Cold Start is indeed a real
concept for limited war rather than just a bureaucratic justification for army
modernization programs, its strategic and policy implications deserve to be assessed by
both India’s political establishment and its strategic community. In particular, there
needs to be a rigorous examination of the impact the development of an organizational
Cold Start capability would have on India’s strategic goals vis-à-vis Pakistan. Active
pursuit of a limited war strategy runs the risk of upsetting favorable trends within
Pakistan, most notably improved bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and the
Pakistan Army’s fight against domestic militancy.


concluding...

It is a well-worn military axiom that no plan survives contact with the enemy. Cold
Start is an example of creative military problem-solving in response to Pakistan’s support
for terrorism and stated rejection of a no-first-use nuclear doctrine. By moving away
from the Sundarji doctrine, the Indian Army believes that it is developing the ability to
respond to a Pakistani proxy war with conventional force, while remaining below the
nuclear threshold. While Cold Start represents a significant advance in India’s
conventional capabilities, it is a concept that is poorly aligned with India’s broader
strategic goals. In the near term, active pursuit of Cold Start could have a pernicious
impact on India’s burgeoning relations with Pakistan. In the longer-term, if Cold Start
were operationalized, it could risk provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent
that could breach the nuclear threshold.

Thats a 2004 link.

There were plans of something like this but it was disbanded soon after as the Indian military did not have the resources to implement such a thing.

With Indian military modernizing itself, maybe in the future we can think of something like that.

And no, Nasr will not deter cold start if we plan to do it.
 
I still dont agree with you.

You have made this system alright.

But usage of a nucleared Nasr on Indian troops even on ur soil will require lot of guts.
You have to keep in mind of the response that may come if u guys ever plan to go through "that" road.

I believe that the Kargil war indicated a lot of 'guts' and indicated to the Indians that Pakistan would be willing/taking a risk which any nuclear state would never consider (unthinkable). No nuclear states have ever gone into armed conflicts (the US/Soviet Union did go through proxies but no direct exchange - though there was a border skirmish with the then Soviet union and China somwhere in the 80s i think). Hence 'guts' have been indicated (irrespective of whether it was wise or not).
 
I still dont agree with you.

You have made this system alright.

But usage of a nucleared Nasr on Indian troops even on ur soil will require lot of guts.

You have to keep in mind of the response that may come if u guys ever plan to go through "that" road.

I never expect you to agree with me.....

But you know what ..... I still don't believe that.... Indian forces will be able to gather up their guts....and cross the border.... I don't see that in the foreseeable future.... and that stood correct even without Nasr.....

And as far the response.... we are very clear about it..... but you guys aren't ready to embrace the response your gonna get... the day you think of crossing the border..... (I am specifically talking about the net zens like your good self.... plus your cry cry again media..... as far as your armed forces are concerned.... they are pretty much clear about it.....so take a leaf from the history book....and derive a conclusion yourself.....whats gonna happen in future)
 
I believe that the Kargil war indicated a lot of 'guts' and indicated to the Indians that Pakistan would be willing/taking a risk which any nuclear state would never consider (unthinkable). No nuclear states have ever gone into armed conflicts (the US/Soviet Union did go through proxies but no direct exchange - though there was a border skirmish with the then Soviet union and China somwhere in the 80s i think). Hence 'guts' have been indicated (irrespective of whether it was wise or not).

Kargil was conventional, I am referring to using nucleared Nasr
 
I suggest Pakistan use all its nuclear arsenals while going along with the strike this Tactical nuclear weapon carrying missile as there'll be full fledge indian nuclear response for Half-9,leaving no chance for Pakistan to strike back.

lolz

i suggest you first check when will Pakistan use this missile??? (when some one will attack)

so what you say??? we should not reply???
 
So surprised to see indian members (some of them not all) think Pakistan will get one hell of a response if NASR is used, then they also believe cold war doctrine (if used by india) will not get the same response. Why???
 
Thats the imbalance in your mind which is giving India a "kick to do something". Until there is a feeling on Indian side that India would come out victorious out of a Nuclear War.. the wishes like "Surgical Strike" and "Cold Start" will keep appearing and this is where such tactile armaments come handy.

I am happy that after the development of Nasr, war with India is less of a possibility than it was the day before it got tested. So I would congratulate Pakistanis as well as Indians that they are at more distance from a Nuclear War than you were before.
 
Ya sure... the article is funny enough..... But less then the idea of attacking(cold start) a nuclear armed nation... did the military strategist ever realized the fact... that such a misadventure... could turn into a full scale nuclear war... and the limited advantage that your country believes to enjoy... might not be actually there...

So stop this nonsense right now... wake up...smell some coffee...... you guys are grossly mistaken.... attacking Pakistan... and expecting it to play by your rules.....purely a sign of delusion......

And as far the dis-proportionate use of nuclear arsenal.... time will tell ... who holds the horses....and for how long..... My take... dust to dust...ashes to ashes.

You guys playing with far and expecting not get burnt....

Moral of the story..... gone are the days ..... when India thought it can attack Pakistan.... at its will...... in fact there wasn't any such times in our brief history..... we never provided you this luxury.... specially post 1998.... it has been proved several times.... and i need not to re-open this debate.... You guys are well aware of it...... So stop justifying your dreams to attack and paralyze us...... without getting a noticeable response..... we are very clear about over sovereignty visa-vis India...... You need to get clear as well.



Adios!

Hi, I very much agree with what you have written. Just to clear some doubts, even the slightest if there are any, I would like to say that my country doesn't want to invade Pakistan just for the sake of it. It's neither feasible economically...and nor militarily to some extent, as you have mentioned. Now what happens, if the another 9/11 happens in India? What if the act is traced back to Pakistan? Will India restrain itself once again?

The answer I'm not very sure but I can tell you once thing, if India decides to launch an attack then our very existence will come under danger. The irreparable loss that both countries will have to suffer will be unmatched. I hope sanity prevails.
 
Thats the imbalance in your mind which is giving India a "kick to do something". Until there is a feeling on Indian side that India would come out victorious out of a Nuclear War.. the wishes like "Surgical Strike" and "Cold Start" will keep appearing and this is where such tactile armaments come handy.

I am happy that after the development of Nasr, war with India is less of a possibility than it was the day before it got tested. So I would congratulate Pakistanis as well as Indians that they are at more distance from a Nuclear War than you were before.

Bold part is classic. Great post Graphican.:tup:
 
Now what happens, if the another 9/11 happens in India? What if the act is traced back to Pakistan? Will India restrain itself once again?

I ask you the same.. what if we find a similar attack on Pakistani Soil coming from India? Will the war be the answer for that or probing in collaboration with India and punishing the individuals who did that would be solution. Don't forget Samjhota Express was an Indian act of terrorism done by Indians against Pakistan. So what you expect that Pakistanis would get out of mind and run towards borders yelling against India?

Common guys start thinking at-least.. I know not every body in India has rational thinking but let there be few at-least.. for the sake of survival of this region at-least! Punish the ones who are terrorists.. not whole Country is terrorists neither whole Pakistan wants what those 10-20 people may want.

And the way you guys react shows India is sooooo manipulatable.. even 10 men can bring a nuclear war to your country.
 
It's sad how we keep talking about nuking each other. It's very easy to speak our guts out. The other day, I read biographies of people who survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the end, I had tears in my eyes. Such was the destruction. Folks, nukes are not child's play. Nukes are meant to be a deterrent. I hope they are never used, be it in a battlefield or for mass destruction.
 
Hi, I very much agree with what you have written. Just to clear some doubts, even the slightest if there are any, I would like to say that my country doesn't want to invade Pakistan just for the sake of it. It's neither feasible economically...and nor militarily to some extent, as you have mentioned. Now what happens, if the another 9/11 happens in India? What if the act is traced back to Pakistan? Will India restrain itself once again?

The answer I'm not very sure but I can tell you once thing, if India decides to launch an attack then our very existence will come under danger. The irreparable loss that both countries will have to suffer will be unmatched. I hope sanity prevails.

This proves..... War is not a solution to the problems.... but a problem in itself....

What needs to be done..... is to built a Mechanism..... to stop any such mishaps..... And if happens what mode of tackling it should be perused by both the countries.... This would require an agreement.... and for agreement..... you got to come to the dialogue table.... and discuss and reach solutions to all the disputed issues..... only then a long lasting peace can prevail in South Asia!
 
Back
Top Bottom