It could do point interception, combat air patrol covering army units during operations, close air support, and a limited amount of interdiction. It is a very stable, easy-to-fly plane and ideal of inducting in large numbers in this kind of support role. Its major weaknesses, the radar and the engine, have to be addressed urgently: without the radar, but with a hugely better engine, better than the 414 even, it can do very well in this kind of tactical role.
If we had had an Army Aviation Corps tasked to fly fixed-wing aircraft in close coordination with brigades and upwards, this would be the key to it, the centre piece.
On the other hand, for an Air Force obsessed, as it should be, with air superiority against very advanced technology to the north, deep strike needs in the west and the north, interdiction in the west and the north, and combat air patrol over air force and big cities and industrial centres, a type of area interception, then this aircraft is frankly a pain in the elbow. That is even after discarding totally any close air support and short-range interdiction tasks. And I forgot to mention maritime roles, which our neighbours to the west harshly criticise their air force for not doing well and which we need to do with a land-based air force, whoever owns it, Air Force, Navy or Army.
A very useful aircraft being shoved into the reluctant hands of a service that is focussed elsewhere, and kept away from two services which desperately need it.
One positive in the picture is that the Air Force is keeping the initial run of 120 Tejas aircraft entirely in the Deccan Peninsula, starting with Sulur. That means their role will be primarily naval and maritime to begin with, a welcome step forward if it is a good guess.
