BANGLADESH - ARTICLES
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#293, 30 November 1999
Shanti Bahini
Zarein Ahmed
Research Scholar, JNU
The people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in South East Bangladesh have been demanding the revival of the former autonomous status of the region. The movement took a militant colour in the 1970s under the leadership of Manobendra Narayan Larma of the Parbatya Chhatagram Jana Sanhati Samiti (PCJSS) (CHT Hill Tracts United People's Forces) and its military wing, Shanti Bahini.
HISTORY
Historically, the CHT covering the three districts of Rangamati, Khagracherri and Bandarban consisted of independent or semi-independent tribes. The area was annexed by the British East Indian Company in 1785, after 25 years of guerilla war of resistance by the Chakmas. Since the 1950s the tribal people were affected by the nation building strategies and inappropriate development projects initiated by the government and the special status of the CHT got eroded. In February, 1972, the Larma brothers, Jyotindra Bodhi Priya and Manobendra Narayan, established. the PCJS and the Shanti Bahini.
IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
The PCJSS is a broad based mass organization which identifies feudalism as the main enemy. The organization advocates Marxist guerilla war tactics as the strategy to counter feudalism. The Shanti Bahini consisting of combatant and non-combatant forces is divided into five categories, namely, (1) fighters (2) medical units (3) production teams (4) communication teams (5) technological teams.
For organizational purposes the Shanti Bahini (SB) had divided the hill tracts into six sectors and appointed J.B. Larma its supreme commander. Later, he also set up smaller well-knit command posts to liaise between two sector commands. The smallest unit in the SB is a section, with only eight guerrillas. Four sections make a platoon, the maximum strength of which is supposed to be thirty-five. Four platoons form a company, with a total strength of 150 guerrillas. Four companies comprise a battalion which has 630 guerrillas. Four battalions make a brigade of 2,600 guerrillas. In August 1975, J.B. Larma was arrested by the Bangladeshauthorities and Priti Kumar Chakma assumed command of the SB after this.
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
The SB followed the essential principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare, which had been explained in terms of local peculiarities by J.B. Larma in his Amader Samar Sanghita (Our Military Manual). He called for a three-stage approach. 1) build up guerrilla units and local militias, then start hit-and-run raids against the enemy, always choosing the ground of battle and avoiding confrontation if the time and terrain of the battle are unfavourable; 2) develop liberated areas and enforce party administration and 3) drive the enemy out of as many areas as possible and declare the existence of a parallel authority.
Initially, it was fairly successful in context of the first two approaches. The hills, valleys and dense vegetation of the tropical rainforests offer ideal terrain for low-to-medium intensity guerrilla warfare. The ability of the guerrillas to fight in the hilly, jungle terrain was much higher than the security forces.
Its main tactic was to attack and collect taxes and extort money from businessmen and transport owners. It targeted developmental activity, members of foreign oil companies or other developmental agencies working in the area. This was primarily intended to discourage all kinds of developmental works in the region from which the government could reap benefits. It also attacked government-sponsored settlements in the CHT. Tactically, the SB takes full advantage of ceasefires to reorganise themselves.
EXTERNAL LINKAGES
The Bahini had linkages across the borders in India and Burma . Initially, it could fall back on the weapons that collaborators had received from the Pakistan army which were mostly of Chinese origin. But, soon it was able to establish contacts and procured arms from Indian Mizo and Naga rebels and from Burmese communist groups. It is believed that training camps for Chakma rebels still exist in Burma . There have also been reports that the SB and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have been operating jointly in the jungles along the Indo-Bangladesh border.
The Chakmas established their first contact with Indian intelligence in 1974 in Dhaka but the appeal for help went unheeded. Sheikh Mujib's assassination in August 1975 changed the attitude of the Indian government towards the Chakmas and they were able to obtain some assistance. Since 1975, it is believed that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) also started assisting the SB with arms supplies, bases and training.
Since 1975, it is believed that the Reaearch and Analysis Wing(RAW) also started assisting the SB with arms supplies, bases and training. Specialised training in the use of explosives and ambushes was allegedly given at the centre at Chakrata near Dehrahun. The insurgents were allowed to operate from bases set up in Tripura in India . The actual deployment of SB units took place after 1975 when hundreds of Indian trained guerrillas equipped with weapons supplied by RAW took their place alongside those who had joined up earlier with captured and collected weapons.
CONCLUSION
By
1978 the Chakma insurgency had become a major problem for Bangladesh and allegations were being made that the SB had the support of India as well as the Soviet Union . Even the Bangladesh security forces were often ambushed by them. On August 4, 1988 SB guerrillas burnt down the 31st Bengal Regiment office in Khagracherri town.
The Chittagong area GOC Major General, Abdus Salam, has gone on record saying that, “We are not fighting just a bandit group. The insurgents are really quite deep into their mission and they are organised and motivated." It is also believed that the SB has sophisticated remote control devices in its arsenal. The 1997 Accord signed between the Government of Bangladesh and J.B. Larma of the PCJSS, seeks to bring an end to violent conflict in the area. One of the key features of the Accord is the decommissioning and deposit of arms by the CHT fighters. Though the process of decommissioning had already begun a few years before the Accord, when the PCJSS had declared a unilateral ceasefire, only time will tell if the Accord will be successful.