Gulf Military Balance in 2010

[Lankan Ranger]

Gulf Military Balance in 2010

Much of the current focus on the Gulf concentrates largely on Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. This, however, is only part of the regional military balance.

Changes are also taking place in the conventional military balance and in the balance of capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

These changes generally favor the other Gulf states, although Iraq has yet to recover anything like the conventional military capabilities it had in 2003.

The Southern Gulf states have far more modern weaponry and military technology than Iran, and far larger numbers of modern weapons.

They are spending far more than Iran, and importing far more – with far better access to the most modern weapons.

Iran so far has not made good on its claims of creating a significant domestic industrial capability to provide its own modern weapons, and much of its inventory is either the worn product of the Iran-Iraq War, or an even older inventory of weapons it obtained from the US and Europe during the time of the Shah.

Iran is, however, building up a major capability for asymmetric or irregular warfare, and the Southern Gulf states still cooperate largely in terms of the hollow rhetoric emerging out of the ministerial meetings of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Their lack of cooperation, interoperability, and serious exercise activity cripples their ability to act with any unity and makes them more of a facade than a force.

It also makes them far more dependent on the US, while limiting their collective ability to fight along side the US in a major crisis.

These issues are address in a new study by the Burke Chair at CSIS entitled The Gulf Military Balance in 2010.

This report is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/100422_GulfMilBal.pdf, and provides a detailed quantitative and graphic analysis of the major trends in the balance as of 2010.

It makes it clear that Iran is anything but a meaningful military hegemon, and is – in fact – a third rate military power in every aspect of warfighting other than irregular warfare.

At the same time, it is all too clear that the Southern Gulf states will remain their own worst enemy until they can translate decades of hollow rhetoric from the Gulf Cooperation Council into a far more cohesive and effective military reality.

The Gulf Military Balance in 2010: An Overview | Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

[Al Bhatti]

Obstacles to Arab Gulf states uniting

Questions remain over Saudi Arabia's suitability as a regional leader and existing security relationships

By Joseph A. Kechichian, Special to Gulf News

May 20, 2010


The Gulf countries should put an end to their sterile debate over local and regional issues based on trivial matters.


Two members of the Kuwaiti intelligentsia delivered critical presentations this past week that raised important questions to ponder. Abdullah Al Nafisi, a former member of the Kuwaiti parliament, posited that the very survival of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states could only be assured if the six independent countries integrated into a single political entity with Madinah, Saudi Arabia, as its capital. Shaikh Mohammad Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, saw "clear and present dangers to GCC security", especially in terms of existing economic distortions and demographic dislocations that, apparently, required immediate deliberations.


Are GCC members capable of meeting current challenges as nation-states or should they take Al Nafisi's pleas to heart?


From Shaikh Mohammad's perspective, who delivered his remarks in late April at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., GCC states managed to remain united after 1981 and, with a little outside help, preserved their security despite significant wars that involved their Iraqi and Iranian neighbours. Although set up as an alliance, the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait forced Arab Gulf states to adopt collective security measures, he stressed, which necessitated the implementation of unpopular safety measures.


Needless to say that the spillover effects of any number of regional conflicts, including the perennial Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, Yemeni conflagrations and their corollaries throughout the Horn of Africa, even the repercussions of the wars in Afghanistan and associated challenges emanating from Pakistan, meant that all of these contests were routinely added to serious internal developments that required utmost stewardship.


Of course, and as Shaikh Mohammad emphasised, "the GCC's ultimate security goal [was] to protect its members from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation and external aggression", which added yet other layers of concern on decision-makers' overflowing plates.


To respond to many of these perceived threats, Shaikh Mohammad accentuated, GCC states relied, first and foremost, on diplomacy, including its financial variety. They also pursued dialogue with neighbours, both foe and friend. Finally, GCC leaders entered into enduring strategic relationships with major global and regional powers, to promote stability, the Kuwaiti diplomat affirmed.


Existing strategies


It would indeed be disingenuous not to acknowledge the many initiatives implemented by GCC countries, both individually as well as collectively, though many of these steps were based on voluntary compliance with directives from the great powers. More often than not, especially when they voiced separate questions on matters that affected them, GCC states were ignored, or their contributions pigeonholed into the financial category (where beggars knocked on GCC doors for contributions to boy scouts).


Periodically, agreements were reached on military sales, but the weapons systems in the pipeline tended to be so sophisticated that their transfers etched the deal into the perpetual dependence category.


Equally problematic were GCC states' economic integration mechanisms, best illustrated by perennial difficulties associated with tariff protocols and, more recently, delays in the adoption of a common currency. Last but not least, GCC capitals displayed little or no interest in regulating the presence of millions of expatriate workers, which certainly presented unique demographic hardships.


It is within such a context that Al Nafisi's call is valuable and worthy of open debate. Speaking to a Salafi gathering in Kuwait City a few days ago, Al Nafisi cautioned: "Plans to occupy the oil fields of the Gulf are ready and we should understand that we can achieve the minimum of our national security only within the context of a genuine union of the GCC states". As reported by the Arabic daily Al Anba on May 10, 2010, Al Nafisi quoted a 1992 paper in which the American analyst forecast the survival of three states (Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Oman) on the Arabian Peninsula by 2025. The kingdom and the sultanate would presumably absorb Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, which was unsettling to say the least.


Anticipating the worst, Al Nafisi confirmed that "GCC countries have problems ensuring the minimum of their national security", which is why he proposed the unification option, ostensibly to withstand foreign threats. This analysis perceived what was really at stake — GCC states' very survival — and not the ephemeral stability concern that, according to the forecaster, necessitated an examination of wider strategic issues. In his inimical style, Al Nafisi concluded: "The Gulf countries should put an end to their sterile debate over local and regional issues based on trivial matters. They should be more engaged in the global strategy and better aware of the regional and international conflict".


Beyond Al Nafisi's pleas to abandon isolationist streaks, as well as his hugely controversial calls to only trust "Saudi Arabia because of [existing] common heritage and history", two fundamental questions need answers after a sustained debate.


First, while Omani norms would present no problems for the vast majority of Gulf citizens, will there be an acceptance of Saudi Arabia as a regional leader while the kingdom's social norms differ sharply from those practised elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula? What conditions need to be met to encourage the creation of standards that encourage socio-political tolerance?


Second, and perhaps as crucially, how will GCC states manage their intrinsic security relationships with major powers, especially those within Nato?


(Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.)


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